**Appendix 1. Overview of countries in analyses**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **N** |  | **N** |  | **N** |  | **N** |
| Algeria | 1 | Ecuador | 1 | Lebanon | 4 | Senegal | 4 |
| Angola | 2 | Eq. Guinea | 1 | Lesotho | 1 | Sierra Leone | 3 |
| Argentina | 5 | Ethiopia | 2 | Latvia | 2 | Singapore | 4 |
| Australia | 5 | Estonia | 1 | Lithuania | 2 | Vietnam | 1 |
| Austria | 3 | Finland | 2 | Malawi | 2 | Slovenia | 3 |
| Bahrain | 1 | France | 10 | Malaysia | 3 | South Africa | 10 |
| Bangladesh | 2 | Gabon | 1 | Mali | 1 | Zimbabwe | 2 |
| Armenia | 2 | Georgia | 1 | Mauritania | 3 | Spain | 3 |
| Belgium | 5 | Gambia | 3 | Mexico | 1 | Sudan | 2 |
| Botswana | 1 | Germany | 10 | Mongolia | 2 | Sweden | 3 |
| Brazil | 5 | Ghana | 2 | Morocco | 3 | Switzerland | 3 |
| Myanmar | 1 | Greece | 1 | Mozambique | 3 | Thailand | 6 |
| Belarus | 1 | Guatemala | 2 | Namibia | 2 | Togo | 1 |
| Cambodia | 1 | Guinea | 1 | Netherlands | 10 | UAE | 3 |
| Canada | 5 | Haiti | 1 | New Zealand | 2 | Tunisia | 2 |
| Sri Lanka | 2 | Honduras | 1 | Niger | 1 | Turkey | 2 |
| Chile | 5 | Hungary | 2 | Nigeria | 7 | Uganda | 3 |
| China | 1 | India | 1 | Norway | 8 | Ukraine | 2 |
| Colombia | 3 | Indonesia | 5 | Pakistan | 1 | Macedonia | 3 |
| Congo | 1 | Ireland | 6 | Papua New G. | 1 | Egypt | 2 |
| Congo, Dem. | 3 | Italy | 2 | Peru | 1 | UK | 5 |
| Costa Rica | 2 | Ivory Coast | 2 | Philippines | 5 | US | 3 |
| Croatia | 1 | Jamaica | 1 | Poland | 3 | Burkina Faso | 2 |
| Czech Rep. | 3 | Japan | 2 | Portugal | 2 | Uruguay | 2 |
| Benin | 4 | Kazakstan | 1 | Romania | 1 | Yemen | 2 |
| Denmark | 6 | Kenya | 8 | Russia | 3 | Zambia | 1 |
| Domin. Rep. | 2 | Korea, South | 2 | Rwanda | 1 | **Total** | **297** |

**Appendix 2. Overview of field work**

With a team of researchers, we randomly conducted interviews with policymakers at the COPs and MCs. The respondents were chosen by the researcher in charge (‘pointer’) to make sure interviewers would not (unknowingly) have a bias in their selection of respondents (e.g. convenience sampling). Moreover, the researcher in charge made sure all physical areas at the conference location were targeted in order to increase the chance of getting a random and representative sample of the participants at the conferences. The fact that our sample includes respondents of over 100 countries (see Appendix 1), covers all continents of the world, and includes all key players in global governance (e.g. United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, Germany, France, Brazil, etc..) as well as policymakers from smaller countries (Togo, Costa Rica, Latvia, etc.) makes us confident the sample is a good representation of the broader population.

In total, we conducted 181 interviews at the climate conferences and 93 interviews at the trade conferences. The response rate is almost 50%, based on our notes of the interviews each of our team members did and the rejections we received. There is no reason to believe that policymakers who refused to be interviewed are fundamentally different from the ones who participated. In addition, we noticed that most refusals were not because policymakers did not want to participate in our research, but because they had limited time during the negotiations. Therefore, we have no indications that the sample has affected the results. Moreover, one needs to bear in mind that the rejections could be from all types of actors present at the international conferences: policymakers, representatives of international organizations and representatives of advocacy groups. We were unable to specify response rates per group of actors, since we simply approached people on the conference sites and often did not know what type of actor we invited for an interview. Also, sometimes advocates were invited (unintentionally) two or three times by different interviewers or they refused the first invitation but then agreed when invited again. However, because we monitored which countries and types of policymakers we had already covered during the fieldwork, we were able to improve the representativeness of our sample considerably. For example, during the climate conference in Paris one of our researchers spent considerable time getting Chinese and Russian policymakers to participate.

The interviews were combined with data that we collected through a web-survey immediately after the conferences. Between January and April 2016, we sent out surveys to all country delegations that our team did not manage to interview while we were in Paris and Nairobi. To policymakers active at the climate conference in Bonn, surveys were sent out between December 2017 and January 2018. This means that respondents who were too busy during the negotiations were given another opportunity to participate in our research. The respondents were selected on the basis of the provisional list of participants for the UNFCCC, this list includes the non-state actors, international organizations and states that received accreditation and their representatives. In addition, we sent the questionnaire to all policymakers from whom we received a business card during our time in Paris and Bonn, but whom we did not manage to interview. Due to tensions between China and Chinese Taipei, the WTO secretariat is not allowed to distribute a list of participating countries. Instead, we provided the secretariat with a list of countries that were still missing in the database and received the contact details of the focal points of these delegations. In doing this, we made sure that there was an equal distribution among the different continents and the size of countries (we selected both small and bigger countries). Moreover, we selected countries that represent the different coalitions within the WTO, such as the ACP Group or the Cotton-4. We also sent the survey to government representatives of whom we had received a business card during the conferences in Nairobi and Buenos Aires.

The questionnaires were sent out quickly after the conferences took place. In this way, we tried to reduce memory loss among the respondents; what happened during the conference was still fresh in their mind. Of all the invitations for the survey that we sent (N=1590), 310 respondents (partially) completed the survey. That is a response rate of 19.5%. This rate was achieved by sending out two electronic reminders, after two weeks and four weeks. One has to bear in mind that the respondents come from all over the world and many governments active at these conferences lack a website that is up-to-date, which meant that we could not send our invitations to the right persons. Moreover, some of the invitations could not be delivered or were bounced, for example because the email addresses were not working.

The interviews and surveys used for this paper were *policy-centred*. The policy issues were selected by combining qualitative interviews with the provisional agreements, the provisional agendas, news articles and position papers of interest organizations. In total, thirteen policy issues for the UNFCCC were identified and seventeen for the WTO. Some issues were on the negotiating table in both 2015 and in 2017, while others were only relevant during one of the two interview rounds. In the Tables below, we present the issues that were discussed at these four conferences.

**Table A2. Issues discussed at the UNFCCC COPs**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Issue** | **Year** |
| Climate finance: who should contribute? | 2015 |
| Degrees-goal | 2015 |
| NDCs: Annex or COP decision? | 2015 |
| MRV: strength of compliance (developing) | 2015 |
| MRV: strength of compliance (developed) | 2015 |
| NDCs: commitment period and assessment | 2015 |
| Loss and damage: finance mechanism | 2015 & 2017 |
| Loss and damage: funding | 2015 & 2017 |
| NDCs: guidance | 2017 |
| Adaptation Fund | 2017 |
| Transparency Framework | 2017 |
| Gender Action Plan | 2017 |
| Adaptation Communication | 2017 |

**Table A2. Issues discussed at the WTO MCs**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Issue** | **Year** |
| GATS negotiations | 2015 |
| TiSA negotiations | 2015 |
| Export subsidies in agriculture | 2015 |
| Export subsidies in agriculture: marketing and internal transportation subsidies | 2015 |
| Agriculture: pillars | 2015 |
| Cotton | 2015 |
| Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) | 2015 |
| Special Safeguard Mechanism on Agriculture | 2015 & 2017 |
| Future of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) | 2015 & 2017 |
| Public stockholding in agriculture | 2017 |
| Public stockholding: conditions | 2017 |
| Fisheries | 2017 |
| E-commerce | 2017 |
| E-commerce: who should negotiate | 2017 |
| Investment Facilitation | 2017 |
| Investment Facilitation: who should negotiate | 2017 |
| Trade Facilitation Agreement on Services | 2017 |

On each of these issues, several policy positions and the status quo were identified. For example, on the future of the Doha Development Agenda, we asked respondents whether they were advocating (1) full implementation of the original DDA mandate, or whether they were in favour of (2) continue working on DDA while exploring different negotiating approaches, or whether they wanted to (3) end DDA and draft a new work programme. On this issue, the status quo is full implementation of the mandate, since this was reaffirmed in the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration.

**Appendix 3. Analyses per venue: UNFCCC**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Model 1* | *Model 2* | *Model 3* |
| **Independent variables** |  |  |  |
| Level of Development |  |  |  |
| *Developed countries* | Ref. |  |  |
| *Developing countries* | 0.719\*\*  (0.332) |  |  |
| Democratic accountability |  | -0.437\*\*  (0.181) |  |
| Interactions |  |  |  |
| *Low developed\*democracy* |  |  | 0.306  (0.285) |
| *High developed\*democracy* |  |  | -0.512\*\*\*  (0.263) |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Salience of issue |  |  |  |
| *High* | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| *Medium* | -0.095  (0.323) | -0.064  (0.327) | -0.114  (0.331) |
| *Low* | 0.503  (0.536) | 0.594  (0.535) | 0.478  (0.548) |
| Importance of issue |  |  |  |
| *High* | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| *Medium* | 0.224  (0.348) | 0.157  (0.347) | 0.115  (0.350) |
| *Low* | 0.485  (0.470) | 0.283  (0.458) | 0.336  (0.464) |
| Function decision maker |  |  |  |
| *Politician* | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| *Diplomat* | -0.167  (0.625) | -0.142  (0.620) | -0.031  (0.628) |
| *Civil servant* | -0.345  (0.515) | -0.283  (0.512) | -0.339  (0.518) |
| *Other* | -1.263\*  (0.698) | -1.092  (0.689) | -1.188  (0.694) |
| GDP | -0.285  (0.245) | -0.435  (0.281) | -0.322  (0.258) |
| **Diagnostics** |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.224\*\*  (0.534) | 0.032  (0.540) | 0.322  (0.563) |
| Country level intercept | 0.000  (0.000) | 0.000  (0.000) | 0.000  (0.000) |
| Log-likelihood | -128.53 | -130.13 | -128.04 |
| N | 202 | 202 | 202 |

*Notes: The model is a mixed-effects logistic regression which estimates a random intercept for each 107 countries (not shown). The dichotomous dependent variable is the content of information exchange Logit coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and significance are presented, whereby:\*P<0.1; \*\*P<0.05; \*\*\*P<0.01.*

**Appendix 4. Analyses per venue: WTO**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Model 1* | *Model 2* | *Model 3* |
| **Independent variables** |  |  |  |
| Level of Development |  |  |  |
| *Developed countries* | Ref. |  |  |
| *Developing countries* | 1.316\*  (0.639) |  |  |
| Democratic accountability |  | -0.909\*\*\*  (0.359) |  |
| Interactions |  |  |  |
| *Low developed\*democracy* |  |  | -0.431  (0.590) |
| *High developed\*democracy* |  |  | -1.168\*\*\*  (0.467) |
| **Control variables** |  |  |  |
| Salience of issue |  |  |  |
| *High* | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| *Medium* | 2.196\*\*  (0.686) | 2.465\*\*\*  (0.697) | 2.357\*\*\*  (0.704) |
| *Low* | 1.938\*\*\*  (0.772) | 2.227\*\*\*  (0.797) | 2.143\*\*\*  (0.795) |
| Importance of issue |  |  |  |
| *High* | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| *Medium* | 0.345  (0.592) | 0.175  (0.577) | 0.223  (0.582) |
| *Low* | 0.581  (0.732) | 0.818  (0.743) | 0.861  (0.760) |
| Function decision maker |  |  |  |
| *Politician* | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| *Diplomat* | 1.068  (0.972) | 1.151  (0.970) | 1.251  (0.986) |
| *Civil servant* | 0.755  (0.914) | 0.913  (0.911) | 0.999  (0.923) |
| *Other* | 1.5047  (1.206) | 1.472  (1.199) | 1.647  (1.225) |
| GDP | 0.041  (0.324) | 0.028  (0.302) | 0.099  (0.310) |
| **Diagnostics** |  |  |  |
| Constant | -2.096\*\*\*  (0.538) | -2.607\*\*  (1.119) | -3.576\*\*\*  (0.538) |
| Country level intercept | 0.298  (0.753) | 0.168  (0.646) | 0.171  (0.648) |
| Log-likelihood | -55.735 | -54.321 | -53.833 |
| N | 95 | 95 | 95 |

*Notes: The model is a mixed-effects logistic regression which estimates a random intercept for each 107 countries (not shown). The dichotomous dependent variable is the content of information exchange Logit coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and significance are presented, whereby:\*P<0.1; \*\*P<0.05; \*\*\*P<0.01.*