**To inform, strategise, collaborate or compete: What use do lobbyists make of lobby registers?**

**Appendix**

**Appendix A - Representativeness of the Sample**

The sample of respondents shows similar characteristics to the population of registered actors as far as some key factors are concerned. First, for comparative purposes I coded 1667 registered organisation for which information about their activities was present on their website. To code them, I followed Binderkrantz et al. (2015) taking however also a behavioural approach to the definition interest groups, thus including also firms. Business associations are no-profit organisations having firms as members. These associations can represent encompassing business interests or sectorial interests (Hanegraaff 2015). Professional organisations have individuals as members and represent the interest of a professional category, such as the nursing staff or teachers. No-profit organisations, such as Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), charities, leisure groups, research institutions, think tanks have been labelled together as public interest groups (Binderkrantz et al. 2015). Firms instead have no membership and can be included in the category of interest groups when they seek to influence public policy (Baroni et al. 2015). Law firms and public affairs specialists deserve a separate category to firms, because even though they do not have members, they conduct their lobbying activity on behalf of clients. This differentiates them from the remaining interest group categories.

It must be reminded that data on the Irish interest group population does not currently exist. SIPO (2018) does not organise registrants according to interest group categories, like the EU transparency register, and past studies, which could not rely on lobbying.ie had to retrieve the list of interest groups from secondary sources. Dür and Mateo (2010), for example, used the *Administration Yearbook & Diary* and retrieved a list of 401 interest associations, thus excluding firms. At current times, this number is too low, considering that registered public interest groups alone were more than 600 in 2018. Table 1A compares the reference population of interest groups by group type with my sample of respondents. The inclusion of firms in this study is an improvement compared to previous studies given that more than 30% of the registered interest groups on the lobby register are firms. In my sample of respondents firms are slightly underrepresented (24%), however this difference is not large enough to be concerning and should thus not bias the results. The largest category of organisations in both groups is made by public interest groups, which make up approximately 40% of the sample. The distribution of business groups matches almost perfectly, while professional associations and law firms/public affairs specialists are slightly overrepresented in my sample. Again, this difference remains small and should not cause bias in my results. The representativeness of the sample of respondents can be assessed by considering other factors shown in Table 1A.

The sample of respondents closely reflects the geographical distribution of interest groups registered on lobbying.ie with 35% based outside of Dublin, almost 60% of the organisations based in Dublin, 4% in the UK, 2% rest of the world (my sample over-represents this category slightly).

**Table 1A – comparison between population of IGs on lobby register and sample of respondents**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Characteristics | IG population on lobby register | Sample of respondents |
| IG Type | Business Associations = 13.67%  Professional Associations (including farmers) = 6.78%  Firms = 31.63%  Public Groups = 38.41%  Public Affairs/Law Firms = 8.56% | Business Associations = 13.97%  Professional Associations (including farmers) = 9.52%  Firms = 24.13%  Public Groups = 40.64%  Public Affairs/Law Firms = 11.75% |
| Geographical Distribution | Dublin = 59%  Outside Dublin = 35%  UK = 4%  Rest of the World = 2% | Dublin = 56%  Outside Dublin = 35%  UK = 4%  Rest of the World = 5% |
| Most Lobbied Policy Areas (ranked) | Health care  Economic development and industry  Agriculture  Justice and equality  Education and training | Health care  Community  Economic development and industry  Justice and equality  Education and training |
| Most Lobbied Institutions | The Houses of the Oireachtas  Government Departments | The Houses of the Oireachtas  Government Departments |

Secondly, the sample of respondents is representative of the registered lobbyist population as far as policy area is concerned. According to the Irish Register of Lobbying, most of the country’s lobbying focuses on health care, followed by economic development and industry, agriculture, justice and equality, and education and training (SIPO, 2018). The survey’s sample closely follows this distribution with health care, economic development and industry, justice and equality, and education and training being among the top five policy areas identified by survey respondents as ‘their main area of lobbying activity’. Finally, again according to the Irish Register of Lobbyists, the Dáil (Lower House) and the Seanad (Upper House) are the top-two lobbied institutions followed by government departments. The same result can be found in the data collected with the survey. As a result, the data collected through the survey can be considered as representative of the Irish population of interest groups, *at least* as far as the above factors are concerned.

**Appendix B – Survey construction**

The survey included a list of questions aimed at capturing organisational characteristics. I asked respondents to identify the category which best describes the organisation they work for. Respondents could choose between business associations, professional organisations, NGOs and citizen groups, labour unions, research institute or university, consultancy, law firm or public affairs specialist, a firm/company, and no organisation. This question was used to construct the group type variable used in the analysis. Next, I explored an organisation’s management structure and complexity asking whether the organisation is structured in board of directors, communication department, advocacy department, regional departments, secretariat, and accountancy. This allowed for the construction of an additive index of organisational capacity as per Crepaz and Hanegraaff (2019), which scores from 0 to 6 depending on how many of the above factors concerning the organisation’s management structure were indicated to be present by respondents. Finally, I asked about the organisation’s total budget allocated to lobbying in the current year in five answer categories (less than €10,000; between €10,000 and €100,000; between €100,000 and €500,000; between €500,000 and €1,000,000; and more than €1,000,000). This question allowed me to measure an organisation’s financial resources allocated to lobbying. I used the measure of organisational capacity and the lobbying budget as indicators of overall resources available for an organisation. Finally, I asked how frequently respondents had been active over the last year (ranging from never to every week) in advocacy in media, online consultations, publication of position papers, lobbying with advocacy partners, lobbying independent government agencies, parliament, government and local government institutions. This provided me with information about the volume of lobbying activity of an organisation. The questions concerning the lobbying activity were inspired by the comparative interest group survey (Beyers et al. 2016). Finally, the survey also asked whether respondents had occupied public officeholder positions in the past (national level, local level, as special advisors), which allows me to construct a variable accounting for revolving doors.

**Appendix C – Factor Analysis**

**Table 2A – Dimensional analysis of nine purposes of use of the Irish lobby register**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Factor* | *Variance* | | *Proportion* | | | *Cumulative* | |
| Factor 1 | **1.959** | | 0.450 | | | 0.450 | |
| Factor 2 | **1.626** | | 0.373 | | | 0.824 | |
| Factor 3 | **1.038** | | 0.238 | | | 1.062 | |
| Factor 4 | 0.338 | | 0.078 | | | 1.140 | |
| **Varimax rotated factor loadings** | | | | | | | |
| *Dimension* | | *Information* | | *Competition* | *Strategy* | | *Collaboration (uniqueness values)* |
| Info about policy-making | | **0.546** | | 0.265 | 0.266 | | 0.549 |
| Form policy position | | **0.598** | | 0.230 | 0.339 | | 0.474 |
| See competitors | | 0.313 | | **0.676** | 0.217 | | 0.396 |
| Choose targets | | 0.359 | | 0.316 | 0.463 | | 0.527 |
| Find clients | | 0.058 | | 0.424 | 0.341 | | 0.529 |
| See whom represented | | 0.130 | | **0.740** | 0.261 | | 0.349 |
| Find partner | | 0.199 | | 0.327 | 0.492 | | **0.530** |
| Define inside strategy | | 0.214 | | 0.255 | **0.718** | | 0.373 |
| Define outside strategy | | 0.208 | | 0.213 | **0.754** | | 0.307 |

**Appendix D – Variables and Summary statistics**

**Table 3A – Descriptive statistics**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Description** | **Values (statistics)** |
| *Dependent Variables (DV)* | | |
| Use | 1 = uses information of the register; 0 = does not use information of the register | 0 = 223 (62.12%)  1 = 136 (37.88%) |
| Information | Count of how often register is used to ‘collect information about policy making’ and ‘collect information to form policy position/opinion’ in one year | Min = 0  Max = 66  Mean = 1.76  St. Dev. = 4.81 |
| Competition | Count of how often register is used to ‘see what competitors are doing’ and ‘whom they are representing’ in one year | Min = 0  Max = 108  Mean = 2.21  St. Dev. = 7.75 |
| Strategy | Count of how often register is used to develop ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ strategies in one year | Min = 0  Max = 55  Mean = 0.90  St. Dev. = 3.90 |
| Collaboration | Count of use of register to ‘find advocacy partners’ | Min = 0  Max = 12  Mean = 0.36  St. Dev. = 1.44 |
| *Independent variables* | | |
| Group Type | 1 = Business association; 2 = Professional Association/Labour Union; 3 = Firm; 4 = NGO, research Organisation, citizen group; 5 = lobbying/law firm | 1 = 44 (13.97%)  2 = 30 (9.52%)  3 = 76 (24.13%)  4 = 128 (40.64%)  5 = 37 (11.75%) |
| Organisational capacity | Composite index considering whether an organisation has the following characteristics: board of directors, communication department, advocacy department, regional departments, secretariat, and accountancy. If present, each characteristic was scored as 1. The index represents a sum of all characteristics (following Crepaz and Hanegraaff 2019) | Min = 0  Max = 6  Mean = 1.68  St. Dev. = 1.83 |
| Lobbying budget | 1 = less than €10,000; 2 = between €10,000 and €100,000; 3 = between €100,000 and €500,000; 4 = between €500,000 and €1,000,000; 5 =  More than €1,000,000 | 1 = 208 (67.97%)  2 = 68 (22.22%)  3 = 18 (5.88%)  4 = 8 (2.61%)  5 = 4 (1.31%) |
| Volume of Lobbying Activity | Count of lobbying activity over the last year. Includes direct and indirect activities | Min = 0  Max = 284  Mean = 36.73  St. Dev. = 47.05 |
| Revolving Doors | 1 = past in elected or unelected public office position (national and local level)  0 = no experience | 1 = 46 (15%)  0 = 259 (85%) |
| Positive Attitude | Ordinal scale of positive attitude towards regulation. Answer to question “does lobby regulation help you in your profession?” | Min = 1 (not helpful)  Max = 5 (very helpful)  Mean = 2.38  St. Dev. = 1.11 |

**Appendix E – Robustness check**

**Table 4A – Logit and Nb regression models explaining use and purpose of use (reduced panel of respondents)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1  (Logit) | Model 2  (Nbreg) | Model 3  (Nbreg) | Model 4  (Nbreg) | Model 5  (Nbreg) |
| VARIABLES | Use | Information | Strategy | Competition | Collaboration |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| *Organisational characteristics* | Odd ratio | Incidence rate ratio (Irr.) | Irr. | Irr. | Irr. |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pub. (ref). | (ref.) | (ref). | (ref). | (ref). | (ref.) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| BA | 0.807 | 1.191 | 0.813 | 1.880\* | 0.698 |
|  | (0.263) | (0.613) | (0.329) | (0.671) | (0.413) |
| Prof. | 1.261 | 0.490\*\* | 1.356 | 1.649 | 1.912 |
|  | (0.528) | (0.173) | (0.962) | (1.000) | (1.373) |
| Firm | 0.717 | 0.727 | 0.765 | 2.035\*\* | 0.534 |
|  | (0.320) | (0.273) | (0.394) | (0.629) | (0.263) |
| PA firm | 0.801 | 0.486\* | 0.674 | 1.581 | 0.363 |
|  | (0.495) | (0.206) | (0.501) | (0.625) | (0.250) |
| Org. capacity | 1.008 | 0.920 | 0.937 | 0.941 | 0.678\*\*\* |
|  | (0.107) | (0.070) | (0.086) | (0.071) | (0.090) |
| Lobbying budget | 1.250 | 1.241 | 1.293 | 1.665\*\*\* | 1.383 |
|  | (0.239) | (0.175) | (0.330) | (0.217) | (0.384) |
| Vol. lobby activity | 1.008\*\* | 1.001 | 1.003 | 1.003 | 1.006 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| Rev. door | 3.098\*\*\* | 1.766 | 1.567 | 3.857\*\*\* | 2.345\*\* |
|  | (1.183) | (0.850) | (0.907) | (1.699) | (1.015) |
| Positive attitude | 2.207\*\*\* | 1.905\*\*\* | 1.556\*\* | 1.567\*\*\* | 1.431\* |
|  | (0.404) | (0.213) | (0.324) | (0.179) | (0.294) |
| Constant | 0.038\*\*\* | 0.216\*\*\* | 0.135\*\*\* | 0.098\*\*\* | 0.149\*\*\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.083) | (0.079) | (0.035) | (0.075) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 212 | 212 | 212 | 212 | 212 |
| Prob. Chi-square | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Pseudo R-square | 0.18 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.07 |

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Pub: Public Interest Group

BA: Business Association

Prof.: Professional Association

PA firm: Public Affairs Firm

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