**Online Appendix**

**APPENDIX A: Operationalization and descriptive data**

**Figure A1. Countries and elections included in the analyses**



**Table A1. Operationalization and descriptive statistics of main variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Wording / Coding** | **Mean** | **SD** | **Min** | **Max** |
| Vote | Voting behaviour in the last legislative election (Lower Chamber) coded in 2 categories (0 = did not vote for that party; 1 = voted for that party). | .11 | .32 | 0 | 1 |
| LR Distance | Distance on the left-right ideological scale. | 2.98 | 2.58 | 0 | 10 |
| Distance in alternative dimensions | Distance on alternative ideological scales provided by CSES that vary by country-election. | 3 | 2.71 | 0 | 10 |
| Party-centred | Categorical variable measuring the electoral system type in two categories (0 = candidate-centred; 1 = party-centred). All systems that are not closed or flexible-list PR are coded as 0. | .37 | .48 | 0 | 1 |
| Shugart index | Continuous variable measuring the level of candidate-centredness of the electoral system, where higher values mean higher levels of candidate-centredness. The minimum value corresponds to closed-list PR and the maximum value in the sample corresponds to open-list PR. | 4.67 | 2.55 | 1 | 8.55 |
| Farrell-McAllister index | Continuous variable measuring the level of candidate-centredness of the electoral system, where higher values mean higher levels of candidate-centredness. The minimum value corresponds to closed-list PR and the maximum value corresponds to the single transferable vote. | 3.66 | 2.31 | 1 | 10 |
| Nominal voting | Categorical variable measuring the electoral system type in two categories (0 = non-nominal voting; 1 = nominal voting). First-past-the-post, two-rounds majority, alternative vote and single transferable vote are considered nominal vote systems (mixed systems receive 0.5). | .25 | .35 | 0 | 1 |
| Intra-party competition | Categorical variable measuring the electoral system type in two categories (0 = non-intra-party competition; 1 = intra-party competition). Open-list PR and the single transferable vote are considered systems with intra-party competition. | .27 | .44 | 0 | 1 |
| District-level candidates (log) | Natural log transformation of the variable measuring the number of candidates at the district level. The variable results from multiplying district magnitude by the number of lists running in that district. | 5.36 | 1.41 | .69 | 8.25 |
| District-level candidates (log), rescaled | Natural logarithm of the number of candidates at the district level rescaled following Gelman (2008). | -.06 | .42 | -1.68 | .79 |
| Preference vote | Only for open list systems, voting behaviour in the last legislative election (Lower Chamber) coded in 2 categories (0 = the respondent did not cast a candidate preference vote; 1 = the respondent cast a candidate preference vote). | .59 | .48 | 0 | 1 |
| Capital district | Categorical variable measuring the district of the respondent in two categories (0 = does not live in a capital electoral district; 1 = lives in a capital electoral district). | .102 | .303 | 0 | 1 |
| Female | Categorical variable measuring the gender of the respondent in two categories (0 = male; 1 = female). | .52 | .49 | 0 | 1 |
| Age (rescaled) | Age of respondents rescaled following Gelman (2008). | -.02 | .501 | -.84 | 1.71 |
| Education (rescaled) | Categorical variable measuring the level of education of respondents in 5 categories ranging from 0 = no education to 4 = university education. The variable is rescaled following Gelman (2008). | -.004 | .49 | -.86 | .76 |

**Figure A2. Distribution of main variables (I)**

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**Figure A3. Distribution of main variables (II)**

****

**Figure A4. Distribution of main variables (III)**



**Table A2. Scoring of electoral systems on the intraparty dimension (ballot structure and potential lack of variation in magnitude across districts within country-election)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country and Year of Election** | **Electoral System** | **Scoring** | | **Variation in DM** | **N** |
|  | **Shugart**  **(2001)** | **Farrell-McAllister**  **(2006)** |  |  |
| **Candidate-centred** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Albania 2005 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 7,212 |
| Australia 1996 | Alternative vote | 5.7 | 9 | 0 | 6,625 |
| Australia 2004 | Alternative vote | 5.7 | 9 | 0 | 7,548 |
| Australia 2007 | Alternative vote | 5.7 | 9 | 0 | 6,012 |
| Australia 2013 | Alternative vote | 5.7 | 9 | 0 | 12,762 |
| Australia 2019 | Alternative vote | 5.7 | 9 | 0 | 9,346 |
| Brazil 2002 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 9,224 |
| Brazil 2006 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 2,724 |
| Brazil 2010 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 5,304 |
| Brazil 2014 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 8,427 |
| Brazil 2018 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 10,351 |
| Canada 1997 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 5,394 |
| Canada 2004 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 5,102 |
| Canada 2008 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 7,628 |
| Canada 2011 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 4,687 |
| Canada 2015 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 5,655 |
| Switzerland 1999 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 8,363 |
| Switzerland 2003 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 6,200 |
| Switzerland 2007 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 14,811 |
| Switzerland 2011 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 27,318 |
| Chile 2005 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 0 | 5,736 |
| Chile 2009 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 0 | 5,181 |
| Chile 2017 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 10,699 |
| Germany 1998 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 10,379 |
| Germany 2002 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 19,140 |
| Germany 2005 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 13,169 |
| Germany 2009 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 10,635 |
| Germany 2013 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 11,685 |
| Germany 2017 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 12,903 |
| Denmark 1998 | Open-list PR\* | 4 | 6 | 1 | 11,062 |
| Denmark 2001 | Open-list PR\* | 4 | 6 | 1 | 14,673 |
| Denmark 2007 | Open-list PR\* | 4 | 6 | 1 | 10,728 |
| Estonia 2011 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 4,033 |
| Finland 2003 | Quasi-list PR | 7.15 | 7 | 1 | 7,182 |
| Finland 2007 | Quasi-list PR | 7.15 | 7 | 1 | 9,206 |
| Finland 2011 | Quasi-list PR | 7.15 | 7 | 1 | 9,265 |
| Finland 2015 | Quasi-list PR | 7.15 | 7 | 1 | 10,324 |
| France 2007 | Two rounds majority | 6.45 | 5 | 0 | 13,294 |
| United Kingdom 1997 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 7,120 |
| United Kingdom 2005 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 1,755 |
| United Kingdom 2015 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 5,984 |
| Greece 2009 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 5,240 |
| Greece 2015 (January) | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 6,535 |
| Hong Kong 1998 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3,298 |
| Hong Kong 2000 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2,126 |
| Hong Kong 2004 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 1,208 |
| Hong Kong 2008 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3,675 |
| Hong Kong 2012 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 4,981 |
| Hong Kong 2016 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3,364 |
| Hungary 1998 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 4.5 | 3 | 1 | 6,499 |
| Hungary 2002 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 4.5 | 3 | 1 | 6,014 |
| Hungary 2018 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 4,795 |
| Ireland 2002 | Single transferable vote | 7.85 | 10 | 1 | 9,481 |
| Ireland 2007 | Single transferable vote | 7.85 | 10 | 1 | 4,612 |
| Ireland 2011 | Single transferable vote | 7.85 | 10 | 1 | 6,626 |
| Ireland 2016 | Single transferable vote | 7.85 | 10 | 1 | 6,243 |
| Italy 2018 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 9,708 |
| Japan 2007 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 5,243 |
| Japan 2013 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 12,609 |
| Kenya 2013 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 2,667 |
| South Korea 2000 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4,142 |
| South Korea 2004 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 6,745 |
| South Korea 2008 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4,897 |
| South Korea 2012 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2,538 |
| South Korea 2016 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4,582 |
| Lithuania 2016 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 6,401 |
| Latvia 2010 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 4,374 |
| Latvia 2011 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 4,880 |
| Latvia 2014 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 4,107 |
| Mexico 2000 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 6,668 |
| Mexico 2003 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 7,113 |
| Mexico 2006 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 8,194 |
| Mexico 2009 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 13,575 |
| Mexico 2012 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 11,308 |
| Mexico 2015 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 5,109 |
| New Zealand 1996 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 16,273 |
| New Zealand 2002 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 8,322 |
| New Zealand 2008 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 5,352 |
| New Zealand 2011 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 6,897 |
| New Zealand 2014 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 7,012 |
| New Zealand 2017 | Mixed-member proportional | 4.5 | 3 | 0 | 9,061 |
| Peru 2001 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 5,345 |
| Peru 2006 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 9,698 |
| Peru 2011 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 6,168 |
| Peru 2016 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 7,510 |
| Philippines 2004 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 5,110 |
| Philippines 2010 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4,659 |
| Philippines 2016 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 6,687 |
| Poland 1997 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 9,261 |
| Poland 2001 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 9,589 |
| Poland 2005 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 12,949 |
| Poland 2007 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 5,959 |
| Poland 2011 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 1 | 7,078 |
| Romania 2012 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 7,890 |
| Slovenia 1996 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 0 | 6,149 |
| Slovenia 2004 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 0 | 3,402 |
| Slovenia 2008 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 0 | 4,788 |
| Slovenia 2011 | Open-list PR | 8.55 | 6 | 0 | 4,381 |
| Thailand 2007 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 1 | 8,330 |
| Taiwan 1996 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 1,412 |
| Taiwan 2001 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4,099 |
| Ukraine 1998 | Mixed-member majoritarian | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3,401 |
| United States 2004 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 2,271 |
| United States 2008 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 3,650 |
| United States 2012 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 3,281 |
| United States 2016 | First-past-the-post | 5.7 | 4 | 0 | 6,876 |
| **Party-centred** |  |  |  |  |  |
| Argentina 2015 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,690 |
| Austria 2008 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6,033 |
| Austria 2013 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5,553 |
| Austria 2017 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6,674 |
| Belgium 1999 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 17,645 |
| Bulgaria 2001 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9,116 |
| Bulgaria 2014 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5,313 |
| Spain 1996 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4,428 |
| Spain 2000 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4,312 |
| Spain 2004 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3,632 |
| Spain 2008 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,747 |
| Croatia 2007 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4,642 |
| Czech Republic 1996 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6,815 |
| Czech Republic 2002 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4,140 |
| Czech Republic 2006 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 8,320 |
| Czech Republic 2010 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 10,551 |
| Czech Republic 2013 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9,387 |
| Greece 2012 (May) | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,305 |
| Greece 2015 (September) | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7,208 |
| Iceland 1999 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,324 |
| Iceland 2003 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5,658 |
| Iceland 2007 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7,433 |
| Iceland 2009 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6,249 |
| Iceland 2013 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6,541 |
| Iceland 2016 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7,050 |
| Iceland 2017 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 13,050 |
| Israel 1996 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4,351 |
| Israel 2003 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6,496 |
| Israel 2006 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 6,052 |
| Israel 2013 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 4,818 |
| Italy 2006 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3,332 |
| Montenegro 2012 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2,645 |
| Montenegro 2016 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3,494 |
| Netherlands 1998 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 0 | 10,453 |
| Netherlands 2002 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 0 | 13,254 |
| Netherlands 2006 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 0 | 18,018 |
| Netherlands 2010 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 0 | 16,959 |
| Norway 1997 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11,640 |
| Norway 2001 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13,152 |
| Norway 2005 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14,957 |
| Norway 2009 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13,421 |
| Norway 2013 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14,386 |
| Norway 2017 | Closed-list PR\* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16,050 |
| Portugal 2002 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,292 |
| Portugal 2005 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10,672 |
| Portugal 2009 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4,692 |
| Portugal 2015 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,468 |
| Romania 1996 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3,795 |
| Romania 2004 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,971 |
| Serbia 2012 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 0 | 7,270 |
| Slovakia 2010 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7,425 |
| Slovakia 2016 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 0 | 5,999 |
| Sweden 1998 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5,627 |
| Sweden 2002 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5,851 |
| Sweden 2006 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 8,663 |
| Sweden 2014 | Flexible-list PR | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6,753 |
| Turkey 2011 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6,912 |
| Uruguay 2009 | Closed-list PR | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3,602 |

*Note:* Preferential voting for a single candidate is mandatory in Finland and, hence, this country it is classified as a quasi-list system (see Söderlund 2016). Iceland (pre-2000) and Norway are considered a closed-list system due to the high threshold for voters to alter a party’s ordering of candidates (Shugart et al. 2005). In Denmark, parties can decide which type of lists they want to use, but actually most of them employ open lists.

**APPENDIX B: Supporting tables**

**Table B1. The Impact of** **Left-right Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance by Type of Ballot Structure on Vote Choice, Alternative-Specific Conditional Logits**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | All observations | Non-closed/non-flexible lists | Closed/flexible lists | All observations |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | .620\*\*\* | .652\*\*\* | .564\*\*\* | .653\*\*\* |
|  | (.010) | (.011) | (.019) | (.011) |
| LR Distance\* |  |  |  | .863\*\*\* |
| Closed/flexible Lists |  |  |  | (.033) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 860,027 | 508,661 | 351,366 | 860,027 |
| Individuals | 142,939 | 89,492 | 53,447 | 142,939 |
| Log-likelihood | -173,466.09 | -106,303.16 | -66,612.955 | -172,916.12 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from conditional logistic models with fixed effects by respondent and cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table B2. The Impact of Left-right Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance by Type of Ballot Structure on Vote Choice, Hierarchical Linear Models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Dichotomous operationalization | Shugart index | Farrell-McAllister index |
|  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | -.036\*\*\* | -.036\*\*\* | -.030\*\*\* |
|  | (.0002) | (.0002) | (.0002) |
| Electoral System | .028\*\*\* | -.006\*\*\* | -.0003 |
|  | (.009) | (.001) | (.001) |
| LR Distance\* | -.011\*\*\* | .001\*\*\* | .0005\*\*\* |
| Electoral System | (.0003) | (.00004) | (.00004) |
| Constant | .218\*\*\* | .235\*\*\* | .207\*\*\* |
|  | (.005) | (.008) | (.007) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,096,715 | 1,232,796 | 1,232,796 |
| Elections | 164 | 164 | 164 |
| Country-election random intercepts | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual random intercepts | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Log-likelihood | -317,372.51 | -303,609.38 | 304,419.1 |

*Note:* Marginal effects from three-level hierarchical linear models with country-election and respondent random intercepts; standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests); in columns 1, 2 and 3, the electoral system variable corresponds to a dummy variable (non-closed/non-flexible vs. closed/flexible), the Shugart Index and the Farrell-McAllister Index, respectively.

**Table B3. The Impact of Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance in Alternative Dimensions by Type of Ballot Structure on Vote Choice, Alternative-Specific Conditional Logits**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | All observations | Non-closed/non-flexible lists | Closed/flexible lists | All observations |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | .653\*\*\* | .691\*\*\* | .528\*\*\* | .691\*\*\* |
|  | (.020) | (.017) | (.025) | (.017) |
| LR Distance\* |  |  |  | .763\*\*\* |
| Closed/flexible Lists |  |  |  | (.039) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 163,434 | 111,577 | 51,857 | 163,434 |
| Elections | 35 | 28 | 7 | 35 |
| Log-likelihood | -34,383.177 | -24,475.829 | -9,618.077 | -34,093.906 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from conditional logit models with fixed effects by respondent and cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table B4. The Impact of Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance by Type of Ballot Structure in Alternative Dimensions on Vote Choice, Hierarchical Linear Models**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | Dichotomous operationalization | Shugart index | Farrell-McAllister index |
|  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | -.028\*\*\* | -.036\*\*\* | -.026\*\*\* |
|  | (.0009) | (.001) | (.0009) |
| Electoral System | .046 | -.010+ | -.003 |
|  | (.037) | (.006) | (.007) |
| LR Distance\* | -.020\*\*\* | .003\*\*\* | .001\*\*\* |
| Electoral System | (.001) | (.0009) | (.0009) |
| Constant | .195\*\*\* | .242\*\*\* | .199\*\*\* |
|  | (.016) | (.035) | (.028) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 232,179 | 264,418 | 264,418 |
| Elections | 37 | 37 | 37 |
| Country-election random intercepts | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Individual random intercepts | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Log-likelihood | -60,304.69 | -56,598.67 | -56,898.94 |

*Note:* Marginal effects from three-level hierarchical linear models with country-election and respondent random intercepts; standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests); in columns 1, 2 and 3, the electoral system variable corresponds to a dummy variable (non-closed/non-flexible vs. closed/flexible), the Shugart Index and the Farrell-McAllister Index, respectively.

**Table B5. The Impact of Left-right Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance in Alternative Dimensions by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level on Vote Choice, Hierarchical Linear Models**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | Non-closed/non-flexible lists | Closed/flexible lists |
|  |  |  |
| LR Distance | -.042\*\*\* | -.032\*\*\* |
|  | (.001) | (.001) |
| LogCandidates | -.013\*\*\* | -.0009 |
|  | (.001) | (.001) |
| LR Distance\* | .004\*\*\* | -.001\*\* |
| LogCandidates | (.0009) | (.0009) |
| Constant | .234\*\*\* | .224\*\*\* |
|  | (.008) | (.008) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 255,367 | 332,852 |
| Elections | 31 | 39 |
| Country-election random intercepts | Yes | Yes |
| Individual random intercepts | Yes | Yes |
| Log-likelihood | -47,762.451 | -83,557.012 |

*Note:* Marginal effects from three-level hierarchical linear models with country-election and respondent random intercepts; standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table B6. Alternative-Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Left-right Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (and Number of Candidates at the District Level), Mechanisms**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | H1-Nominal voting | H2-Nominal voting | H1-Intraparty competition | H2-Intraparty competition |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | .607\*\*\* | .689\*\*\* | .608\*\*\* | .666\*\*\* |
|  | (.014) | (.044) | (.011) | (.018) |
| LR Distance x | 1.079\* | .806\* | 1.075\* | .939 |
| Nominal/Intraparty | (.040) | (.084) | (.039) | (.096) |
| LR Distance x |  | .976\* |  | .969\*\*\* |
| LogCandidates |  | (.012) |  | (.008) |
| LR Distance x |  | 1.084+ |  | 1.047\* |
| Nominal/Intraparty x |  | (.046) |  | (.024) |
| LogCandidates |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 860,027 | 617,160 | 860,027 | 617,160 |
| Respondents | 142,939 | 102,083 | 142,939 | 102,083 |
| Log-likelihood | 172,838.6 | -124,363.4 | -173,271.19 | -123,891.36 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from conditional logistic models with fixed effects by respondent and cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 (two-tailed tests); Nominal voting systems include STV, alternative vote, two-rounds majority and first-past-the-post, whereas intra-party competition systems include open-list PR and STV (in the nominal voting variable, mixed systems receive 0.5).

**Table B7. Determinants of Casting a Preference Vote in Open-list PR Systems, OLS**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | DV: preference vote |
| LogCandidates (rescaled) | .155\* |
|  | (.058) |
| Capital | -.070\* |
|  | (.029) |
| Female | -.019 |
|  | (.011) |
| Age (rescaled) | -.027 |
|  | (.024) |
| Education (rescaled) | -.068 |
|  | (.042) |
| Constant | .346\*\*\* |
|  | (.009) |
| Observations | 15,692 |
| *R*2 | .092 |

*Note:* OLS model with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests); Wave fixed effects included but not shown.

**Table B8. Alternative-Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Left-right Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (and Number of Candidates at the District Level), Greece**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | H1-Linear Effects | H1-Interactive Effects | H2-Linear Effects | H2-Interactive Effects |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | .544\*\*\* | .565\*\*\* | .659\*\*\* | .611\*\*\* |
|  | (.013) | (.011) | (.056) | (.056) |
| LR Distance x |  | .929\*\*\* |  | 1.104 |
| Closed Lists |  | (.022) |  | (.189) |
| LR Distance x LogCandidates |  |  | .959\*\*  (.017) | .982  (.015) |
| LR Distance x LogCandidates x |  |  |  | .965  (.035) |
| Closed Lists |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 18,193 | 18,193 | 17,518 | 17,518 |
| Respondents | 2,676 | 2,676 | 2,574 | 2,574 |
| Elections | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Log-likelihood | -2,984.352 | -2,981.915 | -2,866.059 | -2,858.933 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from conditional logistic models with fixed effects by respondent and cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 (two-tailed tests); Lists are open in October 2009 and January 2015, whereas they are closed in June 2012 and September 2015.

**APPENDIX C: Additional analyses**

**Table C1. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (Alternative Operationalizations of Left-right Ideology), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | H1-LR Experts | H1-Party ID |
|  |  |  |
| LR Distance | .690\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.013) |  |
| Partisan |  | 17.143\*\*\* |
|  |  | (1.337) |
| LR Distance x | .862\*\*\* |  |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.024) |  |
| Partisan x |  | 2.18\*\*\* |
| Closed/flexible List |  | (.254) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 981,910 | 887,529 |
| Respondents | 149,209 | 133,576 |
| Elections | 159 | 141 |
| Log-likelihood | -204,278.42 | -114,320.51 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C2. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Alternative Operationalizations of Left-right Ideology), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | H2-LR Experts | H2-Party ID |
|  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.630\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.047) |  |
| Partisan |  | 21.143\*\*\* |
|  |  | (14.105) |
| LR Distance x | 1.011 |  |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.121) |  |
| Partisan x |  | 2.880 |
| Closed/flexible List |  | (2.166) |
| LR Distance x | 1.019 |  |
| LogCandidates | (0.016) |  |
| Partisan x |  | 1.005 |
| LogCandidates |  | (0.137) |
| LR Distance x | 0.965+ |  |
| LogCandidates x | (0.021) |  |
| Closed/flexible List |  |  |
| Partisan x |  | 0.914 |
| LogCandidates x |  | (0.135) |
| Closed/flexible List |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 468,879 | 433,144 |
| Respondents | 64,943 | 60,352 |
| Elections | 68 | 66 |
| Log-likelihood | -94,831.611 | -58,494.463 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C3. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (Alternative Operationalizations of Left-right Distance), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | H1-Squared Distance | H1-Direction |
|  |  |  |
| Sq. Distance/Direction | 0.062\*\*\* | 7.746\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.799) |
| Sq. Distance/Direction x | 0.322\*\*\* | 1.556\*\*\* |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.102) | (0.174) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 860,027 | 860,027 |
| Respondents | 142,939 | 142,939 |
| Elections | 161 | 161 |
| Log-likelihood | -179,349.15 | -180,151.96 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C4. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Alternative Operationalizations of Left-right Distance), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | H2-Squared Distance | H2-Direction |
|  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.021\*\*\* | 12.484\*\*\* |
|  | (0.019) | (7.467) |
| LR Distance x | 4.368 | 0.499 |
| Closed/flexible List | (4.788) | (0.241) |
| LR Distance x | 4.603 | 0.504 |
| LogCandidates | (4.761) | (0.389) |
| LR Distance | 0.021\*\* | 5.458\* |
| LogCandidates x | (0.026) | (3.668) |
| Closed/flexible List |  |  |
| Observations | 436,169 | 436,169 |
| Respondents | 67,256 | 67,256 |
| Elections | 67 | 67 |
| Log-likelihood | -90,851.457 | -91,316.451 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C5. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (Alternative Operationalizations of Non-closed/non-flexible List), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | H1-Without First Past the Post | H1-Without Majority Two Rounds | H1-Without Alternative Vote | H1-Without Mixed Systems |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.654\*\*\* | 0.654\*\*\* | 0.659\*\*\* | 0.644\*\*\* |
|  | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.015) |
| LR Distance x | 0.862\*\*\* | 0.861\*\*\* | 0.855\*\*\* | 0.875\*\* |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.036) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 806,973 | 851,205 | 822,685 | 668,120 |
| Respondents | 128,336 | 141,655 | 134,768 | 111,924 |
| Elections | 146 | 160 | 156 | 121 |
| Log-likelihood | -160,179.99 | -171,596.32 | -165,505.66 | -135,505.12 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C6. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Alternative Operationalizations of Non-closed/non-flexible List), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | H1-Without STV | H2-Without STV | H1-Without Flexible Lists | H2-Without Flexible Lists |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.651\*\*\* | 0.607\*\*\* | 0.653\*\*\* | 0.633\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.053) | (0.011) | (0.056) |
| LR Distance x | 0.865\*\*\* | 1.120 | 0.866\*\*\* | 1.069 |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.033) | (0.175) | (0.025) | (0.110) |
| LR Distance x |  | 1.022 |  | 1.014 |
| LogCandidates |  | (0.020) |  | (0.020) |
| LR Distance |  | 0.944\* |  | 0.947\* |
| LogCandidates x |  | (0.025) |  | (0.022) |
| Closed/flexible List |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 839,917 | 431,029 | 678,634 | 286,079 |
| Respondents | 139,381 | 66,209 | 115,812 | 45,016 |
| Elections | 157 | 76 | 136 | 58 |
| Log-likelihood | -168,317.88 | -86,412.184 | -136,573.23 | -57,397.404 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C7. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (Alternative Samples of Electoral Systems), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  | H1-Without National-districts Systems | H1-Without Multi-tier Systems |
|  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.644\*\*\* | 0.664\*\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.011) |
| LR Distance x | 0.863\*\* | 0.866\*\* |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.039) | (0.040) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 633,439 | 687,870 |
| Respondents | 106,652 | 118,425 |
| Elections | 111 | 135 |
| Log-likelihood | -128,825.63 | 141,577.22 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C8. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Alternative Samples of Electoral Systems), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | H2-Without Multi-tier Systems | H2-With National-districts Systems | H2-With Systems with Uniform District Magnitude |
|  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.626\*\*\* | 0.648\*\*\* | 0.632\*\*\* |
|  | (0.061) | (0.054) | (0.055) |
| LR Distance x | 1.116 | 1.184 | 1.037 |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.178) | (0.238) | (0.165) |
| LR Distance x | 1.015 | 1.014 | 1.014 |
| LogCandidates | (0.021) | (0.019) | (0.020) |
| LR Distance | 0.944\* | 0.936\* | 0.959 |
| LogCandidates x | (0.025) | (0.029) | (0.025) |
| Closed/flexible List |  |  |  |
| Observations | 413,598 | 331,107 | 456,926 |
| Respondents | 63,786 | 52,530 | 70,612 |
| Elections | 69 | 61 | 83 |
| Log-likelihood | -83,294.636 | -68,482.103 | -92,015.719 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C9. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Exclusion of Cases), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | H1-Only 6 Alternatives | H2-Only 6 Alternatives | H1-No Concurrent Elections | H2-No Concurrent Elections |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.653\*\*\* | 0.647\*\*\* | 0.626\*\*\* | 0.746\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.055) | (0.010) | (0.057) |
| LR Distance x | 0.870\*\*\* | 1.055 | 0.892\*\* | 0.905 |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.034) | (0.166) | (0.035) | (0.140) |
| LR Distance x |  | 1.009 |  | 0.964\* |
| LogCandidates |  | (0.019) |  | (0.015) |
| LR Distance x |  | 0.956+ |  | 1.001 |
| LogCandidates x Closed/flexible List |  | (0.025) |  | (0.024) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 723,823 | 350,072 | 773,636 | 402,146 |
| Individuals | 139,262 | 64,548 | 125,075 | 61,601 |
| Elections | 161 | 77 | 133 | 65 |
| Log-likelihood | -159,029.19 | 77,980.389 | -152,920.63 | -78,991.311 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C10. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure (Additional Control Variables), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | H1-Wave Fixed Effects | H1-Individual-level Controls | H1-Party-level Controls | H1-Controlling for Party System Polarization | H1-Other Macro-level Institutional and Economic Controls |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.653\*\*\* | 0.652\*\*\* | 0.655\*\*\* | 0.651\*\*\* | 0.652\*\*\* |
|  | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| LR Distance x | 0.862\*\*\* | 0.862\*\*\* | 0.831\*\*\* | 0.843\*\*\* | 0.871\*\* |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.038) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 860,027 | 825,749 | 507,509 | 704,398 | 785,193 |
| Respondents | 142,939 | 137,476 | 89,000 | 116,855 | 128,140 |
| Elections | 161 | 158 | 143 | 129 | 140 |
| Log-likelihood | -172,555.59 | -165,084.23 | -104,520.4 | -139,669.98 | 154,705.05 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C11. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Additional Control Variables), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|  | H2-Wave Fixed Effects | H2-Individual-level Controls | H2-Party-level Controls | H2-Controlling for Party System Polarization | H2-Other Macro-level Institutional and Economic Controls |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.633\*\*\* | 0.625\*\*\* | 0.644\*\*\* | 0.640\*\*\* | 0.630\*\*\* |
|  | (0.055) | (0.057) | (0.063) | (0.065) | (0.055) |
| LR Distance x | 1.072 | 1.090 | 0.932 | 0.958 | 1.136 |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.169) | (0.171) | (0.127) | (0.116) | (0.201) |
| LR Distance x | 1.014 | 1.016 | 1.012 | 1.008 | 1.013 |
| LogCandidates | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.019) |
| LR Distance x | 0.952+ | 0.949\* | 0.972 | 0.968 | 0.945\* |
| LogCandidates x Closed/flexible List | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.026) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 436,169 | 410,328 | 241,460 | 338,114 | 395,322 |
| Individuals | 67,256 | 63,456 | 39,109 | 52,314 | 60,426 |
| Elections | 67 | 74 | 68 | 57 | 66 |
| Log-likelihood | -87,484.286 | -81,860.43 | -49,670.28 | -66,537.555 | 77,971.639 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C12. Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Estimates for the Effect of Ideological Distance on Vote Choice by Type of Ballot Structure and Number of Candidates at the District Level (Evaluation of National Leaders as Additional Covariate), Odds Ratios**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | H1-Linear Effect of National Leaders | H1- Interactive Effect of National Leaders | H2-Linear Effect of National Leaders | H2- Interactive Effect of National Leaders |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| LR Distance | 0.762\*\*\* | 0.753\*\*\* | 0.992 | 0.970 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.099) | (0.101) |
| LR Distance x | 0.853\*\*\* | 0.867\*\*\* | 0.719\* | 0.734\* |
| Closed/flexible List | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.103) | (0.106) |
| Evaluation of | 1.714\*\*\* | 1.596\*\*\* | 1.871\*\*\* | 1.717\*\*\* |
| National Leaders | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.053) | (0.065) |
| Leaders x |  | 1.224\*\*\* |  | 1.168\*\* |
| Closed/flexible List |  | (0.043) |  | (0.060) |
| LR Distance x |  |  | 0.951\* | 0.954\* |
| LogCandidates |  |  | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| LR Distance x |  |  | 1.030 | 1.028 |
| LogCandidates x Closed/flexible List |  |  | (0.031) | (0.031) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 432,476 | 432,476 | 222,899 | 222,899 |
| Individuals | 74,614 | 74,614 | 34,292 | 34,292 |
| Elections | 125 | 125 | 62 | 62 |
| Log-likelihood | -61,587.017 | -61,153.17 | -28,966.22 | -28,856.4 |

*Note:* Odds ratios from alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed tests).

**Table C13. Differences in the Relative Saliency of the Economic Left-right and GAL/TAN Dimensions by Type of Ballot Structure**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | *p* value |
| Candidate-centred | 1.246 |  |
| Party-centred | 1.234 |  |
|  |  | 0.8194 |

*Note:* The saliency of the economic left-right dimension divided by the saliency of the GAL/TAN dimension for each party weighted by its vote share in the last national election.

**Figure C1. Predicted Probabilities of Vote Choice by Left-right Party-respondent Absolute Linear Distance and Type of Ballot Structure, Hierarchical Linear Model**

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*Note:* All estimates are based on three-level hierarchical linear models with country-election and respondent random intercepts. Vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure C2. Marginal effects of LR distance on vote choice distinguishing between FPP, low-magnitude PR with open lists/STV and low-magnitude PR with closed lists, Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Models**



*Note:* All estimates are based on alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election. Vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure C3. Odds ratios of “LR distance\*Closed/flexible list” on vote choice excluding one country at a time, Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Models**

****

*Note:* All estimates are based on alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election. That is, the estimates replicate the results of Model 4 of Table B1, excluding one country at a time. Horizontal lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure C4. Odds ratios of “LR distance\*Closed list/flexible\*LogCandidates” on vote choice excluding one country at a time, Alternative Specific Conditional Logit Models**

****

*Note:* All estimates are based on alternative specific conditional logit models with cluster standard errors by election. That is, the estimates replicate the results of Model 4 of Table B5, excluding one country at a time. Horizontal lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure C5. Ideological Distance between Candidates and their Nominating Parties across District Magnitude**



*Note:* This figure shows the mean ideological distance between the candidates and parties across different district magnitudes for 11 elections. Gray lines represent the mean distance by party and the red line depicts the overall mean difference by election. The data for this graph comes from the Comparative Candidate Survey (Lutz et al. 2020).

**APPENDIX D: Conditional Logit Estimation**

Consider the *i*th individual’s utility of voting for a given *j*th choice represented as:

,

where αj is a vector of parameters relating *Zi* -the individual-specific characteristics that do not vary across alternatives- to the respondent’s utility. Notice that *αj* varies across choices, implying that the individual invariant characteristics (e.g., gender, age, and education) may affect the utility of voting for each alternative in a different way. *β* is a vector of parameters denoting the relationship between -the characteristics of the *j*th alternative relative to the *i*th respondent- and the respondent’s utility. Therefore, *β* accounts for the observable characteristics of the alternatives (e.g., the party-respondent left-right distance) that affect everyone’s utility function in a similar way. Finally, is the random disturbance for respondent *i* relative to alternative *j*, which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. This assumption is key to the utility model as it implies that a respondent’s assessment of a given alternative is unaffected by what other choices are available. We transform the utilities for each alternative as choice probabilities following the conditional logit framework (McFadden 1973), where the probability that individual *i* chooses alternative *j* can be expressed as: