**Supplementary Material for**

**The Punitive Impact of Radical Right Populism on Foreign Aid: Immigration Pressure and Mainstream Partnership**

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**Table 1S. Descriptive Statistics: 1995-2018**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Observation | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
| Bilateral aid over GDP (ln) | 21113 | -5.553 | 2.3123 | -12.886 | 1.331 |
| Coalitional capacity (Mudde coding ) | 21113 | 2.0578 | 6.6513 | 0 | 32.5 |
| Coalitional capacity (Akkerman coding ) | 21113 | 2.821 | 7.0653 | 0 | 32.5 |
| Coalitional capacity (Lutz coding ) | 21113 | 2.6539 | 6.9235 | 0 | 32.5 |
| PRR seat share | 21113 | 7.9177 | 9.8262 | 0 | 32.5 |
| Immigrant inflow | 20866 | .10186 | .4202 | 0 | 9.1141 |
| Asylum inflow | 20014 | .02323 | .16096 | 0 | 12.701 |
| Log-scale RILE | 21046 | -6.6826 | 13.662 | -47.87 | 32.71 |
| Cumulative left | 19978 | 26.121 | 11.695 | 6.387 | 53.86 |
| Conflict | 21113 | .23734 | .42546 | 0 | 1 |
| Linguistic commonality | 20690 | .07438 | .2624 | 0 | 1 |
| Religious commonality | 17350 | .17336 | .2498 | 0 | .94284 |
| Colonial legacy | 20690 | .07603 | .26505 | 0 | 1 |
| Islamic population | 21113 | .05409 | .49635 | 0 | 22.062 |
| Strong bicameralism | 21113 | .14697 | .35409 | 0 | 1 |
| Referendum | 19978 | .03384 | .18081 | 0 | 1 |
| Strong federalism | 21113 | .18865 | .39124 | 0 | 1 |
| Judicial review | 19978 | .7311 | .4434 | 0 | 1 |
| Right government | 21113 | .58893 | .49204 | 0 | 1 |
| Center government | 21113 | .39857 | .48962 | 0 | 1 |
| Left government | 21113 | .68901 | .46291 | 0 | 1 |

**Notes**: See the text for the sources of the data for the variables.

**Table 2S. Radical Populist Right Parties in Government Coalitions, Mudde Coding Scheme**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Cabinet | Parties | Period |
| Austria | Schüssel I | ӦVP-**FPӦ** | 2001–2005 |
|  | Schüssel II | ӦVP-**BZӦ** | 2005–2006 |
| Denmark1 | A.F. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2001–2005 |
|  | A.F. Rasmussen II | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2005–2007 |
|  | A.F. Rasmussen III | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2007–2009 |
|  | L.L. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2009–2011 |
| Italy | Berlusconi I | FI-AN-**LN**-CCD-UCD | 1994–1994 |
|  | Berlusconi II/III | FI-AN-**LN** | 2001–2006 |
|  | Berlusconi IV | PdL-**LN**-MpA | 2008–2011 |
| Netherlands | Balkenende | CDA-**LPF**-VVD | 2003–2003 |
|  | Rutte | VVD-CDA-(**PVV**) | 2010–2012 |
| Switzerland 2 | **SVP** |  | 2000–2011 |

Notes: The data are from Mudde (2016, 8). The abbreviated names in bold indicate the PRR parties as follows: FPӦ denotes the Freedom Party of Austria; BZÖ, Alliance for the Future of Austria; DF, Danish People’s Party; LN, Lega Nord/The League; LPF, Pim Fortuyn List; PVV, Freedom Party/Group Wilders; and SVP, Swiss People’s Party.

1 Minority governments in which the populist radical right party functions as the official support party.

2 The Swiss governments are perennial grand coalition governments based on the “Magic Formula.”

**Table 3S. Radical Populist Right Parties in Government Coalitions, Akkerman Coding Scheme**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Cabinet | Parties | Period |
| Austria | Schüssel I | ӦVP-**FPӦ** | 2001–2005 |
|  | Schüssel II | ӦVP-**BZӦ** | 2005–2006 |
| Denmark | A.F. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2001–2005 |
|  | A.F. Rasmussen II | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2005–2007 |
|  | A.F. Rasmussen III | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2007–2009 |
|  | L.L. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2009–2011 |
| Finland | Sipila II | KESK-KOK-**PS** | 2015– |
| Italy | Berlusconi I | FI-AN-**LN**-CCD-UCD | 1994–1994 |
|  | Berlusconi II/III | FI-AN-**LN** | 2001–2006 |
|  | Berlusconi IV | PdL-**LN**-MpA | 2008–2011 |
| Netherlands | Balkenende | CDA-**LPF**-VVD | 2003–2003 |
|  | Rutte | VVD-CDA-(**PVV**) | 2010–2012 |
| Norway | Solberg I | H-**FrP** | 2013– |
| Switzerland | **SVP** |  | 2003–2007 |
|  | **SVP** |  | 2007–2011 |
|  | **SVP** |  | 2011– |

Notes: The data on PRR government participation are from Akkerman et al. (2016, 3). The abbreviated names in bold indicate the PRR parties as follows: FPӦ denotes the Freedom Party of Austria; BZÖ, Alliance for the Future of Austria; DF, Danish People’s Party; LN, Lega Nord/The League; LPF, Pim Fortuyn List; PVV, Freedom Party/Group Wilders; FrP, Progressive Party; and SVP, Swiss People’s Party.

**Table 4S. Radical Populist Right Parties in Government Coalitions, Lutz Coding Scheme**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Cabinet | Parties | Period |
| Austria | Schüssel I | ӦVP-**FPӦ** | 2001–2005 |
|  | Schüssel II | ӦVP-**BZӦ** | 2005–2006 |
| Denmark | A.F. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2001–2005 |
|  | A.F. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2005–2007 |
|  | A.F. Rasmussen III | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2007–2009 |
|  | L.L. Rasmussen I | V-KF-(**DF**) | 2009–2011 |
| Italy | Berlusconi II/III | FI-AN-**LN** | 2001–2006 |
|  | Berlusconi IV | PdL-**LN**-MpA | 2008–2011 |
| Netherlands | Rutte | VVD-CDA-(**PVV**) | 2010–2012 |
| Norway | Bondevik II | **KRF** | 2001-2005 |
|  | Solberg I | H-**FrP** | 2013– |
| Switzerland | **SVP** |  | 2000–2011 |

Notes: The data on PRR government participation are from Lutz (2019). The abbreviated names in bold indicate the PRR parties as follows: FPӦ denotes the Freedom Party of Austria; BZÖ, Alliance for the Future of Austria; DF, Danish People’s Party; LN, Lega Nord/The League; LPF, Pim Fortuyn List; PVV, Freedom Party/Group Wilders; KRF, Christian People’s Party; FrP, Progressive Party; and SVP, Swiss People’s Party.

**Table 5S. List of Aid Recipient Countries**

Albania, Armenia, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Bahrain, Burundi, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bhutan, Botswana, Belarus, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Chile, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, Comoros, South Korea, Kazakhstan, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Liberia, Lesotho, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Madagascar, Mali, Myanmar, Mongolia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Mexico, Malaysia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Nepal, Oman, Panama, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Pakistan, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Suriname, El Salvador, Syria, Chad, Togo, Thailand, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Tanzania, Ukraine, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe (112 countries)

**Sensitivity tests**

This subsection shows the results of several sensitivity tests to evaluate the robustness of the main result with respect to (1) estimates of cluster Jackknife variance inference and reduced sample removing influential observations, (2) alternative coding schemes for PRR government involvement, and (3) an alternative specification for government ideologies.

The first sensitivity test considered influential observations through jackknife procedures. It used a jackknife estimator to conduct cluster Jackknife variance inference for the model (Cameron & Miller, 2015). Column (1) in Table 6S shows the cluster Jackknife variance matrix estimates in which the key interaction variable has remained significant in the expected negative direction, meaning that cluster robust standard errors are sufficiently small. To confirm this, the model was reestimated by removing observations above the DFBETA threshold in Figure 5 of the main text: (Belsley *et al.,* 2004, 28). The estimates in Column (2) show that the key interaction term remains negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the finding is not an artifact of particular influential observations in the sample.

The second test ascertains whether the result is not derived from the choice of the particular coding scheme for PRR involvement in government coalitions and is robust to alternative coding schemes. To begin with, the classification of PRR government coalitions by Mudde (2016) used earlier included Switzerland that has a coalition formation practice different from the conventional one. In Switzerland, the governments led by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) as a PRR party were grand coalitions based on the “Magic Formula” including not just mainstream right, but also left parties that diluted ideological cohesion. An amended Mudde coding scheme was created by removing the Swiss cases. Additionally, the coding schemes by Akkerman et al (2016, 3) (See Table 3S) and Lutz (2019) (See Table 4S) were used as other alternative coding schemes to estimate equation (1).

Table 6S summarizes the estimates from the three coding schemes. Columns (3)–(5) show that the estimated coefficient of the key interaction term between migrant inflow and coalitional capacity remains negative and weakly significant, while the other key interaction term between migrant inflow and electoral capacity is insignificant. Additionally, the coefficient estimates from the three alternative schemes are very similar to those from the original Mudde scheme in column (1) of Table 1. Column (6) shows the estimates from an alternative specification for government ideologies that employs a set of three dummy variables to identify rightist, center, and leftist governments. Again, the coefficient estimates of the key interaction terms are very similar to those in column (1) of Table 1 derived from the original logged scaled *RILE* specification. Together, these sensitivity tests indicate that the main finding is robust to the alternative coding schemes and alternative model specifications.

**Table 6S. Populist Radical Right’s Impacts on Bilateral Aid, Cluster Variance Matrix Estimates and Alternative Coding Schemes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| VARIABLES | Jackknife  Immigrant inflow | Reduced  sample  removing observations above the DFBASE threshold  Immigrant inflow | Mudde coding  without SPV  Immigrant inflow | Akkerman coding  Immigrant inflow | Lutz coding  Immigrant inflow | ideological categories  Immigrant inflow |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Direct pathway: PRR coalitional capacity \* immigrant inflow | -0.0864\*\*\* | -0.117\*\*\* | -0.0900\*\*\* | -0.0824\*\*\* | -0.0873\*\*\* | -0.0883\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0305) | (0.0363) | (0.0300) | (0.0214) | (0.0221) | (0.0256) |
| Direct pathway: PRR coalitional capacity \* immigrant inflow | 0.0126 | 0.0199\*\* | 0.0113 | 0.0139\* | 0.0139\* | 0.0132\* |
|  | (0.00795) | (0.00774) | (0.00770) | (0.00779) | (0.00779) | (0.00773) |
| Immigrant inflow | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.111\*\*\* | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.104\*\*\* | 0.0972\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0349) | (0.0332) | (0.0331) | (0.0328) | (0.0328) | (0.0327) |
| PRR coalitional capacity | -0.00933\* | -0.0151\*\*\* | -0.00903 | -0.000975 | -0.00164 | -0.00474 |
|  | (0.00539) | (0.00472) | (0.00555) | (0.00363) | (0.00347) | (0.00555) |
| PRR electoral capacity | -0.0132\*\*\* | -0.0133\*\*\* | -0.0134\*\*\* | -0.0127\*\*\* | -0.0128\*\*\* | -0.0152\*\*\* |
|  | (0.00340) | (0.00341) | (0.00338) | (0.00351) | (0.00346) | (0.00358) |
| Logged scale RILE | -0.00552\*\*\* | -0.00524\*\*\* | -0.00558\*\*\* | -0.00544\*\*\* | -0.00538\*\*\* | -0.00444\*\* |
|  | (0.00127) | (0.00124) | (0.00126) | (0.00125) | (0.00127) | (0.00186) |
| Cumulative cabinet seat shares  of left parties | 0.0371\*\* | 0.0272\* | 0.0373\*\*\* | 0.0382\*\*\* | 0.0372\*\* | 0.0324\*\* |
|  | (0.0145) | (0.0141) | (0.0144) | (0.0144) | (0.0146) | (0.0150) |
| Conflict | 0.299\*\*\* | 0.298\*\*\* | 0.299\*\*\* | 0.301\*\*\* | 0.300\*\*\* | 0.299\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0511) | (0.0500) | (0.0509) | (0.0509) | (0.0509) | (0.0509) |
| Electoral democracy | 0.809\*\*\* | 0.813\*\*\* | 0.807\*\*\* | 0.809\*\*\* | 0.814\*\*\* | 0.807\*\*\* |
|  | (0.213) | (0.206) | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.212) |
| Foreign policy difference | -0.217\*\*\* | -0.201\*\*\* | -0.217\*\*\* | -0.219\*\*\* | -0.218\*\*\* | -0.220\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0574) | (0.0558) | (0.0571) | (0.0571) | (0.0571) | (0.0571) |
| Share of export in GDP (ln) | 0.0173 | 0.0168 | 0.0173 | 0.0173 | 0.0178 | 0.0176 |
|  | (0.0193) | (0.0186) | (0.0192) | (0.0191) | (0.0192) | (0.0192) |
| Donor's GDP per capita (ln) | 3.252\*\*\* | 3.176\*\*\* | 3.268\*\*\* | 3.260\*\*\* | 3.287\*\*\* | 3.226\*\*\* |
|  | (0.557) | (0.555) | (0.554) | (0.555) | (0.554) | (0.562) |
| Recipient's GDP per capita (ln) | -0.357\*\*\* | -0.351\*\*\* | -0.357\*\*\* | -0.353\*\*\* | -0.356\*\*\* | -0.356\*\*\* |
|  | (0.136) | (0.133) | (0.135) | (0.135) | (0.135) | (0.135) |
| Right government |  |  |  |  |  | 0.00529 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.0354) |
| Center government |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0805\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.0382) |
| Left government |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0730\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.0408) |
| Constant | -37.69\*\*\* | -37.72\*\*\* | -38.92\*\*\* | -38.90\*\*\* | -39.12\*\*\* | -38.40\*\*\* |
|  | (5.990) | (6.082) | (6.080) | (6.096) | (6.074) | (6.152) |
| Donor–recipient pair fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Time fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 21,196 | 20,881 | 21,113 | 21,113 | 21,113 | 21,113 |
| R-squared | 0.058 | 0.755 | 0.745 | 0.745 | 0.745 | 0.745 |

*Notes*: Estimation was made via ordinary least squares with all variables on the right-hand side of equation (1) being lagged by one year. Robust standard errors clustered in panel pairs are in parentheses. \*\*\* indicates p < 0.01; \*\*, p < 0.05; and \*, p < 0.1.