**Appendix I: Correlations between each of the profile ratings by country**

Austria

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7502** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.6054** 0.5741 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.2386 0.1749 0.3506 1.0000

professor | 0.2809 0.2737 0.3691 0.2704 1.0000

Belgium

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.8071** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.6304** 0.5911 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.3869 0.3292 0.4798 1.0000

professor | 0.3192 0.2399 0.4016 0.3762 1.0000

Bulgaria

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.6450** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.5338 0.5041 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.3541 0.2703 0.4089 1.0000

professor | 0.2153 0.2288 0.2659 0.3004 1.0000

Czech Republic

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7273** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.5900 0.5766 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.2302 0.2372 0.3897 1.0000

professor | 0.2719 0.2469 0.3301 0.2021 1.0000

Denmark

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7582** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.5201 0.5481 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.2548 0.2192 0.4682 1.0000

professor | 0.3512 0.3422 0.5638 0.4734 1.0000

Finland

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7090** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.4488 0.5294 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.2434 0.2062 0.4198 1.0000

professor | 0.3121 0.3624 0.5528 0.4819 1.0000

France

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7701** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.6889** **0.6467** 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.5003 0.4369 0.5771 1.0000

professor | 0.4692 0.3886 0.5480 0.5176 1.0000

Germany

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7699** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.6410** **0.6119** 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.3557 0.2914 0.5360 1.0000

professor | 0.4030 0.4027 0.5225 0.4145 1.0000

Greece

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.8421** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.4974 0.4962 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.2099 0.2404 0.3533 1.0000

professor | 0.2488 0.2478 0.3144 0.2752 1.0000

Ireland

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7138** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.5784 0.5490 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.4250 0.4097 0.4677 1.0000

professor | 0.3579 0.3530 0.5082 0.4437 1.0000

Italy

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.8426** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.7188** **0.7380** 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.3604 0.3829 0.5037 1.0000

professor | 0.4532 0.4674 0.5167 0.4593 1.0000

Netherlands

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.8096** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.6633** **0.6527** 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.3287 0.2821 0.4538 1.0000

professor | 0.3942 0.3728 0.4310 0.3897 1.0000

Poland

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.7589** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.5815 **0.6400** 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.1840 0.1780 0.2714 1.0000

professor | 0.2668 0.2957 0.3298 0.3389 1.0000

Spain

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.8055** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | **0.6195** 0.5956 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.3164 0.2669 0.3856 1.0000

professor | 0.2557 0.2686 0.3833 0.1863 1.0000

UK

| MP minister civil\_~t busine~n profes~r

-------------+---------------------------------------------

MP | 1.0000

minister | **0.8131** 1.0000

civil\_serv~t | 0.5309 0.5769 1.0000

businesspe~n | 0.4062 0.4291 0.5143 1.0000

professor | 0.3472 0.3932 0.5850 0.4750 1.0000

**Appendix II: Correlations between support for civil servants and other profiles by country**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | MPs | Ministers | University professors | Business leaders |
| Austria | **Strong** | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Belgium | **Strong** | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Bulgaria | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Czech Republic | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Denmark | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Finland | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| France | **Strong** | **Strong** | Weak | Weak |
| Germany | **Strong** | **Strong** | Weak | Weak |
| Greece | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Ireland | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| Italy | **Strong** | **Strong** | Weak | Weak |
| Netherlands | **Strong** | **Strong** | Weak | Weak |
| Poland | Weak | **Strong** | Weak | Weak |
| Spain | **Strong** | Weak | Weak | Weak |
| UK | Weak | Weak | Weak | Weak |

Note: correlations at 0.60 and above are considered “strong”

**Appendix III: Wording of items in participation orientation scale**

1. “It is important for democracy that citizens have the final say on political issues by voting in referendums” (1=strongly disagree/5=strongly agree).
2. “People sometimes talk about the possibility of letting a group of citizens decide instead of politicians. These citizens will be selected by lot within the population and would then gather and deliberate for several days in order to make policy decisions, like politicians do in Parliament. To what extent do you agree with this proposal?” (1=strongly disagree/5=strongly agree)
3. “The people, and not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions” (1=strongly disagree/5=strongly agree).

**Appendix IV: Step-wise multinomial logistic regression estimates of preferences for political outsiders as ministers (N=24,000)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Preferences for civil servants** | | | | **Preferences for university professors** | | | | **Preferences for business leaders** | | | |
|  | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* |
| **Prefers politician (REFERENCE)** | (ref) |  | (ref) |  |  |  | (ref) |  |  |  | (ref) |  |
| **Prefers outsider** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political distrust | **1.39\*\*\*** | 0.03 | **1.38\*\*\*** | 0.03 | **1.70\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.70\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.66\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.66\*\*\*** | 0.04 |
| Expertise orientations | **-** | **-** | **1.12\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **-** | **-** | **1.43\*\*\*** | 0.05 | **-** | **-** | **1.09\*\*** | 0.03 |
| Participatory orientations | **1.38\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.35\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.33\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.25\*\*\*** | 0.03 | **1.54\*\*\*** | 0.04 | **1.52\*\*\*** | 0.04 |
| Age | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.96\*\* | 0.01 | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.01 | 1.02 | 0.01 | 1.02 | 0.01 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 1.01 | 0.04 | 1.01 | 0.04 | 1.12\* | 0.05 | 1.11\* | 0.05 | 1.22\*\*\* | 0.05 | 1.22\*\*\* | 0.05 |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  |
| -Less than tertiary | 1.03 | 0.07 | 1.03 | 0.07 | 1.13 | 0.08 | 1.10 | 0.07 | 1.24\*\*\* | 0.08 | 1.23\*\* | 0.08 |
| -Tertiary | 1.27\*\*\* | 0.09 | 1.26\*\* | 0.09 | 1.65\*\*\* | 0.11 | 1.58\*\*\* | 0.11 | 1.43\*\*\* | 0.10 | 1.42\*\*\* | 0.09 |
| Feelings about income | 1.05\* | 0.02 | 1.04 | 0.02 | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.99 | 0.02 | 1.05\*\* | 0.02 | 1.05\* | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 1.01 | 0.03 | 1.00 | 0.03 | 1.09\*\* | 0.03 | 1.06\* | 0.03 | 1.07\*\* | 0.03 | 1.06\* | 0.03 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.94\*\* | 0.02 | 0.93\*\* | 0.02 | 1.05\* | 0.02 | 1.03 | 0.02 | 0.77\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.77\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.02 | 1.05\*\* | 0.02 | 1.06\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.84\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.84\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 0.15\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.11\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| **No preference** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political distrust | 1.07\*\* | 0.02 | 1.07\*\* | 0.02 | 1.02 | 0.03 | 1.02 | 0.03 | 1.09\*\*\* | 0.02 | 1.10\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Expertise orientations | - | - | 1.03 | 0.03 | - | - | 1.10\*\* | 0.04 | - | - | 0.99 | 0.03 |
| Participation orientations | 1.23\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.22\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.17\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.15\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.27\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.28\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Age | 1.03\* | 0.01 | 1.03\* | 0.01 | 1.06\*\*\* | 0.02 | 1.05\*\* | 0.02 | 1.08\*\*\* | 0.01 | 1.08\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 1.07 | 0.04 | 1.07 | 0.04 | 1.00 | 0.05 | 1.00 | 0.04 | 1.08\*\* | 0.04 | 1.08\* | 0.04 |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  |
| -Less than tertiary | 0.97 | 0.06 | 0.97 | 0.06 | 1.03 | 0.07 | 1.02 | 0.07 | 0.99 | 0.06 | 1.00 | 0.06 |
| -Tertiary | 1.08 | 0.07 | 1.08 | 0.06 | 1.27\*\* | 0.09 | 1.25\*\* | 0.09 | 1.06 | 0.07 | 1.06 | 0.07 |
| Feelings about income | 1.05\* | 0.02 | 1.04\* | 0.02 | 1.03 | 0.03 | 1.03 | 0.02 | 1.06\*\* | 0.02 | 1.06\* | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 0.95\* | 0.02 | 0.95\* | 0.02 | 0.95 | 0.03 | 0.95\* | 0.03 | 1.00 | 0.03 | 1.00 | 0.03 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.97 | 0.02 | 0.96\* | 0.02 | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.99 | 0.02 | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.98 | 0.01 | 0.98 | 0.01 | 1.00 | 0.02 | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 0.52\*\*\* | 0.10 | 0.48\*\*\* | 0.10 | 0.60 | 0.14 | 0.45\*\* | 0.11 | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.06 | 0.32\*\*\* | 0.07 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.03 |  | 0.03 |  | 0.07 |  | 0.07 |  | 0.06 |  | 0.06 |  |

*Note: models include country-fixed effects & samples are weighted to match distributions on age, sex and education in the general population.*

*\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05*

**Appendix V: Effects of the controls on outsider preferences**

In line with most of the literature on technocratic attitudes, the controls demonstrate that obtaining a university degree increases the chance of preferring all three political outsiders, but especially professors. The effects of age, feelings about one’s household income and political interest are either not significant or very small. However, preferences for professors and business leaders are stronger among male respondents. Finally, positive attitudes towards redistribution and immigration decrease preferences for business leaders and, to a much lesser extent, civil servants. By contrast positive attitudes towards immigration increase preferences for professors. Therefore, business leaders and (to a lesser extent) civil servants are more appealing alternatives for both culturally and economically right-wing individuals while professors are more appealing alternatives for culturally left-wing individuals

Turning to the effects of our predictors on belonging to the no preference group, we find that individuals who do not differentiate between politicians and civil servants or between politicians and university professors are slightly more distrusting of representative actors and institutions than those who prefer politicians. Those with who do not differentiate between politicians and professors are also slightly more expertise-oriented than those who prefer politicians. Finally, those who do not differentiate between politicians and any of the three political outsiders are generally more participatory-oriented than those who prefer politicians. All in all, the results suggest that some politically distrusting and participatory-oriented citizens may perceive political outsiders as equally suitable, but not necessarily more suitable for ministerial positions. In other words, our predictors also lead respondents to think *both* politicians and political outsiders are good candidates for ministerial positions, as opposed to only defending politicians.

**Appendix VI: By-country MNL regression estimates of preferring political outsiders versus politicians as ministers in government**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Preferring civil servants** | | | | **Preferring university professors** | | |  | **Preferring business leaders** | | |  |
|  | Distrust | Expertise  -oriented | Participation  -oriented | Chi2 | Distrust | Expertise  -oriented | Participation  -oriented | Chi2 | Distrust | Expertise  -oriented | Participation  -oriented | Chi2 |
| *Country* | *RRR* | *RRR* | *RRR* |  | *RRR* | *RRR* | *RRR* |  | *RRR* | *RRR* | *RRR* |  |
| AT | 1.33\*\* | 1.16 | 1.35\*\*\* | 59.89\*\*\* | 1.80\*\*\* | 1.79\*\*\* | 1.21 | 136.56\*\*\* | 1.54\*\*\* | 1.05 | 1.68\*\*\* | 139.17\*\*\* |
| BE | 1.42\*\*\* | 1.08 | 1.46\*\*\* | 125.76\*\*\* | 1.89\*\*\* | 1.31\*\* | 1.23\*\* | 310.35\*\*\* | 1.54\*\*\* | 0.97 | 1.54\*\*\* | 222.30\*\*\* |
| BG | 1.36\*\* | 1.01 | 1.03 | 28.80 | 1.20 | 1.18 | 1.15 | 57.67\*\*\* | 1.31\*\* | 1.07 | 1.05 | 51.63\*\*\* |
| CZ | 1.40\*\*\* | 1.01 | 1.35\*\*\* | 70.27\*\*\* | 1.21\*\* | 1.62\*\*\* | 1.09 | 88.28\*\*\* | 1.51\*\*\* | 0.96 | 1.43\*\*\* | 142.72\*\*\* |
| DK | 1.34\*\*\* | 1.82\*\*\* | 1.48\*\*\* | 150.41\*\*\* | 1.75\*\*\* | 1.95\*\*\* | 1.35\*\* | 192.42\*\*\* | 1.82\*\*\* | 1.40\*\* | 1.77\*\*\* | 236.81\*\*\* |
| FI | 1.38\*\* | 1.77\*\*\* | 1.22 | 93.64\*\*\* | 2.03\*\*\* | 1.81\*\*\* | 1.26\* | 113.24\*\*\* | 1.74\*\*\* | 1.21 | 1.96\*\*\* | 186.75\*\*\* |
| FR | 0.96 | 1.02 | 1.46\*\* | 70.56\*\*\* | 1.33\*\* | 0.92 | 1.74\*\*\* | 82.63\*\*\* | 1.34\*\*\* | 1.01 | 1.45\*\* | 87.59\*\*\* |
| DE | 1.16 | 0.90 | 1.38\*\* | 94.56\*\*\* | 1.49\*\*\* | 1.34\* | 1.34\*\* | 102.42\*\*\* | 1.71\*\*\* | 0.82 | 1.68\*\*\* | 152.02\*\*\* |
| GR | 1.81\*\*\* | 0.89 | 1.70\*\*\* | 113.98\*\*\* | 2.76\*\*\* | 1.48\* | 1.14 | 105.54\*\*\* | 1.94\*\*\* | 1.28 | 1.42\*\* | 143.15\*\*\* |
| IE | 1.39\*\*\* | 1.22 | 1.30\* | 115.52\*\*\* | 1.91\*\*\* | 1.41\*\* | 1.56\*\*\* | 231.23\*\*\* | 1.81\*\*\* | 1.30\* | 1.44\*\* | 166.31\*\*\* |
| IT | 1.67\*\*\* | 1.15 | 1.28\* | 64.79\*\*\* | 2.11\*\*\* | 1.33 | 1.53\*\*\* | 109.79\*\*\* | 1.75\*\*\* | 1.49\*\* | 1.43\*\* | 142.80\*\*\* |
| NL | 1.12 | 1.18 | 1.65\*\*\* | 110.97\*\*\* | 1.87\*\*\* | 1.70\*\*\* | 1.43\*\*\* | 149.11\*\*\* | 1.70\*\*\* | 1.01 | 2.18\*\*\* | 210.99\*\*\* |
| PL | 1.40\*\* | 0.93 | 1.26 | 33.55 | 2.07\*\*\* | 2.20\*\*\* | 0.82 | 130.25\*\*\* | 1.93\*\*\* | 1.21 | 1.28 | 107.87\*\*\* |
| ES | 1.36\*\*\* | 1.20 | 1.11 | 80.99\*\*\* | 1.60\*\*\* | 0.92 | 1.26 | 92.00\*\*\* | 1.66\*\*\* | 1.26 | 1.36\*\* | 132.82\*\*\* |
| UK | 1.53\*\*\* | 0.94 | 1.46\*\*\* | 128.26\*\*\* | 1.73\*\*\* | 1.20 | 1.46\*\*\* | 158.42\*\*\* | 1.62\*\*\* | 0.84 | 1.50\*\*\* | 92.22\*\*\* |

*Note: results for the respondents showing no preference for either profile available upon request. All models included the socio-demographic and attitudinal controls specified in the methods section. The sample was weighted to match the distributions on age, sex and education in the general population.*

*\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05*

**Appendix VII: OLS step-wise regression estimates of preferences for political outsiders as ministers (N=24,000)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Preferences for civil servants** | | | | **Preferences for university professors** | | | | **Preferences for business leaders** | | | |
| *Country dummies* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* | *RRR* | *SE* |
| -Austria | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  |
| -UK | -0.04 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.08 | -0.69\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.11 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.11 |
| -Belgium | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 | -0.22\* | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.09 | -0.05 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.10 |
| -Bulgaria | -0.42\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.51\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.52\*\*\* | 0.14 | -0.85\*\*\* | 0.13 | -0.25 | 0.14 | -0.46\*\* | 0.14 |
| -Czech Republic | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.07 | -0.32\*\*\* | 0.07 | -0.27\*\* | 0.10 | -0.13 | 0.10 | -1.06\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.93\*\*\* | 0.10 |
| -Denmark | -0.81\*\*\* | 0.08 | -0.59\*\*\* | 0.08 | -1.64\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.75\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.42\*\*\* | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.11 |
| -Finland | -0.63\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.41\*\*\* | 0.09 | -1.34\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.72\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.44\*\*\* | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.11 |
| -France | -0.16\* | 0.08 | -0.16\* | 0.08 | -1.04\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.85\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.12 | 0.11 | -0.06 | 0.11 |
| -Germany | -0.37\*\*\* | 0.08 | -0.28\*\*\* | 0.08 | -0.64\*\*\* | 0.11 | -0.31\*\* | 0.10 | -0.40\*\* | 0.12 | -0.19 | 0.11 |
| -Greece | -0.32\*\* | 0.10 | -0.40\*\*\* | 0.10 | 0.90\*\*\* | 0.15 | 0.75\*\*\* | 0.13 | 0.73\*\*\* | 0.18 | 0.48\*\* | 0.17 |
| -Ireland | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.19\* | 0.08 | -0.59\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.18 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.40\*\*\* | 0.11 |
| -Italy | 0.37\*\*\* | 0.08 | 0.40\*\*\* | 0.08 | 0.41\*\*\* | 0.11 | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.10 | 1.09\*\*\* | 0.11 | 1.22\*\*\* | 0.11 |
| -Netherlands | -0.44\*\*\* | 0.07 | -0.24\*\*\* | 0.07 | -0.93\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.38\*\*\* | 0.09 | -0.59\*\*\* | 0.10 | -0.13 | 0.10 |
| -Poland | 0.63\*\*\* | 0.10 | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.09 | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.13 | 0.45\*\*\* | 0.11 | 1.21\*\*\* | 0.14 | 0.96\*\*\* | 0.13 |
| -Spain | 0.26\*\* | 0.08 | 0.17\* | 0.08 | 0.42\*\* | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.29\* | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.12 |
| *Independent variables* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political distrust |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.02 |  |  | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.02 |  |  | 0.62\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Expertise orientations |  |  | 0.09\*\*\* | 0.03 |  |  | 0.44\*\*\* | 0.03 |  |  | 0.11\*\* | 0.03 |
| Participatory orientations |  |  | 0.26\*\*\* | 0.02 |  |  | 0.31\*\*\* | 0.03 |  |  | 0.51\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Age |  |  | -0.05\*\*\* | 0.01 |  |  | -0.10\*\*\* | 0.01 |  |  | 0.04\*\* | 0.02 |
| Gender (Male=1) |  |  | 0.01 | 0.03 |  |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.04 |  |  | 0.25\*\*\* | 0.04 |
| *Education* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| -Less than upper secondary |  |  | (ref) |  |  |  | (ref) |  |  |  | (ref) |  |
| -Less than tertiary |  |  | 0.05 | 0.05 |  |  | 0.05 | 0.06 |  |  | 0.15\* | 0.07 |
| -Tertiary |  |  | 0.17\*\*\* | 0.05 |  |  | 0.36\*\*\* | 0.06 |  |  | 0.29\*\*\* | 0.07 |
| Feelings about income |  |  | 0.03 | 0.02 |  |  | -0.02 | 0.02 |  |  | 0.08\*\* | 0.02 |
| Political interest |  |  | -0.01 | 0.02 |  |  | 0.08\*\* | 0.03 |  |  | 0.08\*\* | 0.03 |
| Leftwing economic orientations |  |  | -0.05\*\* | 0.02 |  |  | 0.03 | 0.02 |  |  | -0.30\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations |  |  | -0.04\*\* | 0.01 |  |  | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.02 |  |  | -0.21\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Constant | 0.00 | 0.05 | -1.87\*\*\* | 0.18 | 1.37\*\*\* | 0.07 | -4.56\*\*\* | 0.22 | -0.02 | 0.08 | -3.55\*\*\* | 0.25 |
| R-squared | **0.03** |  | **0.06** |  | **0.06** |  | **0.18** |  | **0.04** |  | **0.14** |  |

*Note: samples are weighted to match distributions on age, sex and education in the general population. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05*

**Appendix VIII: Multinomial logistic regression estimates of preferences business leaders over professors**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Preferences for business leaders** | |
|  | *RRR* | *SE* |
| **Prefers professors (REFERENCE)** | (ref) | (ref) |
| **Prefers business leaders** |  |  |
| Political distrust | 0.98 | 0.02 |
| Expertise orientations | 0.79\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Participatory orientations | **1.22\*\*\*** | 0.03 |
| Age | 1.05\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 1.11\*\*\* | 0.05 |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) | (ref) |
| -Less than tertiary | 1.03 | 0.07 |
| -Tertiary | 0.89\* | 0.06 |
| Feelings about income | 1.09\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 1.06\*\* | 0.03 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.76\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 1.40 | 0.32 |
| **No preference** |  |  |
| Political distrust | 0.89\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Expertise orientations | 0.84\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Participation orientations | 1.13\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Age | 1.14\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 0.98 | 0.04 |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) | (ref) |
| -Less than tertiary | 1.03 | 0.06 |
| -Tertiary | 0.92 | 0.06 |
| Feelings about income | 0.98 | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 0.94\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.88\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 1.49\* | 0.31 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.04 |  |

*Note: samples are weighted to match distributions on age, sex and education in the general population. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05*

**Appendix IX: Multinomial logistic regression estimates of preferences business leaders over civil servants**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Preferences for business leaders** | |
|  | *RRR* | *SE* |
| **Prefers civil servants (REFERENCE)** | (ref) | (ref) |
| **Prefers business leaders** |  |  |
| Political distrust | 1.35\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Expertise orientations | 1.01 | 0.03 |
| Participatory orientations | **1.23\*\*\*** | 0.03 |
| Age | 1.08\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 1.19\*\*\* | 0.05 |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) | (ref) |
| -Less than tertiary | 1.13\*\* | 0.07 |
| -Tertiary | 1.13\*\* | 0.07 |
| Feelings about income | 1.04\*\* | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 1.08\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.83\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.87\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 0.22\*\*\* | 0.05 |
| **No preference** |  |  |
| Political distrust | 1.06\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Expertise orientations | 0.91\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Participation orientations | 1.13\*\*\* | 0.03 |
| Age | 1.14\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 0.92\*\* | 0.04 |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) | (ref) |
| -Less than tertiary | 0.98 | 0.06 |
| -Tertiary | 0.98 | 0.06 |
| Feelings about income | 0.97 | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 0.95\*\* | 0.03 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.92\*\*\* | 0.02 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.93\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 0.69\* | 0.15 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.03 |  |

*Note: samples are weighted to match distributions on age, sex and education in the general population. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05*

**Appendix X: Logistic regression estimates of preferring political outsiders over politicians as ministers in government**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1:**  **Civil servants**  **(N=18,237)** | | **Model 2:**  **University professors**  **(N=19,924)** | | **Model 3:**  **Business leader**  **(N=19,923)** | | **Model 1:**  **Civil servants**  **(N=18,237)** | | **Model 2:**  **University professors**  **(N=19,924)** | | **Model 3:**  **Business leader**  **(N=19,923)** | |
|  | *OR* | *SE* | *OR* | *SE* | *OR* | *SE* | *OR* | *SE* | *OR* | *SE* | *OR* | *SE* |
| *Key predictors* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political distrust | 1.76\*\*\* | 0.19 | 2.00\*\*\* | 0.23 | 1.81\*\*\* | 0.19 | 1.51\*\*\* | 0.13 | 1.48\*\*\* | 0.13 | 1.85\*\*\* | 0.15 |
| Expertise orientations | 1.46\*\*\* | 0.13 | 1.64\*\*\* | 0.16 | 1.19\* | 0.11 | 1.12\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.38\*\*\* | 0.04 | 1.06\* | 0.03 |
| Participation orientations | 1.25\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.19\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.42\*\*\* | 0.03 | 1.44\*\*\* | 0.11 | 1.11 | 0.08 | 1.64\*\*\* | 0.12 |
| Political activism | 1.40\*\*\* | 0.10 | 1.08 | 0.08 | 1.37\*\*\* | 0.10 | 1.40\*\*\* | 0.10 | 1.10 | 0.08 | 1.36\*\*\* | 0.10 |
| *Interaction* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Distrust x Expertise orientations | **0.93**\*\* | 0.02 | **0.95**\* | 0.03 | **0.97** | 0.02 | **-** |  | **-** |  | - |  |
| Distrust x Participatory Orientations |  |  |  |  |  |  | **0.96** | 0.02 | **1.02** | 0.02 | **0.96\*** | 0.02 |
| *Controls* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Age | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.96\*\* | 0.01 | 1.01 | 0.01 | 0.95\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.96\*\* | 0.01 | 1.02 | 0.01 |
| Gender (Male=1) | 1.02 | 0.04 | 1.08\* | 0.04 | 1.18\*\*\* | 0.04 | 1.02 | 0.04 | 1.08\* | 0.04 | 1.18\*\*\* | 0.04 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| -Less than upper secondary | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  | (ref) |  |
| -Less than tertiary | 1.03 | 0.06 | 1.11 | 0.07 | 1.17\*\* | 0.07 | 1.03 | 0.06 | 1.10 | 0.07 | 1.17\*\* | 0.07 |
| -Tertiary | 1.19\*\* | 0.07 | 1.51\*\*\* | 0.09 | 1.31\*\*\* | 0.08 | 1.19\*\* | 0.07 | 1.50\*\*\* | 0.09 | 1.31\*\*\* | 0.08 |
| Feelings about income | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.97 | 0.02 | 1.04\* | 0.02 | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.97 | 0.02 | 1.04 | 0.02 |
| Political interest | 0.97 | 0.02 | 1.04 | 0.03 | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.97 | 0.02 | 1.04 | 0.03 | 1.00 | 0.02 |
| Leftwing economic orientations | 0.95\*\* | 0.02 | 1.03 | 0.02 | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.95\* | 0.02 | 1.03 | 0.02 | 0.80\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Leftwing cultural orientations | 0.96\*\* | 0.01 | 1.06\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.96\*\* | 0.01 | 1.06\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.85\*\*\* | 0.01 |
| Constant | 0.06\*\*\* | 0.02 | 0.03\*\*\* | 0.01 | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.10\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.08\*\*\* | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.02 |

*Note: models include country-fixed effects & samples are weighted to match distributions on age, sex and education in the general population. The number of observations is smaller as those who show no preference were excluded from the analyses.*

*\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05*