**Appendix A.** Descriptive statistics and figures.

A1. Descriptive statistics, all variables.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Standard Deviation | Range | Minimum | Maximum | Count |
| Presidential popularity | 45,12 | 16,46 | 91,10 | 2,90 | 94,00 | 1054 |
| Presidential powers (Siaroff) | 6,02 | 2,03 | 6,00 | 2,00 | 8,00 | 1054 |
| Presidential powers (Doyle & Elgie) | 0,33 | 0,13 | 0,52 | 0,05 | 0,57 | 1054 |
| Honeymoon | 0,07 | 0,25 | 1,00 | 0,00 | 1,00 | 1054 |
| End of term | 0,07 | 0,25 | 1,00 | 0,00 | 1,00 | 1054 |
| Corruption | 51,95 | 18,34 | 96,5 | 3,50 | 100,00 | 1054 |
| GDP pc growth | 2,50 | 3,09 | 21,83 | -11,85 | 9,97 | 1054 |
| Unemployment | 7,83 | 3,77 | 17,68 | 2,24 | 19,92 | 1054 |


A2. Descriptive statistics, presidential popularity ratings.


|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Standard Deviation | Range | Minimum | Maximum | Count |
| Argentina | 46,95 | 11,65 | 44,28 | 23,48 | 67,76 | 75 |
| Brazil | 41,57 | 18,05 | 68,03 | 8,03 | 76,05 | 80 |
| Chile | 44,33 | 11,24 | 47,21 | 22,89 | 70,10 | 78 |
| Costa Rica | 37,27 | 9,69 | 36,57 | 19,25 | 55,82 | 77 |
| Korea | 44,08 | 10,98 | 55,13 | 25,33 | 80,46 | 73 |
| Panama | 47,43 | 13,63 | 68,04 | 20,40 | 88,44 | 80 |
| United states | 45,38 | 8,03 | 42,78 | 29,17 | 71,96 | 78 |
| Uruguay | 51,55 | 13,54 | 57,13 | 24,15 | 81,28 | 76 |
| Finland | 84,65 | 7,24 | 32,00 | 62,00 | 94,00 | 36 |
| Czech Republic | 41,25 | 5,17 | 18,08 | 32,15 | 50,23 | 20 |
| Bulgaria | 48,99 | 11,26 | 42,99 | 27,78 | 70,77 | 74 |
| Poland | 49,64 | 12,19 | 44,38 | 25,96 | 70,34 | 78 |
| Portugal | 57,13 | 13,28 | 50,28 | 32,31 | 82,59 | 75 |
| France | 34,77 | 12,64 | 45,57 | 11,47 | 57,04 | 77 |
| Peru | 21,17 | 11,11 | 37,86 | 2,79 | 40,65 | 77 |


A3. Presidential popularity ratings in each country, quarterly data.


Kuva, joka sisältää kohteen teksti, diagrammi, käsiala, viiva

Kuvaus luotu automaattisestiKuva, joka sisältää kohteen teksti, diagrammi, käsiala, viiva

Kuvaus luotu automaattisesti



**Notes:** Gaps refer to missing data points (Finland) and dots refer to a time period not included in the analysis (Czech Republic).

A4. Presidential popularity ratings in presidential and semi-presidential regimes, annual values. Adjustments with Finland, France and Peru excluded.

**Appendix B.** Robustness checks.

B1. Siaroff’s presidential power scores replaced with power scores by Doyle and Elgie.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent: level of presidential popularity | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Corruption (control) | 0.032 | 0.040 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.037) |
| Presidential powers | -0.629\*\*\* | -0.739\*\*\* | -0.637\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.092) | (0.043) |
| Unemployment | -0.067\* | 0.035 | -0.064\* |
|  | (0.029) | (0.069) | (0.029) |
| GDP pc growth | 0.255\*\*\* | 0.050 | 0.261\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.079) | (0.029) |
| Honeymoon | 0.074\*\*\* | 0.076\*\*\* | -0.043 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.039) |
| End of term | 0.009 | 0.010 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.038) |
| *Interactions:* |  |  |  |
| Presidential powers x unemployment |  | -0.229 |  |
|  |  | (0.146) |  |
| Presidential powers x GDP pc growth |  | 0.325\* |  |
|  |  | (0.133) |  |
| Presidential powers x honeymoon |  |  | 0.220\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.067) |
| Presidential powers x end of term |  |  | 0.073 |
|  |  |  | (0.067) |
| *Country dummies* | *Included* | *Included* | *Included* |
| Constant | 0.763\*\*\* | 0.847\*\*\* | 0.768\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.048) | (0.026) |
| Observations | 1 054 | 1 054 | 1 054 |
| R2 | 0.517 | 0.521 | 0.523 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.508 | 0.512 | 0.513 |

**Notes:** \*\*\*p <0.001; \*\*p <0.01; \*p <0.05. All variables are standardized between 0 and 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

B2. OLS regression models without country dummies.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent: level of presidential popularity | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Corruption (control) | -0.232\*\*\* | -0.203\*\*\* | -0.234\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.027) |
| Presidential powers | -0.158\*\*\* | -0.546\*\*\* | -0.168\*\*\* |
|  | (0.016) | (0.080) | (0.016) |
| Unemployment | 0.080\*\* | 0.067 | 0.081\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.047) | (0.025) |
| GDP pc growth | 0.193\*\*\* | -0.209\*\*\* | 0.199\*\*\* |
|  | (0.037) | (0.086) | (0.037) |
| Honeymoon | 0.050\* | 0.054\*\* | -0.074 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.048) |
| End of term | 0.011 | 0.010 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.052) |
| *Interactions:* |  |  |  |
| Presidential powers x unemployment |  | 0.055 |  |
|  |  | (0.073) |  |
| Presidential powers x GDP pc growth |  | 0.559\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.107) |  |
| Presidential powers x honeymoon |  |  | 0.178\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.062) |
| Presidential powers x end of term |  |  | -0.001 |
|  |  |  | (0.066) |
| *Country dummies* | *Not included* | *Not included* | *Not included* |
| Constant | 0.529\*\*\* | 0.788\*\*\* | 0.532\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.059) | (0.031) |
| Observations | 1 054 | 1 054 | 1 054 |
| R2 | 0.204 | 0.225 | 0.211 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.200 | 0.219 | 0.205 |

**Notes:** \*\*\*p <0.001; \*\*p <0.01; \*p <0.05. All variables are standardized between 0 and 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

B3. Fixed effects regression with a lagged dependent variable.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent variable: presidential popularity (lagged) | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Corruption (control) | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
|  | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.037) |
| Presidential powers | -0.400\*\*\* | -0.258\*\*\* | -0.401\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.065) | (0.030) |
| Unemployment | -0.068\* | 0.116\*\* | -0.067\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.042) | (0.030) |
| GDP pc growth | 0.212\*\*\* | 0.146\* | 0.214\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.062) | (0.030) |
| Honeymoon | -0.033\* | -0.032\* | -0.078\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.037) |
| End of term | -0.021 | -0.020 | -0.007 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.044) |
| *Interactions:* |  |  |  |
| Presidential powers x unemployment |  | -0.402\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.071) |  |
| Presidential powers x GDP pc growth |  | 0.044 |  |
|  |  | (0.082) |  |
| Presidential powers x honeymoon |  |  | 0.064 |
|  |  |  | (0.051) |
| Presidential powers x end of term |  |  | -0.019 |
|  |  |  | (0.057) |
| *Country dummies* | *Included* | *Included* | *Included* |
| Constant | 0.790\*\*\* | 0.763\*\*\* | 0.790\*\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.043) | (0.027) |
| Observations | 1 054 | 1 054 | 1 054 |
| R2 | 0.497 | 0.513 | 0.498 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.488 | 0.503 | 0.488 |

**Notes:** \*\*\*p <0.001; \*\*p <0.01; \*p <0.05. All variables are standardized between 0 and 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.