# Online Appendix to ‘Incentives and Constraints: A Configurational Account of European Involvement in the anti-Daesh Coalition’

*Table A1: Calibration of Conditions and Outcome*



*Figure A1: Histograms of Calibrated Sets*



*Table A2: Truth Table with Logical Remainders*



*Table A3: Conservative Solution*

This table displays the conservative solution (also referred to as complex solution). The configurations are identical to the intermediate solution except for a single condition in the five-condition configuration that comprises path 3 (the absence of external threat). The measures of fit for individual paths and the overall solution are also identical (except for a slightly lower PRI in Path 3, when compared to the intermediate solution).



*Table A4: Parsimonious Solution, Models 1 and 2*

This table displays the two logically equivalent models of the parsimonious solution. Apart from slightly different measures of fit, the configurations are identical except for a single condition in Path 3 (the presence of alliance value in model 1 and the presence of right executive in model 2). The parsimonious solution also resonates with the substantive interpretation provided in the paper, which was based on the intermediate solution.



*Table A5: Robustness Test (Crisp Sets)*

For this robustness test, all of the study’s fuzzy-set conditions were transformed into crisp sets (dichotomized). A comparison with Table 5 shows that the results are substantively identical, and thus robust, both in terms of the solution paths and the case attribution. What changes are the measures of fit, which show perfect solution consistency, coverage, and PRI when crisp sets are used in the analysis.



*Table A6: Robustness Test (Alternative Calibration of the Outcome)*

For this robustness test, more weight was assigned to lower-level military contributions like the training of local forces (fuzzy scores of 0.3 and 0.4, respectively, depending on the number of personnel) and logistical support such as overflight and basing rights (fuzzy score 0.2). Also, political support was assigned a fuzzy score of 0.1 (for a comparison to the original values, see Table 1). This robustness test yields results that are substantively identical to those reported in Table 5. A difference can be seen with regards to consistency, PRI, and coverage – with the former two increasing and the latter decreasing due to the alternative calibration of the outcome.



*Table A7: Robustness Test (Restricted Analysis)*

For this robustness test, an analysis was conducted solely with the three conditions external threat, alliance value, and parliamentary veto rights (the three conditions that comprise Path 2 of the intermediate solution term reported in Table 5). The result confirms the pattern previously identified. However, due to the exclusion of the conditions right executive and public threat perception, fewer cases are covered and thus there is only a single solution path, which entails only five of the eight cases that show the outcome, whereas the intermediate solution with five conditions accounts for all of these cases (coverage drops from 0.79 to 0.53 in the restricted analysis). Hence, the intermediate solution with the full model of five conditions is the preferred solution for the substantive interpretation.



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