**Online appendix for** *Ideological Extremism, Perceived Party System Polarisation, and Democratic Support*

**1. Data**

Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) Merged File. Available at <https://u.osu.edu/cnep/>.

**Table 1A: CNEP surveys conducted in liberal democracies (coded 3 in demv2x\_regime — Coppedge et al. 2020)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **N** | **Fieldwork** | **Mode** | **Sampling** | **Contractor** | **AAPOR RR1** |
| Chile2017 | 1,600 | Nov-Dec 2017 | CAPI | Multi-stage stratified random sample | School of Communication, Diego Portales University-Feedback | 25% |
| France 2017 | 2,000 | May2017 | CAWI | Stratified sampling from European Social Survey sample with propensity score matching | YouGov | 40% |
| Germany 2017 | 3,173 | Sep-Oct2017 | CAWI | Quota sample (gender, age, education, region) fromIpsos Online Panel | Ipsos | 51% |
| Great Britain 2017 | 2,000 | June2017 | CAWI | Stratified sampling from UK Office for National Statistics 2016 Labor Force Survey with propensity score matching | YouGov | 27% |
| Greece 2015 | 1,008 | Jun-Aug2015 | Multimode(CATI with option for CAWI completion) | Multi-stage stratified random sample (RDD) | Aristotle University of Thessaloniki | Not available |
| S. Africa 2004 | 1,200 | Sep-Oct2004 | PAPI | Multi-stage stratified random sample | Citizen Surveys | Not available |
| S. Africa 2009 | 1,300 | Oct 2009 | PAPI | Multi-stage stratified random sample | Citizen Surveys | 34% |
| Spain2015 | 2,264 | Jan2016 | CAWI | Quota sampling (age, gender, region) | Netquest | 82% |
| Taiwan 2016 | 1,000 | Jan-Feb2016 | CAWI | Quota sampling (age, gender, education) | AIP | 20% |
| US2016 | 1,600 | Dec 2016-Jan 2017 | CAWI | Stratified sampling from 2010 American Community Survey with propensity score matching | YouGov | 36% |
| US2020 | 2,000 | Dec 2020-Jan 2021 | CAWI | Stratified sampling from 2018 American Community Survey with propensity score matching | YouGov | Not available |

***Individual level variables***

a. **Principled support for democracy:** Auth\_Dem\_cfa\_all. Factor scoring of each individual in each country departing from a CFA of four items from the CNEP surveys:

1.2. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree or Strongly Disagree with the following alternatives?

 **B.OnePartyRule** [reversed]

 -- Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office.

 **B.PresDict** [reversed]

 -- Elections and the National Assembly should be abolished so that we can have a strong leader running this country. [reversed]

 **B.MilRule**

 -- The army should govern the country.

1 Strongly Agree

2 Agree

3 Neither agree/disagree [DO NOT ASK, BUT CODE IF THEY DO NOT AGREE OR DISAGREE]

4 Disagree

5 Strongly disagree

{998 No response or question not asked}

{999 Don’t know}

**B.DemAuth**

Which of the following phrases most closely reflects your own opinion? [PROVIDE OPTIONS IN FOLLOWING ORDER]

 3 Democracy is preferable to any other form of government

 2 Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system

 1 For people like me, one regime is the same as another.

 {998 No response or question not asked}

 {999 Don't know}

**Recoded as:**

 1 Democracy is preferable to any other form of government

 0 Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system

 0 For people like me, one regime is the same as another.

 Missing {998 No response or question not asked}

 Missing {999 Don't know}

**Table 2A: Response rates for the survey items employed for *Principled support for democracy***

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **B.DemAuth** | **B.PresDict** | **B.OnePartyRule** | **B.MilRule** |
|  | N | Response rate | N | Response rate | N | Response rate | N | Response rate |
| Chile 2017 | 1,506 | 92.7% | 1,475 | 90.8% | 1,539 | 94.7% | 1,562 | 96.1% |
| France 2017 | 2,000 | 100.0% | 1,999 | 100.0% | 1,999 | 100.0% | 1,998 | 99.9% |
| Germany 2017 | 3,191 | 98.6% | 3,228 | 99.8% | 3,225 | 99.7% | 3,230 | 99.8% |
| Great Britain 2017 | 1,998 | 99.9% | 2,000 | 100.0% | 2,000 | 100.0% | 2,000 | 100.0% |
| Greece 2015 | 997 | 98.9% | 990 | 98.2% | 990 | 98.2% | 990 | 98.2% |
| S. Africa 2004 | 1,102 | 91.8% | 1,092 | 91.0% | 1,152 | 96.0% | 1,131 | 94.3% |
| S. Africa 2009 | 1,130 | 94.2% | 1,139 | 94.9% | 1,164 | 97.0% | 1,156 | 96.3% |
| Spain 2015 | 2,264 | 93.9% | 2,140 | 88.8% | 2,140 | 88.8% | 2,185 | 90.6% |
| Taiwan 2016 | 1,000 | 100.0% | 1,000 | 100.0% | 1,000 | 100.0% | 1,000 | 100.0% |
| US 2016 | 1,599 | 99.9% | 1,600 | 100.0% | 1,600 | 100.0% | 1,600 | 100.0% |
| US 2020 | 1,999 | 100.0% | 1,999 | 100.0% | 1,998 | 99.9% | 1,998 | 99.9% |
| **All 11 surveys** | **18,786** | **97.4%** | **18,662** | **96.8%** | **18,807** | **97.5%** | **18,850** | **97.8%** |

**Table 3A: Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results for the survey items employed for *Principled support for democracy***

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **PARAMETERS** |  |
|  | **N** | **Democracy is preferable (1)** | **…strong leader running this country (II)** | **Only one political party…(III)** | **The army should govern the country (IV)** | **Raykov´s Factor Reliability** |
| Chile 2017 | 1,337 | 0.168 | -0.826 | -0.692 | -0.549 | 0.638 |
| France 2017 | 1,998 | 0.243 | -0.976 | -0.941 | -0.834 | 0.786 |
| Germany 2017 | 3,173 | 0.232 | -0.842 | -0.816 | -0.697 | 0.836 |
| Great Britain 2017 | 1,998 | 0.231 | -0.858 | -0.742 | -0.626 | 0.796 |
| Greece 2015 | 985 | 0.112 | -0.585 | -0.491 | -0.352 | 0.621 |
| S. Africa 2004 | 997 | 0.101 | -1.161 | -1.014 | -0.939 | 0.775 |
| S. Africa 2009 | 1,068 | 0.130 | -1.057 | -0.998 | -0.740 | 0.796 |
| Spain 2015 | 2,105 | 0.130 | -0.821 | -0.728 | -0.471 | 0.809 |
| Taiwan 2016 | 1,000 | 0.128 | -0.968 | -0.878 | -0.776 | 0.834 |
| US 2016 | 1,599 | 0.254 | -1.015 | -1.024 | -0.813 | 0.842 |
| US 2020 | 1,996 | 0.252 | -0.979 | -0.905 | -0.767 | 0.848 |

**Table 4A: Basic descriptives for *Principled support for democracy* in eleven country/years**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std.Dev. | Min. | Max. |
| Chile 2017 | 1,337 | -0.000 | 0.836 | -3.00 | 0.94 |
| France 2017 | 1,998 | -0.000 | 0.922 | -2.86 | 0.80 |
| Germany 2017 | 3,173 | -0.000 | 0.945 | -3.86 | 0.59 |
| Great Britain 2017 | 1,998 | -0.001 | 0.931 | -3.84 | 0.67 |
| Greece 2015 | 985 | 0.000 | 0.854 | -4.36 | 0.56 |
| S. Africa 2004 | 997 | -0.000 | 0.909 | -2.02 | 1.11 |
| S. Africa 2009 | 1,068 | 0.000 | 0.938 | -2.61 | 0.92 |
| Spain 2015 | 2,105 | -0.000 | 0.923 | -4.27 | 0.54 |
| Taiwan 2016 | 1,000 | -0.000 | 0.942 | -3.00 | 1.02 |
| US 2016 | 1,599 | 0.000 | 0.950 | -2.87 | 0.79 |
| US 2020 | 1,996 | -0.000 | 0.945 | -3.27 | 0.65 |
| TOTAL | 18,256 | -0.000 | 0.924 | -4.35 | 1.11 |

Index of Principled Support for Democracy is the Latent variable computed from the parameters estimated with the Fixed Effects of the CFA, so that higher values correspond to a higher level of principled support for liberal democracy.

1. **Ideological Extremism:** **IE.**

**IEi**= $\sqrt{ (Ideol\_{i}- \overline{Ideol)}^{2}}$

where $Ideol\_{i}$ is the left-right position of each individual respondent *i* (**C\_LRSelf**) and $\overline{Ideol}$ is the country-year average of the ideological self-placement of voters.

1. **(Weighted) Perceived Party Ideological Polarisation:** **WPIP**.

**WPIPi** = $\sum\_{p=1}^{p}s\_{p}\*\sqrt{(Position\_{ip}- \overline{Position\_{i})}^{2}}$

where$ Position\_{ip}$ is the left-right position of each party *p* assigned by individual respondent *I* , $\overline{Position\_{i}}$ is the average respondent ideological position of political parties, and $s\_{p}$ is the size of each party, measured as the normalized proportion of votes of each party. The respondent’s mean left-right position of parties is also weighted by the normalized proportion of votes:

$\overline{Position}\_{i}$ = $\sum\_{p=1}^{p}(s\_{p}\* Position\_{ip})$

**Table 5A: Basic descriptives for Left-Right Scale, Individual Political Extremism (IE) and Perceived Party System Polarization (WPIP) in 11 country/years**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std.Dev. | Min. | Max. |
| **Chile 2017** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 1,231 | 4.77 | 2.40 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 1,231 | 1.85 | 1.54 | 0.23 | 5.23 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,319 | 2.68 | 1.12 | 0.00 | 4.50 |
| **France 2017** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 1,998 | 5.47 | 2.24 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 1,998 | 1.76 | 1.37 | 0.47 | 4.52 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,998 | 2.68 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 4.48 |
| **Germany 2017** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 3,204 | 5.09 | 1.80 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 3,204 | 1.33 | 1,21 | 0.09 | 4.91 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 3,205 | 2.05 | 0,67 | 0.00 | 4.49 |
| **Great Britain 2017** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 2,000 | 4.95 | 1.90 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 2,000 | 1.47 | 1.21 | 0.05 | 5.05 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,999 | 2.25 | 1.17 | 0.00 | 4.50 |
| **Greece 2015** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 964 | 5.04 | 1.89 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 964 | 1.40 | 1.27 | 0.04 | 4.96 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 956 | 2.53 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 4.49 |
| **S. Africa 2004** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 823 | 6.13 | 2.89 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 823 | 2.42 | 1.58 | 0.13 | 5.13 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 821 | 2.08 | 1.12 | 0.00 | 4.02 |
| **S. Africa 2009** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 1,048 | 6.58 | 2.41 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 1,048 | 2.04 | 1.25 | 0.42 | 5.58 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,094 | 1.98 | 1.15 | 0.00 | 4.13 |
| **Spain 2015** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 2,172 | 4.72 | 2.13 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 2,172 | 1.69 | 1.30 | 0.28 | 5.28 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 2,247 | 2.66 | 0.86 | 0.00 | 4.50 |
| **Taiwan 2016** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 1,000 | 5.61 | 1.48 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 1,000 | 1,11 | 0,98 | 0,39 | 4,61 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,000 | 1,80 | 1,23 | 0.00 | 4.50 |
| **US 2016** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 1,598 | 5.70 | 2.50 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 1,598 | 2.06 | 1.41 | 0.30 | 4.70 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,593 | 2.33 | 1.34 | 0.00 | 4.50 |
| **US 2020** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 1,729 | 5.57 | 2.83 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 1,729 | 2.43 | 1.45 | 0.43 | 5.57 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 1,996 | 2.43 | 1.24 | 0.00 | 4.50 |
| **TOTAL** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  (1) Left-Right Scale | 17,767 | 5.31 | 2.27 | 1 | 10 |
|  (2) Individual political extremism-IE | 17,767 | 1.73 | 1.38 | 0.04 | 5.58 |
|  (3) Perception of partisan ideological polarization -WPIP | 18,228 | 2.33 | 1.06 | 0.00 | 4.50 |

1. ***Other independent variables***

**Table 6A: Descriptives of other independent variables**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Economic situation |
|  | Very Good | Good | Average | Somewhat bad | Very bad |
| Chile 2017 | 1 | 17 | 54 | 23 | 6 |
| France 2017 | 1 | 4 | 32 | 39 | 24 |
| Germany 2017 | 9 | 41 | 33 | 13 | 3 |
| Great Britain 2017 | 1 | 8 | 44 | 36 | 12 |
| Greece 2015 | 2 | 0 | 26 | 26 | 70 |
| S. Africa 2004 | 11 | 31 | 36 | 14 | 8 |
| S. Africa 2009 | 5 | 22 | 35 | 21 | 15 |
| Spain 2015 | 0 | 5 | 32 | 44 | 19 |
| Taiwan 2016 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 45 | 32 |
| US 2016 | 2 | 15 | 38 | 32 | 13 |
| US 2020 | 2 | 13 | 26 | 39 | 21 |
| TOTAL | 3 | 16 | 33 | 30 | 17 |
|  |
|  | Interest in Politics |
|  | Not at all | Not much | Somewhat | Very much |
| Chile 2017 | 11 | 26 | 28 | 35 |
| France 2017 | 37 | 36 | 17 | 9 |
| Germany 2017 | 15 | 40 | 35 | 10 |
| Great Britain 2017 | 26 | 42 | 21 | 10 |
| Greece 2015 | 35 | 39 | 19 | 7 |
| S. Africa 2004 | 12 | 22 | 22 | 43 |
| S. Africa 2009 | 16 | 36 | 31 | 17 |
| Spain 2015 | 16 | 46 | 30 | 7 |
| Taiwan 2016 | 5 | 22 | 44 | 22 |
| US 2016 | 35 | 34 | 19 | 12 |
| US 2020 | 39 | 36 | 16 | 10 |
| TOTAL | 23 | 36 | 26 | 15 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Party Identification | Education | Gender |
|  | Yes | No | Primary or less | Some Secondary | Complete Secondary | Some University | Male | Female |
| Chile 2017 | 18 | 82 | 9 | 9 | 40 | 42 | 43 | 57 |
| France 2017 | 48 | 52 | 11 | 21 | 31 | 36 | 46 | 54 |
| Germany 2017 | 54 | 46 | 10 | 13 | 40 | 36 | 50 | 50 |
| Great Britain 2017 | 64 | 36 | 19 | 12 | 20 | 49 | 47 | 53 |
| Greece 2015 | 67 | 33 | 1 | 2 | 17 | 80 | 56 | 44 |
| S. Africa 2004 | 51 | 49 | 27 | 37 | 25 | 10 | 50 | 50 |
| S. Africa 2009 | 74 | 26 | 15 | 32 | 33 | 19 | 50 | 50 |
| Spain 2015 | 63 | 37 | 6 | 7 | 43 | 44 | 51 | 49 |
| Taiwan 2016 | 39 | 61 | 1 | 1 | 37 | 61 | 50 | 50 |
| US 2016 | 62 | 38 | 0 | 5 | 38 | 57 | 47 | 53 |
| US 2020 | 68 | 32 | 0 | 4 | 33 | 63 | 47 | 53 |
| **TOTAL** | 56 | 44 | 12 | 17 | 33 | 38 | 49 | 51 |

***Contextual variables*:**

1. *Democracies* (**demv2x\_regime**): ordinal variable from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al. 2020) identifying surveys conducted in liberal democracies (value 3).

**2. Additional tables and figures**

**Table 7A: Robustness Checks for Ideological extremism, perceived polarisation, and Principled support for democracy (OLS country-year fixed effects)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 4 without controls** | **Replacing economic evaluations with government evaluation** | **Without lowest 10% of observations of IE and WPIP** |
| Polarisation variables transformed |  |  |  |
| Ideological extremism – IE exponential | -.004\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\* |
|  | (.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| Weighted perceived ideological polarisation – WPIP Quadratic | -.146\*\*\* | -0.111\*\*\* | -0.105\*\*\* |
|  | (.022) | (0.016) | (0.019) |
| Original Polarisation variables  |  |  |  |
| Ideological extremism - IE | 0.041 | 0.009 | 0.015 |
|  | (0.019) | (0.026) | (0.023) |
| Weighted perceived ideological polarisation - WPIP | 0.812\*\*\* | 0.625\*\*\* | 0.586\*\*\* |
|  | (0.114) | (0.075) | (0.119) |
| Other coefficients |  |  |  |
| Left-right self-placement | - | -0.070\*\*\* | -0.058\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Party identification | - | 0.048 | 0.044 |
|  |  | (0.040) | (0.040) |
| Economic situation:  |  |  |  |
| Very Bad | - | - | Reference |
| Bad | - | - | 0.134 |
|  |  |  | (0.075) |
| Average | - | - | 0.040 |
|  |  |  | (0.134) |
| Good | - | - | 0.062 |
|  |  |  | (0.142) |
| Very Good | - | - | -0.002 |
|  |  |  | (0.141) |
| Government evaluation:  |  |  |  |
| Very dissatisfied | - | Reference | - |
| Dissatisfied | - | 0.069 | - |
|  |  | (0.090) |  |
| Neither | - | 0.088 | - |
|  |  | (0.110) |  |
| Satisfied | - | 0.137 | - |
|  |  | (0.104) |  |
| Very satisfied | - | 0.144 | - |
|  |  | (0.107) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Political Interest: |  |  |  |
| None | - | Reference | Reference |
| Not much | - | 0.099\* | 0.099 |
|  |  | (0.041) | (0.045) |
| Somewhat | - | 0.255\*\* | 0.220\*\* |
|  |  | (0.069) | (0.063) |
| Very | - | 0.415\*\*\* | 0.383\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.069) | (0.077) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |  |
| Primary or less | - | Reference | Reference |
| Some secondary | - | 0.139\*\* | 0.160\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.036) | (0.034) |
| Complete secondary | - | 0.303\*\*\* | 0.301\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.025) | (0.029) |
| Some university or more | - | 0.481\*\*\* | 0.465\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.044) | (0.052) |
| Female | - | -0.045\* | -0.060\* |
|  |  | (0.018) | (0.019) |
| Age | - | 0.010\*\*\* | 0.008\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Intercept | -.904\*\*\* | -1.085\*\*\* | -1.110\*\*\* |
|  | (.130) | (0.138) | (0.151) |
| Adjusted R2 | .095 | 0.22 | 0.14 |
| AIC | 43156.7 | 34119.9 | 31297.3 |
| BIC | 43187.6 | 34180.3 | 31372.2 |
| Country-years | 11 | 9 | 11 |
| Respondents | 16,774 | 13,999 | 13,157 |

Standard errors clustered corrected by country-year in parentheses

Country-year dummies not displayed

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

**Table 8A: Extremism, perceived polarisation and Principled support for democracy (Generalized additive models with country-year fixed effects).**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Replacing economic evaluations with government evaluation** | **Without lowest 10% of observations of IE and WPIP** |
| Effective degrees of freedom |  |  |
| s (Ideological extremism) - IE | 4.39\*\*\* | 4.97\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |
| s (Weighted perceived ideological polarisation) - WPIP | 6.70\*\*\* | 5.35\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |
| Parametric coefficients |  |  |
| Left-right self-placement | -0.07\*\*\* | -0.06\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (.003) |
| Party identification | 0.05\*\* | 0.04\*\* |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Economic situation:  |  |  |
| Very Bad | - | Reference |
| Bad | - | 0.12\*\*(0.04) |
| Average | - | 0.04(0.04) |
| Good | - | 0.06(0.04) |
| Very Good | - | -0.01(0.05) |
|  |  |  |
| Government evaluation:  |  |  |
| Very dissatisfied | Reference | - |
| Dissatisfied | 0.06(0.03) | - |
| Neither | 0.08\*(0.03) | - |
| Satisfied | 0.13\*\*\*(0.02) | - |
| Very satisfied | 0.14\*\*\*(0.03) | - |
|  |  |  |
| Political Interest: |  |  |
| None | Reference | Reference |
| Not much | 0.11\*\*\*(0.03) | 0.10\*\*\*(0.03) |
| Somewhat | 0.26\*\*\*(0.03) | 0.22\*\*\*(0.03) |
| Very | 0.42\*\*\*(0.03) | 0.38\*\*\*(0.03) |
|  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |
| Primary or less | Reference | Reference |
| Some secondary | 0.14\*\*\*(0.03) | 0.16\*\*\*(0.03) |
| Complete secondary | 0.30\*\*\*(0.02) | 0.30\*\*\*(0.03) |
| Some university or more | 0.48\*\*\*(0.03) | 0.46\*\*\*(0.03) |
|  |  |  |
| Female | -0.04\*\*(0.01) | -0.06\*\*\*(0.01) |
|  |  |  |
| Age | 0.010\*\*\*(0.0004) | 0.008\*\*\*(0.0004) |
|  |  |  |
| Intercept | -0.36\*\*\* | -0.39\*\*\* |
|  | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.22 | 0.14 |
| Country-years | 9 | 11 |
| Respondents | 13,999 | 13,157 |

Country-year dummies not displayed

\**p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

**Figure 1A: Predicted values of Principled support for democracy based on results from Table 7A (OLS with government evaluation)**

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Confidence intervals at 95%

**Figure 2A: Predicted values of Principled support for democracy based on results from Table 7A (OLS after dropping the lowest 10% IE and WPIP)**

 **

Confidence intervals at 95%

**Figure 3A: Non-linear relationship between extremism and perceived polarization and Principled support for democracy from Table 8A (GAM estimation with government evaluation)**



Note: Confidence interval, 95%

**Figure 4A: Non-linear relationship between extremism and perceived polarization and Principled support for liberal democracy from Table 8A (GAM estimation after dropping the lowest 10% IE and WPIP)**

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Note: Confidence interval, 95%

**Table 9A: Robustness Checks for Ideological extremism, perceived polarisation, and Principled support for democracy (Multilevel REB models)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **FE with no random slopes** | **FE with random slopes** |
| Polarisation variables transformed |  |  |
| Ideological extremism – IE exponential | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| Weighted perceived ideological polarisation – WPIP Quadratic | -0.107\*\*\* | -0.113\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Original Polarisation variables  |  |  |
| Ideological extremism – IE | 0.002 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.008) | (0.009) |
| Weighted perceived ideological polarisation – WPIP | 0.603\*\*\* | 0.617\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| Other coefficients |  |  |
| Left-right self-placement | -0.068\*\*\* | -0.063\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Party identification | 0.047\*\* | 0.048\*\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Economic situation:  |  |  |
| Very Bad | reference | reference |
| Bad | 0.143\*\*\* | 0.128\*\*\* |
|  | (0.039) | (0.039) |
| Average | 0.056 | 0.043 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.038) |
| Good | 0.092\* | 0.079\* |
|  | (0.039) | (0.039) |
| Very Good | 0.027 | 0.019 |
|  | (0.041) | (0.041) |
| Political Interest: |  |  |
| None | reference | reference |
| Not much | 0.094\*\*\* | 0.095\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Somewhat | 0.236\*\*\* | 0.240\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Very | 0.402\*\*\* | 0.406\*\*\* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.026) |
|  |  |  |
| Education |  |  |
| Primary or less | reference | reference |
| Some secondary | 0.151\*\*\* | 0.142\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Complete secondary | 0.319\*\*\* | 0.307\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Some university or more | 0.495\*\*\* | 0.478\*\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Female | -0.048\*\*\* | -0.047\*\*\* |
|  | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Age | 0.009\*\*\* | 0.009\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Intercept | -0.618\*\*\* | -0.389\*\*\* |
|  | (0.063) | (0.075) |
| Wald-Chi2 (28) | 4087.8 | 3660.2 |
| Log likelihood  | -20231.72 | -20174.82 |
| ICC |  0.000 | 0.000 |
| Residual Variance | 0.678 | 0.671 |
| Country/year Variance | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| IE- exponential Variance | -- | 0.994 |
| WPIP- quadratic Variance | -- | 0.797 |
| AIC | 40525.43 (31) | 40415.64(33) |
| BIC | 40764.52 (31) | 40670.15(33) |
| Country-years | 11 | 11 |
| Respondents | 16,520 | 16,520 |

Standard errors clustered corrected by country-year in parentheses

Country-year dummies not displayed

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

Likelihood-ratio test

Assumption: 1 nested within 2

LR chi2(2) = 126.06

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

**Table 10A: Interaction between ideological extremism and perceived party system polarization (GAM estimation with country-year fixed effects).**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Effective degrees of freedom |  |
| s (IE) \* s (WPIP) | 22.94\*\*\* |
|  |  |
| Parametric coefficients |  |
| Left-right self-placement | -0.07\*\*\* |
|  | (0.003) |
| Party identification | 0.05\*\* |
|  | (0.01) |
| Economic situation:  |  |
| Very Bad | Reference |
| Bad | 0.15\*\*\*(0.04) |
| Average | 0.06(0.04) |
| Good | 0.09\*(0.04) |
| Very Good | 0.03(0.04) |
|  |  |
|  |  |
| Political Interest: |  |
| None | Reference |
| Not much | 0.10\*\*\*(0.02) |
| Somewhat | 0.24\*\*\*(0.02) |
| Very | 0.41\*\*\*(0.03) |
|  |  |
| Education |  |
| Primary or less | Reference |
| Some secondary | 0.15\*\*\*(0.03) |
| Complete secondary | 0.32\*\*\*(0.02) |
| Some university or more | 0.50\*\*\*(0.02) |
|  |  |
| Female | -0.05\*\*\*(0.01) |
|  |  |
| Age | 0.009\*\*\*(0.0004) |
|  |  |
| Intercept | -0.35\*\*\* |
|  | (0.06) |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.20 |
| Country-years | 11 |
| Respondents | 16,520 |

Country-year dummies not displayed

\**p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001

**Data and code for replication available at an OSF anonymous link:** <https://osf.io/d6jvw/?view_only=fad0225a0227431cb3decf33636c54e6>

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