# APPENDICES

# Appendix I: Selected Questions of the INTEREURO Interest Group Survey

## Member involvement

1. Interaction among members:

*Does your organization have a general assembly or an annual general meeting?*

1. Decision-making procedure:

*Organizations like yours can make decisions in different ways, such as consensus among individual members or board members or by voting procedures. Can you please indicate below how your organization primarily makes decisions in the following areas?*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Consensus among members* | *Voting among the members* | *Consensus in board* | *Voting in the board* | *Senior staff take these decisions* | *Other* |
| *Establishing your organization’s position on policy issues* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |
| *Deciding on advocacy/lobbying strategies and tactics* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |

Note: These two items of the questionnaire have been grouped based on the results of a principal component analysis and confirmed by a Cronbach’s alpha test of reliability (α = 0.72).

1. Local branches:

*Does your organization have local or regional chapters?*

## Organizational capacity

1. Autonomy:

*Organizations like yours can make decisions in different ways, such as consensus among individual members or board members or by voting procedures. Can you please indicate below how your organization primarily makes decisions in the following areas?*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Consensus among members* | *Voting among the members* | *Consensus in board* | *Voting in the board* | *Senior staff take these decisions* | *Other* |
| *Budget* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |
| *Hiring staff* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |

1. Centralization:

*Thinking about your organization’s position on EU policies, how would you rate the relative influence of the following actors?*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Very influential* | *Somewhat influential* | *Not very influential* | *Not at all influential* |
| *Executive director* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |
| *Chair of the board* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *The board of directors/executive committee* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |

*Thinking about your organization's decisions on advocacy and lobbying tactics, how would you rate the relative influence of the following actors?*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Very influential* | *Somewhat influential* | *Not very influential* | *Not at all influential* |
| *Executive director* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |
| *Chair of the board* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |
| *The board of directors/executive committee* | *O* | *O* | *O* | *O* |

Note: These six items have been grouped after examining the data with a principal component analysis and estimating the reliability of the construct (α = 0.79).

1. Functional differentiation:

*Does your organization have committees for specific tasks?*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A0. Cronbach’s alpha and correlation matrix of items in the two explanatory variables (n=272)** | | | | | | |
|  |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| **Member involvement**  (α = 0.085) | 1.Interaction among members |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.Decision-making procedure | -.024 |  |  |  |  |
| 3.Local branches | -.002 | -.056 |  |  |  |
| **Organizational capacity**  (α = 0.214) | 4.Autonomy | -.011 | -.038 | .055 |  |  |
| 5.Centralizaiton | -.105 | .117\* | -.063 | -.014 |  |
| 6.Funcational differentiation | .170\* | .016 | .026 | -.133\* | .101 |
| Note: the low scores of the Cronbach's alphas (α) confirm that the two explanatory factors are multi-dimensional 'composites'. | | | | | | |

# Appendix II: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean (S.D.) | Min-Max | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 1.Level of access to the Commission | 8.204 (15.431) | 1-116 | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.Member involvement | 1.486 (0.643) | 0-3 | 0.035 | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.Organizational capacity | 1.797 (.481) | 0-3 | 0.199\* | 0.099 | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.Transmission belt | 0.372 (0.485) | 0-1 | 0.079 | 0.785\* | 0.391\* | - |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5.Group type | 0.546 (0.499) | 0-1 | -0.062 | 0.155 | 0.077 | 0.203\* | - |  |  |  |  |
| 6.Organizational scale | 0.893 (0.310) | 0-1 | 0.069 | 0.059 | 0.217\* | 0.128 | -0.001 | - |  |  |  |
| 7.Scope of activity | 4.888 (3.294) | 1-15 | 0.122 | 0.086 | -0.049 | -0.092 | -0.225\* | -0.164 | - |  |  |
| 8. Membership diversity | 1.883 (1.133) | 1-5 | -0.098 | -0.192\* | -0.094 | -0.298\* | -0.154 | -0.075 | 0.267\* | - |  |
| 9.Organizational age | 31.593 (28.534) | 3-168 | 0.014 | 0.085 | -0.130 | -0.025 | 0.024 | -0.253\* | 0.287\* | -0.092 | - |
| 10.Resources (FTE) | 16.790 (46.058) | 0-500 | 0.116 | 0.139 | -0.185 | -0.078 | -0.006 | -0.473\* | 0.180 | 0.122 | 0.328\* |
| *\**p < 0.05 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## Table A1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of dependent variable and explanatory factors

# Appendix III: Robustness checks

This appendix presents several checks that have been conducted in order to confirm the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 in the article. Firstly, to account for a potential over-estimation of the models presented in the paper, Models 1 in Table A2 show how the main results hold when excluding all the control variables. Secondly, to provide a more contextualized analyses, Models 2 in Table A2 control for the policy domain in which groups have access (Klüver Braun and Beyers 2015). According to the results, investing in organizational capacity is relevant across economic and non-economic domains. Thirdly, results also hold when controlling for whether groups seek access to the Commission and for the extent to which they include their potential constituency (see Models 1 and 2 in Table A3). The extent to which interest groups seek access is an important control as some groups may function as clubs that do not intend to interact with public officials (Braun 2012; Schmitter and Streeck 1999) or may prioritize outside lobbying strategies (Binderkrantz 2005). The level of representativeness is also important since it relates to the transmissive belt function and affects legislative access of interest groups (Junk 2019; Kohler-Koch Kotzian and Quittkat 2017). The inclusion of these two variables does not affect the main results. Fourthly, an OLS regressions using survey data as dependent variable has been conducted. More specifically, the dependent variable indicates the 'frequency of access to the Commission via public consultations, advisory meetings and presenting reports'. Again, results hold, and only organizational capacity is positively and significantly related to the frequency of access to the Commission (see Table A4).

To confirm the results while accounting for the organizations without access, Tables A5, A6 and A7 include alternative models. Firstly, Table A5 replicates the models in Table 2 of the manuscript but including the interest groups with "zero" meetings with public officials. The coefficients and p-values are almost identical to the ones reported in the manuscript, confirming the robustness of the results. Secondly, Table A6 presents the results of zero-inflated negative binomial regression that assumes that the zero outcome is due to two different processes – binomial and negative binomial distributions. Zero-inflated negative binomial accounts for both the structural and sampling zeros, therefore, the two components of the mixture distribution are estimated simultaneously. However, as noted by Rasmussen and Gross (2015), 'it is not theoretically clear which substantive factor/s predict whether a group always (or only sometimes) has the value of zero'. In this case, the models reported in Table A6 only consider group type, organizational age and resources, together with the main explanatory variables, as the predictors of the logit model – the models fail to converge when adding additional controls. It is worth noting that when comparing the models from Table A5 and Table A6 using the BIC and AIC, the negative binomial models (i.e., the ones in Table A5), are preferred over zero-inflated negative binomial reported int Table A6. Despite not being the preferred method, the second-step of the model confirms the results related to the main explanatory variables as presented in the manuscript.

Lastly, Table A7 present the results of a Heckman two step selection model. This approach involves estimation of a probit model for selection, followed by the insertion of a correction factor—the inverse Mills ratio, calculated from the probit model—into the second OLS model of interest. Due to the overdispersion of the dependent variable (i.e., level of access), OLS is not the most appropriate model, yet the results presented in Table A7 confirm the ones discussed in the paper. Importantly, the probit model is the same for all the models. To avoid inflated standard errors due to multicollinearity resulting from the use of the same factors in the selection and regression equations, the factors included in this first step are not the same as the ones included in the second step of the model (Bushway Johnson and Slocum 2007; Moffitt 1999; Puhani 2000). To circumvent the multicollinearity issue, and aligned with the goals of the paper, the hypotheses are tested at the second level of the selection model.

## Table A2. Models without controls and full model controlling for policy domain

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Main model without controls | | | Models with policy domains as controlsa | | |
|  | Model 1a | Model 1b | Model 1c | Model 2a | Model 2b | Model 2c |
| Membership involvement | -0.003 (0.184) |  | 0.086 (0.317) | -0.212 (0.152) |  | -0.353 (0.267) |
| Organizational capacity | 0.782\*\*\* (0.231) |  | 0.843\*\*\* (0.289) | 0.578\*\*\* (0.191) |  | 0.494\*\* (0.231) |
| Transmission belt |  | 0.313 (0.241) | -0.159 (0.452) |  | 0.085 (0.200) | 0.235 (0.368) |
| Group type: Non-business (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group type: Business |  |  |  | -0.254 (0.192) | -0.206 (0.197) | -0.245 (0.192) |
| Org. scale: (Sub) National assns. (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Org. scale: European or Int'l assns. |  |  |  | 0.442 (0.307) | 0.416 (0.316) | 0.445 (0.305) |
| Scope of activity |  |  |  | 0.019 (0.032) | 0.021 (0.034) | 0.024 (0.033) |
| Membership diversity |  |  |  | -0.264\*\*\* (0.089) | -0.245\*\*\* (0.093) | -0.256\*\*\* (0.089) |
| Organizational age |  |  |  | 0.002 (0.004) | 0.001 (0.004) | 0.002 (0.004) |
| Resources (FTE) |  |  |  | 0.004 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.004 (0.002) |
| Policy domain: Economy |  |  |  | 1.872\*\*\* (0.212) | 1.931\*\*\* (0.222) | 1.860\*\*\* (0.212) |
| Policy domain: Others |  |  |  | 1.766\*\*\* (0.262) | 1.952\*\*\* (0.268) | 1.786\*\*\* (0.264) |
| Constant | 0.662 (0.498) | 2.021\*\*\* (0.148) | 0.472 (0.732) | -1.657\*\*\* (0.555) | -1.133\*\*\* (0.489) | -1.445\*\* (0.646) |
| N | 113 | 113 | 113 | 107 | 107 | 107 |
| Alpha | 1.326 (0.172) | 1.424 (0.182) | 1.325 (0.172) | 0.519 (0.088) | 0.589 (0.095) | 0.516 (0.088) |
| Log likelihood | -352.452 | -357.085 | -352.390 | -286.532 | -291.212 | -286.330 |
| \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01 | | | | | | |
| a Policy domain: Economic domains include the following DGs: Competition; Economic and Financial Affairs; Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union; Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs; Taxation and Customs Union; Trade. Other domains include the remaining DGs of the Commission. | | | | | | |

## Table A3. Models controlling for 'seeking access' and 'representativeness'

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Models controlling for 'seeking access'a | | | Models controlling for 'representativeness'b | | |
|  | Model 1a | Model 1b | Model 1c | Model 2a | Model 2b | Model 2c |
| Membership involvement | 0.143 (0.212) |  | -0.086 (0.323) | -0.0783 (0.193) |  | -0.1733 (0.348) |
| Organizational capacity | 0.702\*\*\* (0.238) |  | 0.571\*\* (0.277) | 0.744\*\* (0.296) |  | 0.666\* (0.381) |
| Transmission belt |  | 0.623\*\* (0.267) | 0.408 (0.452) |  | 0.153 (0.248) | 0.153 (0.472) |
| Group type: Non-business (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group type: Business | -0.036 (0.265) | 0.023 (0.264) | -0.033 (0.264) | -0.461\* (0.240) | -0.543\*\* (0.244) | -0.469\* (0.241) |
| Organizational age | -0.005 (0.005) | -0.006 (0.005) | -0.004 (0.005) | 0.005 (0.005) | 0.006 (0.005) | 0.005 (0.005) |
| Resources (FTE) | 0.006\*\* (0.003) | 0.006\*\* (0.003) | 0.007\*\* (0.003) | 0.006\*\* (0.003) | 0.006\* (0.003) | 0.007\*\* (0.003) |
| Seeking access | 0.711\*\*\* (0.137) | .815\*\*\* (0.136) | 0.714\*\*\* (0.138) |  |  |  |
| Representativeness |  |  |  | 0.103 (0.118) | 0.126 (0.124) | 0.116 (0.125) |
| Constant | -1.879\*\*\* (0.638) | -.934\* (0.530) | -1.486\* 0.7718 | 0.326 (0.702) | 1.492\*\*\* (0.405) | 0.510 (0.904) |
| N | 86 | 86 | 86 | 99 | 99 | 99 |
| Alpha | 0.928 (0.150) | 0.987 (0.155) | 0.921 (.149) | 1.098 (0.160) | 1.158 (0.166) | 1.096 (0.160) |
| Log likelihood | -261.437 | -263.573 | -261.035 | -297.207 | -299.946 | -297.154 |
| \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01 | | | | | | |
| a Question: How frequently did your organization seek access to the Commission? [Options: 1=We did not seek access; 2=At least once; 3=At least once every three months; 4=At least once a month; 5=At least once a week]  b Question: If you consider the size of your potential membership and the number of actual members, approximately what percentage of potential members are actually members of your organization? [Options: Less than 25%; Between 25 and 50%; Between 50 and 75%; More than 75%] | | | | | | |

## Table A4. OLS regression using survey data as dependent variablesa

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
| Membership involvement | -0.074 (0.086) |  | -0.073 (0.126) |
| Organizational capacity | 0.278\*\*\* (0.088) |  | 0.278\*\*\* (0.101) |
| Transmission belt |  | 0.082 (0.115) | -0.001 (0.183) |
| Group type: Non-business (REF) |  |  |  |
| Group type: Business | 0.168 (0.111) | 0.183 (0.114) | 0.168 (0.112) |
| Org. scale: (Sub)National assns. (REF) |  |  |  |
| Org. scale: European or Int'l assns. | 0.241\* (0.138) | 0.266\* (0.140) | 0.241\* (0.138) |
| Scope of activity | 0.079\*\*\* (0.017) | 0.076\*\*\* (0.018) | 0.079\*\*\* (0.017) |
| Membership diversity | -0.034 (0.043) | -0.026 (0.044) | -0.034 (0.043) |
| Organizational age | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| Resources (FTE) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Constant | 1.336\*\*\* (0.254) | 1.652\*\*\* (0.207) | 1.335\*\*\* (0.298) |
| N | 197 | 197 | 197 |
| R-square | 0.163 | 0.120 | 0.163 |
| \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01 | | | |
| **a** Questions to measure level of access: How frequently did your organization gained access to the Commission via (1) public consultations, (2) advisory meetings and (3) presenting reports? [Options: 1=We did not do this; 2=At least once; 3=At least once every three months; 4=At least once a month; 5=At least once a week] | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Table A5. Negative binomial regression (including zeros)** | | | | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
| Membership involvement | -0.168  (0.284) |  | -0.232  (0.260) |  | -0.218  (0.399) |
| Organizational capacity |  | 1.044\*\*\*  (0.289) | 1.056\*\*\*  (0.287) |  | 1.066\*\*\*  (0.361) |
| Transmission belt |  |  |  | 0.265  (0.330) | -0.0251  (0.542) |
| Group type: Non-business (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group type: Business | 0.408  (0.315) | 0.127  (0.306) | 0.192  (0.313) | 0.289  (0.318) | 0.191  (0.313) |
| Org. scale: (Sub)National associations (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Org. scale: European or International associations | 1.338\*\*\*  (0.447) | 1.150\*\*\*  (0.431) | 1.201\*\*\*  (0.432) | 1.258\*\*\*  (0.449) | 1.201\*\*\*  (0.432) |
| Scope of activity | 0.177\*\*\*  (0.061) | 0.160\*\*\*  (0.056) | 0.159\*\*\*  (0.055) | 0.181\*\*\*  (0.062) | 0.158\*\*\*  (0.056) |
| Membership diversity | -0.412\*\*\*  (0.159) | -0.429\*\*\*  (0.148) | -0.450\*\*\*  (0.149) | -0.366\*\*  (0.159) | -0.451\*\*\*  (0.151) |
| Organizational age | -0.012\*  (0.007) | -0.010  (0.007) | -0.010  (0.007) | -0.012  (0.007) | -0.010  (0.007) |
| Resources (FTE) | 0.023\*\*  (0.009) | 0.018\*\*  (0.008) | 0.018\*\*  (0.008) | 0.023\*\*  (0.010) | 0.018\*\*  (0.008) |
| Constant | -0.195  (0.775) | -1.948\*\*\*  (0.740) | -1.655\*\*  (0.803) | -0.558  (0.670) | -1.679\*  (0.952) |
| N | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 | 272 |
| lnlpha | 1.633\*\*\*  (0.126) | 1.549\*\*\*  (0.129) | 1.543\*\*\*  (0.129) | 1.630\*\*\*  (0.126) | 1.543\*\*\*  (0.129) |
| Log likelihood | -466.868 | -461.050 | -460.661 | -466.713 | -460.660 |
| \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01 | | | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table A6. Zero-inflated negative binomial | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | **Logit component** | | | | | **Negative binomial component** | | | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 1b | Model 2b | Model 3b | Model 4b | Model 5b |
| Membership involvement | -1.27 (0.853) |  | -1.113 (0.892) |  | -1.105  (0.889) | -0.375 (0.277) |  | -0.384  (0.260) |  | -0.331  (0.418) |
| Organizational capacity |  | -0.262 (0.975) | -0.342 (0.999) |  | -0.299  (1.042) |  | 0.977\*\*\* (0.341) | 0.952\*\*\*  (0.334) |  | 0.999\*\*  (0.443) |
| Transmission belt |  |  |  | -1.176  (1.085) |  |  |  |  | 0.0326  (0.338) | -0.0913  (0.559) |
| Group type: Non-business (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group type: Business | -0.451 (0.817) | -0.938 (0.770) | -0.439 (0.877) | -0.744  (0.771) | -0.452  (0.875) | 0.437 (0.325) | 0.006 (0.312) | 0.212  (0.332) | 0.259  (0.328) | 0.205  (0.335) |
| Org. scale: (Sub)National associations (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Org. scale: European or International associations |  |  |  |  |  | 1.357\*\*\* (0.413) | 1.162\*\*\* (0.393) | 1.248\*\*\*  (0.400) | 1.242\*\*\*  (0.415) | 1.248\*\*\*  (0.400) |
| Scope of activity |  |  |  |  |  | 0.173\*\*\* (0.058) | 0.1403\*\*\* (0.054) | 0.149\*\*\*  (0.0530) | 0.167\*\*\*  (0.0597) | 0.147\*\*\*  (0.0545) |
| Membership diversity |  |  |  |  |  | -0.469\*\*\* (0.145) | -0.451\*\*\* (0.138) | -0.474\*\*\*  (0.137) | -0.442\*\*\*  (0.150) | -0.478\*\*\*  (0.139) |
| Organizational age | 0.020 (0.020) | 0.035 (0.023) | 0.026 (0.021) | 0.026  (0.021) | 0.0257  (0.0213) | -0.012\* (0.007) | -0.006 (0.007) | -0.009  (0.007) | -0.010  (0.007) | -0.009 (0.007) |
| Resources (FTE) | -0.973\*\*\* (0.359) | -0.778\*\*\* (0.281) | -0.960\*\* (0.380) | -0.894\*\*\*  (0.322) | -0.957\*\*  (0.376) | 0.013\*\* (0.006) | 0.010\*\*\* (0.004) | 0.012\*\*  (0.005) | 0.012\*  (0.006) | 0.012\*\*  (0.005) |
| Constant | 3.036\*\* (1.512) | 1.141 (1.887) | 3.180 (2.244) | 1.392  (0.878) | 3.103  (2.312) | 0.645 (0.689) | -1.349\* (0.813) | -0.866  (0.845) | 0.185  (0.643) | -0.971  (1.063) |
| Lnalpha | 1.276\*\*\* (0.162) | 1.192\*\*\* (0.165) | 1.201\*\*\* (0.169) | 1.289\*\*\*  (0.162) | 1.199\*\*\* (0.168) | 1.276\*\*\* (0.162) | 1.192\*\*\* (0.165) | 1.201\*\*\* (0.169) | 1.289\*\*\*  (0.162) | 1.199\*\*\* (0.168) |
| Log likelihood | -456.623 | -452.166 | -450.717 | -457.360 | -452.166 | -456.623 | -452.166 | -450.717 | -457.360 | -452.166 |
| N= 272; \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01 | | | | | | | | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table A7. Heckman two-step selection model | | | | | | |
|  | **Probit model**  **(1st step)** | **OLS models (2nd step)** | | | | |
|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
| Membership involvement |  | -1.840 (2.836) |  | -2.279 (2.784) |  | -2.504 (4.839) |
| Organizational capacity |  |  | 7.716\*\* (3.673) | 7.935\*\* (3.673) |  | 7.812\* (4.227) |
| Transmission belt |  |  |  |  | 0.671 (3.612) | 0.375 (6.593) |
| Group type: Non-business (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Group type: Business | 0.284\* (0.157) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Org. scale: (Sub)National associations (REF) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Org. scale: European or International associations |  | 5.072 (5.454) | 1.045\*\* (0.513) | 2.899 (5.431) | 4.353 (5.417) | 2.918 (5.448) |
| Scope of activity |  | 1.118\*\* (0.532) | 2.262 (5.358) | 1.123\*\* (0.521) | 1.053\*\* (0.523) | 1.130\*\* (0.533) |
| Membership diversity |  | -2.827\* (1.597) | -2.336 (1.526) | -2.624\* (1.566) | -2.503 (1.618) | -2.609\* (1.586) |
| Organizational age | -0.001 (0.003) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Resources (FTE) | 0.003\* (0.002) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -0.424\*\*\* (0.145) | 23.48 (15.70) | 5.893 (14.69) | 11.21 (16.53) | 18.28 (13.90) | 11.64 (18.11) |
| lambda | -17.33 (15.08) | -17.33 (15.08) | -14.65 (13.93) | -17.41 (14.86) | -14.76 (14.30) | -17.50 (14.95) |
| N= 272; \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01 | | | | | | |

# References

Binderkrantz, A. S. (2005). Interest group strategies: Navigating between privileged access and strategies of pressure. *Political Studies*, *53*(4), 694–715. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00552.x

Braun, C. (2012). The Captive or the Broker? Explaining Public Agency-Interest Group Interactions. *Governance*, *25*(2), 291–314.

Bushway, S., Johnson, B. D., & Slocum, L. A. (2007). Is the magic still there? The use of the Heckman two-step correction for selection bias in criminology. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, *23*(2), 151–178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-007-9024-4

Junk, W. M. (2019). Representation beyond people: Lobbying access of umbrella associations to legislatures and the media. *Governance*, *32*(2), 313–330. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12375

Klüver, H., Braun, C., & Beyers, J. (2015). Legislative lobbying in context: towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *22*(4), 447–461.

Kohler-Koch, B., Kotzian, P., & Quittkat, C. (2017). The multilevel interest representation of national business associations. *West European Politics*, *40*(5), 1046–1065. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1303244

Moffitt, R. (1999). *Econometric methods for labor market analysis*. North-Holland.

Puhani, P. A. (2000). The Heckman correction for sample selection and its critique. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, *14*(1), 53–68. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00104

Rasmussen, A., & Gross, V. (2015). Biased access? Exploring selection to advisory committees. *European Political Science Review*, *7*(3), 343–372.

Schmitter, P. C., & Streeck, W. (1999). *The Organization of Business Interests. Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies*. 1–95.