The Costs of Interest Representation – A Resource Perspective on Informational Lobbying

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Online Appendices

Appendix A: Sampling Strategy and Overview of Policy Issues

One of the challenges in interest groups research is how to draw a representative sample as it is hard to define a clear population. This study follows an issue-centered approach (Beyers et al., 2014), rather than an actor-centered sampling strategy to also account for varying context factors that may affect lobbying behavior. There are different starting points from where to sample policy issues. While some rely on a legislative database (Beyers et al., 2014; Burstein, 2014), or the media (Bernhagen, 2012), the starting point for the project's dataset were nationally existing public opinion polls between 2005-2010. The survey item had to be a specific policy issue rather than an overall policy area, present a suggestion for policy change, was measured on an agreement scale and had to fall under national competences (as opposed to EU or national level). These criteria have led to a list of issues, whereby the number of issues varies per country. From the selected set of issues, a final sample was selected in a way that ensures variation with regard to issue type, media salience and public support for the issue. By ensuring such variation, we aim to increase our ability to draw more generalisable conclusions.

The advantage of this approach over sampling issues from the legislative agenda is that the sample also captures interest group activity before an issue was introduced in the parliament, which makes the chance of policy change slightly higher. Sampling from existing opinion polls, however, means that the sample only includes issues that were somewhat salient so that they were worth polling on (Burstein, 2014). In that sense, also this sample is not a completely random sample of issues. However, citizens should have at least somewhat informed opinions if interest groups are expected to transmit their preferences meaningfully (Gilens, 2012). The advantage is thus that the dataset includes issues the public has an opinion on instead of issues the public does not care about or has no meaningful opinion on. The

stratified sample, moreover, ensures variation with regard to media saliency, which is always added as a control variable.

Table A: Overview of Policy Issues

Country	Policy issue
	Building of a bridge for vehicles and trains across the Kattegat
	Reducing mortgage interest deduction from 33% to 25%
	Granting asylum to families with children among rejected Iraqi asylum seekers
	Reducing the unemployment benefit period by half from four to two years
	Strengthening the control of the Danish agriculture in order to take action
Denmark	against the misuse of antibiotics
Delillark	Controlled delivery of heroin for particularly vulnerable drug addicts at special
	clinics as a pilot scheme
	Introducing differentiated VAT
	Making schools' average test results public
	Cutting the allowances paid to young people between 25 and 29 years by half
	Creation of an equal pay commission
	Financial support of Arcandor through public money
	Guaranteeing a pension above the poverty line for pensioners who have paid
	contributions for many years
	Supplying citizens with consumption vouchers to boost the economy
	Establishing a wealth tax
Germany	State control of electricity prices
	Banning of computer games that glorify violence
	Cutting the tax exemption for night, Sunday, and holiday supplements
	Cutting coal subsidies
	Making it illegal to carry out a paternity test without the consent of the mother
	Cutting social benefits
	Allowing all illegal immigrants who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time
	to stay
	Raising the retirement age to 67
	Abolishing the mortgage interest
	Spending more money on development aid
Netherlands	Obligating stores to be closed on Sunday
	Ban of smoking in restaurants
	Banning embryonic stem cell research
	Allowing more asylum seekers
	Banning euthanasia
	Building new nuclear power plants
	Permanent introduction of a congestion charge in Stockholm
	Reinstating the wealth tax, which was abolished in 2007 and meant that anyone
	with a fortune of 1.5 million paid 1.5% in taxes
	Rescuing Saab through government funds
	Banning the construction of minarets in Sweden
Sweden	Reducing third-world aid
	Introducing a language test for Swedish citizenship
	Restricting the right to free abortion
	Making household and domestic services tax deductible
	Allowing free download of all films and music from the Internet
	Increasing the old age retirement age

	Giving amnesty to illegal immigrants who have spent ten years in Britain without getting into trouble with the police
	Scrapping ID cards
	Requiring food manufacturers to reduce the fat/salt content in their products
	Introducing a graduate tax, where graduates would pay an extra income tax on
UK	their income after graduating
	Allowing a third runway to be built at Heathrow Airport
	Reducing corporation tax
	Increasing Air Passenger Duty, to be paid by people taking both short-haul and
	long-haul flights
	Subsidising the building of new nuclear power stations
	Increasing the tax on large executive-style, estate, and 4x4 vehicles
	Downgrading 'ecstasy' from a class-A drug to a class-B drug

Appendix B: Overview of Survey Data

B1. Response Rates Per Country for the GovLis Survey

Country	Not Completed	Completed	Total Invited
Germany	175	50	225
	77%	22%	100%
UK	339	73	412
	82%	18%	100%
Denmark	114	134	248
	45%	54%	100%
Sweden	173	96	269
	64%	36%	100%
Netherlands	131	125	256
	51%	49%	100%
Total	932	478	1,410
Total rate (%)	66%	34%	100%

B2. Survey Questions

The appendix B2 lists a template of the survey questions. The actual survey was individualised for each specific policy issue (*policytitle*) and time of observation (*period*). Furthermore, all questions were adjusted according to the advocate's specific actor type (*membership organisation/firm/expert*).

Arguments

Regarding the issue of #u_policytitleshort# #u_periodlong#, how often did you/your organisation/your company use arguments...

referring to facts and	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very	DK
scientific evidence	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Often	
					(5)	
referring to the feasibility and	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very	DK
effectiveness of the proposed	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Often	
policy					(5)	
referring to the economic	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very	DK
impact for the country	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Often	
					(5)	
referring to compatibility with	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very	DK
existing legislation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Often	
					(5)	
referring to public support on	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very	DK
the issue	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Often	
					(5)	
referring to fairness and moral	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Very	DK
principles	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Often	
					(5)	

Resources and Capacities

Regarding the issue of #u_policytitleshort#, please indicate whether you agree that you/ your company/ your organization...

Political Capacity

had media	Strongly	Disagree	Neither agree	Agree	Strongly	DK
attention.	Disagree (1)	(2)	or disagree (3)	(4)	Agree (5)	
had public	Strongly	Disagree	Neither agree	Agree	Strongly	DK
opinion on your	Disagree (1)	(2)	or disagree (3)	(4)	Agree (5)	
side.						

On the issue of (policytitleshort), how important was it for you (experts)/ your organisation (associations)/ your company (firms) to represent...

the	Not	Somewhat	Moderately	Important	Very	DK
general	Important	Important (2)	Important (3)	(4)	Important	
public	(1)				(5)	

Please indicate how important the following activities were to you (experts)/your organisation (associations)/ your company (firms) on the issue of (policytitleshort) (periodshort).

Interaction with	Not	Somewhat	Moderately	Important	Very	DK
members or	Important	Important	Important	(4)	Important	
stakeholders, such	(1)	(2)	(3)		(5)	
as in newsletters or						
discussion events						

Economic Resources

Regarding the issue of #u_policytitleshort#, please indicate whether you agree that you/ your company/ your organization...

spent a high level	Strongly	Disagree	Neither agree	Agree	Strongly	DK
of economic	Disagree (1)	(2)	or disagree (3)	(4)	Agree (5)	
resources.						

Outside Activity

Please indicate how important the following activities were to you/your organization/your company on the issue of #u_policytitleshort# #u_periodshort#:

Protest or other activities mobilising the public	Not Important (1)	Somewhat Important (2)	Moderately Important (3)	Important (4)	Very Important (5)	DK
Commenting in the press or conducting media campaigns	Not Important (1)	Somewhat Important (2)	Moderately Important (3)	Important (4)	Very Important (5)	DK

Organisational Salience

This survey addresses the issue of #u_policytitleshort#. #u_explainissue# How important was the issue of #u_policytitleshort# to you compared to other policy- related issues you work on?

- 5 = Much more important
- 4 = More important
- 3 = Equally important
- 2 = Less important
- 1 = Much less important

Appendix C: Overview of Variables

C1. Descriptive Statistics of all Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Info on Public Preferences	383	3.138381	1.240847	1	5
Expert Information	383	3.519582	.9446087	1	5
Combination	383	.5979112		0	1
Economic Resources	383	2.355091	1.177569	1	5
Political Capacity	383	3.334856	.8188185	1	5
Interest Group type	383			1	4
(Categorical)					
Position	383			0	2
(Categorical)					
Organisational Salience	383	3.375979	1.148478	1	5
Media Saliency (log)	383	-3.441598	1.373981	-6.614726	7323679
Outside Activity	383	2.840731	1.205121	1	5
Policy type (Categorical)	383			1	3
Country (Categorical)	383			1	5

C2. Correlation Matrix

	Economic	Political	Media	Outside	Orga.	Group	Pro	Policy
	Resources	Capacity	Saliency	Activity	Salience	Type	Change	Туре
Economic	1							
Resources								
Political	0.3732	1						
Capacity								
Media Saliency	0.2394	0.0183	1					
Outside Activity	0.3434	0.6302	0.0582	1				
Org. Salience	0.3346	0.4434	0.1204	0.4954	1			
Group Type	-0.1050	-0.1757	-0.0616	-0.3491	-0.0983	1		
Pro Change	0.0527	0.0447	-0.1397	0.0622	0.0001	-0.0435	1	
Policy type	0.0395	-0.0271	0.0419	0.0429	0.0082	-0.0059	-0.0856	1
Country	-0.0170	0.0447	-0.0469	0.1081	0.1315	-0.0044	-0.0481	0.1819

N=383

Appendix D: Interest Group Categorisation

The coding scheme relies on the INTERARENA project (Binderkrantz et al., 2015) to which firms and think tanks have been added.

Public interest groups

Environment and animal welfare

Humanitarian – international

Humanitarian – national

Consumer Group

Government reform

Civil liberties

Citizen Empowerment

Other public interest

Business associations

Peak-level business group

Sector-wide business group

Breed associations

Technical business associations

Other business group

Firms

Labour groups and occupational associations

Blue-collar union

White-collar union

Employee representative committee

Other labour groups

Doctors' associations

Other medical professions

Teachers' associations

Other occupational associations

Identity, hobby and religious groups

Patients

Elderly

Students

Friendship groups (i.e. non-specific groups related to a country)

Racial or ethnic

Women

Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual/Transsexual

Other – undefined - identity group

Sports groups

Other hobby/leisure groups

Groups associated with the protestant church

Roman/Catholic groups

Other religious group

Expert organizations, think tanks and institutional association


Expert organizations


Think tanks

Associations of local authorities Associations of other public institutions Associations of managers of public institutions Other Institutional associations

Appendix E-I: Descriptive Statistics and Different Model Specifications


E: Visual Inspection of Main Variables






E1: Economic Resources on Expert Info

E2: Political Capacity on Expert Info



E3: Economic Resources on Info on Public Pref.



E4: Political Capacity on Info on Public Pref.

F: Multilevel ordered logistic regression with random intercepts for policy issues and SEs in parentheses, excluding Outside Activity

	(F1)	(F2)
	Expert	Info on Public
	Information	Preferences
Economic Resources	0.26**	0.21*
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Political Capacities	0.99***	1.42***
•	(0.15)	(0.15)
Group Type (Ref: Citizen Groups)	,	,
Professional Groups	0.14	-0.19
•	(0.30)	(0.28)
Business Groups & Firms	0.11	-1.27* [*] *
	(0.31)	(0.30)
Experts & Others	0.48+	-0.40
,	(0.27)	(0.26)
Position (Ref: Pro Change)	()	()
Neutral	-0.91**	-0.96**
	(0.34)	(0.36)
Against	-0.01	0.31
, igainet	(0.21)	(0.20)
Organisational Salience	0.44***	0.23*
C. gameaneria: Camerico	(0.10)	(0.09)
Media Saliency (log)	0.07	0.04
ca.a caee, (.eg)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Policy Type (Ref: Distributive)	(00)	(0.00)
Regulatory	-0.07	1.17***
. regulatory	(0.41)	(0.33)
Redistributive	0.17	0.54
	(0.42)	(0.34)
Country (Ref: Germany)	(0.12)	(0.0.1)
UK	1.18*	0.54
	(0.50)	(0.42)
Denmark	-0.31	-0.24
2 0	(0.43)	(0.37)
Sweden	-0.43	-0.20
	(0.45)	(0.38)
Netherlands	-0.02	0.91**
	(0.42)	(0.35)
Random Intercept	Yes	Yes
Number of Cases	383	383
AIC	1884	1447

⁺ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

G: Multilevel Regression Analysis with random intercepts for policy issues (OLS Regression with SEs in Parentheses)

Model	(G1)	(G2)
DV	Expert Information	Info on Public Preferences
Economic Resources	0.08*	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Political Capacities	0.32***	0.43***
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Group Type (Ref: Citizen Groups)		
Professional Groups	0.10	-0.11
B : 0	(0.12)	(0.14)
Business Groups	0.10	-0.50***
Fun auta 9 Oth aug	(0.12)	(0.14)
Experts & Others	0.34**	-0.07
Position (Pot: Pro Change)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Position (Ref: Pro Change) Neutral	-0.31*	-0.30+
Neutrai	(0.14)	(0.16)
Against	-0.04	0.10
Against	(0.08)	(0.10)
Organisational Salience	0.15***	0.04
Organisational Salience	(0.04)	(0.05)
Outside Activity	0.17***	0.37***
Catoliae / tearrity	(0.05)	(0.05)
Media Saliency (log)	0.02	0.00
, (5,	(0.04)	(0.04)
Policy Type (Ref: Distributive)		
Regulatory	-0.09	0.39*
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Redistributive	0.02	0.15
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Country (Ref: Germany)		
UK	0.39*	0.19
December	(0.19)	(0.19)
Denmark	-0.10 (0.46)	-0.18 (0.47)
Cwadan	(0.16)	(0.17)
Sweden	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.17)
Netherlands	-0.02	0.38*
Netrienands	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	1.24***	0.23
- Constant	(0.31)	(0.34)
Random Intercept	-1.82***	-27.90***
	(0.40)	(3.00)
Level-1 Residual	-0.34***	-0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Number of Cases	383	383
AIC	883	1009

⁺ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

H: Multilevel ordered logistic regression with random intercepts for policy issues and SEs in Parentheses, using organisational staff as an alternative measure for economic resources

Model	(H1)	(H2)	(H3)
DV	Policy Info	Info on Public Preferences	Combination
Organisational Staff (log)	0.19*	0.04	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Political Capacities	0.94***	1.21***	1.10**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.37)
Group Type (Ref: Citizen Groups)			
Professional Groups	0.39	-0.43	0.13
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.58)
Business Groups & Firms	0.77*	-1.05**	-1.16*
	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.57)
Experts & Others	1.23**	-0.66	-1.03
	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.68)
Position (Ref: Pro Change)			
Neutral	-0.68	-0.29	-1.37
	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.93)
Against	-0.12	0.39	0.05
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.41)
Organisational Salience	0.30*	0.06	0.31
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Outside Activity	0.61***	0.81***	0.83***
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.24)
Media Saliency (log)	-0.05	0.02	-0.22
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Policy Type (Ref: Distributive)			
Regulatory	0.28	1.15*	0.18
	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.73)
Redistributive	0.51	0.56	0.21
	(0.55)	(0.46)	(0.76)
Country (Ref: Germany)			
UK	1.52*	0.35	1.04
	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.92)
Denmark	-0.20	0.00	-0.40
	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.73)
Sweden	-0.64	-0.12	-0.23
A	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.75)
Netherlands	-0.17	0.58	0.29
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.72)
Constant			-7.54*** (1.86)
Random Intercept	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of Cases	226	226	226
AIC	1112	854	229
· •	111=		

⁺ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

I: Multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts for policy issues and SEs in Parentheses

	(I1)	(12)
-	Expert	Info on Public
	Information	Preferences
Economic Resources	0.26*	0.21
	(0.13)	(0.14)
Political Capacities	0.74***	1.24***
·	(0.22)	(0.25)
Group Type (Ref: Citizen Groups)	, ,	,
Professional Groups	-0.20	-0.32
·	(0.42)	(0.41)
Business Groups & Firms	0.03	-0.85+
•	(0.44)	(0.45)
Experts & Others	0.47	`0.16 [′]
•	(0.38)	(0.39)
Position (Ref: Pro Change)	,	,
Neutral	-1.07*	0.01
	(0.49)	(0.56)
Against	-0.42	0.20
G	(0.29)	(0.29)
Organisational Salience	0.35*	-0.06
•	(0.14)	(0.15)
Outside Activity	0.32*	0.72***
•	(0.15)	(0.16)
Media Saliency (log)	0.10	0.05
, , ,	(0.15)	(0.11)
Policy Type (Ref: Distributive)	,	,
Regulatory	-0.30	0.68
•	(0.58)	(0.47)
Redistributive	-0.07	-0.11
	(0.60)	(0.47)
Country (Ref: Germany)		
UK	0.77	0.26
	(0.71)	(0.56)
Denmark	-1.06+	-0.00
	(0.62)	(0.51)
Sweden	-0.96	-0.14
	(0.65)	(0.52)
Netherlands	-0.73	0.77
	(0.60)	(0.47)
Constant	-3.87**	-7.55* [*] *
	(1.19)	(1.20)
Random Intercept	Yes	Yes
Number of Cases	383	383
AIC	456	393

⁺ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendix J: Comparing resource effects across different types of information An alternative way of looking at the resources that are necessary for the provision of information is to compare each type of resource across different types of information. Following a similar theoretical reasoning as outlined in the paper, one could expect that economic resources are more important when providing expert information than information about public preferences. In a similar vein, one could expect political capacities to have stronger effects on information about public preferences than on expert information. In order to test this alternative way, the dataset will be transformed into a stacked dataset. Each individual actor on an issue appears now twice in the dataset, once for the provided expert information and once for the information about public preferences. The dependent variable is now the overall extent of information that is provided. A new binary variable identifies the amount of expert information as well as the amount of information about public preferences. This variable will be interacted with the independent variable to allow direct comparison between one type of resource across two types of information. Since observations are now nested within actors and policy issues, the analysis employs multilevel modelling with information nested within actors and within issues. Table J provides the results. Note that the effects do not change if each independent variable is interacted with the identifier. The results show a positive and significant effect for political capacities and information on public preferences which is in line with what one would expect. This suggests that political capacities are more important for the provision of information about public preferences than for the provision of expert information. However, it does not mean that such resources do not allow also the provision of expert information, simply that they are more relevant for political information. The effect for economic resources is in the expected direction, i.e., economic resources are less important for information about political information than for expert

information, but the effect fails to achieve significance. Again, it does not allow drawing any

conclusions as to how important economic resources are for either type of information, which the paper's main analysis does.

Table J: Multilevel ordinal logistic regression with observations nested within actors and issues, SEs in parentheses

	(J1)
DV	Extent of Information
Identifier	
(Ref Cat: Expert Information)	
Information on Public	-3.35***
Preferences	(0.58)
Economic Resources	0.25*
	(0.10)
Economic Resources *	-0.08
Information on Public Pref.	(0.12)
Political Capacities	0.55***
1 ontical capacities	(0.16)
Political Capacities *	0.83***
Information on Public Pref.	(0.18)
Group Type (Ref: Citizen	(0.10)
Groups)	
Professional Groups	-0.04
Floressional Groups	
Business Croups & Firms	(0.25) -0.36
Business Groups & Firms	
Evporto 9 Othoro	(0.27)
Experts & Others	0.43+
Desition (Def. Dr. Change)	(0.24)
Position (Ref: Pro Change)	0.74*
Neutral	-0.74*
A ' 1	(0.31)
Against	0.06
0	(0.18)
Organisational Salience	0.20*
Marka Oakaa (laa)	(0.09)
Media Saliency (log)	0.04
	(0.07)
Outside Activity	0.64***
D.". T. (D.C.D.) (")	(0.10)
Policy Type (Ref: Distributive)	0.40
Regulatory	0.46
	(0.28)
Redistributive	0.18
0 (7 (0)	(0.29)
Country (Ref: Germany)	
UK	0.70*
	(0.35)
Denmark	-0.25
	(0.31)
Sweden	-0.30
	(0.32)
Netherlands	0.48
	(0.29)
Number of Cases	766
Actor Level	Yes
Policy Intercept + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001	Yes

⁺ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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