**Do Coalition and Formateur Expectations Affect Vote Switching?**

Online Appendix

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# Table A1. Multilevel models with respondent as the upper level

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5a) | (5b) | (6a) | (6b) |
| VARIABLES | Switch | Switch | Switch | Switch | To Formateur | To Non-Formateur | To Formateur | To Non-Formateur |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coalition expectations | -0.315\*\*\* | -0.295\*\*\* | -0.296\*\*\* | -0.278\*\*\* | -0.265\*\*\* | -0.194\*\*\* | -0.267\*\*\* | -0.229\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.073) | (0.070) | (0.073) | (0.076) | (0.081) |
| Formateur uncertainty |  |  | -0.088 | -0.835 | 0.453 | 0.073 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.258) | (0.845) | (0.391) | (0.432) |  |  |
| Uncertainty \* coalition |  |  |  | 0.192 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.129) |  |  |  |  |
| Expected formateur: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncertain |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.847\* | -0.399 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.450) | (0.554) |
| Preferred loses |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.859 | 0.166 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.591) | (0.626) |
| Insincere past |  | 0.507\* | 0.502 | 0.643 | 0.754 | 0.486 | 0.702 | 0.337 |
|  |  | (0.307) | (0.307) | (0.447) | (0.499) | (0.531) | (0.523) | (0.567) |
| Ideological distance |  | 0.627\*\*\* | 0.631\*\*\* | 0.835\*\*\* | 0.873\*\*\* | 0.863\*\*\* | 0.906\*\*\* | 0.918\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.108) | (0.109) | (0.179) | (0.194) | (0.197) | (0.206) | (0.213) |
| Political knowledge | 0.014 | 0.057 | 0.041 | -0.854\*\* | -1.059\*\* | -0.801\* | -0.982\*\* | -0.884\* |
|  | (0.254) | (0.268) | (0.269) | (0.403) | (0.458) | (0.471) | (0.470) | (0.491) |
| Age | -0.006 | -0.009 | -0.009 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.008 | 0.013 | 0.007 |
|  | (0.007) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Female | 0.121 | 0.159 | 0.157 | -0.202 | 0.093 | -0.624 | -0.023 | -0.528 |
|  | (0.240) | (0.253) | (0.253) | (0.340) | (0.385) | (0.407) | (0.401) | (0.432) |
| Switching opportunity =2 | -0.946\*\*\* | -0.938\*\*\* | -0.933\*\*\* | -0.686\*\* | 0.134 | -1.917\*\*\* | 0.150 | -2.269\*\*\* |
|  | (0.209) | (0.220) | (0.221) | (0.298) | (0.344) | (0.420) | (0.364) | (0.494) |
| Level 2 variance | 3.097\*\*\* | 3.400\*\*\* | 3.418\*\*\* | 2.672\* | 3.082\* | 3.082\* | 3.133\* | 3.133\* |
|  | (1.039) | (1.178) | (1.185) | (1.462) | (1.612) | (1.612) | (1.683) | (1.683) |
| Constant | 1.116\*\* | 0.258 | 0.272 | 0.621 | -0.755 | -0.133 | -0.941 | 0.194 |
|  | (0.507) | (0.549) | (0.553) | (0.748) | (0.805) | (0.838) | (0.856) | (0.910) |
| AIC | 1082.15 | 1032.69 | 1033.71 | 486.295 | 738.16 | 738.16 | 671.49 | 671.49 |
| BIC | 1117.14 | 1077.68 | 1083.68 | 539.00 | 816.40 | 816.40 | 756.63 | 756.63 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,095 | 1,095 | 1,093 | 454 | 454 | 454 | 426 | 426 |
| Number of groups | 650 | 650 | 649 | 309 |  |  |  |  |

*Note*. Multilevel models with respondent as the upper level. Dependent variable for models 1-4: vote switching (1), non-switching (0); for models 5 and 6: non-switching (0, base category), switching to formateur party (1), switching to non-formateur party (2). Expected formateur base category: Preferred candidate wins. Models 4-6 include voters for non-formateur parties only. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

# Table A2. Replicating Table 1 with bootstrap

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Switch | Switch | Switch |
|  |  |  |  |
| Coalition expectations | -0.242\*\*\* | -0.228\*\*\* | -0.228\*\*\* |
|  | (0.039) | (0.038) | (0.039) |
| Formateur uncertainty |  |  | -0.035 |
|  |  |  | (0.216) |
| Insincere past |  | 0.454\* | 0.450 |
|  |  | (0.251) | (0.279) |
| Ideological distance |  | 0.419\*\*\* | 0.421\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.080) | (0.080) |
| Political knowledge | -0.051 | -0.042 | -0.053 |
|  | (0.218) | (0.238) | (0.231) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.006 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Female | 0.025 | 0.032 | 0.031 |
|  | (0.189) | (0.216) | (0.214) |
| Switching opportunity =2 | -0.651\*\*\* | -0.627\*\*\* | -0.626\*\*\* |
|  | (0.174) | (0.171) | (0.176) |
| Constant | 1.022\*\* | 0.457 | 0.463 |
|  | (0.440) | (0.473) | (0.472) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,095 | 1,095 | 1,093 |

*Note*. Logistic regression models. Dependent variable: vote switching (1), non-switching (0). Bootstrapping on random subsamples (450 unique respondents) repeated 500 times for each model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by respondent.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

# Table A3. Replicating Table 2 with bootstrap

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2a) | (2b) | (3a) | (3b) |
| VARIABLES | Switch | To Formateur | To Non-formateur | To Formateur | To Non-formateur |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coalition expectations | -0.225\*\*\* | -0.210\*\*\* | -0.143\* | -0.211\*\*\* | -0.178\*\* |
|  | (0.069) | (0.071) | (0.073) | (0.075) | (0.082) |
| Formateur uncertainty | -0.816 | 0.364 | -0.039 |  |  |
|  | (0.903) | (0.430) | (0.502) |  |  |
| Uncertainty \* coalition | 0.175 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.138) |  |  |  |  |
| Expected formateur: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncertain |  |  |  | 0.668 | -0.568 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.426) | (0.646) |
| Preferred loses |  |  |  | 0.558 | -0.082 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.584) | (0.888) |
| Insincere past | 0.511 | 0.645 | 0.294 | 0.632 | 0.178 |
|  | (0.395) | (0.490) | (0.606) | (0.442) | (1.370) |
| Ideological distance | 0.592\*\*\* | 0.600\*\*\* | 0.591\*\*\* | 0.638\*\*\* | 0.644\*\*\* |
|  | (0.143) | (0.148) | (0.159) | (0.159) | (0.192) |
| Political knowledge | -0.595 | -0.769\* | -0.507 | -0.729\* | -0.590 |
|  | (0.373) | (0.460) | (0.460) | (0.410) | (0.464) |
| Age | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.004 | 0.009 | 0.003 |
|  | (0.009) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Female | -0.170 | 0.090 | -0.540 | -0.018 | -0.438 |
|  | (0.322) | (0.395) | (0.399) | (0.387) | (0.415) |
| Switching opportunity =2 | -0.519\* | 0.319 | -1.707\*\*\* | 0.336 | -2.043 |
|  | (0.281) | (0.354) | (0.492) | (0.349) | (1.293) |
| Constant | 0.615 | -0.700 | -0.115 | -0.848 | 0.227 |
|  | (0.667) | (0.846) | (0.841) | (0.835) | (0.941) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 454 | 454 | 454 | 426 | 426 |

*Note*. Model 1 is logistic. Dependent variable: vote switching (1), non-switching (0). Models 2 and 3 are multinomial logistic. Dependent variable: non-switching (0, base category), switching to formateur party (1), switching to non-formateur party (2). Expected formateur base category: Preferred candidate wins. Bootstrapping on random subsamples (200 unique respondents) repeated 500 times for each model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by respondent.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

# Table A4. Interacting coalition expectations with demographic variables

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | Switch | Switch | Switch | Switch |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Coalition expectations | -0.246\*\*\* | -0.243\*\*\* | -0.274\*\*\* | -0.225\*\*\* |
|  | (0.062) | (0.090) | (0.042) | (0.039) |
| Formateur uncertainty | -0.032 | -0.033 | -0.032 | -0.036 |
|  | (0.183) | (0.184) | (0.183) | (0.182) |
| Insincere past | 0.444\*\* | 0.451\*\* | 0.474\*\* | 0.450\*\* |
|  | (0.212) | (0.212) | (0.213) | (0.212) |
| Ideological distance | 0.422\*\*\* | 0.421\*\*\* | 0.423\*\*\* | 0.421\*\*\* |
|  | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.064) |
| Political knowledge | -0.214 | -0.055 | -0.037 | -0.055 |
|  | (0.514) | (0.192) | (0.193) | (0.192) |
| Age | -0.006 | -0.008 | -0.006 | -0.006 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.014) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Female | 0.034 | 0.032 | -0.599 | 0.032 |
|  | (0.173) | (0.172) | (0.451) | (0.172) |
| Switching opportunity =2 | -0.624\*\*\* | -0.628\*\*\* | -0.639\*\*\* | -0.566 |
|  | (0.145) | (0.145) | (0.146) | (0.413) |
| Coalition \* knowledge | 0.024 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.070) |  |  |  |
| Coalition \* age |  | 0.000 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.002) |  |  |
| Coalition \* female |  |  | 0.092 |  |
|  |  |  | (0.061) |  |
| Coalition \* opportunity 2 |  |  |  | -0.009 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.058) |
| Constant | 0.584 | 0.565 | 0.756\* | 0.438 |
|  | (0.518) | (0.696) | (0.414) | (0.416) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,093 | 1,093 | 1,093 | 1,093 |

*Note*. Logistic regression models. Dependent variable: vote switching (1), non-switching (0). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by respondent. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

# Table A5. Excluding Israel Our Home voters

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5a) | (5b) | (6a) | (6b) |
| VARIABLES | Switch | Switch | Switch | Switch | To Formateur | To Non-Formateur | To Formateur | To Non-Formateur |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Coalition expectations | -0.241\*\*\* | -0.239\*\*\* | -0.241\*\*\* | -0.222\*\*\* | -0.232\*\*\* | -0.160\*\*\* | -0.216\*\*\* | -0.180\*\*\* |
|  | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.049) | (0.054) | (0.055) | (0.058) | (0.059) |
| Formateur uncertainty |  |  | -0.100 | -0.455 | 0.293 | -0.123 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.190) | (0.675) | (0.324) | (0.350) |  |  |
| Uncertainty \* coalition |  |  |  | 0.101 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.108) |  |  |  |  |
| Expected formateur: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Uncertain |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.630\* | -0.593 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.355) | (0.456) |
| Preferred loses |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.590 | -0.091 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | (0.462) | (0.445) |
| Insincere past |  | 0.301 | 0.294 | 0.243 | 0.343 | 0.059 | 0.435 | 0.090 |
|  |  | (0.216) | (0.216) | (0.323) | (0.385) | (0.435) | (0.374) | (0.468) |
| Ideological distance | 0.416\*\*\* | 0.405\*\*\* | 0.408\*\*\* | 0.559\*\*\* | 0.545\*\*\* | 0.581\*\*\* | 0.596\*\*\* | 0.624\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.066) | (0.105) | (0.117) | (0.127) | (0.123) | (0.146) |
| Political knowledge | -0.042 | -0.024 | -0.037 | -0.706\*\* | -0.815\*\* | -0.659\* | -0.793\*\* | -0.710\* |
|  | (0.196) | (0.195) | (0.196) | (0.294) | (0.369) | (0.357) | (0.365) | (0.372) |
| Age | -0.007 | -0.007 | -0.006 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.008 | 0.004 |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Female | 0.068 | 0.067 | 0.069 | -0.188 | 0.141 | -0.598\*\* | 0.007 | -0.436 |
|  | (0.173) | (0.173) | (0.173) | (0.239) | (0.299) | (0.293) | (0.310) | (0.305) |
| Switching opportunity =2 | -0.750\*\*\* | -0.743\*\*\* | -0.735\*\*\* | -0.581\*\*\* | 0.196 | -1.687\*\*\* | 0.258 | -1.923\*\*\* |
|  | (0.152) | (0.152) | (0.153) | (0.223) | (0.280) | (0.351) | (0.285) | (0.402) |
| Constant | 0.662\* | 0.597 | 0.619 | 0.818 | -0.305 | 0.172 | -0.634 | 0.337 |
|  | (0.388) | (0.389) | (0.391) | (0.550) | (0.621) | (0.638) | (0.651) | (0.687) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,065 | 1,065 | 1,063 | 424 | 424 | 424 | 400 | 400 |

*Note*. Dependent variable for models 1-4: vote switching (1), non-switching (0); for models 5-6: non-switching (0, base category), switching to formateur party (1), switching to non-formateur party (2). Expected formateur base category: Preferred candidate wins. Models 4-6 include voters for non-formateur parties only. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05