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References

A.1 Intra-party conflict perceptions and the vote

The intuition that voters punish a political party when they perceive it to be disunited is common wisdom and (implicitly) assumed in many academic analyses as well. Nonetheless, explicit empirical tests have been scarce so far (but see Barrett, 2018; Greene and Haber, 2015; Lehrer *et al.*, 2022).

Table A.1.1 reports the results from analyzing two different dependent variables related to the consequences of party conflict perceptions. We use here again the *Politbarometer* surveys. First, we look at the voting intention which is modelled as an unordered discrete choice problem using conditional logistic regression in models A1.1.1-A1.1.4 of Table A.1.1. Here, the set of discrete alternatives consists of all the major parties a voter could potentially choose in an election (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP Greens, Left, AfD). Possible alternative choices like not voting or voting for a minor party are not taken into account. Effectively, we thus only model the effect of conflict perceptions on all respondents who would attend an election and vote for one of the main parties. Second, we analyze the scores that voters assigned to the individual parties on the 11-point scale feeling thermometer scale, ranging from "strongly dislike" and "strongly like". Given the quasi-matric nature of the latter variable, we apply OLS-regression models (Model A.1.1.5).

Referring to the main theoretical perspectives in the literature on voting behavior, we include a number of variables to see whether the effect of conflict perceptions on voters' evaluation of parties is robust or merely a result of omitted-variable bias. According to the micro-sociological approach, the members of a group exert social pressure on the individual which will then vote in congruence with group norms (Lazarsfeld *et al.*, 1944). Supplementing this, the macro-sociological approach argues that social groups form stable alliances with political parties on the same side of a societal cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The former constitute the core clientele of the latter. Taking both sociological arguments together, we

expect that members of social groups will vote for the respective allied party. In accordance with the literature on German voting behavior (see Debus, 2007: 270–271 for an overview), we identified respondents who belong to four social groups: Respondents who indicate that they go to church once or more per week should be more likely to vote for CDU/CSU. Members of a union belong to the core clientele of the SPD. Self-employed people are more likely to vote for the FDP. Respondents with a high degree of education (Abitur or higher) represent the core clientele of the Greens (Debus, 2007: 278). To capture parts of the support for the Alternative for Germany, we include a variable that reflects anti-establishment sentiment. It is based on the feeling thermometer indices asking respondents to rate parties on an 11-point scale between "strongly dislike" and "strongly like". For each respondent we identify the highest value/support that she gives to any of the established parties (i.e. CDU/CSU, FDP, Greens, SPD, The Left). The lower the maximum support a respondent give to any of these parties, the more likely it is that the respective respondent votes for the right-wing populist AfD.

We additionally include the measure of party identification that we already used in the main text in order to incorporate social-psychological theory (Campbell *et al.*, 1960). Respondents should be more likely to vote for the party they lean towards. Proximity theory (Downs, 1957) is another highly influential approach to modeling voting behavior. The theory suggests that a voter will vote for the party closest to her in an ideological space. Only very few of the *Politbarometer* survey waves (from March 2002) allow us to operationalize this notion as they contain the left-right placement of respondents for themselves and for the parties – as well as questions concerning perceived disunity. Last, we include party dummies in the analysis of the feeling thermometers (Model A1.1.5).

	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	A.1.1.1	A.1.1.2	A.1.1.3	A.1.1.4	A.1.1.5
Conflict	-0.91***	-0.90***	-0.94***	-0.76***	-1.26***
Conflict perception	-0.91*** (0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.05)
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.03)
Preferred party	3.23***	3.26***	3.15***	3.16***	2.28***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.04)
Disunity X Preferred			0.22*	-0.27***	0.39***
party			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Union member - SPD		0.11	0.11	0.74**	0.19***
		(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Churchgoer - CDU/CSU		1.28***	1.29***	1.34**	0.26***
U		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.03)
Self-employed - FDP		-0.04	-0.05	-11.96**	0.28***
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(1.07)	(0.06)
Highly educated - Greens		0.15	0.15	-0.29	0.62***
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.04)
Anti-establishment - AfD		0.02	0.02		0.02
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)
Left-Right distance				-0.31***	
				(0.04)	
Party dummy variables					\checkmark
included					
N	141,946	73,000	73,000	3,189	118,070
R2		,	,	-,,	0.254
pseudo R^2	0.491	0.533	0.533	0.527	

Table A.1.1: Determinants of vote intention and party evaluations

Notes: In the first four models the dependent variable reflects vote intention (grouped for respondents). In the fifth model the dependent variable reflects respondents' sympathy towards individual parties on a 1-11point scale. Only the six major parties are considered. Standard errors clustered by surveys and West/East Germany in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

We see that when a voter perceives a party as internally conflicted, she is less likely to vote for it (Table A.1.1). The associate coefficient is highly statistically significant, and it stays that way even after we control for *factors* that are commonly used to explain voters' evaluation of political parties (party identification, affiliation with aligned social and attitudinal groups, left-right distance).




Figure A.1.1: Effect of disunity perceptions on vote intention by party identification

Note: Predictions are based on model A1.1.3 (Table A.1.1).

What has to be emphasized is just how substantial the effect of disunity perceptions is. The probability to vote for a certain party drops by about a third if respondents perceive this party as internally conflicted (all else equal). The substantial effect is particularly interesting when we consider the possibility of an interaction between conflict perceptions and partisanship: If a respondent identifies with a party, the negative impact of her conflict-assessment is negligible when compared to a respondent which does not. However, the probability to vote for a party the respondent does not feel close to, increases from 30% to 52% if the respective party is regarded as not internally conflicted (Figure A.1.1).

A.2 Summary statistics

	Mean	Median	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Party disunity perception	0.56	1	0.50	0	1
Policy position variance	1.10	0.95	0.41	0.52	2.10
National government participation	0.45	0	0.50	0	1
Distance to election	356.12	379.00	201.73	10.00	697.00
Share lost elections	0.51	0.50	0.20	0.00	0.95
AfD	0.01	0	0.12	0	1
CDU	0.23	0	0.42	0	1
FDP	0.19	0	0.39	0	1
The Greens	0.22	0	0.42	0	1
PDS/The Left	0.12	0	0.33	0	1

Table A2.1: Summary statistics for the analysis of disunity perceptions

Notes: The table presents values that are based on the 244,938 observations that are included in the main analysis (Table 1, Model 5).

A.3 Validating policy position variance

According to H_1 , the greater the heterogeneity a party exhibits, the more do voters perceive the party to experience internal conflict. We draw on the programmatic differences between the different *Land* branches of the German parties as an indicator of heterogeneity. As described in the text, we are using the text scaling method Wordscores (Laver *et al.*, 2003) to estimate the policy positions of the *Land* branches throughout 16 years and then use their standard deviation.

Following standard procedures in the literature (e.g., Hjorth *et al.*, 2015), we validate the policy positions of the *Land* parties we derived using Wordscores with voters' estimations of these positions.¹ We do this, firstly, by correlating the Wordscores estimates of *Land* party branch positions with the positions the respondents in the respective *Land* assign to the party. Unfortunately, respondents of the *Politbarometer* were asked to place each of the parties on an 11-point left-right scale only in an extremely small subset of the surveys that we used for our analyses (only for respondents who were interviewed between March 18th and March 21st 2002 is information available in our dataset).

In the *Politbarometer*, voters are asked to place themselves on the left-rights scale more often than they are asked to place the parties (namely in 22 of the 30 survey waves we look at). As a further validation, we thus, secondly, correlate the Wordscores estimates of the *Land* party branch positions with the left-right self-placement of those respondents in the respective *Land* that lean towards the respective party.

Table A.3.1 shows positive correlations between the Wordscores estimates and both measures that are highly statistically significant (all p < 0.0001). These correlations are sizeable, given in particular that a) respondents are not directly asked to evaluate the position

¹ Estimations of *Land* party branch positions based on expert surveys or in the tradition of the Manifesto Project do not exist.

of the *Land* party but the party in general (fist indicator) and b) the process by which citizens perceive party positions (first indicator) / partisans take the same position as their party (second indicator) is complicated and the correspondence far from perfect (e.g., Adams *et al.*, 2011, 2014).

If we additionally distinguish respondents with low political interest from respondents with high political interest (the variable is not included in the surveys that ask respondents to place the parties themselves), we also observe the expected patterns: for the politically interested, the association between self-placement and the position of their preferred party, as derived from Wordscores, is stronger. We thus have good reason to believe that the Wordscores method delivered largely valid estimates of *Land* party policy positions and that their standard deviation thus gives an appropriate measure of heterogeneity inside parties.

	Correlation	Observations
Position of the party	0.42	7,069
Position of the respondent (with corresponding PID)	0.38	20,239
Subset: high political interest	0.47	9,335
Subset: low political interest	0.32	6,315

Table A.3.1: Correlation of measures of Land party policy positions

A.4 Robustness checks for an alternative specification of governing parties

We find that citizens are more likely to perceive internal conflict in case of parties that are governing at the national level (see Table 1). However, one might expect differences between senior and junior coalition partners (Klüver and Spoon, 2020). Therefore, we replicate the respective regression models using an alternative specification of government participation (see Table A.4.1). Both kinds of parties are – in line with our expectation – perceived to be more internally conflicted than opposition partners (and to a comparable degree). If anything, the penalty is larger for the senior coalition partner.

	Model 2	Model 2 (alternative)	Model 5	Model 5 (alternative)
			0.76^{**}	0.70**
Policy position variance				0.72 ^{**} (0.02)
			(0.02)	(0.02)
National government participation	0.82^{**}		0.50**	
	(0.01)		(0.02)	
National government participation		0.72^{**}		0.44^{**}
(junior partner)		(0.01)		(0.02)
5 1 /				
National government participation		0.98^{**}		0.55^{**}
(senior partner)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Distance to election			0.09^{**}	0.09^{**}
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Share lost elections			0.73**	0.71**
Share lost elections			(0.03)	(0.03)
			(0.03)	(0.03)
AfD	2.34**	2.30**	1.92**	1.90**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
	× ,			
CDU	0.32**	0.33**	-0.56**	-0.55**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
FDP	0.45**	0.42**	-0.09**	-0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
The Greens	0.70**	0.57**	0.27**	0.22**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
PDS/The Left	0.82**	0.79**	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	294,412	294,412	244,938	244,938
Log likelihood	-196,302	-196,160	-161,854	161,833
AIC	392,672	392,389	323,782	323,742
pseudo R ²	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037

Table A.4.1: Determinants of voters' intra-party conflict perceptions II

A.5 Robustness checks for alternative specifications of distance to election

According to our results, citizens are more likely to perceive internal conflict the further away in time an election is. However, one might argue that it is the time to the *next* election that matters for parties' behavior. Similarly, it is possibly the last few months before an election that should make a difference and are crucial regarding a party's appearance. Thus, using the log of the distance might be more appropriate from a theoretical perspective. We replicate our regression analysis using three alternative specifications of distance to election (see Table A.5.1). We find no significant differences between the regression models. Parties are more likely to be perceived as internally conflicted by the voters, the further in time an election is. Focusing on the next elections or a possible logarithmic relationship does not change this.

	Model 5	Model 5 (alternative 2)	Model 5 (alternative 3)	Model 5 (alternative 4
Dalian nasitian	0.76**	0.77**	0.76**	0.76^{**}
Policy position variance	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	0.76 (0.02)
variance	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
National government	0.50^{**}	0.50^{**}	0.50^{**}	0.50^{**}
participation	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Distance to election	0.09^{**}			
	(0.03)			
Distance to next		0.04^{**}		
election				
		(0.01)		
Distance to election			0.05**	
(log)			(0.01)	
Distance to next				0.06^{**}
election (log)				(0.01)
Share lost elections	0.73**	0.72**	0.73**	0.72^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AfD	1.92**	1.92**	1.92**	1.92**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CDU	-0.56**	-0.56**	-0.56**	-0.56**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
FDP	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
The Greens	0.27**	0.27**	0.27**	0.27**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PDS/The Left	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	244,938	244,938	244,938	244,938
Log likelihood	-161,854	-161,828	-161,843	-161,803
AIC	323,782	323,730	323,760	323,680
pseudo R ²	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.038

Table A.5.1: Determinants of voters' intra-party conflict perceptions III

In a multi-level system like Germany, developments and events at the *Land* level might also influence how voters perceive political parties. Applied to our argument about the effect of elections on voters' perceptions, this could mean that the distance to *Land* elections has a similar effect as the distance federal elections: Parties may be more likely to be perceived as internally conflicted by the voters, the further away in time a *Land* election is. We replicate our regression model adding a variable that reflects the number of days between the survey interview and the closest election in the state in which the respondent resided. Our results show that the coefficient of the distance to the *Land* election is positive but does not have a statistically significant effect on voters' perceptions (see Table A.5.2). While *Land* party leaders generally have an interest in a united appearance of their branch as well as support from the national party for their campaigns, they in some cases also "look for a fight" with the national level (and thereby increasing the perceived intra-party conflict in the overall party) to profit in the *Land* elections. We believe that the insignificant coefficient reflects these contrasting tendencies.

	Model 5	Model 5	Model 5
		(alternative 6)	(alternative 7)
Policy position	0.76**	0.77**	0.76**
variance	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
, un un un o	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0:02)
National government	0.50**	0.52**	0.52**
participation	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
_			
Distance to election	0.09**		0.09**
	(0.03)		(0.03)
Distance to state		0.01	0.01
election		(0.01)	(0.01)
ciccular		(0.01)	(0.01)
Share lost elections	0.73**	0.72**	0.72**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AfD	1.92**	1.94**	1.94**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CDU	-0.56**	-0.54**	-0.54**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
FDP	-0.09**	-0.07**	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
The Greens	0.27**	0.28**	0.28**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PDS/The Left	-0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	244,938	241,928	241,928
Log likelihood	-161,854	-159,857	-159,850
AIČ	323,782	319,789	319,774
pseudo R2	0.037	0,037	0.037

A.6 Robustness checks for measures of intra-party functioning

Elections are not the only time when there is a particular interest in minimizing internal conflict. Assuming that party leaders want to remain in their position suggests that the same holds for party conventions, i.e., where the leadership has to be formally accountable to the members. Party conventions are indeed a particular prominent forum for intra-party strife (Ceron, 2019; Greene and Haber, 2016). While conflict between actors within a party are a constant feature of political life, it often manifests themselves remotely, with, for instance, one MP criticizing their party leader in an interview and the party leader responding in a talk show. At conventions, however, intra-party conflict manifests itself much more visibly and directly through controversial speeches, leadership elections, or votes on party lists.

To test how this kind of intra-party functioning imprints on voters, we make use of the timing of two types of intra-party events: national conventions and leadership changes. We straightforwardly operationalize the variable as the number of days between the survey interview and the closest national convention/leadership change, of the respective party (equivalent to the operationalization of the distance to elections). For example, five days before a convention, the variable takes the value five. If a respondent is being interviewed ten days after a party's last convention, the variable takes the value 10.

As shown in Table A.6.1, respondents perceive parties as more internally conflicted, the closer the survey was conducted to the party's most proximate convention, all else equal. Leadership changes are also accompanied by an increase in intra-party conflict perceptions. Note that both of these factors are particularly endogenous to the intra-party conflict perceptions. Often conventions are called and leaders changed when visible intra-party conflict becomes untenable. The inclusion of both factors does not impact the effects of the four factors we associated with the democratic life cycle in the main text.

	Model 5	Model 5 (alternative 8)	Model 5 (alternative 9)
		0.70***	
Policy position variance	0.76**	0.78**	0.72**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
National government	0.50**	0.52**	0.58**
participation	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Distance to election	0.09**	0.09**	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share lost elections	0.73**	0.67**	0.69**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Distance to convention		-0.55**	
		(0.02)	
Distance to leadership change			-0.03**
Distance to readership change			(0.00)
AfD	1.92**	1.76**	1.86**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CDU	-0.56**	-0.57**	-0.40**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
FDP	-0.09**	-0.10**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
The Greens	0.27**	0.21**	0.27**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PDS/The Left	-0.02	-0.09**	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	244,938	244,938	244,938
Log likelihood	-161,854	-161,563	-161,770
AIC	323,782	323,202	323,615
pseudo R2	0.037	0.039	0.038

Table A6.1: Determinants of voters' intra-party conflict perceptions V

A.7 Regression results for interactive effects with political interest

Our theory posits that the four factors related to the democratic life cycle enter the perceptions of the electorate because they a) increase the hostility in intra-party relations, and b) increase the visibility of the latter in media reporting. If these postulated theoretical mechanisms are correct, we would expect that it is particularly those with high political interest that behave as our hypotheses predict because they are more sensitive to the fluctuations (in the visibility) of intra-party hostility.

Put more generally, whether voters receive stimuli of intra-party conflict and how they will incorporate them into their party image will depend on their exposure to political competition. Voters who are not interested in politics are less likely to seek, receive, and comprehend stimuli pertaining to intra-party matters (Zaller, 1992: 42). This is in particular the case because intra-party conflict is per se not a substantive issue.

We test this by interacting the independent variables with a measure based on a question asking respondents how interested they are in politics. If an individual indicated that she is "strongly" or "very strongly" interested in politics, we coded their political interest as "high". Five answers were distinguished originally. Because of an imbalance in the survey answers – two of the five categories provide 75 percent of the answers – we focus on differences between "low" and "high" political interest.

Figure A.7.1 shows, first, that the politically interested are less likely to perceive parties as internally conflicted when the independent variables are set to their minimum. However, the effect of each of the independent variables is stronger for them than for the politically interested. All for interactive coefficients are positive and three out of four are statistically significant (the exception is the one for the distance to elections) (see Table A.7.1).




Figure A.7.1: Predicted probabilities of perceiving intra-party conflict by political interest

Notes: The shaded area represent the 95 percent confidence interval. The rugs show the empirical variance of the respective independent variable. Predictions are based on regression Models alternative 10-13 (Table A.7.1).

While some of the effects appear to be small because the y-axis starts at zero, they are actually quite substantial: For instance, moving from the first quartile to the third quartile with regard to the share of lost elections increases the probability to perceive intra-party conflict by 6,0 (low political interest) and 8.8 percentage points (high political interest), respectively.

0.76** (0.02) 0.50** (0.02)	0.42** (0.02) 0.39** (0.02)	0.51** (0.02)	0.51** (0.02)	0.52**
(0.02) 0.50** (0.02)	(0.02) 0.39**			
(0.02)			(3.32)	(0.02)
	(0, 0, 0)	0.36**	0.39**	0.40**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
0.09**	0.27**	0.28**	0.26**	0.28**
(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
0.73**	0.98**	0.98**	0.98**	0.79**
(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
	-0.25**	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.23**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
	0.19**			
	(0.03)			
		0.07*		
		(0.02)		
			0.02 (0.02)	
				0.36** (0.05)
1.92**	2.10**	2.11**	2.11**	2.13**
(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
-0.56**	-0.54**	-0.54**	-0.54**	-0.54**
(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
-0.09**	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07*
(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
0.27**	0.36**	0.36**	0.36**	0.36**
(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
-0.02	0.16**	0.17**	0.17**	0.17**
(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
244,938	152,287	152,287	152,287	152,287
-161,854	-100,488	-100,508	-100,512	-100,489
323,782	201,055	201,094	201,102	201,057 0.040
	(0.05) -0.56** (0.02) -0.09** (0.02) 0.27** (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) 244,938 -161,854	$\begin{array}{c} (0.03) \\ 0.19^{**} \\ (0.03) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 1.92^{**} \\ (0.03) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 2.10^{**} \\ (0.03) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.19^{**} \\ (0.03) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.03 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.05 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.56^{**} \\ (0.02) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.56^{**} \\ (0.02) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} -0.07^{*} \\ (0.02) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.16^{**} \\ (0.02) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.16^{**} \\ (0.02) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.02 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 0.16^{**} \\ (0.02) \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 244,938 \\ 152,287 \\ -161,854 \\ -100,488 \\ 323,782 \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{c} 201,055 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

Table A.7.1: Determinants of voters' intra-party conflict perceptions VI

A.8 Regression results for interactive effects with partisanship

	Model 5 (alternative 14)	Model 5 (alternative 15)	Model 5 (alternative 16)	Model 5 (alternative 17
	· · ·		· · ·	
Policy position variance	0.72^{**}	0.75^{**}	0.75^{**}	0.75^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
National government participation	0.50^{**}	0.50^{**}	0.50^{**}	0.50^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Distance to election	0.09^{**}	0.09^{**}	0.09^{**}	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Share lost elections	0.74**	0.74^{**}	0.74^{**}	0.72^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party identification	-0.97**	-0.80**	-0.79**	-0.92**
5	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Policy position variance	0.15**			
X PID	(0.03)			
Government participation X PID		0.00		
1 1		(0.03)		
Distance to election			-0.01	
X PID			(0.02)	
Share lost elections				0.23*
X PID				(0.08)
AfD	1.74**	1.74**	1.74**	1.73**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CDU	-0.59**	-0.58**	-0.58**	-0.58**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
FDP	-0.28**	-0.27**	-0.27**	-0.27**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
The Greens	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.13**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PDS/The Left	-0.15**	-0.16**	-0.16**	-0.16**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	244,938	244,938	244,938	244,938
Log likelihood	-159,926	-159,941	-159,941	-159,937
AIC	319,930	319,960	319,959	319,952
Pseudo R2	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.049

Table A.8.1: Determinants of voters' intra-party conflict perceptions VII

A.9 Robustness checks for an alternative specification of partisanship

Our results show that voters' disunity perceptions are to a considerable extent determined by partisanship. The variable that we use to capture a possible mediating effect of party identification on the relationship between our central independent variables and voters' perceptions of intra-party conflict is a straightforward dummy variable. The measure indicates whether the respondent "leans" towards the party whose disunity perception is being evaluated. This implies that we do not distinguish between observations where a respondent prefers a certain party but not the one which is evaluated and non-partisans. To test the robustness of our results, we run the regression models that test for interactions (Figure 4) with an alternative specification of our measure of party identification. This measure distinguishes between 1) respondents who do not identify with any party, 2) respondents who identify with the party that is evaluated and 3) respondents who identify with another party. As shown in Figure A.9.1, the results corroborate our previous findings. A direct comparison with Figure 4 shows only minor differences. In general, respondents who do not identify with a party view parties very similarly to respondents who evaluate parties they do not identify with. The slope differs only very slightly. At the same time, there are minimal differences in levels between how partisans perceive other parties' disunity and the perceptions of no-partisans.




Figure A.9.1: Predicted probabilities of perceiving intra-party conflict

Notes: The shaded area represent the 95 percent confidence interval. The rugs show the empirical variance of the respective independent variable.

A.10 Regression results for alternative specification of party branches

	Model 2 (alternative 1)	Model 2 (alternative 2)	Model 3 (alternative 1)	Model 3 (alternative 2)
National government participation	0.57** (0.01)	0.39** (0.01)		
Distance to election		(1) (1)	0.07*	0.15**
Distance to election			(0.02)	(0.03)
AfD	1.80**	1.68**	1.20**	1.31**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
CDU	-0.10**	-0.21**	-0.46**	-0.46**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
CSU	-0.72**		-1.07**	
	(0.01)		(0.01)	
FDP	-0.04	-0.20**	-0.55**	-0.56**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
The Greens	0.37**	0.32**	0.23**	0.22**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PDS/The Left	0.31**	0.18**	-0.24**	-0.19**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	294,412	244,938	294,412	244,938
Log likelihood	-195,032	-163,584	-196,410	-164,066
AIC	390,133	327,237	392,889	328,200
Pseudo R2	0.043	0.027	0.036	0.024

Table A.10.1: Determinants of voters' intra-party conflict perceptions VIII

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