**Answers to the Reviewers on “The Impact of Populist Radical Right Parties on Socio-Economic Policies”**

We are pleased that we could address most of the points raised by the reviewers with the revised version. The remaining point raised by reviewer 2 is indeed central to our analysis. We answer it in detail and propose a further explanation on the meaning of the PRRP dummy (and especially its relation to the market-liberalism variable) in the manuscript.

The authors

Reviewer: 2

*I remain doubtful about my first point, which is the theoretical reasoning behind the impact of PRRP's. The authors have responded by clarifying their measurement of the main control variable 'government positions on redistributive and regulative economic policies'.  I am glad that they have explained how this variable is measured. Yet, as I wrote in my first review, if the position of PRRP's on those policies is included in the measure of the governing coalition in which they participate, this raises the question why we would expect their to be an additional effect of their coalition membership. Their policy positions are already included in the control variable. So, do the positions of PRRP's weight more heavily in policies than one would expect on the basis of their size? Or are their voters more left-leaning than the parties themselves and are they afraid of losing their support (which is what the Austrian example suggests)? This seems to be the argument that the authors make in the concluding section. However, of these parties are mainly vote seeking and if their voters are left-wing on economic policies, why don't these parties take a clearer left-leaning position on economic policies, rather than a 'blurred' one?   
  
The theoretical reasoning is still not clear to me, and since the article centres around this particular finding, I would like to see this clarified.*

There are two things we would like to discuss here. The first is a technical issue: we *need* both the PRRP dummy and the market-liberalism-of-government variable in order to meaningfully estimate the policy effects of PRRPs. Dropping one of these variables from the analysis would either make it impossible to identify PRRP governments or would not control for the fact that PRRPs are always part of rather market-liberal coalitions.

Second, and given the necessity to include both variables, we understand the need to explain the effect of the PRRP dummy in more detail. The reviewer is right that the policy positions of PRRPs are also included in the market-liberalism-of-government variable. However, even controlling for market-liberalism, the PRRP dummy still captures 1.) a meaningful part of PRRPs’ economic programmatic and 2.) the specific coalition logic of PRRPs in terms of logrolling with mainstream right parties.

As we point out in the theory part, we expect PRRPs to be defenders of the status quo with regard to redistributive policies, but being more open to economic deregulation. We derive these arguments from what we know about the socio-economic profile of their voters as well as the parties’ ideology. Thus, we expect the policy positions of PRRPs to be somewhere centre-left with regard to redistributive issues and centre-right with regard to deregulation. Please note that this is not “position blurring” with regard to economic issues, it is just that PRRPs are left-wing with regard to issues like welfare state reform but more right-wing with regard to issues like privatization and corporatism.

With regard to measuring this distinct economic programmatic, the CMP data gives us no possibility to separate economic issues into redistribute and deregulatory ones. Combining both into the market-liberalism-of-government variable, we therefore have a high risk to place PRRPs more to the centre than these parties deserve. Against this background, the PRRP dummy captures the distinct *combination* of (left-wing) redistributive and (right-wing) deregulatory positions in PRRPs’ manifestos. We believe that this measurement problem is of minor concern for mainstream right parties, since Conservatives and Liberals have a much more consistent approach to the two policy dimensions. Thus, the market-liberalism variable should still provide us with a good control for governments’ economic positions.

Beside its programmatic effect, the PRRP dummy also accounts for the specific coalition logic of PRRPs when entering coalitions with mainstream right parties. More precisely, we see the interchange of concessions with regard to immigration, redistributive and deregulatory issues to be distinct to PRRPs in centre-right coalitions. We assume that strategic behaviour such as logrolling is programmatically not visible but strongly affects the overall policy outcome of the governments.

For the manuscript, we see no need to point to the technical issue. With regard to limitations of the market-liberalism variable for positioning PRRPs, we now discuss this on page 10. With regard to the interpretation of the effect of the PRRP dummy, we make this now much more explicit on page 11.