**Parliamentary Questions as an Intra-Coalition Control Mechanism in Mixed Regimes**

**Online Appendix**

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# Appendix A: Local PQs-Examples

In this section, the full text of two PQs is displayed, including the original German text, an English translation, the topic label PQ, the corresponding CAP code, and the name of the party raising the PQ.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Topic | PQ (original) | PQ (translation) |
| Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties (CAP Topic: 2; Party: Die Linke; City: Dresden) | Titel: CSD-BeflaggungAm letzten Mai-Wochenende findet in Dresden wieder die Parade und das Straßenfest Christopher Street Day (CSD) statt. Der Tag steht für die Gleichberechtigung von Lesben, Schwulen, Trans- und Inter-Personen, für eine offene Gesellschaft und gegen Diskriminierung. Nahezu alle deutschen Großstädte hissen zum CSD vor dem Rathaus die Regenbogenflagge, als Zeichen von Solidarität und Unterstützung der Anliegen der Demonstrantinnen und Demonstranten. Vor diesem Hintergrund bitte ich Sie um die Beantwortung der folgenden Frage: Werden Sie als Zeichen dafür, dass die Stadtspitze für eine offene und tolerante Gesellschaf eintritt, vor dem Rathaus und - da es sich räumlich anbietet - vor dem Kulturpalast in diesem Jahr die Regenbogenflagge hissen?" | *Title: CSD flagging*On the last weekend in May, the parade and street festival Christopher Street Day (CSD) will again take place in Dresden. The day stands for equal rights for lesbians, gays, trans and inter persons, for an open society, and against discrimination. Almost all major German cities raise the rainbow flag in front of the city hall on CSD as a sign of solidarity and support for the concerns of the demonstrators. Against this background, I would like to ask you to answer the following question: Will you raise the rainbow flag in front of the city hall and - since it is suitable - in front of the Kulturpalast this year as a sign that the city leadership stands up for an open and tolerant society?" |
| Education(CAP Topic: 6; Party: SPD; City: Aachen) | *Titel: Gute Schule 2020*Das vor kurzem von der Rot-Grünen Landesregierung vorgestellte Programm "Gute Schule 2020" stellt für die Städte und Gemeinden in NRW in den kommenden vier Jahren insgesamt zwei Milliarden Euro für die Renovierung von Schulen zur Verfügung. Ab 2017 werden vier Jahre lang jeweils 500 Millionen Euro für die Erneuerung und Instandhaltung von Schulgebäuden ausgeschüttet, jedoch sollen die Mittel auch für den digitalen Aufbruch hin zur Schule 4.0 genutzt werden können. Die Infrastruktur der Aachener Schulen im Bereich IT ist zwar bereits gut, dennoch könnte durch das Förderprogramm ein neuer Standard in der Ausstattung unserer Schulen erreicht werden. 1. Wie weit sind der Stadtverwaltung die Richtlinien zur Förderung durch das Programm "Gute Schule 2020" bekannt? 2. Werden bereits Vorbereitungen für die Bewerbung um Fördermittel getroffen und wenn ja, welche Schulen bzw. Projekte sollen berücksichtigt werden? 3. Sofern bereits Projekte bzw. Schulen für das Förderprojekt favorisiert wurden, handelt es sich hierbei ausschließlich um bauliche Maßnahmen oder sind auch Projekte zur Verbesserung der IT in Schulen berücksichtigt worden? 4. Ist im Rahmen dieses Förderprogramms die Realisierung von moderner IT-Ausstattung, 3D-Druck-Labors, virtuellen Realitätsräumen oder ähnlichem, die durch die Aachener Schülerschaft genutzt werden können, angedacht worden?" | Title: Good School 2020The "Good School 2020" program recently unveiled by the red-green state government will make a total of two billion euros available to cities and municipalities in NRW over the next four years for the renovation of schools. Starting in 2017, 500 million euros will be distributed for each of the four years for the renovation and maintenance of school buildings, but it should also be possible to use the funds for the digital departure toward School 4.0. Although the infrastructure of Aachen's schools in the area of IT is already good, the funding program could nevertheless achieve a new standard in the equipment of our schools. 1. To what extent is the city administration aware of the guidelines for funding through the "Good School 2020" program? 2. Are preparations already being made to apply for funding, and if so, which schools or projects are to be considered? 3. If projects or schools have already been favored for the funding project, are these exclusively structural measures, or have projects to improve IT in schools also been considered? 4. Has the realization of modern IT equipment, 3D printing labs, virtual reality rooms or similar, which can be used by the Aachen student body, been considered as part of this funding program?" |

# Appendix B: Overview of the used datasets

## Table B-1: Overview of the cities contained in the dataset

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| City name | State | Legislative period | Coalition parties | Mayor’s party |
| Aachen | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; SPD | CDU |
| Bochum | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | SPD; Greens | SPD |
| Bonn | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; Greens; FDP | SPD (until 2015)CDU (from 2015) |
| Bremerhaven | Bremen | 2015-2019 | SPD; CDU | SPD |
| Chemnitz | Saxony | 2014-2019 | Left Party; SPD; Greens | SPD |
| Dresden | Saxony | 2014-2019 | SPD; Left Party; Greens; Pirate Party | CDU (until 2015)FDP (from 2015) |
| Düsseldorf | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | SPD; Greens; FDP | SPD |
| Duisburg | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | SPD; Greens; FDP | SPD |
| Erfurt | Thuringia | 2014-2019 | SPD; Left Party; Greens | SPD |
| Frankfurt | Hesse | 2011-2016 | CDU; Greens | CDU |
| Hamm | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; SPD | CDU |
| Hannover | Lower Saxony | 2011-2016 | SPD; Greens | SPD |
| Kiel | Schleswig-Holstein | 2013-2018 | SPD; Greens; SSW; Piraten Partei | SPD |
| Köln | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; Greens(Started 2016) | SPD (until 2015)Independent (from 2015) |
| Ludwigshafen | Rhineland-Palatinate | 2014-2019 | SPD; CDU | CDU (until 2017)SPD (from 2017) |
| Mainz | Rhineland-Palatinate | 2014-2019 | SPD; Greens; FDP | SPD |
| Mönchengladbach | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; SPD | CDU |
| München | Bavaria | 2014-2020 | CSU; SPD | SPD |
| Neuss | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; Greens | CDU (until 2015)SPD (from 2015) |
| Potsdam | Brandenburg | 2014-2019 | SPD; CDU/ANW; Greens; Potsdamer Demokraten/ BVB Freie Wähler | SPD |
| Wuppertal | North Rhine-Westphalia | 2014-2020 | CDU; SPD | CDU (until 2015)SPD (from 2015) |

*Notes:* Coalition parties are ordered by number of council seats

## Appendix B-2: Portfolios, CAP Topics, and positional metrics

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ID | City name | Portfolio | Head | Party | CAP | Dimension |
| 1 | Aachen | Wirtschaftsförderung, Soziales und Wohnen | Manfred Sicking | SPD | 3, 5, 13, 15 | lrecon |
| 2 | Aachen | Finanzen und Recht | Annekathrin Grehling | CDU/CSU | 1, 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 3 | Aachen | Bildung, Kultur, Schule, Jugend und Sport | Susanne Schwier | CDU/CSU | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 4 | Bochum | Finanzen, Beteiligungen und Bürgerservice | Manfred Busch | Greens | 1  | lrecon |
| 5 | Bochum | Jugend, Gesundheit und Soziales | Britta Anger | Greens | 3, 5  | spendvtax |
| 6 | Bochum | Kultur, Bildung, Sport und Wissenschaft | Michael Townsend | SPD | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 7 | Bochum | Kultur, Bildung, Sport und Wissenschaft | Dietmar Dieckmann | SPD | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 8 | Bochum | Recht und Ordnung | Sebastian Kopietz | SPD | 2, 9, 12  | civlib\_laworder |
| 9 | Bochum | Bauen, Umwelt, Mobilität | Ernst Kratzsch | SPD | 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 10 | Bonn | Umwelt, Gesundheit, Recht | Ruediger Wagner | FDP | 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 | galtan |
| 11 | Bonn | Kinder, Jugend, Schule, Soziales, Recht, Gesundheit | Ruediger Wagner | FDP | 5, 6, 9, 13,17 | spendvtax |
| 12 | Bonn | Allgemeine Verwaltung und Ordnung | Wolfgang Fuchs | CDU/CSU | 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 13 | Bonn | Finanzen | Ludger Sander | CDU/CSU | 1 | lrecon |
| 14 | Bremerhaven | Finanzen und Recht | Michael Teiser | CDU/CSU | 1, 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 15 | Bremerhaven | Finanzen und Recht | Paul Bödeker | CDU/CSU | 1, 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 16 | Bremerhaven | Gesundheit, Sport und Freizeit | Torsten Neuhoff | CDU/CSU | 3,  | spendvtax |
| 17 | Bremerhaven | Sozales, Arbeit, Jugend | Klaus Rosche | SPD | 5, 13,  | spendvtax |
| 18 | Bremerhaven | Umwelt | Susanne Benöhr-Laqueur | SPD | 4, 7, 8 | environment |
| 19 | Chemnitz | Personal, Finanzen, Organisation | Sven Schulze | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 20 | Chemnitz | Stadtentwicklung und Bau | Michael Stötzer | Greens | 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 21 | Dresden | Personal und Recht | Peter Lames | SPD | 2, 9  | civlib\_laworde |
| 22 | Dresden | Finanzen, Personal und Recht | Peter Lames | SPD | 1, 2, 9  | galtan |
| 23 | Dresden | Stadtentwicklung, Bau, Verkehr | Raoul Schmidt-Lamontain | Greens | 10, 14  | urban\_rural |
| 24 | Dresden | Umwelt und Kommunalwirtschaft | Eva Jähnigen | Greens | 4, 7, 8 | environment |
| 25 | Dresden | Arbeit, Soziales, Gesundheit und Wohnen | Kristin Klaudia Kaufmann | Linke | 3, 5, 13  | spendvtax |
| 26 | Düsseldorf | Planen, Bauen, Wohnen, Mobilität und Grundstückwesen | Cornelia Zuschke | Greens | 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 27 | Düsseldorf | Stadtkämmerer | Dorothée Schneider | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 28 | Düsseldorf | Jugend, Schule und Soziales | Burkhard Hintzsche | SPD | 3, 5, 6, 13, 17 | spendvtax |
| 29 | Duisburg  | Umwelt, Klimaschutz, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz | Ralf Krumpholz | Greens | 3, 4, 7, 8  | environment |
| 30 | Duisburg | Finanzen, Beteiligungen und Europaangelegenheiten (until 15.1.2016) | Peter Langner | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 31 | Duisburg | Finanzen, Beteiligungen und Europaangelegenheiten (from 1.2.2019) | Martin Murrack | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 32 | Duisburg | Familie, Bildung und Kultur | Thomas Kruetzberg | SPD | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 33 | Duisburg | Bildung, Arbeit und Soziales | Astrid Neese | SPD | 5, 6, 13, 17  | spendvtax |
| 34 | Duisburg | Arbeit, Soziales und Sport | Reinhold Spaniel | SPD | 5, 13 | spendvtax |
| 35 | Duisburg | Stadtentwicklung | Carsten Tum | SPD | 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 36 | Duisburg | Stadtentwicklung, Mobilität und Sport | Martin Linne | SPD | 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 37 | Erfurt | Soziales, Bildung und Kultur | Tamara Thierbach | Left | 3, 5, 6, 13, 17 | spendvtax |
| 38 | Erfurt | Soziales, Bildung und Kultur | Anke Hoffman-Domke | Left | 3, 5, 6, 13, 17 | spendvtax |
| 39 | Erfurt | Wirtschaft und Umwelt | Kathrin Hoyer  | Greens | 4, 7, 8, 15 | environment |
| 40 | Erfurt | Umwelt, Kultur und Sport | Kathrin Hoyer  | Greens | 4, 7, 8 | environment |
| 41 | Erfurt | Buergerservice, Sicherheit | Alexander Hilge | SPD | 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 42 | Erfurt | Buergerservice, Sicherheit, Wirtschaft | Steffen Linnert | SPD | 2, 9, 12, 15 | civlib\_laworder |
| 43 | Erfurt | Finanzen und Wirtschaft | Steffen Linnert | SPD | 1, 15 | lrecon |
| 44 | Erfurt | Stadtentwicklung, Bauen und Verkehr | Uwe Spangenberg  | SPD | 10, 14 | urban\_rural |
| 45 | Erfurt | Stadtentwicklung, Bauen und Verkehr | Alexander Hilge | SPD | 10, 14 | urban\_rural |
| 46 | Frankfurt | Planen und Bauen | Olaf Cunitz | Greens | 14 | urban\_rural |
| 47 | Frankfurt | Bildungs- und Frauenderzernat | Jutta Ebeling | Greens | 6 | spendvtax |
| 48 | Frankfurt | Bildungs- und Frauenderzernat | Sarah Sorge | Greens | 6 | spendvtax |
| 49 | Frankfurt | Verkehrsdezernat | Stefan Majer | Greens | 10 | urban\_rural |
| 50 | Frankfurt | Umwelt-, Personal- und Gesundheitsdezernat | Manuela Rottmann | Greens | 3, 4, 7, 8 | environment |
| 51 | Frankfurt | Umwelt-, Personal- und Gesundheitsdezernat | Rosemarie Heilig | Greens | 3, 4, 7, 8 | environment |
| 52 | Frankfurt | Integrationsdezernat | Nargess Eskandari-Gruenberg | Greens | 9 | multiculturalism |
| 53 | Frankfurt | Planen, Bauen, Wohnen und Grundbesitz | Edwin Schwarz | CDU/CSU | 14 | urban\_rural |
| 54 | Frankfurt | Finanz-, Regional- und Kirchendezernat | Uwe Becker | CDU/CSU | 1 | lrecon |
| 55 | Frankfurt | Kultur- und Wissenschaftsdezernat | Felix Semmelroth | CDU/CSU | 17 | spendvtax |
| 56 | Frankfurt | Sozial-, Senioren-, Jugend- und Rechtsdezernat | Daniela Birkenfeld | CDU/CSU | 2, 5, 13 | galtan |
| 57 | Frankfurt | Wirtschafts-, Sport-, Sicherheit- und Feuerwehr | Markus Frank | CDU/CSU | 12, 15 | civlib\_laworder |
| 58 | Hamm | Bezirksangelegenheiten, Ordnung, Recht, Umwelt | Joerg Moesgen | SPD | 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12 | galtan |
| 59 | Hamm | Soziales, Jugend | Thomas Hunsteger-Petermann | CDU/CSU | 3, 5, 13 | spendvtax |
| 60 | Hamm | Finanzen, Beteiligungen, Bildung, Sport, Abfallwirtschaft | Markus Kreuz | CDU/CSU | 1, 6, 17 | lrecon |
| 61 | Hannover | Wirtschafts- und Umweltderzernat | Hans Moenninghoff | Greens | 4, 7, 8, 15 | environment |
| 62 | Hannover | Wirtschafts- und Umweltderzernat | Sabine Tegtmeyer-Dette | Greens | 4, 7, 8, 15 | environment |
| 63 | Hannover | Kultur- und Schuldezernat | Marlis Drevermann | SPD | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 64 | Hannover | Finanz-, Rech- und Ordnungsdezernat | Marc Hansmann | SPD | 1, 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 65 | Kiel | Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt | Peter Todeskino | Greens | 4, 7, 8, 10, 15 | environment |
| 66 | Kiel | Bildung, Jugend und Kreative Stadt | Renate Treutel | Greens | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 67 | Kiel | Soziales, Wohnen, Gesundheit und Sport | Gerwin Stoecken | SPD | 3, 5, 13 | spendvtax |
| 68 | Kiel | Finanzen, Personal, Kultur und Ordnung | Wolfgang Roettgers | SPD | 1, 2, 9, 12 | galtan |
| 69 | Köln | Finanzen und Beteiligungen | Gabriele C. Klug | Greens | 1  | lrecon |
| 70 | Köln | Soziales, Integration und Umwelt | Gabriele C. Klug | Greens | 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13 | galtan |
| 71 | Köln | Soziales, Integration und Umwelt | Harald Rau | Greens | 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13 | galtan |
| 72 | Köln | Allgemeine Verwaltung, Ordnung und Recht | Stephan Keller | CDU/CSU | 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 73 | Ludwigshafen | Kultur, Jugend, Schule und Familie | Cornelia Reifenberg | CDU/CSU | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 74 | Ludwigshafen | Bau, Umwelt, Verkehr und WBL | Klaus Dillinger | CDU/CSU | 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 75 | Ludwigshafen | Finanzen, Ordnung, Feuerwehr, Immobilien und Bürgerdienste | Dieter Feid  | SPD | 1, 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 76 | Ludwigshafen | Finanzen, Ordnung, Feuerwehr, Immobilien und Bürgerdienste | Andreas Schwarz | SPD | 1, 2, 9, 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 77 | Ludwigshafen | Soziales, Integration und Sport | Wolfgang van Vliet | SPD | 3, 5, 9, 13 | spendvtax |
| 78 | Ludwigshafen | Soziales, Integration und Sport | Beate Steeg | SPD | 3, 5, 9, 13 | spendvtax |
| 79 | Mainz | Finanzen, Beteiligungen und Sport | Guenter Beck | Greens | 1,  | lrecon |
| 80 | Mainz | Wirtschaft, Stadtentwicklung, Liegenschaften und Ordnungswesen | Christopher Sitte | FDP | 2, 9, 12, 14, 15,  | civlib\_laworder |
| 81 | Mainz | Umwelt, Grün, Energie und Verkehr | Katrin Eder | Greens | 4, 7, 8, 10 | environment |
| 82 | Mainz | Soziales, Kinder, Jugend, Schule und Gesundheit | Kurt Merkator | SPD | 3, 5, 6, 13, 17 | spendvtax |
| 83 | Mainz | Soziales, Kinder, Jugend, Schule und Gesundheit | Eckart Lensch | SPD | 3, 5, 6, 13, 17 | spendvtax |
| 84 | Mönchengladbach | Allgemeine Verwaltung, Buergerservice, Ordnung und Feuerwehr | Hans-Juergen Schnass | SPD | 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 85 | Mönchengladbach | Allgemeine Verwaltung, Buergerservice, Ordnung und Feuerwehr | Matthias Engel | SPD | 12 | civlib\_laworder |
| 86 | Mönchengladbach | Recht, Soziales, Jugend, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz | Dörte Schall | SPD | 2, 3, 5, 9 | galtan |
| 87 | Mönchengladbach | Planung und Bauen | Gregor Bonin | CDU/CSU | 10, 14, 15 | urban\_rural |
| 88 | Mönchengladbach | Bildung, Kultur und Sport | Gert Fischer | CDU/CSU | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 89 | Mönchengladbach | Finanzen und Beteiligung | Michael Heck | CDU/CSU | 1 | lrecon |
| 90 | München | Baureferat | Rosemarie Hingerl | SPD | 10 | urban\_rural |
| 91 | München | Kreisverwaltungsreferat  | Thomas Böhle | SPD | 2, 9 | civlib\_laworder |
| 92 | München | Stadtplanung und Bauordnung | Elisabeth Merk | SPD | 14 | urban\_rural |
| 93 | München | Bildung und Sport | Rainer Schweppe | SPD | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 94 | München | Bildung und Sport | Beatrix Zurek | SPD | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 95 | München | Sozialreferat | Brigitte Meier | SPD | 13 | spendvtax |
| 96 | München | Sozialreferat | Dorothee Schiwy | SPD | 13 | spendvtax |
| 97 | München | Stadtkaemmerei | Ernst Wolowicz | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 98 | München | Stadtkaemmerei | Christoph Frey | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 99 | München | Arbeit und Wirtschaft | Josef Schmid | CDU/CSU | 5, 15 | lrecon |
| 100 | München | Arbeit und Wirtschaft | Clemens Baumgärtner | CDU/CSU | 5, 15 | lrecon |
| 101 | Neuss | Umwelt, Sport und Brandschutz | Matthias Welpmann | Greens | 4, 7, 8 | environment |
| 102 | Neuss | Wirtschaftsfoerderung, Finanzen und Liegenschaften | Frank Gensler | CDU/CSU | 1, 15 | lrecon |
| 103 | Neuss | Jugend und Soziales, Ordnung und Rettungswesen | Stefan Hahn | CDU/CSU | 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13  | galtan |
| 104 | Neuss | Jugend und Ordnung | Ralf Hörsken | CDU/CSU | 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13 | galtan |
| 105 | Potsdam | Bildung, Kultur und Sport | Iris Jana Magdowski | CDU/CSU | 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 106 | Potsdam | Stadtentwicklung, Bauen und Umwelt | Matthias Klipp | Greens | 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15 | environment |
| 107 | Potsdam | Zentrale Steuerung und Finanzen | Burkhard Exner | SPD | 1 | lrecon |
| 108 | Potsdam | Soziales, Jugend, Gesundheit und Ordnung | Mike Schubert | SPD | 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13 | galtan |
| 109 | Wuppertal | Stadtentwicklung, Bauen, Verkehr, Umwelt | Frank Meyer | SPD | 4, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15 | environment |
| 110 | Wuppertal | Soziales, Jugend, Schule | Stefan Kühn | SPD | 5, 6, 17 | spendvtax |
| 111 | Wuppertal | Finanzen und zentrale Dienstleistungen | Johannes Slawig | CDU/CSU | 1 | lrecon |
| 112 | Wuppertal | Kultur, Bildung und Sport, Sicherheit und Ordnung | Matthias Nocke | CDU/CSU | 2, 3, 9, 12 | galtan |

## Appendix B-3: Overview issue salience per topic using the measure created by ANONYMIZED FOR REVIEW

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## Appendix B-4: Overview of which policy areas are proportionally controlled by each type of portfolio holder

Overview of the total number and share of portfolios per policy area and portfolio holder type

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Coalition party**  | **No coalition party**  | **Independent**  |  |
| **Policy Area** | **n** | **Proportion total** | **n** | **Proportion total** | **n** | **Proportion total** | **Total** |
| **Macroeconomic Issues** | 25 | 69 % | 5 | 14 % | 6 | 17 % | 36 |
| **Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil Liberties** | 23 | 54 % | 7 | 19 % | 6 | 17 % | 36 |
| **Health** | 24 | 73 % | 3 | 9 % | 6 | 18 % | 33 |
| **Agriculture** | 20 | 57 % | 4 | 11 % | 11 | 31 % | 35 |
| **Labor & Employment** | 26 | 72 % | 2 | 6 % | 8 | 22 % | 36 |
| **Education & Culture** | 22 | 61 % | 6 | 17 % | 8 | 22 % | 36 |
| **Environment** | 20 | 57 % | 4 | 11 % | 11 | 31 % | 35 |
| **Energy** | 20 | 57 % | 4 | 11 % | 11 | 31 % | 35 |
| **Migration** | 23 | 66 % | 7 | 20 % | 5 | 14 % | 35 |
| **Transportation** | 16 | 43 % | 3 | 8 % | 18 | 49 % | 37 |
| **Law, Crime, & Family** **Issues** | 22 | 65 % | 8 | 24 % | 4 | 12 % | 34 |
| **Social Welfare** | 25 | 71 % | 2 | 6 % | 8 | 23 % | 35 |
| **Community** **Development** | 17 | 43 % | 4 | 10 % | 19 | 48 % | 40 |
| **Domestic Commerce & Banking** | 22 | 58 % | 4 | 11 % | 12 | 32 % | 38 |
| **Science, Technology, & Communication** | 21 | 60 % | 6 | 17 % | 8 | 23 % | 35 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# Appendix C

In this section, additional models are used as robustness checks for the models used in the main text. In each subsection, I explain why the particular robustness check was conducted, what variables I used for the particular model, and discuss the results and implications for the main models used in the main text.

## Appendix C-1

## Robustness check: Measuring the mayoral effect by focusing on whether the party asking a PQ is affiliated with the mayor instead of whether the mayor's party holds a portfolio

An alternative operationalization of the variable of how having a HoE affiliated with one of the coalition parties affects the intra-coalition control dynamics is presented. Rather than measuring this effect by checking whether the portfolio to which a PQ is directed comes from a party affiliated with the mayor, the robustness check models capture the mayoral effect by checking whether a party aligned with the mayor generally addresses fewer questions to portfolios held by a coalition partner.

Explaining the number and share of PQs used to control the coalition partner.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Variables | Model A (with Mayor) |
| Log-Mean | IRR |
| *Hypothesis 1:* |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological distance | 0.403\*(0.18)0.175\*(0.08) | 1.50 |
|  |  |  |
| *Hypothesis 2:* | 1.19 |
| Issue salience |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *Hypothesis 3 (alternative operationalization):* |  |  |  |  |
| Mayor from asking party | -1.173\*\*\*(0.33) | 0.31 |
|  |  |  |
| *Controls:* |  |  |  |  |
| Seats in council (log) | 0.949\*\*\*(0.26)0.834\*\*\*(0.1)0.687(0.44)0.271(0.35)0.001(0.2)-2.615\*\*(0.83) | 2.58 |
|  |  |  |
| Total no. of PQs to portfolio (in 100) | 2.33 |
|  |  |  |
| Multiparty | 1.99 |
|  |  |  |
| Same coalition partner | 1.31 |
|  |  |  |
| Duration portfolio (in 100) | 1.00 |
|  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.07 |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 16521532.55-389 |  |  |
| Ncity |  |  |
| Nparty:City |  |  |
| Dispersion parameter |  |  |
| Log Likelihood |  |  |
| *Notes:* Multi-level negative binomial regression models with random intercepts (parties are nested in cities). Dependent variable: total number of PQs per portfolio asked by a coalition party in local city councils. Standard errors of Log-Mean coefficients are in parentheses. IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. Total no. of PQs to a portfolio and the duration of a portfolio are measured in increments of 100. Significance levels: \**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001. |

The results show that parties affiliated with the mayor direct significantly fewer PQs to portfolios held by the coalition partner. The ideological distance between the party asking a PQ and the party holding the respective PQ is also a significant driver of intra-coalition control in these models. Thus, the models using this alternative operationalization back the findings of the main analysis.

## Appendix C-2

## Robustness check: Interaction-effect between ideological distance and issue salience

The analysis in the main paper focuses on the effects of ideological distance and issue salience as possible drivers for intra-coalition control behavior. The results show that both are device factors explaining the number of PQs a coalition party addresses to a portfolio held by a coalition partner. In this section, I use an interaction effect of both variables to test whether the coalition partners control especially the portfolios that are highly salient for them and where they are ideologically far apart from the coalition partner holding the portfolio, as found by Höhmann and Sieberer (2020).

Explaining the number and share of PQs used to control the coalition partner (including the interaction term between ideological distance and issue salience).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | Model A (without Mayor) | Model B (with Mayor) |
| Log-Mean | IRR | Log-Mean | IRR |
| *Hypothesis 1:* |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological distance | 0.508\*\* | 1.66 | 0.401\* | 1.5 |
|  | (0.19) |  | (0.19) |  |
| *Hypothesis 2:* |  |  |  |  |
| Issue salience | 0.218 | 1.24 | 0.155 | 1.17 |
|  | (0.14) |  | (0.15) |  |
| *Hypothesis 3:* |  |  |  |  |
| Mayor from asked portfolio party |  |  | 0.504\* | 1.66 |
|  |  |  | (0.25) |  |
| *Robustness check variable:* |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological distance \* Issue salience | -0.03 | 0.97 | 0.014 | 1.01 |
|  | (0.14) |  | (0.15) |  |
| *Controls:* |  |  |  |  |
| Issue salience |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Seats in council (log) | 0.481 | 1.62 | 0.636\* | 1.89 |
|  | (0.27) |  | (0.26) |  |
| Total no. of PQs to portfolio (in 100) | 0.837\*\*\* | 2.31 | 0.889\*\*\* | 2.44 |
|  | (0.1) |  | (0.11) |  |
| Multiparty | 0.475 | 1.61 | 0.589 | 1.8 |
|  | (0.45) |  | (0.44) |  |
| Same coalition partner | 0.188 | 1.21 | 0.098 | 1.1 |
|  | (0.36) |  | (0.35) |  |
| Duration portfolio (in 100) | 0.003 | 1 | 0.003 | 1 |
|  | (0.02) |  | (0.02) |  |
| Intercept | -1.753 | 0.17 | -2.322\*\* | 0.1 |
|  | (0.91) |  | (0.87) |  |
| Observations | 165 |  | 165 |  |
| Ncity | 21 |  | 21 |  |
| Nparty:City | 53 |  | 53 |  |
| Dispersion parameter | 2.53 |  | 2.17 |  |
| Log Likelihood | -394 |  | -392 |  |
| *Notes:* Multi-level negative binomial regression models with nested random intercepts (parties are nested in cities). Dependent variable: total number of PQs per portfolio asked by a coalition party in local city councils. Standard errors of Log-Mean coefficients are in parentheses. IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. Total no. of PQs to a portfolio and the duration of a portfolio are measured in increments of 100. Significance levels: \**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001. |

The results for the models including an interaction effect between ideological distance and issue salience show no significant effect for the interaction term. Thus, I find no empirical support that parties are more incentivized to control a coalition party’s portfolio if the ideological positions of both parties are further apart and the policy area under the jurisdiction of a portfolio is highly relevant for the controlling party.

## Appendix C-3

## Robustness check: Interaction-effect between ideological distance and the mayor’s party holding the portfolio

In my third hypothesis, I argue that all portfolios held by the party affiliated with the mayor receive more control PQs. In this section, I test the robustness of this hypothesis and use an interaction term between ideological distance and the mayor from asked portfolio variables to test whether a coalition party not affiliated with the mayor is more incentivized to control a portfolio held by the party affiliated with the mayor when the policy positions of the two parties in the policy areas under the portfolio’s jurisdiction are more distant from each other. Thus, coalition parties should have high incentives to control the portfolios of the party affiliated with the mayor more strictly due to information asymmetries resulting from the fact that the mayor’s party has more information and the costs of potential policy drift due to the large policy distance between the two parties.

Explaining the number and share of PQs used to control the coalition partner (including the interaction term between ideological distance and mayor from asked portfolio).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variables |  Model A (with Mayor) |  |
| Log-Mean | IRR |  |  |
| *Hypothesis 1:* |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological distance | 0.409 | 1.5 |  |  |
|  | (0.252) |  |  |  |
| *Hypothesis 2:* |  |  |  |  |
| Issue salience | 0.166 | 1.66 |  |  |
|  | (0.09) |  |  |  |
| *Hypothesis 3:* |  |  |  |  |
| Mayor from asked portfolio party | 0.507 | 1.66 |  |  |
|  | (0.5) |  |  |  |
| *Robustness check variable:* |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological distance \* Mayor from asked portfolio party | -0.005 | 0.99 |  |  |
|  | (0.37) |  |  |  |
| *Controls:* |  |  |  |  |
| Seats in council (log) | 0.633\* | 1.88 |  |  |
|  | (0.26) |  |  |  |
| Total no. of PQs to portfolio (in 100) | 0.891\*\*\* | 2.44 |  |  |
|  | (0.11) |  |  |  |
| Multiparty | 0.585 | 1.8 |  |  |
|  | (0.45) |  |  |  |
| Same coalition partner | 0.1 | 1.1 |  |  |
|  | (0.35) |  |  |  |
| Duration portfolio (in 100) | 0.003 | 1 |  |  |
|  | (0.02) |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -2.313\* | 0.1 |  |  |
|  | (0.94) |  |  |  |
| Observations | 165 |  |  |  |
| Ncity | 21 |  |  |  |
| Nparty:City | 53 |  |  |  |
| Dispersion parameter | 2.18 |  |  |  |
| Log Likelihood | -392 |  |  |  |
| *Notes:* Multi-level negative binomial regression models with nested random intercepts (parties are nested in cities). Dependent variable: total number of PQs per portfolio asked by a coalition party in local city councils. Standard errors of Log-Mean coefficients are in parentheses. IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. Total no. of PQs to a portfolio and the duration of a portfolio are measured in increments of 100. Significance levels: \**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001. |

The results for the models that include the interaction term between ideological distance and whether the portfolio is held by the mayor’s party show no significant effect for the interaction term. Thus, I find no empirical support that coalition parties have a special incentive to control portfolios held by the mayor’s party more the greater the ideological distance between the two parties. Thus, this robustness check supports the third hypothesis and the findings in the main text that the portfolios held by the mayor’s party are generally more controlled because the mayor’s party has more information than the coalition partners.

## Appendix C-4

## Robustness check: Models including a measure of portfolio prestige

Portfolios differ in their prestige. According to Raabe and Linhart (2014), some portfolios are relatively more important for parties than others. A portfolio may be more prestigious because it has a high public standing, or because a portfolio offers broad legislative influence and, is therefore important to a for policy reasons (Raabe and Linhart, 2014). Thus, how prestigious a portfolio is may also affect how intensely parties control a portfolio. In the models in the main paper, this aspect is modeled to some extent by the control variable *Total no. of PQs to portfolio*, as the variable takes into account the total number of PQs addressed to a portfolio. However, the variable itself is not a direct measure of prestige.

Since it could be the case that the coalition parties affiliated with the mayor are more likely to hold portfolios that are highly prestigious, and this in turn could affect the results in the main text models, especially for the third hypothesis, I test in this section whether the results in the main text are robust to the inclusion of a genuine portfolio prestige measure.

Raabe and Linhart (2014) created a prestige measure for portfolios at the German state level using a survey that asked party leaders to rate all ministries according to their prestige relative to the prime minister of the state. They collected data on 18 portfolios: Finance, Education, Interior, Construction, Transportation, Economy, Labor, Energy, Science, Family, Culture, Social, Research, Environment, Health, Agriculture, Federal/European, and Justice. Furthermore, the authors note that their findings for the German state level are very similar to those for the German national level, with two exceptions. The exceptions are that education is rated higher at the state level and justice is rated higher at the national level. The authors plausibly argue that these findings are due to differences in responsibilities between the national and state levels. In the policy area of education, the German state governments have far-reaching powers and can make more autonomous decisions, while in the policy area of justice, the division of powers is reversed, and the state governments are less powerful in this policy area.

Since Raabe and Linhart’s (2014) results show that portfolio prestige is relatively consistent across political levels in Germany, I use the two researchers’ prestige ratings as a starting point to create a local-level measure of portfolio prestige. To do this, I map the 18 ministry ratings from Raabe and Linhart (2014) onto the CAP topic coding scheme (see Table A), which I use to determine which PQs are addressed to which portfolio based on the portfolio’s jurisdiction (see main text section “Data and methods.” I use this mapping to create the prestige value of a local portfolio based on the average prestige value of all policy areas under its jurisdiction. For example, to calculate the prestige value of a ministry responsible for the CAP policy area of environment, agriculture, and energy, I sum the three respective prestige values from Raabe and Linhart (2014) (Environment = 68, Agriculture = 66, Energy = 73) and divide the sum by three. Thus, the prestige of this portfolio would be 69.

Table A. Overview mapping portfolio prestige to CAP topics and local decision leeway.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Portfolio | Prestige Rating | CAP Topic | Local decision leeway |
| Finance | 92 | Macroeconomic Issues | 3 |
| Education | 82 | Education & Culture | 2 |
| Interior | 78 | Migration; Law, Crime & Family Issues | 1 |
| Construction | 77 | Community Development | 3 |
| Transport | 76 | Transportation | 2 |
| Economy | 76 | Domestic Commerce & Banking | 2 |
| Labor | 73 | Labor and Employment | 1 |
| Energy | 73 | Energy | 1 |
| Science | 72 | Science, Technology, & Communication | 1 |
| Family | 71 | Crime and Family Issues | 2 |
| Culture | 70 | Education & Culture | 3 |
| Social | 70 | Social Welfare | 2 |
| Research | 70 | Science, Technology, & Communication | 1 |
| Environment | 68 | Environment | 2 |
| Health | 67 | Health | 2 |
| Agriculture | 66 | Agriculture | 2 |
| Federal/Europe | 66 | Not matched | Not matched |
| Justice | 58 | Civil Rights, Minority Issues, & Civil Liberties | 1 |
| Notes: Colum Prestige Ratings are mean ratings per ministry from Raabe and Linhart (2014 1072). The higher the number in column Local decision leeway the freer to make their own decisions are local politicians in a policy area (1 = directive task, 2 = mandatory task, 3 = voluntary task). |

The two authors also found that prestige is affected by the leeway that governments at their respective political levels have to make decisions in a particular policy area. The leeway that local politicians in Germany have depends on whether the task is a so-called voluntary task (Freiwillige Aufgabe), a so-called mandatory task (Pflichtaufgabe), or a so-called directive task (Weisungsaufgabe) (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, 2023; Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, 2023).

In the case of voluntary tasks, local politicians can decide whether and how to carry out a task. Voluntary tasks include decisions on cultural issues, sports, parks, or urban planning. Mandatory tasks are tasks that local politicians must carry out, but they are free to decide how to carry out a task given to them by higher levels. Examples of mandatory tasks include sewage, transportation, welfare state issues, and schools and kindergartens. Directive tasks are tasks that local politicians have to implement without having any leeway in how they want to do it. These tasks are mainly administrative. For example, organizing the issuance of ID cards to citizens or civil protection and police duties.

Overall, voluntary tasks give local politicians the most leeway to make their own decisions and the opportunity to show their constituents that they care about their interests. For each of the prestige policy areas, I added a code that captures whether the policy area is a directed, mandatory, or voluntary task (see Table A). In the same way that I created the prestige score earlier, I created a proxy that captures the leeway that local politicians have to make decisions in the policy areas under a portfolio’s jurisdiction in the same way that I created the prestige value by calculating the average decision leeway score based on the policy issues under a portfolio’s jurisdiction.

To obtain a local prestige score for each portfolio, I weighted the created prestige measures with the measure that captures how much leeway local politicians have to make decisions in the policy areas under a portfolio’s authority. I do this to account for differences in authority between the local level in Germany and the state level in the prestige measure. I use this newly created local-level prestige measure to test the robustness of the models in the main text. In these models, I use all the variables from the main models plus the prestige measure.

Explaining the number and share of PQs used to control the coalition partner (including prestige of a portfolio).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | Model A (without Mayor) | Model B (with Mayor) |
| Log-Mean | IRR | Log-Mean | IRR |
| *Hypothesis 1:* |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological distance | 0.472\* | 1.6 | 0.386\* | 1.47 |
|  | (0.19) |  | (0.19) |  |
| *Hypothesis 2:* |  |  |  |  |
| Issue salience | 0.208\*\* | 1.23 | 0.177\* | 1.19 |
|  | (0.08) |  | (0.08) |  |
| *Hypothesis 3:* |  |  |  |  |
| Mayor from asked portfolio party |  |  | 0.477+ | 1.61 |
|  |  |  | (0.25) |  |
| *Robustness check variable:* |  |  |  |  |
| Prestige | -0.001 | 1 | -0.001 | 1 |
|  | (0.001) |  | (0.001) |  |
| *Controls:* |  |  |  |  |
| Issue salience |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Seats in council (log) | 0.461 | 1.59 | 0.603\* | 1.83 |
|  | (0.27) |  | (0.25) |  |
| Total no. of PQs to portfolio (in 100) | 0.809\*\*\* | 2.25 | 0.864\*\*\* | 2.37 |
|  | (0.1) |  | (0.11) |  |
| Multiparty | 0.485 | 1.62 | 0.579 | 1.78 |
|  | (0.45) |  | (0.44) |  |
| Same coalition partner | 0.188 | 1.21 | 0.103 | 1.11 |
|  | (0.36) |  | (0.35) |  |
| Duration portfolio (in 100) | 0.005 | 1.01 | 0.005 | 1 |
|  | (0.01) |  | (0.02) |  |
| Intercept | -1.535 | 0.22 | -2.079\*\* | 0.13 |
|  | (0.93) |  | (0.91) |  |
| Observations | 165 |  | 165 |  |
| Ncity | 21 |  | 21 |  |
| Nparty:City | 53 |  | 53 |  |
| Dispersion parameter | 2.72 |  | 2.36 |  |
| Log Likelihood | -394 |  | -392 |  |
| *Notes:* Multi-level negative binomial regression models with nested random intercepts (parties are nested in cities). Dependent variable: total number of PQs per portfolio asked by a coalition party in local city councils. Standard errors of Log-Mean coefficients are in parentheses. IRR = Incidence Rate Ratio. Total no. of PQs to a portfolio and the duration of a portfolio are measured in increments of 100. Significance levels: + *p*<0.1; \**p*<0.05; \*\**p*<0.01; \*\*\**p*<0.001. |

The results show no significant effect of the prestige measure. In addition, the results of the ideological distance and issue salience variables are positively significant as in the main models. The variable “mayor from asked portfolio” party is also positive but only significant at the 10 percent level. Overall, the results of the robustness check do not suggest that the models in the main text are biased by the fact that governing parties affiliated with the mayor might more likely to hold portfolios that are highly prestigious and thus more likely to receive more PQs.

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