# Online Supplementary Materials Populism, Participation, and Political Equality

# Eva Anduiza, Marc Guinjoan, Guillem Rico

# European Political Science Review

# Analyses by country

Replication of Tables A2, A3 and A4 by country.

Table A5. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, France

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | -0.144 | -0.248 | 0.146 | -0.022 |
|  | (0.144) | (0.158) | (0.158) | (0.164) |
| Age | -0.000 | -0.025\*\* | -0.003 | 0.056\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.075 | 0.126 | 0.569 | 0.349 |
|  | (0.338) | (0.361) | (0.371) | (0.412) |
| Income | -0.843\* | -0.502 | -0.490 | 0.904+ |
|  | (0.390) | (0.415) | (0.431) | (0.462) |
| Interest | 1.101\*\* | 2.275\*\* | 1.202\*\* | 0.939\*\* |
|  | (0.295) | (0.338) | (0.333) | (0.303) |
| Populism | 1.330\*\* | 0.953\* | 0.980\* | 0.538 |
|  | (0.413) | (0.438) | (0.450) | (0.461) |
| Ideology | -1.669\* | -1.489+ | -1.637\* | -0.133 |
|  | (0.754) | (0.832) | (0.817) | (0.923) |
| Ideology squared | 0.662 | 1.194 | -0.141 | 0.054 |
|  | (0.728) | (0.790) | (0.821) | (0.860) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.655\* | 1.057\*\* | 0.499+ | 0.903\*\* |
|  | (0.256) | (0.290) | (0.276) | (0.262) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.972\*\* | 1.958\*\* | 1.228\*\* | 0.026 |
|  | (0.405) | (0.434) | (0.441) | (0.423) |
| Constant | -3.755\*\* | -3.949\*\* | -3.411\*\* | -2.663\*\* |
|  | (0.520) | (0.556) | (0.568) | (0.547) |
| Observations | 1437 | 1437 | 1437 | 1392 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A6. The interaction between populism and education, France

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | -0.143 | -0.247 | 0.146 | -0.021 |
|  | (0.144) | (0.158) | (0.158) | (0.164) |
| Age | -0.000 | -0.025\*\* | -0.003 | 0.056\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Education | 1.005 | 0.386 | 0.879 | 0.154 |
|  | (1.393) | (1.420) | (1.492) | (1.520) |
| Income | -0.836\* | -0.499 | -0.486 | 0.905+ |
|  | (0.390) | (0.416) | (0.431) | (0.462) |
| Interest | 1.101\*\* | 2.275\*\* | 1.202\*\* | 0.939\*\* |
|  | (0.295) | (0.338) | (0.333) | (0.303) |
| Populism | 1.894\* | 1.114 | 1.176 | 0.414 |
|  | (0.924) | (0.954) | (1.021) | (1.039) |
| Education\*Populism | -1.234 | -0.348 | -0.417 | 0.281 |
|  | (1.795) | (1.836) | (1.943) | (2.105) |
| Ideology | -1.668\* | -1.490+ | -1.636\* | -0.135 |
|  | (0.754) | (0.832) | (0.817) | (0.923) |
| Ideology squared | 0.667 | 1.197 | -0.140 | 0.056 |
|  | (0.728) | (0.790) | (0.821) | (0.860) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.646\* | 1.055\*\* | 0.496+ | 0.905\*\* |
|  | (0.256) | (0.291) | (0.277) | (0.262) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.976\*\* | 1.960\*\* | 1.229\*\* | 0.025 |
|  | (0.405) | (0.434) | (0.441) | (0.423) |
| Constant | -4.178\*\* | -4.069\*\* | -3.556\*\* | -2.578\*\* |
|  | (0.810) | (0.844) | (0.885) | (0.836) |
| Observations | 1437 | 1437 | 1437 | 1392 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A7. The interaction between populism and income, France

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | -0.144 | -0.245 | 0.146 | -0.032 |
|  | (0.144) | (0.158) | (0.158) | (0.164) |
| Age | -0.000 | -0.025\*\* | -0.004 | 0.056\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.073 | 0.122 | 0.567 | 0.374 |
|  | (0.338) | (0.361) | (0.371) | (0.413) |
| Income | -0.189 | -3.289+ | 0.705 | -1.768 |
|  | (1.635) | (1.707) | (1.764) | (1.829) |
| Interest | 1.104\*\* | 2.269\*\* | 1.210\*\* | 0.915\*\* |
|  | (0.295) | (0.338) | (0.333) | (0.304) |
| Populism | 1.560\* | -0.047 | 1.403+ | -0.342 |
|  | (0.697) | (0.729) | (0.759) | (0.746) |
| Income\*Populism | -0.851 | 3.657+ | -1.571 | 3.754 |
|  | (2.066) | (2.167) | (2.252) | (2.500) |
| Ideology | -1.667\* | -1.525+ | -1.635\* | -0.162 |
|  | (0.754) | (0.832) | (0.818) | (0.924) |
| Ideology squared | 0.667 | 1.199 | -0.131 | 0.066 |
|  | (0.728) | (0.789) | (0.822) | (0.861) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.652\* | 1.072\*\* | 0.494+ | 0.897\*\* |
|  | (0.256) | (0.290) | (0.277) | (0.262) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.968\*\* | 1.976\*\* | 1.216\*\* | 0.030 |
|  | (0.405) | (0.435) | (0.441) | (0.423) |
| Constant | -3.928\*\* | -3.204\*\* | -3.723\*\* | -2.010\*\* |
|  | (0.670) | (0.701) | (0.726) | (0.699) |
| Observations | 1437 | 1437 | 1437 | 1392 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A8. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Germany

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.434\*\* | -0.225 | -0.038 | 0.138 |
|  | (0.127) | (0.157) | (0.220) | (0.144) |
| Age | -0.013\*\* | -0.021\*\* | -0.032\*\* | 0.008+ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.387 | 0.168 | 0.112 | -0.065 |
|  | (0.284) | (0.347) | (0.487) | (0.340) |
| Income | -0.665\* | -0.864\* | -0.342 | 1.357\*\* |
|  | (0.313) | (0.383) | (0.526) | (0.364) |
| Interest | 1.531\*\* | 1.982\*\* | 2.414\*\* | 1.903\*\* |
|  | (0.292) | (0.371) | (0.542) | (0.320) |
| Populism | 0.297 | 0.130 | -0.558 | -1.213\*\* |
|  | (0.335) | (0.401) | (0.548) | (0.403) |
| Ideology | -3.607\*\* | -2.292+ | -5.196\*\* | -0.610 |
|  | (1.003) | (1.181) | (1.461) | (1.189) |
| Ideology squared | 1.981+ | 0.429 | 3.251\* | 1.917 |
|  | (1.039) | (1.278) | (1.632) | (1.249) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.279 | 0.608\* | 0.310 | 1.283\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.263) | (0.366) | (0.223) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.408 | 1.699\*\* | 1.349\* | 0.386 |
|  | (0.391) | (0.493) | (0.675) | (0.427) |
| Constant | -0.907\* | -2.429\*\* | -2.047\*\* | -1.076\* |
|  | (0.435) | (0.537) | (0.729) | (0.494) |
| Observations | 1498 | 1498 | 1498 | 1485 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A9. The interaction between populism and education, Germany

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.430\*\* | -0.228 | -0.030 | 0.142 |
|  | (0.127) | (0.157) | (0.221) | (0.144) |
| Age | -0.013\*\* | -0.021\*\* | -0.033\*\* | 0.008+ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.005) |
| Education | -0.497 | -0.325 | 1.832 | 1.337 |
|  | (0.992) | (1.172) | (1.527) | (1.319) |
| Income | -0.659\* | -0.858\* | -0.368 | 1.355\*\* |
|  | (0.314) | (0.383) | (0.528) | (0.364) |
| Interest | 1.535\*\* | 1.983\*\* | 2.423\*\* | 1.894\*\* |
|  | (0.292) | (0.371) | (0.540) | (0.321) |
| Populism | -0.386 | -0.256 | 0.857 | -0.225 |
|  | (0.806) | (0.963) | (1.319) | (0.976) |
| Education\*Populism | 1.308 | 0.725 | -2.627 | -2.022 |
|  | (1.405) | (1.646) | (2.230) | (1.827) |
| Ideology | -3.634\*\* | -2.309+ | -5.129\*\* | -0.576 |
|  | (1.004) | (1.182) | (1.463) | (1.189) |
| Ideology squared | 2.008+ | 0.447 | 3.171+ | 1.880 |
|  | (1.040) | (1.279) | (1.635) | (1.248) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.270 | 0.601\* | 0.342 | 1.288\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.264) | (0.368) | (0.223) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.416 | 1.708\*\* | 1.290+ | 0.398 |
|  | (0.391) | (0.494) | (0.675) | (0.428) |
| Constant | -0.447 | -2.170\*\* | -2.961\*\* | -1.762\* |
|  | (0.657) | (0.796) | (1.065) | (0.793) |
| Observations | 1498 | 1498 | 1498 | 1485 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A10. The interaction between populism and income, Germany

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.435\*\* | -0.224 | -0.039 | 0.130 |
|  | (0.127) | (0.157) | (0.221) | (0.144) |
| Age | -0.013\*\* | -0.022\*\* | -0.032\*\* | 0.009+ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.383 | 0.137 | 0.130 | -0.052 |
|  | (0.284) | (0.349) | (0.488) | (0.340) |
| Income | -0.288 | 1.154 | -1.264 | -0.895 |
|  | (1.082) | (1.289) | (1.694) | (1.375) |
| Interest | 1.532\*\* | 1.988\*\* | 2.413\*\* | 1.885\*\* |
|  | (0.292) | (0.370) | (0.543) | (0.320) |
| Populism | 0.474 | 1.090 | -1.016 | -2.138\*\* |
|  | (0.592) | (0.712) | (0.968) | (0.685) |
| Income\*Populism | -0.558 | -2.985 | 1.394 | 3.292+ |
|  | (1.532) | (1.824) | (2.433) | (1.947) |
| Ideology | -3.613\*\* | -2.283+ | -5.215\*\* | -0.596 |
|  | (1.004) | (1.184) | (1.461) | (1.190) |
| Ideology squared | 1.988+ | 0.422 | 3.260\* | 1.902 |
|  | (1.040) | (1.285) | (1.629) | (1.254) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.280 | 0.620\* | 0.302 | 1.287\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.264) | (0.366) | (0.223) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.406 | 1.686\*\* | 1.356\* | 0.408 |
|  | (0.390) | (0.492) | (0.677) | (0.427) |
| Constant | -1.021+ | -3.054\*\* | -1.754\* | -0.462 |
|  | (0.536) | (0.663) | (0.890) | (0.614) |
| Observations | 1498 | 1498 | 1498 | 1485 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A11. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Greece

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.573\*\* | 0.093 | 0.106 | -0.558\*\* |
|  | (0.124) | (0.112) | (0.137) | (0.171) |
| Age | 0.009+ | 0.001 | -0.014\*\* | 0.013\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.953\*\* | -0.757\*\* | 0.472 | -0.040 |
|  | (0.285) | (0.274) | (0.318) | (0.420) |
| Income | 1.333\*\* | -0.147 | 1.111\* | 0.673 |
|  | (0.396) | (0.378) | (0.433) | (0.602) |
| Interest | 0.645\*\* | 1.201\*\* | 1.080\*\* | 0.578+ |
|  | (0.243) | (0.223) | (0.282) | (0.315) |
| Populism | 3.601\*\* | 1.106\*\* | 2.077\*\* | 0.850 |
|  | (0.424) | (0.367) | (0.458) | (0.540) |
| Ideology | -0.153 | 0.184 | -1.950\*\* | -0.370 |
|  | (0.718) | (0.673) | (0.756) | (1.062) |
| Ideology squared | -1.001 | -1.175+ | 0.029 | 1.256 |
|  | (0.725) | (0.648) | (0.804) | (1.100) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.673\*\* | 0.960\*\* | 1.016\*\* | 1.008\*\* |
|  | (0.187) | (0.173) | (0.219) | (0.242) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.632\*\* | 2.239\*\* | 0.945\* | 2.120\*\* |
|  | (0.389) | (0.360) | (0.434) | (0.499) |
| Constant | -6.255\*\* | -3.092\*\* | -3.740\*\* | -1.133+ |
|  | (0.526) | (0.438) | (0.534) | (0.612) |
| Observations | 1591 | 1591 | 1591 | 1590 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A12. The interaction between populism and education, Greece

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.575\*\* | 0.095 | 0.106 | -0.556\*\* |
|  | (0.124) | (0.112) | (0.137) | (0.171) |
| Age | 0.009+ | 0.001 | -0.014\*\* | 0.013\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Education | 1.581 | 0.250 | -0.350 | 3.086+ |
|  | (1.312) | (1.127) | (1.452) | (1.806) |
| Income | 1.320\*\* | -0.161 | 1.121\*\* | 0.664 |
|  | (0.397) | (0.379) | (0.434) | (0.600) |
| Interest | 0.644\*\* | 1.198\*\* | 1.083\*\* | 0.569+ |
|  | (0.243) | (0.222) | (0.282) | (0.316) |
| Populism | 3.963\*\* | 1.671\* | 1.613+ | 2.500\* |
|  | (0.854) | (0.717) | (0.917) | (1.061) |
| Education\*Populism | -0.840 | -1.397 | 1.099 | -4.406+ |
|  | (1.710) | (1.517) | (1.893) | (2.452) |
| Ideology | -0.161 | 0.154 | -1.935\* | -0.389 |
|  | (0.719) | (0.674) | (0.756) | (1.060) |
| Ideology squared | -0.994 | -1.151+ | 0.016 | 1.240 |
|  | (0.725) | (0.649) | (0.804) | (1.099) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.677\*\* | 0.971\*\* | 1.013\*\* | 1.035\*\* |
|  | (0.187) | (0.173) | (0.219) | (0.243) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.634\*\* | 2.244\*\* | 0.945\* | 2.128\*\* |
|  | (0.388) | (0.360) | (0.434) | (0.500) |
| Constant | -6.530\*\* | -3.501\*\* | -3.395\*\* | -2.288\*\* |
|  | (0.771) | (0.626) | (0.794) | (0.883) |
| Observations | 1591 | 1591 | 1591 | 1590 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A13. The interaction between populism and income, Greece

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.569\*\* | 0.092 | 0.106 | -0.550\*\* |
|  | (0.124) | (0.112) | (0.137) | (0.171) |
| Age | 0.009+ | 0.001 | -0.014\*\* | 0.013\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.993\*\* | -0.764\*\* | 0.478 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.287) | (0.274) | (0.319) | (0.419) |
| Income | -2.225 | 0.699 | 0.471 | -2.264 |
|  | (1.967) | (1.649) | (2.036) | (2.638) |
| Interest | 0.650\*\* | 1.199\*\* | 1.080\*\* | 0.600+ |
|  | (0.244) | (0.223) | (0.282) | (0.316) |
| Populism | 2.735\*\* | 1.307\* | 1.919\*\* | 0.256 |
|  | (0.622) | (0.531) | (0.669) | (0.754) |
| Income\*Populism | 4.748+ | -1.159 | 0.849 | 4.140 |
|  | (2.568) | (2.196) | (2.636) | (3.649) |
| Ideology | -0.221 | 0.186 | -1.958\*\* | -0.395 |
|  | (0.720) | (0.673) | (0.756) | (1.061) |
| Ideology squared | -0.920 | -1.181+ | 0.040 | 1.283 |
|  | (0.725) | (0.648) | (0.805) | (1.099) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.679\*\* | 0.958\*\* | 1.018\*\* | 1.010\*\* |
|  | (0.188) | (0.173) | (0.219) | (0.242) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.638\*\* | 2.236\*\* | 0.947\* | 2.125\*\* |
|  | (0.390) | (0.360) | (0.434) | (0.499) |
| Constant | -5.604\*\* | -3.235\*\* | -3.623\*\* | -0.728 |
|  | (0.623) | (0.516) | (0.644) | (0.711) |
| Observations | 1591 | 1591 | 1591 | 1590 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A14. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Italy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.268\* | -0.032 | 0.034 | -0.067 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.128) | (0.181) | (0.182) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.020\*\* | -0.027\*\* | 0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | 1.113\*\* | 0.577+ | 0.075 | 0.044 |
|  | (0.332) | (0.346) | (0.463) | (0.499) |
| Income | -0.563 | -1.169\*\* | -0.026 | 1.051+ |
|  | (0.393) | (0.417) | (0.569) | (0.631) |
| Interest | 1.607\*\* | 2.440\*\* | 2.458\*\* | 0.979\* |
|  | (0.282) | (0.306) | (0.441) | (0.389) |
| Populism | 1.662\*\* | 1.919\*\* | -0.155 | 0.275 |
|  | (0.376) | (0.395) | (0.531) | (0.511) |
| Ideology | -1.498\* | -1.085 | -2.788\*\* | 1.464 |
|  | (0.676) | (0.704) | (0.925) | (0.997) |
| Ideology squared | 0.738 | 1.083 | 1.343 | -1.170 |
|  | (0.641) | (0.665) | (0.935) | (0.957) |
| Closeness to a party | -0.668\*\* | 0.185 | -0.454 | 0.239 |
|  | (0.231) | (0.249) | (0.347) | (0.317) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.246\*\* | 1.458\*\* | 0.835 | 0.686 |
|  | (0.366) | (0.387) | (0.549) | (0.493) |
| Constant | -2.916\*\* | -3.430\*\* | -1.727\* | -0.596 |
|  | (0.494) | (0.524) | (0.684) | (0.644) |
| Observations | 1436 | 1436 | 1436 | 1421 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A15. The interaction between populism and education, Italy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.268\* | -0.032 | 0.034 | -0.064 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.128) | (0.181) | (0.183) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.020\*\* | -0.027\*\* | 0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | 2.867\* | 1.129 | 0.039 | 5.122\* |
|  | (1.415) | (1.494) | (1.948) | (2.141) |
| Income | -0.585 | -1.175\*\* | -0.025 | 0.965 |
|  | (0.393) | (0.417) | (0.569) | (0.635) |
| Interest | 1.596\*\* | 2.438\*\* | 2.458\*\* | 0.934\* |
|  | (0.282) | (0.306) | (0.441) | (0.390) |
| Populism | 2.540\*\* | 2.193\*\* | -0.174 | 2.686\* |
|  | (0.788) | (0.826) | (1.122) | (1.090) |
| Education\*Populism | -2.361 | -0.742 | 0.049 | -6.799\* |
|  | (1.851) | (1.954) | (2.570) | (2.737) |
| Ideology | -1.495\* | -1.083 | -2.788\*\* | 1.447 |
|  | (0.677) | (0.704) | (0.925) | (1.002) |
| Ideology squared | 0.728 | 1.079 | 1.343 | -1.163 |
|  | (0.642) | (0.665) | (0.935) | (0.962) |
| Closeness to a party | -0.664\*\* | 0.187 | -0.454 | 0.244 |
|  | (0.231) | (0.249) | (0.347) | (0.318) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.251\*\* | 1.459\*\* | 0.835 | 0.671 |
|  | (0.366) | (0.387) | (0.549) | (0.497) |
| Constant | -3.571\*\* | -3.636\*\* | -1.713+ | -2.346\* |
|  | (0.717) | (0.756) | (0.997) | (0.949) |
| Observations | 1436 | 1436 | 1436 | 1421 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A16. The interaction between populism and income, Italy

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.268\* | -0.031 | 0.050 | -0.065 |
|  | (0.123) | (0.128) | (0.181) | (0.182) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.020\*\* | -0.026\*\* | 0.021\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | 1.107\*\* | 0.589+ | 0.116 | 0.052 |
|  | (0.333) | (0.347) | (0.463) | (0.500) |
| Income | -0.127 | -2.160 | -3.554 | 0.446 |
|  | (1.656) | (1.791) | (2.388) | (2.367) |
| Interest | 1.606\*\* | 2.441\*\* | 2.474\*\* | 0.983\* |
|  | (0.282) | (0.305) | (0.440) | (0.389) |
| Populism | 1.784\*\* | 1.653\*\* | -1.174 | 0.130 |
|  | (0.587) | (0.609) | (0.840) | (0.752) |
| Income\*Populism | -0.579 | 1.312 | 4.765 | 0.819 |
|  | (2.136) | (2.302) | (3.102) | (3.099) |
| Ideology | -1.495\* | -1.092 | -2.792\*\* | 1.464 |
|  | (0.676) | (0.704) | (0.926) | (0.997) |
| Ideology squared | 0.734 | 1.091 | 1.348 | -1.169 |
|  | (0.641) | (0.665) | (0.937) | (0.958) |
| Closeness to a party | -0.666\*\* | 0.180 | -0.462 | 0.238 |
|  | (0.231) | (0.249) | (0.347) | (0.317) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.241\*\* | 1.470\*\* | 0.887 | 0.688 |
|  | (0.367) | (0.388) | (0.552) | (0.493) |
| Constant | -3.000\*\* | -3.245\*\* | -1.073 | -0.498 |
|  | (0.585) | (0.613) | (0.793) | (0.745) |
| Observations | 1436 | 1436 | 1436 | 1421 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A17. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Poland

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.025 | 0.073 | -0.244 | -0.215 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.128) | (0.216) | (0.160) |
| Age | -0.022\*\* | -0.022\*\* | -0.035\*\* | 0.055\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.568+ | -0.125 | -1.494\*\* | 1.934\*\* |
|  | (0.312) | (0.318) | (0.568) | (0.418) |
| Income | -0.294 | -0.002 | 0.271 | 0.094 |
|  | (0.358) | (0.356) | (0.571) | (0.447) |
| Interest | 1.674\*\* | 2.283\*\* | 1.226\* | 0.669+ |
|  | (0.306) | (0.317) | (0.478) | (0.349) |
| Populism | 0.535 | 0.819\* | -0.630 | -1.229\*\* |
|  | (0.382) | (0.391) | (0.572) | (0.466) |
| Ideology | -1.274 | -1.538+ | -1.242 | -2.862\* |
|  | (0.854) | (0.835) | (1.554) | (1.187) |
| Ideology squared | 1.749\* | 1.648\* | 2.311+ | 3.339\*\* |
|  | (0.734) | (0.723) | (1.260) | (1.041) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.040 | -0.493\* | -1.210\*\* | 0.417 |
|  | (0.254) | (0.249) | (0.415) | (0.302) |
| Internal efficacy | -0.341 | 1.294\*\* | -0.468 | 0.511 |
|  | (0.380) | (0.396) | (0.569) | (0.471) |
| Constant | -1.584\*\* | -2.440\*\* | -0.065 | -1.301\* |
|  | (0.544) | (0.564) | (0.851) | (0.655) |
| Observations | 1334 | 1334 | 1334 | 1293 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A18. The interaction between populism and education, Poland

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.022 | 0.071 | -0.261 | -0.215 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.128) | (0.216) | (0.161) |
| Age | -0.022\*\* | -0.022\*\* | -0.036\*\* | 0.055\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.002 | -0.439 | -4.060+ | 1.936 |
|  | (1.305) | (1.400) | (2.292) | (1.802) |
| Income | -0.286 | 0.002 | 0.288 | 0.094 |
|  | (0.358) | (0.356) | (0.572) | (0.447) |
| Interest | 1.676\*\* | 2.284\*\* | 1.242\*\* | 0.669+ |
|  | (0.306) | (0.317) | (0.479) | (0.349) |
| Populism | 0.170 | 0.623 | -2.128 | -1.227 |
|  | (0.895) | (0.938) | (1.389) | (1.124) |
| Education\*Populism | 0.800 | 0.437 | 3.673 | -0.004 |
|  | (1.778) | (1.897) | (3.131) | (2.423) |
| Ideology | -1.275 | -1.540+ | -1.257 | -2.862\* |
|  | (0.854) | (0.835) | (1.554) | (1.187) |
| Ideology squared | 1.753\* | 1.651\* | 2.330+ | 3.339\*\* |
|  | (0.734) | (0.724) | (1.260) | (1.042) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.036 | -0.495\* | -1.226\*\* | 0.417 |
|  | (0.254) | (0.249) | (0.415) | (0.302) |
| Internal efficacy | -0.341 | 1.293\*\* | -0.461 | 0.511 |
|  | (0.380) | (0.396) | (0.570) | (0.471) |
| Constant | -1.324+ | -2.298\*\* | 0.983 | -1.302 |
|  | (0.791) | (0.834) | (1.225) | (0.988) |
| Observations | 1334 | 1334 | 1334 | 1293 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A19. The interaction between populism and income, Poland

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.022 | 0.102 | -0.247 | -0.201 |
|  | (0.129) | (0.129) | (0.216) | (0.161) |
| Age | -0.022\*\* | -0.022\*\* | -0.035\*\* | 0.055\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.574+ | -0.172 | -1.493\*\* | 1.911\*\* |
|  | (0.313) | (0.320) | (0.569) | (0.419) |
| Income | -0.735 | 3.580\* | -0.175 | 1.814 |
|  | (1.409) | (1.454) | (1.978) | (1.782) |
| Interest | 1.675\*\* | 2.289\*\* | 1.227\* | 0.685+ |
|  | (0.306) | (0.316) | (0.478) | (0.350) |
| Populism | 0.341 | 2.475\*\* | -0.835 | -0.529 |
|  | (0.711) | (0.772) | (1.039) | (0.830) |
| Income\*Populism | 0.611 | -4.913\* | 0.649 | -2.381 |
|  | (1.889) | (1.935) | (2.753) | (2.373) |
| Ideology | -1.276 | -1.510+ | -1.242 | -2.898\* |
|  | (0.854) | (0.838) | (1.553) | (1.189) |
| Ideology squared | 1.754\* | 1.598\* | 2.315+ | 3.360\*\* |
|  | (0.734) | (0.726) | (1.260) | (1.042) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.037 | -0.471+ | -1.216\*\* | 0.438 |
|  | (0.254) | (0.249) | (0.416) | (0.303) |
| Internal efficacy | -0.332 | 1.233\*\* | -0.457 | 0.498 |
|  | (0.381) | (0.397) | (0.571) | (0.472) |
| Constant | -1.450\* | -3.622\*\* | 0.071 | -1.801\* |
|  | (0.681) | (0.747) | (1.027) | (0.815) |
| Observations | 1334 | 1334 | 1334 | 1293 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A20. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Spain

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.329\*\* | 0.093 | 0.429\*\* | 0.141 |
|  | (0.115) | (0.127) | (0.157) | (0.155) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.019\*\* | 0.000 | 0.029\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.178 | 0.524\* | 0.224 | -0.026 |
|  | (0.213) | (0.234) | (0.285) | (0.295) |
| Income | 0.556+ | -1.161\*\* | 0.780+ | 0.819+ |
|  | (0.309) | (0.352) | (0.415) | (0.450) |
| Interest | 1.236\*\* | 2.040\*\* | 2.401\*\* | 0.902\*\* |
|  | (0.245) | (0.277) | (0.353) | (0.326) |
| Populism | 2.063\*\* | 1.495\*\* | 1.218\* | 0.421 |
|  | (0.362) | (0.395) | (0.492) | (0.459) |
| Ideology | -0.812 | -1.237+ | -3.381\*\* | 0.190 |
|  | (0.668) | (0.713) | (0.852) | (0.932) |
| Ideology squared | -0.393 | 1.093 | 1.109 | 0.800 |
|  | (0.707) | (0.742) | (0.992) | (1.030) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.190 | 0.573\* | 0.769\* | 0.868\*\* |
|  | (0.208) | (0.241) | (0.309) | (0.264) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.164\*\* | 1.359\*\* | 0.617 | 0.018 |
|  | (0.308) | (0.348) | (0.423) | (0.402) |
| Constant | -3.206\*\* | -3.325\*\* | -4.420\*\* | -1.296\* |
|  | (0.454) | (0.499) | (0.634) | (0.550) |
| Observations | 1563 | 1563 | 1563 | 1547 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A21. The interaction between populism and education, Spain

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.336\*\* | 0.100 | 0.429\*\* | 0.141 |
|  | (0.116) | (0.128) | (0.157) | (0.155) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.019\*\* | 0.000 | 0.029\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | 1.932\* | 2.142\* | 0.289 | -0.361 |
|  | (0.859) | (0.938) | (1.167) | (1.141) |
| Income | 0.528+ | -1.182\*\* | 0.779+ | 0.826+ |
|  | (0.309) | (0.352) | (0.415) | (0.451) |
| Interest | 1.262\*\* | 2.063\*\* | 2.401\*\* | 0.896\*\* |
|  | (0.246) | (0.278) | (0.353) | (0.326) |
| Populism | 3.167\*\* | 2.562\*\* | 1.261 | 0.228 |
|  | (0.643) | (0.724) | (0.896) | (0.784) |
| Education\*Populism | -2.438\* | -2.236+ | -0.088 | 0.471 |
|  | (1.156) | (1.253) | (1.535) | (1.548) |
| Ideology | -0.783 | -1.180+ | -3.377\*\* | 0.200 |
|  | (0.671) | (0.717) | (0.854) | (0.933) |
| Ideology squared | -0.421 | 1.045 | 1.105 | 0.789 |
|  | (0.711) | (0.746) | (0.994) | (1.032) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.191 | 0.572\* | 0.769\* | 0.869\*\* |
|  | (0.208) | (0.241) | (0.309) | (0.264) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.184\*\* | 1.364\*\* | 0.618 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.308) | (0.347) | (0.423) | (0.402) |
| Constant | -4.034\*\* | -4.126\*\* | -4.453\*\* | -1.156 |
|  | (0.609) | (0.681) | (0.854) | (0.719) |
| Observations | 1563 | 1563 | 1563 | 1547 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A22. The interaction between populism and income, Spain

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.332\*\* | 0.094 | 0.429\*\* | 0.141 |
|  | (0.116) | (0.127) | (0.157) | (0.155) |
| Age | -0.004 | -0.019\*\* | 0.000 | 0.029\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Education | 0.170 | 0.522\* | 0.223 | -0.025 |
|  | (0.213) | (0.234) | (0.285) | (0.295) |
| Income | 3.553\*\* | 1.138 | 0.988 | 0.061 |
|  | (1.194) | (1.311) | (1.689) | (1.642) |
| Interest | 1.230\*\* | 2.036\*\* | 2.399\*\* | 0.907\*\* |
|  | (0.246) | (0.277) | (0.354) | (0.326) |
| Populism | 3.182\*\* | 2.322\*\* | 1.299 | 0.193 |
|  | (0.574) | (0.612) | (0.803) | (0.664) |
| Income\*Populism | -4.210\*\* | -3.229+ | -0.285 | 1.088 |
|  | (1.623) | (1.785) | (2.234) | (2.274) |
| Ideology | -0.759 | -1.199+ | -3.376\*\* | 0.188 |
|  | (0.670) | (0.716) | (0.853) | (0.932) |
| Ideology squared | -0.466 | 1.051 | 1.104 | 0.814 |
|  | (0.709) | (0.743) | (0.993) | (1.031) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.194 | 0.574\* | 0.769\* | 0.870\*\* |
|  | (0.209) | (0.241) | (0.309) | (0.264) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.155\*\* | 1.350\*\* | 0.616 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.308) | (0.347) | (0.423) | (0.402) |
| Constant | -4.013\*\* | -3.913\*\* | -4.478\*\* | -1.139+ |
|  | (0.562) | (0.605) | (0.780) | (0.643) |
| Observations | 1563 | 1563 | 1563 | 1547 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A23. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.530\*\* | 0.029 | 0.100 | 0.638\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.143) | (0.226) | (0.317) |
| Age | -0.006 | -0.022\*\* | -0.008 | 0.015 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Education | 0.300 | -0.510+ | -0.013 | 0.426 |
|  | (0.278) | (0.309) | (0.484) | (0.675) |
| Income | -0.140 | -0.679\* | 0.755 | -0.169 |
|  | (0.310) | (0.338) | (0.528) | (0.729) |
| Interest | 1.194\*\* | 2.532\*\* | 2.877\*\* | -0.573 |
|  | (0.333) | (0.385) | (0.645) | (0.704) |
| Populism | 0.620+ | 0.004 | -0.873 | 0.486 |
|  | (0.355) | (0.378) | (0.572) | (0.865) |
| Ideology | -0.751 | -2.027\* | -3.572\*\* | -4.585+ |
|  | (0.830) | (0.889) | (1.256) | (2.568) |
| Ideology squared | -0.667 | 1.616+ | 0.868 | 6.602\* |
|  | (0.802) | (0.831) | (1.337) | (2.683) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.470+ | 0.601\* | 1.352\*\* | 1.521\*\* |
|  | (0.275) | (0.297) | (0.525) | (0.559) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.643+ | 2.093\*\* | 0.570 | 1.210 |
|  | (0.367) | (0.416) | (0.651) | (0.817) |
| Constant | -2.127\*\* | -2.375\*\* | -3.859\*\* | 0.907 |
|  | (0.455) | (0.498) | (0.793) | (1.069) |
| Observations | 1398 | 1398 | 1398 | 1394 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A24. The interaction between populism and education, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.531\*\* | 0.028 | 0.100 | 0.637\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.143) | (0.226) | (0.318) |
| Age | -0.007+ | -0.022\*\* | -0.008 | 0.015 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Education | 2.431\*\* | 0.392 | 0.818 | 0.505 |
|  | (0.937) | (0.990) | (1.454) | (2.266) |
| Income | -0.138 | -0.670\* | 0.763 | -0.169 |
|  | (0.311) | (0.338) | (0.529) | (0.729) |
| Interest | 1.193\*\* | 2.539\*\* | 2.873\*\* | -0.573 |
|  | (0.334) | (0.385) | (0.645) | (0.704) |
| Populism | 2.322\*\* | 0.725 | -0.154 | 0.547 |
|  | (0.798) | (0.842) | (1.311) | (1.859) |
| Education\*Populism | -3.370\* | -1.433 | -1.395 | -0.131 |
|  | (1.407) | (1.495) | (2.290) | (3.570) |
| Ideology | -0.755 | -2.033\* | -3.563\*\* | -4.584+ |
|  | (0.831) | (0.889) | (1.256) | (2.568) |
| Ideology squared | -0.647 | 1.629+ | 0.869 | 6.602\* |
|  | (0.803) | (0.831) | (1.338) | (2.683) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.474+ | 0.601\* | 1.363\*\* | 1.522\*\* |
|  | (0.275) | (0.297) | (0.526) | (0.559) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.623+ | 2.076\*\* | 0.551 | 1.209 |
|  | (0.367) | (0.416) | (0.651) | (0.817) |
| Constant | -3.203\*\* | -2.827\*\* | -4.294\*\* | 0.870 |
|  | (0.645) | (0.689) | (1.072) | (1.458) |
| Observations | 1398 | 1398 | 1398 | 1394 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A25. The interaction between populism and income, Sweden

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.523\*\* | 0.018 | 0.081 | 0.632\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.144) | (0.227) | (0.318) |
| Age | -0.006 | -0.022\*\* | -0.009 | 0.015 |
|  | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.009) |
| Education | 0.299 | -0.491 | 0.004 | 0.408 |
|  | (0.278) | (0.309) | (0.484) | (0.677) |
| Income | 1.679 | 1.832 | 2.536 | 1.525 |
|  | (1.092) | (1.159) | (1.661) | (2.751) |
| Interest | 1.203\*\* | 2.557\*\* | 2.862\*\* | -0.579 |
|  | (0.333) | (0.385) | (0.644) | (0.705) |
| Populism | 1.729\* | 1.564\* | 0.318 | 1.498 |
|  | (0.732) | (0.787) | (1.190) | (1.808) |
| Income\*Populism | -2.842+ | -3.941\* | -2.901 | -2.696 |
|  | (1.636) | (1.744) | (2.553) | (4.222) |
| Ideology | -0.745 | -2.051\* | -3.596\*\* | -4.569+ |
|  | (0.830) | (0.888) | (1.255) | (2.574) |
| Ideology squared | -0.656 | 1.670\* | 0.899 | 6.617\* |
|  | (0.802) | (0.831) | (1.337) | (2.689) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.457+ | 0.587\* | 1.347\* | 1.535\*\* |
|  | (0.275) | (0.298) | (0.524) | (0.561) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.631+ | 2.066\*\* | 0.560 | 1.221 |
|  | (0.367) | (0.416) | (0.650) | (0.817) |
| Constant | -2.829\*\* | -3.360\*\* | -4.567\*\* | 0.263 |
|  | (0.611) | (0.665) | (1.011) | (1.465) |
| Observations | 1398 | 1398 | 1398 | 1394 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A26. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, Switzerland

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.119 | 0.288+ | 0.689\*\* | -0.449\*\* |
|  | (0.125) | (0.152) | (0.246) | (0.144) |
| Age | -0.002 | -0.026\*\* | -0.003 | 0.054\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.253 | 1.618\*\* | 0.328 | -1.075\*\* |
|  | (0.282) | (0.345) | (0.547) | (0.356) |
| Income | -0.284 | -0.963\* | 0.863 | 1.044\* |
|  | (0.346) | (0.424) | (0.666) | (0.445) |
| Interest | 0.569\* | 2.743\*\* | 0.690 | 0.288 |
|  | (0.279) | (0.366) | (0.573) | (0.330) |
| Populism | 1.232\*\* | 3.275\*\* | -2.110\*\* | -1.293\*\* |
|  | (0.370) | (0.462) | (0.731) | (0.453) |
| Ideology | -3.800\*\* | -2.358\* | -8.759\*\* | 0.108 |
|  | (0.920) | (1.067) | (1.442) | (1.109) |
| Ideology squared | 2.339\*\* | 1.065 | 8.056\*\* | 0.226 |
|  | (0.836) | (0.994) | (1.367) | (1.017) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.872\*\* | -0.129 | 0.944\* | 1.584\*\* |
|  | (0.207) | (0.246) | (0.458) | (0.240) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.771\* | 0.587 | -0.588 | 1.989\*\* |
|  | (0.337) | (0.416) | (0.634) | (0.398) |
| Constant | -1.422\*\* | -4.244\*\* | -0.882 | -2.887\*\* |
|  | (0.434) | (0.541) | (0.786) | (0.515) |
| Observations | 1326 | 1326 | 1326 | 1156 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A27. The interaction between populism and education, Switzerland

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.118 | 0.292+ | 0.674\*\* | -0.445\*\* |
|  | (0.125) | (0.152) | (0.246) | (0.144) |
| Age | -0.002 | -0.026\*\* | -0.003 | 0.054\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.567 | 0.612 | 3.548+ | -0.387 |
|  | (1.028) | (1.383) | (1.845) | (1.275) |
| Income | -0.278 | -0.977\* | 0.924 | 1.059\* |
|  | (0.347) | (0.425) | (0.672) | (0.446) |
| Interest | 0.576\* | 2.722\*\* | 0.787 | 0.301 |
|  | (0.280) | (0.367) | (0.581) | (0.330) |
| Populism | 1.487+ | 2.475\* | 0.874 | -0.752 |
|  | (0.883) | (1.156) | (1.789) | (1.064) |
| Education\*Populism | -0.483 | 1.469 | -5.357+ | -1.104 |
|  | (1.520) | (1.960) | (2.934) | (1.967) |
| Ideology | -3.808\*\* | -2.340\* | -8.741\*\* | 0.111 |
|  | (0.921) | (1.066) | (1.442) | (1.108) |
| Ideology squared | 2.345\*\* | 1.048 | 8.044\*\* | 0.235 |
|  | (0.837) | (0.994) | (1.372) | (1.016) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.874\*\* | -0.144 | 0.956\* | 1.582\*\* |
|  | (0.207) | (0.247) | (0.465) | (0.241) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.767\* | 0.612 | -0.641 | 2.006\*\* |
|  | (0.337) | (0.418) | (0.634) | (0.400) |
| Constant | -1.591\* | -3.690\*\* | -2.739\* | -3.251\*\* |
|  | (0.686) | (0.909) | (1.309) | (0.830) |
| Observations | 1326 | 1326 | 1326 | 1156 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A28. The interaction between populism and income, Switzerland

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.095 | 0.270+ | 0.674\*\* | -0.434\*\* |
|  | (0.125) | (0.153) | (0.246) | (0.144) |
| Age | -0.003 | -0.027\*\* | -0.003 | 0.055\*\* |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.287 | 1.641\*\* | 0.351 | -1.087\*\* |
|  | (0.284) | (0.346) | (0.546) | (0.356) |
| Income | 3.875\*\* | 2.358 | 3.839 | -0.801 |
|  | (1.388) | (1.750) | (2.370) | (1.696) |
| Interest | 0.493+ | 2.684\*\* | 0.616 | 0.326 |
|  | (0.281) | (0.368) | (0.578) | (0.332) |
| Populism | 2.667\*\* | 4.363\*\* | -0.937 | -1.890\*\* |
|  | (0.599) | (0.736) | (1.156) | (0.701) |
| Income\*Populism | -6.172\*\* | -4.779+ | -4.780 | 2.813 |
|  | (2.001) | (2.458) | (3.682) | (2.507) |
| Ideology | -3.992\*\* | -2.470\* | -8.920\*\* | 0.137 |
|  | (0.928) | (1.075) | (1.450) | (1.110) |
| Ideology squared | 2.551\*\* | 1.205 | 8.236\*\* | 0.184 |
|  | (0.843) | (1.003) | (1.377) | (1.019) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.933\*\* | -0.082 | 0.993\* | 1.553\*\* |
|  | (0.210) | (0.249) | (0.460) | (0.242) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.810\* | 0.623 | -0.569 | 1.967\*\* |
|  | (0.338) | (0.417) | (0.634) | (0.399) |
| Constant | -2.355\*\* | -4.991\*\* | -1.587+ | -2.497\*\* |
|  | (0.534) | (0.674) | (0.962) | (0.620) |
| Observations | 1326 | 1326 | 1326 | 1156 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A29. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, UK

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.548\*\* | 0.093 | -0.059 | 0.552\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.146) | (0.286) | (0.256) |
| Age | -0.009\* | -0.033\*\* | -0.026\*\* | 0.016+ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Education | 0.404 | 0.240 | 0.516 | 1.477\* |
|  | (0.291) | (0.328) | (0.649) | (0.593) |
| Income | 0.346 | -0.390 | -1.229+ | 0.382 |
|  | (0.328) | (0.368) | (0.723) | (0.650) |
| Interest | 1.282\*\* | 2.117\*\* | 1.775\* | 0.530 |
|  | (0.335) | (0.402) | (0.883) | (0.602) |
| Populism | 0.967\* | 1.297\*\* | -0.331 | 1.192+ |
|  | (0.376) | (0.418) | (0.798) | (0.716) |
| Ideology | -0.339 | -1.817+ | -3.793\* | 2.961 |
|  | (1.001) | (1.053) | (1.761) | (1.832) |
| Ideology squared | -1.122 | 0.622 | 1.046 | -3.442\* |
|  | (0.945) | (1.023) | (2.035) | (1.667) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.733\*\* | 0.887\*\* | 0.062 | 2.058\*\* |
|  | (0.278) | (0.322) | (0.606) | (0.482) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.109\*\* | 2.083\*\* | 2.596\* | 1.164 |
|  | (0.421) | (0.501) | (1.040) | (0.725) |
| Constant | -2.258\*\* | -2.929\*\* | -3.350\*\* | -2.609\*\* |
|  | (0.547) | (0.611) | (1.153) | (0.959) |
| Observations | 1298 | 1298 | 1298 | 1298 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A30. The interaction between populism and education, UK

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.546\*\* | 0.097 | -0.065 | 0.555\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.146) | (0.286) | (0.256) |
| Age | -0.008\* | -0.033\*\* | -0.026\*\* | 0.016+ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Education | 0.097 | 1.184 | -0.486 | 4.419\* |
|  | (1.063) | (1.211) | (2.318) | (2.104) |
| Income | 0.340 | -0.370 | -1.244+ | 0.399 |
|  | (0.328) | (0.369) | (0.724) | (0.649) |
| Interest | 1.281\*\* | 2.113\*\* | 1.791\* | 0.563 |
|  | (0.335) | (0.402) | (0.886) | (0.601) |
| Populism | 0.737 | 2.027\* | -1.169 | 3.087\* |
|  | (0.854) | (0.996) | (2.025) | (1.475) |
| Education\*Populism | 0.484 | -1.454 | 1.528 | -4.675 |
|  | (1.614) | (1.796) | (3.397) | (3.174) |
| Ideology | -0.328 | -1.839+ | -3.806\* | 2.967 |
|  | (1.001) | (1.054) | (1.764) | (1.830) |
| Ideology squared | -1.132 | 0.641 | 1.059 | -3.461\* |
|  | (0.946) | (1.023) | (2.037) | (1.668) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.737\*\* | 0.882\*\* | 0.054 | 2.045\*\* |
|  | (0.278) | (0.322) | (0.607) | (0.484) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.114\*\* | 2.074\*\* | 2.582\* | 1.128 |
|  | (0.422) | (0.501) | (1.040) | (0.720) |
| Constant | -2.118\*\* | -3.390\*\* | -2.789+ | -3.780\*\* |
|  | (0.720) | (0.840) | (1.690) | (1.243) |
| Observations | 1298 | 1298 | 1298 | 1298 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A31. The interaction between populism and income, UK

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Petition | On-line | Demons. | Vote |
| Female | 0.549\*\* | 0.100 | -0.083 | 0.555\* |
|  | (0.130) | (0.147) | (0.287) | (0.256) |
| Age | -0.009\* | -0.033\*\* | -0.025\*\* | 0.016+ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Education | 0.409 | 0.255 | 0.525 | 1.495\* |
|  | (0.291) | (0.328) | (0.649) | (0.594) |
| Income | 1.188 | 1.886 | -3.328 | 2.724 |
|  | (1.205) | (1.371) | (2.686) | (2.286) |
| Interest | 1.289\*\* | 2.146\*\* | 1.758\* | 0.580 |
|  | (0.335) | (0.402) | (0.886) | (0.607) |
| Populism | 1.370\* | 2.383\*\* | -1.257 | 2.178+ |
|  | (0.671) | (0.761) | (1.386) | (1.164) |
| Income\*Populism | -1.307 | -3.439+ | 3.067 | -3.772 |
|  | (1.798) | (1.996) | (3.772) | (3.510) |
| Ideology | -0.332 | -1.792+ | -3.846\* | 2.943 |
|  | (1.002) | (1.057) | (1.763) | (1.833) |
| Ideology squared | -1.126 | 0.598 | 1.081 | -3.421\* |
|  | (0.946) | (1.028) | (2.035) | (1.666) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.745\*\* | 0.929\*\* | 0.032 | 2.086\*\* |
|  | (0.279) | (0.324) | (0.606) | (0.482) |
| Internal efficacy | 1.093\*\* | 2.062\*\* | 2.603\* | 1.067 |
|  | (0.422) | (0.500) | (1.040) | (0.736) |
| Constant | -2.529\*\* | -3.693\*\* | -2.699+ | -3.219\*\* |
|  | (0.664) | (0.763) | (1.391) | (1.108) |
| Observations | 1298 | 1298 | 1298 | 1298 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

**Analyses with additional controls**

Replication of Tables A2, A3 and A4 with political trust, external political efficacy, anger and authoritarian values as additional controls. Some of these variables can be considered as outcomes of populism, and hence their inclusion may involve overcontrolling and bias the estimated effect of populism on participation downwardly. They are however reported here as an additional robustness checks.

Measurement of additional controls

Political trust: composite score averaging the respondent’s degree of trust in government, national parliament, parties, and politicians, all measured on an 11-point scale from “No trust at all” to “Complete trust”.

External efficacy: composite score based on respondent’s agreement with statements “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think” and “People like me don’t have any say about what government does”, both measured on 5-point scales from “Disagree strongly” to “Agree strongly”.

Anger: composite scale based on the degree to which the country’s economic situation makes the respondent feel angry and disgusted, both measured on an 11-point scale from “Not at all” to “Very much”.

Authoritarian values: composite scale based on five 11-point bipolar items using pairs of statements: “A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled” vs. “A woman can be fulfilled through her professional career” (reversed); “A woman who does not want to have a child should be allowed to have a free and safe abortion” vs. “Abortion should not be allowed in any case”; “Children should be taught to obey authority” vs. “Children should be encouraged to have an independent judgement” (reversed); “People who break the law should get stiffer sentences” vs. “Stiffer sentences do not contribute to reduce criminality” (reversed); “Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children” vs. “Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances”.

Table A2bis. The relationship between populist attitudes and political participation with socio-demographic controls, pooled sample

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Vote | Petition | Demons. | On-line |
| Female | -0.086 | 0.198\*\* | -0.034 | -0.040 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.042) | (0.063) | (0.046) |
| Age | 0.031\*\* | -0.004\*\* | -0.014\*\* | -0.018\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Education | 0.140 | 0.428\*\* | 0.097 | 0.125 |
|  | (0.133) | (0.094) | (0.136) | (0.102) |
| Income | 0.817\*\* | -0.144 | 0.277 | -0.681\*\* |
|  | (0.164) | (0.116) | (0.173) | (0.127) |
| Populism | 0.118 | 0.976\*\* | 0.686\*\* | 0.974\*\* |
|  | (0.194) | (0.147) | (0.214) | (0.158) |
| Interest | 0.882\*\* | 1.125\*\* | 1.558\*\* | 2.029\*\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.095) | (0.144) | (0.106) |
| Ideology | -0.384 | -1.312\*\* | -2.857\*\* | -1.053\*\* |
|  | (0.375) | (0.265) | (0.348) | (0.282) |
| Ideology squared | 0.760\* | 0.565\* | 1.668\*\* | 0.780\*\* |
|  | (0.357) | (0.251) | (0.349) | (0.264) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.905\*\* | 0.356\*\* | 0.370\*\* | 0.462\*\* |
|  | (0.094) | (0.075) | (0.113) | (0.082) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.724\*\* | 1.041\*\* | 0.737\*\* | 1.691\*\* |
|  | (0.158) | (0.124) | (0.186) | (0.137) |
| Political trust | 0.458\*\* | -0.753\*\* | 0.418\*\* | -0.579\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.109) | (0.156) | (0.116) |
| External efficacy | -0.229+ | -0.421\*\* | -0.585\*\* | -0.563\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.101) | (0.143) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian values | -0.289+ | 1.027\*\* | 1.847\*\* | 0.971\*\* |
|  | (0.170) | (0.123) | (0.182) | (0.131) |
| Anger | -0.027 | 0.314\*\* | 0.646\*\* | 0.538\*\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.080) | (0.122) | (0.087) |
| Constant | -0.634\* | -1.951\*\* | -5.182\*\* | -3.239\*\* |
|  | (0.283) | (0.208) | (0.327) | (0.227) |
| Observations | 11922 | 12197 | 12197 | 12197 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A3. The interaction between populism and education, pooled sample

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Vote | Petition | Demons. | On-line |
| Female | -0.082 | 0.200\*\* | -0.033 | -0.039 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.042) | (0.063) | (0.046) |
| Age | 0.031\*\* | -0.004\*\* | -0.014\*\* | -0.018\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Education | 1.201\* | 1.171\*\* | 0.645 | 0.596 |
|  | (0.501) | (0.353) | (0.516) | (0.383) |
| Income | 0.814\*\* | -0.145 | 0.275 | -0.682\*\* |
|  | (0.164) | (0.116) | (0.173) | (0.127) |
| Populism | 0.797\* | 1.478\*\* | 1.053\*\* | 1.289\*\* |
|  | (0.363) | (0.273) | (0.397) | (0.294) |
| Education\*Populism | -1.534\* | -1.065\* | -0.772 | -0.670 |
|  | (0.696) | (0.488) | (0.701) | (0.526) |
| Interest | 0.889\*\* | 1.129\*\* | 1.561\*\* | 2.032\*\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.095) | (0.144) | (0.106) |
| Ideology | -0.378 | -1.306\*\* | -2.849\*\* | -1.049\*\* |
|  | (0.375) | (0.266) | (0.348) | (0.282) |
| Ideology squared | 0.755\* | 0.558\* | 1.660\*\* | 0.775\*\* |
|  | (0.357) | (0.251) | (0.349) | (0.264) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.905\*\* | 0.359\*\* | 0.374\*\* | 0.465\*\* |
|  | (0.094) | (0.075) | (0.113) | (0.082) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.727\*\* | 1.038\*\* | 0.734\*\* | 1.687\*\* |
|  | (0.159) | (0.124) | (0.186) | (0.137) |
| Political trust | 0.464\*\* | -0.747\*\* | 0.420\*\* | -0.575\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.109) | (0.156) | (0.116) |
| External efficacy | -0.222 | -0.412\*\* | -0.581\*\* | -0.558\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.101) | (0.143) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian values | -0.291+ | 1.021\*\* | 1.844\*\* | 0.968\*\* |
|  | (0.170) | (0.123) | (0.182) | (0.131) |
| Anger | -0.032 | 0.312\*\* | 0.644\*\* | 0.537\*\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.080) | (0.122) | (0.087) |
| Constant | -1.113\*\* | -2.309\*\* | -5.448\*\* | -3.466\*\* |
|  | (0.356) | (0.265) | (0.408) | (0.289) |
| Observations | 11922 | 12197 | 12197 | 12197 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01

Table A4. The interaction between populism and income, pooled sample

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Vote | Petition | Demons. | On-line |
| Female | -0.087 | 0.199\*\* | -0.033 | -0.039 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.042) | (0.063) | (0.046) |
| Age | 0.031\*\* | -0.005\*\* | -0.014\*\* | -0.018\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Education | 0.141 | 0.422\*\* | 0.092 | 0.117 |
|  | (0.133) | (0.094) | (0.136) | (0.102) |
| Income | 0.484 | 1.342\*\* | 0.879 | 1.147\* |
|  | (0.596) | (0.419) | (0.624) | (0.454) |
| Populism | 0.001 | 1.577\*\* | 0.923\*\* | 1.699\*\* |
|  | (0.280) | (0.221) | (0.320) | (0.236) |
| Income\*Populism | 0.480 | -2.113\*\* | -0.841 | -2.586\*\* |
|  | (0.827) | (0.573) | (0.839) | (0.619) |
| Interest | 0.883\*\* | 1.126\*\* | 1.557\*\* | 2.032\*\* |
|  | (0.120) | (0.095) | (0.144) | (0.106) |
| Ideology | -0.382 | -1.316\*\* | -2.854\*\* | -1.053\*\* |
|  | (0.376) | (0.266) | (0.348) | (0.282) |
| Ideology squared | 0.758\* | 0.565\* | 1.664\*\* | 0.776\*\* |
|  | (0.357) | (0.251) | (0.349) | (0.264) |
| Closeness to a party | 0.903\*\* | 0.367\*\* | 0.373\*\* | 0.477\*\* |
|  | (0.094) | (0.076) | (0.113) | (0.082) |
| Internal efficacy | 0.724\*\* | 1.028\*\* | 0.732\*\* | 1.673\*\* |
|  | (0.158) | (0.124) | (0.186) | (0.137) |
| Political trust | 0.456\*\* | -0.747\*\* | 0.419\*\* | -0.573\*\* |
|  | (0.149) | (0.110) | (0.156) | (0.116) |
| External efficacy | -0.230+ | -0.416\*\* | -0.583\*\* | -0.557\*\* |
|  | (0.138) | (0.101) | (0.143) | (0.108) |
| Authoritarian values | -0.286+ | 1.009\*\* | 1.841\*\* | 0.947\*\* |
|  | (0.170) | (0.123) | (0.182) | (0.131) |
| Anger | -0.026 | 0.311\*\* | 0.644\*\* | 0.534\*\* |
|  | (0.109) | (0.080) | (0.122) | (0.087) |
| Constant | -0.553+ | -2.366\*\* | -5.344\*\* | -3.739\*\* |
|  | (0.316) | (0.237) | (0.366) | (0.259) |
| Observations | 11922 | 12197 | 12197 | 12197 |

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, \* p<.05, \*\* p<.01