# Appendix 1: Potentially Divisive Operation

| **Operation** | **Criterion** | **Legality** | **fs** | **Sources** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Desert Storm/Shield (Iraq 1990-1991) | No internal political changeThe operations were a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and did not pursue internal political change in Iraq. | LegalUNSC resolution 678 provided a clear legal framework. | 0 | Jentleson (1992:67) and Ruys (2010). |
| UNPROFOR II/ Deny Flight /IFOR (Bosnia 1992-1995)  | No internal political changeThe operations in the former Yugoslavia started as traditional peacekeeping missions, the operations also had a humanitarian goal. | LegalThe presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was authorized by UNSC resolution 758; Deny Flight and Sharp Guard by resolutions 713, 757 and 816. | 0 | Eichenberg (2005) |
| UNOSOMSomalia (1992-1993)  | No internal political changeAt the time of the vote in Italy, UNOSOM’s main goal was creating a secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia.  | LegalUNSC Resolution 751 provided a legal framework. | 0 | Jentleson and Britton (1998:401) |
| AlbaAlbania (1997) | No internal political changeOperation Alba was a peacekeeping/humanitarian operation, tasked with restoring order and providing protection for the provision of humanitarian assistance. | LegalUNSC Resolution 1101 provided a clear legal framework and the Albanian government consented to the operation. | 0 | Dobbins (2008:7-9) |
| Operation Allied Force/ Allied Harbour/AFORKosovo (1999) | Humanitarian intervention: The Kosovo intervention was launched in response to the grave human rights violations of the Serbian government and resulted in the loss of control of Serbia over Kosovo. | IllegalReports on the legality of the Kosovo intervention generally conclude that it was illegal because the UNSC did not authorize the use of force. | 0.67 | Newman (2002), Eichenberg (2005), Mello (2014) |
| UNDOFGolan Heights (1976-ongoing) | No internal political changeUNDOF was a peacekeeping operation tasked with maintaining a ceasefire between Syria and Israel | Legal UNSC resolution 350 provided a clear legal framework. | 0 | <https://undof.unmissions> .org/mandate |
| KFORKosovo (1999-ongoing) | No internal political changeKFOR was deployed to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. | LegalUNSC resolution 1244 provided a clear legal framework. | 0 | Yannis (2001) |
| Essential HarvestMacedonia (2001) | No internal political changeEssential Harvest was launched after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement to collect and destroy weapons of ethnic Albanian groups. | LegalLocal actors consented to the operation: an agreement detailing the plans for disarmament was signed between NATO and the major parties. | 0 | Chivvis (2008) |
| Enduring Freedom/ISAFAfghanistan (2001) | Internal political changeThe principle policy objectives of the operations in Afghanistan were foreign policy restraint and internal political change. Enduring Freedom was the military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and aimed to remove the Taliban regime and to destroy Al-Qaeda capabilities. ISAF aimed to assist the Afghan government. | LegalUNSC resolutions 1368 (Enduring Freedom) and 1386 (ISAF) provided a clear legal framework. | 0.33 | Mello (2014) |
| Iraqi FreedomIraq (2003) | Illegitimate ObjectiveOperation Iraqi freedom was launched to restrain Iraq’s production of weapons of mass destruction, but there was no “actual aggression”, so the case does not qualify as a case of foreign policy restraint. | IllegalLegal scholars have almost unanimously denounced the legal justification of the 2003 Iraq War. | 1 | Eichenberg (2005), Ruys (2010) |
| EUFOR CongoCongo (2006) | No internal political changeEUFOR Congo was deployed to support UN peacekeeping operation MONUC in Congo during the 2006 elections. | LegalUNSC resolution 1671 provided a clear legal framework. | 0 | Major (2009) |
| UNIFIL IILebanon (2006-ongoing) | No internal political changeThe reinforced UNIFIL operation was a peacekeeping operation, tasked with monitoring the cessation of hostilities, confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces and assisting Lebanese armed forces. | LegalUNSC resolution 1701 provided a clear legal framework. | 0 | Haesebrouck (2015) |
| AtalantaIndian Ocean (2008-Ongoing) | No internal political changeThe operation aimed to protect vessels of the World Food Program, repress piracy and monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. | LegalUNSC resolutions 1814, 1838 and 1853 provided a clear legal framework. | 0 | Helly (2009) |
| EUTM SomaliaSomalia (2010-ongoing) | No internal political changeEUTM Somalia was a training operation for the Somali armed forces, with the goal of strengthening the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia | LegalLocal actors consented to the operation. | 0 | Oksamytna (2011) |
| Odyssey Dawn/ Unified ProtectorLibya (2011) | Internal political changeThe proclaimed goal of the Libya intervention was the protection of civilians under threat of attack and the enforcement of a no-fly zone, but the operation ended in the toppling of Ghadafi. | LegalUNSC Resolution 1973 provided a legal mandate | 0.33 | Haesebrouck (2017) |
| ServalMali (2013-2014) | No internal political changeThe French-led operation Serval was launched to stop the rise of insurgent groups AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine, after a request from the central government and the UN to France. | LegalUNSC Resolution 2085 provided a legal mandate. | 0 | Boeke and Schuurman (2015) |
| EUTM Mali/MINUSMAMali (2013-ongoing) | No internal political changeEUTM Mali aimed to strengthen the capabilities of the Malian armed forces. MINUSMA was tasked with ensuring security and stabilization, protection of civilians and assisting in the reestablishment of state authority. | LegalEUM Mali took place under the framework of UNSC resolution 2071, MINUSMA under UNSC resolutions 2100 and 2164. | 0 | <http://eutmmali.eu/en/>https://minusma. unmissions.org/en |
| Syria (2013) | Humanitarian interventionAfter a chemical attack in Syria, the UK came close to conducting strike operations to deter the future use of chemical weapons. The UK government stressed that regime change was not the goal. | IllegalChina and Russia would veto a UNSC resolution. | 0.67 | Mello (2017) |
| Sangaris/ EUFOR RCACentral African Republic (2014-2016) | No internal political changeFrench forces were deployed to assist the AU-led MISCA operation, which was tasked with protecting civilians, restoring political order and creating conditions for providing humanitarian assistance; EUFOR RCA aimed to contribute to achieving a safe and secure environment in Bangui. | LegalUNSC resolution 2134 provided a legal framework for EUFOR RCA and Sangaris. | 0 | Haesebrouck and Meirvenne (2015) |
| EUNAVFOR Sophia (2015-ongoing) | No internal political changeThe operation aimed to contribute to the ‘disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean. | LegalUNSC resolution 2240 provided a legal framework. | 0 | Tardy (2015) |
| Inherent ResolveIraq (2014-ongoing) | No internal political changeThe main goal of operation Inherent Resolve was to eliminate the terrorist group Daesh and the threat it poses to the international community. | LegalThe operation was deployed after a request by the Iraqi government. | 0 | Ruys et al. (2019) |
| Inherent ResolveSyria (2014-ongoing) | Foreign policy restraintThe main goal of operation Inherent Resolve was to eliminate the terrorist group Daesh and the threat it poses to the international community. | IllegalIn the absence of a UNSC mandate and a request of the Syrian government, the legal basis for operations in Syria was disputed. | 0.67 | Ruys, et al. (2019) |

# Appendix 2 High Risk deployment

| **Case** | **Vote** | **Criterion** | **Conflict** | **fs** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| BEL\_DaeshIr | 26/09/2014 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: Six F16 fighter jets and 45 military instructors (Fonck et al., 2019) | Yes | 1 |
| BEL\_Libya | 21/03/2011 | Combat aircraft: Six F16 fighter jets (Fonck, et al., 2019) | Yes | 0,67 |
| BEL\_Mali | 17/01/2013 | Transport aircraft: Two C-130s (Reykers and Fonck, 2018) | Yes | 0 |
| DK\_Afgh | 14/12/2001 | Combat ground forces: 100 Special Forces, four F-16s and up to 250 military personnel (Mello, 2014) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_Alba | 2/05/1997 | Combat ground forces: Reconnaissance squadron of 59 soldiers (Saxi, 2010) | No | 0,33 |
| DK\_Bosnia | 18/09/1992 | Combat ground forces: One headquarters company of 170 soldiers to support the new UN Protection Force HQs (Houben, 2004:95, Jakobsen, 2000) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_DaeshIr | 2/10/2014 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: Seven F-16 fighter jets with up to 110 supporting personnel and 120 military trainers (Haesebrouck, 2016:51) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_DaeshSyr | 19/04/2016 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: Seven F-16 fighters, a C-130 transport aircraft, up to supporting military personal and 120 military trainers ([https://www.ft.dk/samling/ 20151/ beslutningsforslag/ b108/index.htm](https://www.ft.dk/samling/%2020151/%20beslutningsforslag/%20b108/index.htm)) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_Iraq03 | 21/03/2003 | Combat ground forces: 380 soldiers, a submarine and a corvette (Houben, 2004:97) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_Iraq91 | 31/08/1990 | Transport aircraft: One C-130 (Doeser, 2013:591) | No | 0 |
| DK\_Kosovo | 8/10/1998 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: Four F16 fighter jets and 115 supporting personnel; later it contributed a reconnaissance force of 150 units to AFOR and an infantry battalion (+-870 units) to KFOR (Houben, 2004:96) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_Leb | 14/09/2006 | Naval units: One corvette and one patrol boat (Haesebrouck, 2016:45) | No | 0 |
| DK\_Libya | 18/03/2011 | Combat aircraft: Four F16 fighter jets and 120 supporting personnel (Haesebrouck, 2017) | Yes | 0,67 |
| DK\_MINUSMA | 17/11/2015 | Combat ground forces: 30 special forces and a Hercules transport plane with 60 supporting personnel (Jakobsen, 2016) | Yes | 1 |
| DK\_Serval | 15/01/2013 | Transport aircraft: One C-130 (https://www2.forsvaret.dk /omos/publikationer/forsvarsavisen/Documents/Forsvarsavisen%20nr.%201%202013.pdf) | Yes | 0 |
| ESP\_Atalanta | 21/01/2009 | Naval units: One warship and up to 200 soldiers (<https://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/actuales/listado/atalanta.html>) | No | 0 |
| ESP\_DaeshIr | 22/10/2014 | Non-combat units: 300 troops mainly tasked with training local forces (<https://elpais.com/politica/2014/10/22/actualidad/1413976311_425791.html>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| ESP\_EUMali | 30/01/2013 | Non-combat units: 40 military instructors (<https://elpais.com/politica/2013/01/30/actualidad/1359576018_703345.html>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| ESP\_EURCA | 19/03/2019 | Combat ground forces: 50 Special Forces and 25 Guardia Civil (<http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/historico/listado/eufor-rca.html>) | Yes | 1 |
| ESP\_EUSom | 22/04/2010 | Non-combat units: 38 military instructors (deployed in Uganda) (<http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/SalaPrensa/NotPre?_piref73_7706063_73_1337373_1337373.next_page=/wc/detalleNotaSalaPrensa&idNotaSalaPrensa=1246&anyo=2010&mes=4&pagina=1&mostrarvolver=S&movil=null>) | No | 0,33 |
| ESP\_Libya | 22/03/2011 | Combat aircraft: Four F18 fighter jets, which did not participate in strike operations, and two support planes (Johnson and Mueen, 2012) | Yes | 0,67 |
| ESP\_Sophia | 15/07/2015 | Naval units: One plane for maritime patrolling in the first phase, expected to contribute a frigate, two helicopters and 250 soldiers in the second phase (<https://elpais.com/politica/2015/07/15/actualidad/1436991268_066142.html>) | No | 0 |
| FIN\_Atalanta | 26/11/2010 | Naval units: One navy ship and 120 personnel ([https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/selonteko/Documents/vns\_5+2010.pdf](https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/selonteko/Documents/vns_5%2B2010.pdf)) | No | 0 |
| FIN\_DaeshIr | 13/03/2015 | Non-combat units: 50 military instructors (<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/sivut/trip.aspx?triptype=ValtiopaivaAsiat&docid=vns+10/2014>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| FIN\_IFOR | 20/12/1995 | Combat ground forces: 400 troops (engineering company and infantry battalion) (Raunio, 2018) | No | 0,33 |
| FIN\_KFOR | 18/06/1999 | Combat ground forces: Enforced battalion of 800 soldiers (Forsberg, 2000:44) | No | 0,33 |
| FIN\_Leb | 7/09/2006 | Non-combat units: Engineering company of 200 units (Haesebrouck, 2016:44) | No | 0,33 |
| FRN\_DaeshIr | 13/01/2015 | Combat aircraft: 15 to 20 fighter jets, a refuelling plane and a maritime patrol aircraft; from February 2015: aircraft carrier Charles de Gaule with an additional 26 fighter jets; 200 military instructors (Haesebrouck, 2016) | Yes | 1 |
| FRN\_DaeshSyr | 25/11/2015 | Combat aircraft: 15 to 20 fighter jets, a refuelling plane and a maritime patrol aircraft and 200 military instructors (Haesebrouck, 2016) | Yes | 1 |
| FRN\_Iraq91 | 16/01/1991 | Combat ground forces: 10,000 combat forces; 30 fighter jets, naval units and armed vehicles (Bennett et al., 1994) | Yes | 1 |
| FRN\_Libya | 12/07/2011 | Combat aircraft: Over 40 aircraft, 30 helicopters, and a dozen warships (Johnson and Mueen, 2012) | Yes | 0,67 |
| FRN\_Sangaris | 25/02/2014 | Combat ground forces: Approximately 1000 troops that participated in combat operations (<https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/actualites2/centrafrique-lancement-de-l-operation-sangaris>)  | Yes | 1 |
| FRN\_Serval | 22/04/2013 | Combat ground forces: 4000 soldiers were deployed at the time of the vote. The aim was to decrease that to 2000 in the summer and to 1000 at the end of the year (<https://www.france24.com/fr/20130422-mali-assemblee-nationale-vote-prolongation-operation-serval-armee-francaise>) | Yes | 1 |
| GER\_Afgh | 16/11/2001 | Combat ground forces: up to 3,900 troops, including 100 special forces in Afghanistan (Mello, 2014:213) | Yes | 1 |
| GER\_Atalanta | 19/12/2001 | Naval units: One frigate and 1,400 supporting personnel (Brummer, 2017) | No | 0 |
| GER\_Bosnia | 22/07/1994 | Combat aircraft: 14 aircraft to monitor no-fly zone, but did not participate in strike operations (Larson et al., 2003) | Yes | 0,67 |
| GER\_Congo | 1/06/2006 | Combat ground forces: Up to 780 troops (Major, 2009) | Yes | 1 |
| GER\_DaeshIr | 29/01/2015 | Non-combat ground forces: 100 military instructors ([https://www.budestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw05\_de\_bundeswehr\_irak-356342](https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw05_de_bundeswehr_irak-356342)) | Yes | 0,33 |
| GER\_DaeshSy | 4/12/2015 | Combat aircraft, no strike operations: Six tornado reconnaissance aircraft, a refuelling aircraft and up to 1200 supporting personnel (<https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw49-bundeswehreinsatz-isis-397866>) | Yes | 0,67 |
| GER\_EUMali | 28/02/2013 | Non-combat units: 180 soldiers to train mechanics and paramedics (<https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2013/43167387_kw09_de_mali-211134>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| GER\_EURCA | 10/04/2014 | Non-combat units: Strategic aeromedical evacuation capability (<https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/50572717_kw15_de_zentralafrikanische_republik_abstimmung-216974>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| GER\_EUSom | 3/04/2014 | Non-combat units: Up to 20 soldiers to train and advice Somalian forces, deployed in Uganda (https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/50124828\_kw14\_de\_bundeswehr\_somalia-216626) | No | 0,33 |
| GER\_Kosovo | 16/10/1998 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: 14 fighter jets allowed to attack ground targets and participated with 8000 troops in KFOR (Larson, et al., 2003, Mello, 2014) | Yes | 1 |
| GER\_Leb | 20/09/2006 | Naval units: Eight ships with maximum 2400 supporting personnel (<https://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/ausschuesse18/a12/auslandseinsaetze/auslandseinsaetze/unifil-247438>) | No | 0 |
| GER\_Mac | 29/08/2001 | Combat ground forces: 500 soldiers tasked with collecting weapons (https://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/einsatzbw/start/abgeschlossene\_einsaetze/mazedonien/!ut/p/z1/04\_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTMOMTQwcTTzDTI193IzdfY30wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxm2GuH6wfpR-VlViWWKFXkF9UkpNaopeYDHKhfmRGYl5KTmpAfrIjRKAgN6LcoNxREQDGcOE0/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\_B8LTL29225V340A4IV53LF3GM7) | No  | 0,33 |
| GER\_Serval | 28/02/2013 | Transport aircraft: Up to 150 soldiers to provide air transport capacity and to refuel French aircrafts (https://www.bundestag.de/ausschuesse/ausschuesse18/a12/auslandseinsaetze/auslandseinsaetze/minusma\_und\_eutm\_mali-253016) | Yes | 0 |
| ITA\_Afgh | 7/11/2001 | Combat aircraft, no strike operations: Harrier’ warplanes that flew from the aircraft carrier ‘Garibaldi’, but were constrained by strict rules of engagement that prohibited strikes (Ignazi et al., 2012) | Yes | 0,67 |
| ITA\_Alba | 8/04/1997 | Combat ground forces: 2,800 troops, Tornado fighter-bombers, assault helicopters and C-130 planes (Ignazi, et al., 2012:111) | No | 0,33 |
| ITA\_Iraq03 | 24/07/2003 | Combat ground forces: 2,400 troops, including mechanized infantry, helicopter units, and 400 Carabinieri (Mello, 2014) | Yes | 1 |
| ITA\_Iraq90 | 23/08/1990 | Naval units: Two frigates and fuelling ship (Ignazi, et al., 2012) | Yes | 0 |
| ITA\_Iraq91 | 16/01/1991 | Combat aircraft: Eight tornado fighter jets (Ignazi, et al., 2012:91) | Yes | 0,67 |
| ITA\_Kosovo | 26/03/1999 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: 28 combat aircraft and 6000 troops in KFOR (Ignazi, et al., 2012:119) | Yes | 1 |
| ITA\_Leb | 17/10/2006 | Combat ground forces: 2,500 troops in southern Lebanon, inter alia tasked with monitoring the cessation of hostilities (Ignazi, et al., 2012) | No | 0,33 |
| ITA\_Libya | 24/03/2011 | Combat aircraft: 30 fighter jets mandated to attack ground targets (Haesebrouck, 2017) | Yes | 0,67 |
| ITA\_Som92 | 10/12/1992 | Combat ground forces: 2,500 troops tasked with arms control, patrolling, providing support to refugees and reconstruction (Ignazi, et al., 2012) | Yes | 1 |
| ITA\_Sophia | 30/07/2015 | Naval units: Host nation and participates with naval units and helicopters (European Union Committee, 2016) | No | 0 |
| SLK\_DaeshIr | 13/10/2017 | Non-combat units: 25 military instructors (<https://www.mosr.sk/40669-en/narodna-rada-sr-schvalila-vyslanie-vojakov-do-iraku/>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| SLK\_EUMali | 1/12/2015 | Non-combat units: 5 military instructors (<https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20071269/lopinot-eu-presidency-is-a-chance-for-slovakia.html>) | Yes | 0,33 |
| SLK\_Iraq03 | 6/02/2003 | Non-combat units: 75 member NBC-CM team (Hummel, 2007:25) | Yes | 0,33 |
| SLK\_KFOR | 30/06/1999 | Non-combat units: 40 military engineers (Simon, 2004:204) | No | 0,33 |
| SLK\_Kosovo | 1/06/1999 | Non-combat units: 40 military engineers (deployed in Albania) (Simon, 2004:204) | No | 0,33 |
| SLK\_Leb | 6/02/2007 | Non-combat units: 11 surgeons (Kříž and Urbanovská, 2013:380) | No | 0,33 |
| SLK\_Sophia | 10/05/2017 | Naval units: 10 forces deployed on German ship (<https://newsnow.tasr.sk/featured/first-ten-slovak-soldiers-leave-for-eus-eunavfor-med-sophia-mission/>) | No | 0 |
| SLK\_UNDOF | 16/12/1998 | Combat ground forces: 97 troops (Kříž and Urbanovská, 2013:378) | No | 0,33 |
| UK\_DaeshIr | 26/09/2014 | Combat aircraft and ground forces: Eight Tornado Jets, one air-to-air refuelling and surveillance aircraft and an unspecified number of Reaper Drones and 275 military instructors (Haesebrouck, 2016) | Yes | 1 |
| UK\_DaeshSy | 2/12/2015 | Combat aircraft: and ground forces 16 Tornado Jets, one air-to-air refuelling and surveillance aircraft, an unspecified number of Reaper Drones and 275 military instructors (Haesebrouck, 2016) | Yes | 1 |
| UK\_Iraq03 | 18/03/2003 | Combat ground forces: 46,150 soldiers, including 28,000 army personnel (Mello, 2014) | Yes | 1 |
| UK\_Libya | 21/03/2011 | Combat aircraft: 37 aircraft that conducted strike operations, apache helicopters, special forces (Johnson and Mueen, 2012) | Yes | 0,67 |
| UK\_Syria13 | 29/08/2013 | Combat aircraft: Planned strike operations (Mello, 2017) | Yes | 1 |

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