**Online Appendix** to“Working through the Issues”

In this Appendix, I provide additional evidence in support of the results presented in “Working through the Issues.” In particular, I provide a detailed discussion of the construction and validation of the primary independent variable, the effective number of manifesto issues (ENMI) as well as a series of sensitivity analyses to demonstrate the robustness of the findings presented in the main text. I begin with a discussion of the operationalization of issue diversity.

**Measurement Appendix**

Researchers have shown increasing interest in concepts of issue salience and diversity. For example, public policy (e.g. Jennings et al. 2011; Boydstun et al. 2014) and party politics scholars (e.g. Nyblade 2004 ; Stoll 2011; Greene 2015) summarize the relative attention to issues in policy outputs and party manifestos using measures of diversity. Diversity indicators begin as a measure of entropy or the concentration of attention to issues on one or a small number of categories. Shannon’s H (Shannon 1948) index (Equation 1), for example, measures the extent to which a manifesto concentrates its attention to a small or large number of topics where, *m*, equals the percentage of the document dedicated to issue, *i*. Larger values indicate greater concentration to a small number of issues.

Equation 2 converts Shannon’s H into a measure of diversity (following Jost 2006; see also Boydstun et al. 2014; Greene 2015). Diversity measures both the concentration as well as the total number of issues. By inverting the index, issue diversity measures the effective number of issues. As the example presented in Equation 3 demonstrates, the effective number of issues is equal to the total number of categories given attention when each category is given the same amount of attention. When one or a small number of categories are given disproportionate attention, then the value will always be less than the number of categories discussed.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | (1) |
|  |  | (2) |

As discussed in the main text, there are 42 categories in the Comparative Manifestos Project (once the directional categories are collapsed). This indicates that the highest value of ENMI would be 42 if all issues received the exact same attention. ENMI is lower in any other configuration.

**Figure A1. Issue Diversity by Party Family.**

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I present the aggregate smoothed levels of ENMI by party family across the sample in Figure A1. The figure illustrates that there is an upward trend in ENMI. This trend fits well with studies of issue competition that demonstrate an increase in competition on previously unaddressed issues such as the environment, human rights, or immigration (e.g. Meguid 2005, 2008). Furthermore, the increasing trend fits well with Przeworksi and Sprague’s (1986) argument that Social Democratic parties have broadened their appeal to a wider range of issues as they seek to attract new constituencies to the party. More broadly, the parties of the traditional center left and right have seen the steadiest increase, consistent with the catch-all thesis (Kirchheimer 1990).[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Figure A2. Issue Diversity in Germany.**

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Although Figure 1A demonstrates interesting trends across party types, it provides little information about how parties in any individual system change. To demonstrate variation at the individual party level, Figure 2A highlights ENMI for the major parties in Germany. Each of the major parties shows substantial shifts over the analysis period. Intriguingly, there is a slight upward trend for all parties, particularly near the end of the time series. The CDU discusses the greatest diversity of issues within the German sample in the late 1970s with an ENMI over 27. According to the theoretical perspective, this suggests that the CDU was quite willing to legislate on a range of issues following that election, but was less willing to collaborate previously in the 1950s and 1960s. Immediately prior to elections in 1998, all parties increased their ENMI, but the SPD did so quite dramatically. This trend suggests that each of the parties would have been capable of collaborating on a range of issues following the 1998 election, potentially reflecting broad office seeking priorities.

**Figure A3. ENMI and Party Seat Share/Size **

A potential limitation of ENMI is that any variance in the measure might only capture the difference between small and large parties if only small parties adopt manifestos with low levels of diversity. Figure 3 plots parties’ ENMI against their seat shares. As Figure A3 demonstrates, this is clearly not the case, despite a positive correlation (Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient .08). Smaller parties tend to also discuss a large number of issues even accounting party family. Green parties, for example, on average have an ENMI of over 16.5 in the sample. Small parties also discuss a large range of topics. The difference is rather that small and niche parties often discuss a different set of issues than their more mainstream competitors. Furthermore, even niche parties discuss traditional economic policies in their platforms, although they may not gain the most attention (Spoon 2011; Wagner and Meyer 2013).

Another potential counter argument would be that the average ENMI may be just another proxy measure of disagreement or that average coalition ENMI poorly reflects the distribution of each coalition party’s ENMI. In the main analysis, the primary independent variable is the coalition average ENMI, which reflects the average willingness of coalition parties to collaborate on a small or large range of issues. The hypotheses predict that ENMI conditions the effect of ideological disagreement in the coalition. Figure A4 shows the bivariate relationship between average ENMI in a coalition, the party with the lowest ENMI and the party with the highest ENMI with the amount of ideological disagreement in the coalition. Interestingly, both the lowest ENMI and mean ENMI are negatively related to disagreement while a coalition where the party with the highest level of ENMI positively correlates with disagreement. The relationship between mean ENMI and disagreement is negative, but only maintains a weak bivariate relationship. Altogether there is no strong relationship between parties’ ENMI and disagreement, although a more detailed analysis is necessary to determine the full relationship between the two measures.

**Figure 4A. Correlation of Coalition ENMI and Disagreement**

Another concern is that a measure of central tendency, such as the average, unnecessarily throws away information about each party’s contribution. An alternative approach is to use information about the coalition partner with the lowest ENMI or the highest ENMI to explain a richer story about coalition negotiations. Figure 5A shows the bivariate relationship between coalition duration and ENMI for the mean level, and the value of ENMI for the coalition parties with the lowest and highest levels. Intriguingly, as the conditional hypothesis might predict, the correlation of ENMI and duration is relatively flat for each measure on its own. While measuring ENMI as both the mean and the party with the lowest are weakly, positively correlated with duration, the party with the highest ENMI is weakly negative. Pearson’s correlation coefficients indicate that although the measures are not exact duplicates, they are closely related to the mean level of ENMI. The measures based on the parties with the lowest and highest ENMI are correlated at .923 and .917 with the average ENMI. These strong correlations indicate that the average is likely a reasonable summary of the coalition’s capability to compromise. In the next section, sensitivity analyses confirm that the average succinctly accounts for differences in ENMI for coalition parties.   
**Figure 5A. Alternate indicators of coalition ENMI.**

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**Sensitivity analysis 1 – Is the Average Coalition ENMI a reasonable approach?**

The average coalition ENMI necessarily ignores differences in the variance in the coalition parties’ individual values. Alternate approaches might make greater use of the differences in variance between parties by directly including them in the analysis as independent variables. This approach might refocus the analysis by predicting coalition duration at the party level. To demonstrate the consistency of the results, I present the results of sensitivity analyses using alternate measures of coalition ENMI and party-level analyses. Largely, they confirm the results from the analysis using the average coalition ENMI and indicate that differences in the variance of coalition party ENMI does not provide much additional information to the analysis.

*Minimum and Maximum ENMI.*

In Table A1, I present the results from a sensitivity analysis which includes two measures of ENMI for the coalition parties with the lowest and highest values for each type of cabinet termination. The results largely mirror those presented in the main analysis. Further analyses including two variables (lowest, mean and highest ENMI) in the same model leads the model to be over-specified. The close correlation between the measures[[2]](#footnote-2) means that the inclusion of all three and their interactions with disagreement introduces serious levels of multicollinearity to the model. One method for accounting for multicollinearity among a series of related measures is to create an index out of the offending measures. The average coalition ENMI (as presented in the main analysis) would be one way to reduce the collinearity, but still summarize the coalition’s broad levels. I present the results of analyses with variables for ENMI of the coalition parties with the lowest ENMI and the highest ENMI.

Table A1 presents the results of the analysis with both the value of the lowest and highest coalition party’s ENMI.[[3]](#footnote-3) In particular, the coefficients for the interaction of the minimum coalition ENMI with disagreement are in the predicted direction and statistically different from zero at greater than the 90% level in nearly all of the models. In nearly every model, the constitutive terms for the two measures of ENMI are positive and the interactions with ideological disagreement are negative. The coefficients for the maximum coalition ENMI are in the correct direction in most models, but are not statistically different from zero. Interestingly, the coefficients for the interaction of the party with the lowest ENMI indicate that ENMI reduces the risk of termination as disagreement increases. Together these results might imply that the parties willing to negotiate on the smallest number of issues may be the limiting factor in coalition policy-making.

Altogether, these results suggest some evidence in favor of the primary hypothesis that C-ENMI reduces the risk of early termination. This analysis should be considered a difficult test of the theory, as the high level of collinearity between the two indicators of C-ENMI likely inflates the standard errors, making statistical significance unlikely for these variables. Finally, tests of the non-proportionality hypothesis are impossible due to the multicollinearity. The inclusion of any interactions with time leads the models to fail to converge for all failure types.

**Sensitivity analysis 2. Party level information**

Another approach to accounting for the rich information provided by parties’ ENMI would be to change the unit of analysis to the party level and to use ideological distance from the coalition mean position instead of the cabinet’s ideological range. Although this tactic introduces serious issues of non-independence between the observations, comparable results at the party level would lend additional support to the use of the cabinet’s mean level of ENMI and the theory more broadly. Therefore, I replicate the main analyses in Table A2, Table A3 and Table A4 by changing the unit of analysis to the party level.

Unsurprisingly, the results are nearly identical in each model to those presented in the main analysis. ENMI conditions the effect of ideological disagreement and the coefficients are significant in all of the models with greater than 99.9% confidence.

To a much greater extent than in the main analysis, the Schoenfeld residuals indicate serious violations of the proportional hazards assumption at the party level.[[4]](#footnote-4) In the early elections model, nearly all the coefficients violate the assumption. The results including interactions with the log of time indicate further support for the second hypothesis. Consistent with the main analysis, the stabilizing effect of ENMI does not emerge until later in the parliamentary cycle for both types of termination.

*Broad conclusions on the operationalization of ENMI*

Altogether, the results using alternate measures of ENMI and the party level analysis both suggest that the results of the main analysis are representative of the broader trend. Mean coalition ENMI reasonably captures the coalition’s dynamics. Inclusion of alternate measures needlessly complicates the analysis by creating large levels of multicollinearity. Focusing on the party level does not fit well with the structure of the dependent variable and violates the model’s independence assumption. Regardless of these compromises, the results indicate broad support for the theory.

**Sensitivity Analysis 3 – Frailties**

In this section, I include additional robustness checks that follow alternate modeling choices. I first account for country and period effects using shared frailties (random effects) to allow for varying intercepts for coalitions that form following each election before presenting a parametric approach that allows for a more direct test of the hypotheses while including fixed effects for the country and decade.

*Election Frailties*

I present the results from the Frailty models in Table A5. The inclusion of shared frailties allow for observations that follow a single election to have a distinct intercept similar to random effects in multilevel models. The results from this analysis are consistent with the theory and largely similar to those presented in the main analysis. In particular, the key coefficients for ideological disagreement, C-ENMI and their interaction are in the prediction directions and significant in the joint and replacement models. The coefficients indicate that ideological disagreement increases the risk of a replacement cabinet, but that greater ENMI decreases that risk. The coefficients are not significant for the risk of early elections. Furthermore, the frailty models fail to converge once interactions with the log of time are included, limiting the ability to directly test the second hypothesis in this framework. These results indicate support for the first hypothesis, but at best inconclusive results for the second hypothesis.

*Parametric Models of Coalition Duration with Fixed Effects*

While election frailties account for heterogeneity caused by processes linked to cabinets following the same election, the Cox Model is unable to converge with more complex specifications meant to account for variation in space and time. Instead, I replicate these analyses with the parametric Weibull event history model to allow for the inclusion of additional variables to account for country level and temporal effects. In particular, I include fixed effects for both the country and decade levels using the Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard. These results are largely consistent with those assuming an exponential hazard. Models using the gamma distribution faced similar convergence problems.  
 I present the replication of the main analysis in Table A6 and Table A7. The coefficients mirror those presented in the main analysis. The interaction of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement is negative and statistically significant in the combined risk and replacement risk models in Table A6. These results indicate that ideological disagreement increases the risk of new cabinets, while C-ENMI moderates the chance in risk from disagreement.

To further test the second hypothesis, I rerun the analysis including interactions of the natural log of time with C-ENMI and the interaction of C-ENMI and ideological disagreement in Table A7. Table A7 demonstrates strong evidence for the second hypothesis. Coefficients for each of the interactions with time are negative. The interactions of C-ENMI and the natural log of time are strongly significant in each of the models. This indicates that the initial increased risk from disagreement is reduced by C-ENMI at later points in the legislative cycle. Given the general increasing risk of termination from the baseline hazard in the Weibull model, the moderating effect of C-ENMI becomes clear once there is a real risk of termination.

**Sensitivity Analysis 4 – PDDA sub-sample**

Finally, the use of an extensive sample of parliamentary democracies with varying experience with democracy from a range of cultural backgrounds might imply that the results are being driven by the differences between older and newer democracies. Therefore, I re-run the analysis in Table A8 and A9 using only the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008), which only provides data up to 1999 for Western European Democracies. These results closely mirror those presented in the main analysis in the text.

In particular, the coefficients for the interaction of C-ENMI[[5]](#footnote-5) and disagreement in Table A8 are negative and statistically significant in the combined and replacement models. The coefficients fail to reach standard levels of significance for the early election models. Table A9 presents the results with an interaction of the natural log of time. Like the main analysis, the effect of the key variables are in the correct direction and statistically significant. I present predicted effects from this analysis in Figure 6A based on Licht’s (2011) method. Figure 6A demonstrates that C-ENMI decreases the risk of early termination for both types, although the effect is clearest in the replacement models.

**Figure 6A. First Difference Change in the Non Proportional Risk of an Election from** C-**ENMI using only the PDDA sample**

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*Conclusions*

Altogether the results using alternate operationalizations of ENMI, shared frailties, parametric models with fixed effects or the PDDA subset provide additional evidence in support of the hypotheses. C-ENMI decreases the risk of failure from ideological disagreement. Furthermore, the non-proportional analyses including interactions with time show that the effect of C-ENMI takes effect later in the parliamentary cycle. Ultimately, however, these tests are limited by the number of observations for each type of failure. Additional observations of coalition failure will better enable future analyses that can fully account for time in a rigorous manner.

**Table A1. Cabinet Level Analysis with Multiple Measures of ENMI Using the Cox Proportional Hazards Model. [[6]](#footnote-6)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  | Combined Risk | Combined Risk (Full) | Replacement Risk plus Economy | Replacement Risk (Full) | Election Risk | Election Risk (Full) |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.278\*\*\* | 2.416\*\*\* | 2.687\*\*\* | 2.754\*\* | 1.493 | -0.037 |
| (0.561) | (0.629) | (0.725) | (0.910) | (2.207) | (2.110) |
| Ideological Disagreement X Min ENMI | -0.096+ | -0.094+ | -0.131+ | -0.161\* | -0.186+ | -0.166 |
| (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.073) | (0.081) | (0.106) | (0.103) |
| Min ENMI | 0.029 | 0.018 | 0.010 | 0.020 | 0.039 | 0.013 |
|  | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.049) | (0.053) | (0.066) | (0.067) |
| Ideological Disagreement X Max ENMI | -0.031 | -0.051 | -0.051 | -0.035 | 0.089 | 0.113 |
| (0.057) | (0.058) | (0.071) | (0.081) | (0.140) | (0.145) |
| Max ENMI | 0.039 | 0.069+ | 0.089+ | 0.083 | -0.012 | 0.029 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.037) | (0.053) | (0.061) | (0.078) | (0.089) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition | -0.657\*\*\* | -0.648\*\*\* | 0.037 | 0.020 | -0.580 | -0.875\* |
| (0.178) | (0.181) | (0.389) | (0.458) | (0.388) | (0.438) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition | -1.034\*\*\* | -0.981\*\*\* | -0.783\* | -0.856\* | -0.774\* | -0.634 |
| (0.180) | (0.188) | (0.381) | (0.428) | (0.353) | (0.409) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition | 0.170 | 0.158 | 0.242 | 0.132 | -0.082 | -0.092 |
| (0.127) | (0.130) | (0.265) | (0.276) | (0.281) | (0.351) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median | 0.023 | 0.059 | -0.151 | -0.209 | -0.389 | -0.132 |
| (0.164) | (0.172) | (0.295) | (0.331) | (0.364) | (0.410) |
| Parliamentary Range | -0.288\* | -0.278+ | -0.527+ | -0.622+ | -0.097 | 0.006 |
|  | (0.147) | (0.153) | (0.318) | (0.340) | (0.278) | (0.322) |
| Presidentialism | 0.564\* | 0.357 | 0.537+ | 0.382 | 0.026 | 0.177 |
|  | (0.222) | (0.249) | (0.285) | (0.421) | (0.479) | (0.470) |
| Bicameralism | 0.615\*\* | 0.645\*\* | 0.409 | 0.492 | 0.695 | 0.689+ |
|  | (0.218) | (0.201) | (0.317) | (0.347) | (0.427) | (0.401) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence | 0.227 | 0.348 | 0.355 | 0.751+ | -0.019 | 0.192 |
| (0.193) | (0.218) | (0.337) | (0.384) | (0.451) | (0.524) |
| Constructive Confidence | -0.035 | -0.231 | 0.067 | -0.320 | -0.161 | -0.465 |
| (0.174) | (0.210) | (0.378) | (0.443) | (0.400) | (0.459) |
| Unemployment Rate |  | 0.051\*\*\* |  | 0.019 |  | 0.077+ |
|  |  | (0.015) |  | (0.032) |  | (0.041) |
| Inflation |  | 0.007\*\*\* |  | 0.008\*\* |  | 0.015\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.002) |  | (0.003) |  | (0.004) |
| Days to next election | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | 0.001\* | 0.001\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| AIC | 2387.576 | 2060.556 | 793.366 | 672.258 | 426.113 | 379.079 |
| BIC | 2443.082 | 2121.539 | 848.872 | 733.242 | 481.620 | 440.062 |
| χ2 | 189.416 | 183.860 | 64.514 | 74.586 | 148.392 | 148.024 |
| Log Likelihood | -1178.788 | -1013.278 | -381.683 | -319.129 | -198.056 | -172.540 |
| Observations | 299 | 267 | 299 | 267 | 299 | 267 |

**Table A2. Party Level Analysis for Combined Risk of Termination. [[7]](#footnote-7)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|  | Simple | No Econ | Full | No Econ X ln(t) | Full X ln(t) |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.594\*\* | 3.261\*\*\* | 3.153\*\*\* | 3.529\*\*\* | 3.201\*\*\* |
| (0.794) | (0.694) | (0.711) | (0.776) | (0.837) |
| Ideological Disagreement X ENMI | 1.080\*\*\* | -0.176\*\*\* | -0.180\*\*\* | 1.103\*\*\* | 1.101\*\*\* |
| (0.142) | (0.036) | (0.038) | (0.118) | (0.120) |
| Ideological Disagreement X ENMI X ln(t) | -0.190\*\*\* |  |  | -0.196\*\*\* | -0.194\*\*\* |
| (0.019) |  |  | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| ENMI | 0.011 | 0.038\*\* | 0.045\*\* | 0.043\*\* | 0.046\*\* |
|  | (0.015) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition |  | -0.571\*\* | -0.594\*\* | -0.709\*\*\* | -0.720\*\*\* |
|  | (0.190) | (0.194) | (0.167) | (0.171) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition |  | -0.993\*\*\* | -0.928\*\*\* | -0.980\*\*\* | -0.903\*\*\* |
|  | (0.170) | (0.175) | (0.151) | (0.161) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition |  | 0.163 | 0.138 | 0.170 | 0.143 |
|  |  | (0.131) | (0.133) | (0.120) | (0.124) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median |  | -0.047 | 0.003 | 0.022 | 0.066 |
|  |  | (0.177) | (0.185) | (0.142) | (0.147) |
| Parliamentary Range |  | -0.210 | -0.229 | -0.371\*\* | -0.379\*\* |
|  |  | (0.152) | (0.159) | (0.131) | (0.138) |
| Presidentialism |  | 0.587\*\* | 0.510\* | 0.550\*\* | 0.450+ |
|  |  | (0.201) | (0.235) | (0.194) | (0.232) |
| Bicameralism |  | 0.711\*\* | 0.745\*\*\* | 0.671\*\*\* | 0.709\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.219) | (0.209) | (0.186) | (0.178) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence |  | 0.145 | 0.200 | -0.022 | 0.031 |
|  | (0.201) | (0.227) | (0.184) | (0.207) |
| Constructive Confidence |  | 0.025 | -0.134 | -0.043 | -0.163 |
|  | (0.187) | (0.220) | (0.197) | (0.223) |
| Unemployment Rate |  |  | 0.034\* |  | 0.034\* |
|  |  |  | (0.015) |  | (0.015) |
| Inflation |  |  | 0.007\*\*\* |  | 0.006\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.002) |  | (0.001) |
| Days to next election |  | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.001\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| AIC | 8196.244 | 8275.529 | 7202.804 | 7871.617 | 6847.825 |
| BIC | 8215.130 | 8336.908 | 7271.984 | 7937.717 | 6921.618 |
| χ2 | 131.495 | 178.523 | 176.284 | 489.534 | 466.705 |
| Log Likelihood | -4094.122 | -4124.765 | -3586.402 | -3921.809 | -3407.913 |
| Observations | 830 | 830 | 744 | 830 | 744 |

**Table A3. Party Level Analysis for Replacement Risk of Termination. [[8]](#footnote-8)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) |
|  | Simple | No Econ | Full | No Econ X ln(t) | Full X ln(t) |
| Ideological Disagreement | 4.749\*\*\* | 3.568\*\*\* | 3.736\*\*\* | 5.146\*\*\* | 5.228\*\*\* |
| (1.091) | (1.032) | (1.091) | (1.139) | (1.145) |
| Ideological Disagreement X ENMI | 1.441\*\*\* | -0.231\*\* | -0.233\*\* | 1.508\*\*\* | 1.470\*\*\* |
| (0.307) | (0.071) | (0.076) | (0.252) | (0.227) |
| Ideological Disagreement X ENMI X ln(t) | -0.271\*\*\* |  |  | -0.279\*\*\* | -0.273\*\*\* |
| (0.043) |  |  | (0.036) | (0.033) |
| ENMI | 0.032 | 0.038+ | 0.042+ | 0.061\*\* | 0.063\* |
|  | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.025) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition |  | 0.210 | 0.065 | 0.096 | -0.058 |
|  | (0.402) | (0.448) | (0.388) | (0.421) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition |  | -0.640+ | -0.769+ | -0.497 | -0.656 |
|  | (0.372) | (0.410) | (0.380) | (0.418) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition |  | 0.329 | 0.138 | 0.297 | 0.140 |
|  | (0.268) | (0.278) | (0.258) | (0.262) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median |  | -0.122 | -0.102 | -0.159 | -0.185 |
|  | (0.287) | (0.310) | (0.280) | (0.296) |
| Parliamentary Range |  | -0.471+ | -0.547+ | -0.683\*\* | -0.784\*\* |
|  |  | (0.281) | (0.310) | (0.246) | (0.258) |
| Presidentialism |  | 0.672\* | 0.735+ | 0.633\* | 0.723+ |
|  |  | (0.289) | (0.395) | (0.258) | (0.372) |
| Bicameralism |  | 0.464 | 0.679+ | 0.408 | 0.654\* |
|  |  | (0.331) | (0.364) | (0.299) | (0.320) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence |  | 0.239 | 0.600 | 0.014 | 0.337 |
|  | (0.360) | (0.401) | (0.364) | (0.411) |
| Constructive Confidence |  | 0.218 | -0.147 | 0.134 | -0.170 |
|  | (0.392) | (0.458) | (0.448) | (0.485) |
| Unemployment Rate |  |  | -0.001 |  | -0.005 |
|  |  |  | (0.028) |  | (0.029) |
| Inflation |  |  | 0.010\*\*\* |  | 0.009\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.003) |  | (0.003) |
| Days to next election |  | 0.001\* | 0.001\*\*\* | 0.001\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| AIC | 2656.993 | 2800.325 | 2339.707 | 2590.615 | 2157.074 |
| BIC | 2675.878 | 2861.704 | 2408.887 | 2656.715 | 2230.867 |
| χ2 | 70.262 | 52.053 | 73.261 | 140.471 | 166.856 |
| Log Likelihood | -1324.496 | -1387.163 | -1154.853 | -1281.307 | -1062.537 |
| Observations | 830 | 830 | 744 | 830 | 744 |

**Table A4. Party Level Analysis for the Risk of New Elections. [[9]](#footnote-9)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) | (21) |
|  | Simple | No Econ | Full | No Econ X ln(t) | Full X ln(t) |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.904\* | 3.936\* | 2.381 | 4.856\* | 2.851 |
| (1.442) | (1.932) | (1.689) | (1.931) | (1.915) |
| Ideological Disagreement X ENMI | 1.165\*\*\* | -0.154 | -0.106 | 0.858\*\* | 0.851\*\* |
| (0.178) | (0.108) | (0.098) | (0.292) | (0.289) |
| Ideological Disagreement X ENMI X ln(t) | -0.226\*\*\* |  |  | -0.175\*\*\* | -0.163\*\*\* |
| (0.031) |  |  | (0.045) | (0.043) |
| ENMI | -0.001 | 0.012 | 0.022 | 0.018 | 0.023 |
|  | (0.023) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.032) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition |  | -0.427 | -0.679 | -0.544 | -0.813+ |
|  | (0.391) | (0.459) | (0.375) | (0.442) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition |  | -0.905\* | -0.767+ | -0.987\*\* | -0.836\* |
|  | (0.353) | (0.415) | (0.356) | (0.411) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition |  | -0.039 | -0.062 | -0.005 | -0.023 |
|  | (0.284) | (0.320) | (0.284) | (0.314) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median |  | -0.573+ | -0.383 | -0.449 | -0.234 |
|  | (0.335) | (0.371) | (0.329) | (0.358) |
| Parliamentary Range |  | -0.103 | -0.090 | -0.213 | -0.233 |
|  |  | (0.247) | (0.263) | (0.244) | (0.277) |
| Presidentialism |  | 0.241 | 0.377 | 0.247 | 0.383 |
|  |  | (0.401) | (0.479) | (0.381) | (0.444) |
| Bicameralism |  | 0.823\* | 0.855\* | 0.765+ | 0.778\* |
|  |  | (0.401) | (0.381) | (0.399) | (0.386) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence |  | -0.180 | -0.189 | -0.322 | -0.351 |
|  | (0.477) | (0.494) | (0.461) | (0.486) |
| Constructive Confidence |  | -0.077 | -0.452 | -0.034 | -0.437 |
|  | (0.346) | (0.413) | (0.336) | (0.454) |
| Unemployment Rate |  |  | 0.045 |  | 0.047 |
|  |  |  | (0.042) |  | (0.040) |
| Inflation |  |  | 0.015\*\*\* |  | 0.013\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.004) |  | (0.004) |
| Days to next election |  | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* | -0.005\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| AIC | 1874.393 | 1477.187 | 1294.927 | 1424.914 | 1251.927 |
| BIC | 1893.279 | 1538.565 | 1364.108 | 1491.014 | 1325.719 |
| χ2 | 59.048 | 148.137 | 127.455 | 241.278 | 264.232 |
| Log Likelihood | -933.197 | -725.593 | -632.463 | -698.457 | -609.963 |
| Observations | 830 | 830 | 744 | 830 | 744 |

**Table A5. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis with Election Frailty.[[10]](#footnote-10)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (22) | (23) | (24) | (25) | (26) | (27) |
|  | Combined Risk | Combined Risk (Full) | Replacement Risk | ReplacementRisk (Full) | Election Risk | Election Risk (Full) |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.456\*\*\* | 2.340\*\* | 2.843\*\* | 3.018\*\* | 2.989 | 1.543 |
| (0.685) | (0.793) | (0.981) | (1.069) | (1.826) | (1.955) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI | -0.124\*\* | -0.121\*\* | -0.170\*\* | -0.182\*\* | -0.137 | -0.083 |
| (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.060) | (0.066) | (0.102) | (0.107) |
| C-ENMI | 0.067\* | 0.073\*\* | 0.087+ | 0.095\* | 0.049 | 0.052 |
| (0.026) | (0.028) | (0.045) | (0.048) | (0.055) | (0.053) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition | -0.612\*\* | -0.480\* | 0.103 | 0.010 | -0.470 | -0.732+ |
| (0.202) | (0.212) | (0.385) | (0.415) | (0.398) | (0.427) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition | -1.052\*\*\* | -0.856\*\*\* | -0.852\* | -0.933\* | -0.771\* | -0.675 |
| (0.188) | (0.200) | (0.365) | (0.383) | (0.380) | (0.419) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition | 0.170 | 0.128 | 0.231 | 0.101 | -0.079 | -0.135 |
| (0.136) | (0.147) | (0.246) | (0.264) | (0.294) | (0.338) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median | 0.016 | -0.014 | -0.158 | -0.139 | -0.411 | -0.127 |
| (0.155) | (0.169) | (0.284) | (0.306) | (0.356) | (0.394) |
| Parliamentary Range | -0.326\* | -0.284+ | -0.608\* | -0.677\* | -0.129 | -0.104 |
|  | (0.150) | (0.161) | (0.278) | (0.303) | (0.288) | (0.316) |
| Presidentialism | 0.638\*\* | 0.506\* | 0.666+ | 0.587 | 0.257 | 0.420 |
| (0.222) | (0.255) | (0.351) | (0.424) | (0.508) | (0.564) |
| Bicameralism | 0.681\*\*\* | 0.635\*\* | 0.451 | 0.610+ | 0.856\* | 0.844\* |
|  | (0.190) | (0.195) | (0.349) | (0.370) | (0.410) | (0.426) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence | 0.243 | 0.250 | 0.405 | 0.743\* | -0.061 | -0.041 |
| (0.202) | (0.211) | (0.338) | (0.369) | (0.482) | (0.545) |
| Constructive Confidence | -0.034 | 0.004 | 0.018 | -0.333 | -0.042 | -0.224 |
| (0.221) | (0.225) | (0.401) | (0.454) | (0.449) | (0.501) |
| Unemployment Rate[[11]](#footnote-11) |  | -0.155\* |  | 0.012 |  | 0.056 |
|  |  | (0.078) |  | (0.031) |  | (0.041) |
| Inflation |  | 0.274\*\*\* |  | 0.011\*\* |  | 0.013\*\* |
|  |  | (0.068) |  | (0.004) |  | (0.005) |
| Days to next election | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | 0.001\* | 0.001\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| AIC | 2386.436 | 2002.893 | 793.319 | 671.707 | 424.445 | 378.465 |
| BIC | 2434.542 | 2056.361 | 841.425 | 725.515 | 472.551 | 432.274 |
| χ2 | 191.154 | 158.685 | 40.536 | 44.327 | 113.906 | 100.906 |
| Log Likelihood | -1180.218 | -986.447 | -383.660 | -320.853 | -199.223 | -174.233 |
| Observations | 299 | 261 | 299 | 267 | 299 | 267 |

**Table A6. Parametric Survival Model (Weibull distribution) with country and decade fixed effects. [[12]](#footnote-12)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (28) | (29) | (30) | (31) | (32) | (33) |
|  | Combined Risk | Combined Risk (Full) | Replacement Risk | ReplacementRisk (Full) | Election Risk | Election Risk (Full) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.626\*\*\* | 2.552\*\*\* | 4.779\*\*\* | 5.823\*\*\* | 4.489\* | 0.538 |
| (0.571) | (0.552) | (1.413) | (1.641) | (2.104) | (2.116) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI | -0.126\*\*\* | -0.131\*\*\* | -0.278\*\* | -0.336\*\* | -0.206 | -0.007 |
| (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.094) | (0.107) | (0.132) | (0.160) |
| C-ENMI | 0.098\*\*\* | 0.095\*\* | 0.211\*\* | 0.200\* | 0.095 | 0.052 |
|  | (0.029) | (0.031) | (0.075) | (0.079) | (0.082) | (0.101) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition | -0.928\*\*\* | -0.816\*\* | -0.296 | -0.755 | -1.049+ | -1.118+ |
| (0.268) | (0.256) | (0.696) | (0.707) | (0.556) | (0.576) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition | -1.171\*\*\* | -1.068\*\*\* | -1.652\* | -2.129\*\* | -1.417\* | -0.982 |
| (0.223) | (0.240) | (0.686) | (0.753) | (0.687) | (1.002) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition | 0.141 | 0.079 | 0.379 | 0.097 | 0.152 | 0.461 |
| (0.135) | (0.158) | (0.349) | (0.465) | (0.458) | (0.584) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median | -0.093 | -0.054 | -0.571 | -0.425 | -0.672 | -0.212 |
| (0.192) | (0.203) | (0.431) | (0.466) | (0.520) | (0.802) |
| Parliamentary Range | -0.430\*\* | -0.413\* | -0.802 | -0.585 | -0.210 | -0.850 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.169) | (0.530) | (0.537) | (0.498) | (0.791) |
| Presidentialism | -0.216 | -0.239 | -1.557 | -1.217 | -0.636 | -0.723 |
|  | (0.653) | (0.666) | (1.002) | (1.092) | (0.936) | (1.797) |
| Bicameralism | -2.681\*\*\* | -2.541\*\*\* | -2.392\*\*\* | -2.852\*\* | -6.368\*\*\* | -9.029\*\*\* |
|  | (0.369) | (0.384) | (0.579) | (0.909) | (1.443) | (2.598) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence | -2.773\*\*\* | -2.945\*\*\* | 0.268 | 13.279\*\*\* | -8.270\*\*\* | -10.083\*\*\* |
| (0.748) | (0.753) | (1.394) | (1.521) | (1.872) | (2.674) |
| Constructive Confidence | -1.199\* | -0.757 | -2.312\*\* | -16.162\*\*\* | -15.162\*\*\* | -15.491\*\*\* |
| (0.600) | (0.750) | (0.847) | (1.039) | (1.209) | (1.455) |
| Unemployment Rate[[13]](#footnote-13) |  | 0.026 |  | -0.036 |  | 0.087 |
|  |  | (0.024) |  | (0.085) |  | (0.110) |
| Inflation |  | 0.011\*\*\* |  | 0.005 |  | 0.026\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.002) |  | (0.006) |  | (0.007) |
| Days to next election | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | 0.003\* | 0.005\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* | -0.008\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| AIC | 609.912 | 555.756 | 418.440 | 349.143 | 239.217 | 211.385 |
| BIC | 761.631 | 710.008 | 581.260 | 478.013 | 402.036 | 372.811 |
| Log Likelihood | -263.956 | -234.878 | -165.220 | -138.571 | -75.608 | -60.693 |
| Observations | 299 | 267 | 299 | 265 | 299 | 267 |

**Table A7. Parametric Survival Model (Weibull Distribution) with Country and Decade Fixed Effects and Non-Proportional Effects. [[14]](#footnote-14)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (34) | (35) | (36) | (37) | (38) | (39) |
|  | Combined Risk | Combined Risk (Full) | Replacement Risk | ReplacementRisk (Full) | Election Risk | Election Risk (Full) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.793\*\*\* | 2.768\*\*\* | 6.616\*\*\* | 7.423\*\*\* | 5.014\*\* | 1.799 |
| (0.683) | (0.716) | (1.676) | (1.915) | (1.855) | (1.901) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI | 0.867\*\*\* | 0.848\*\*\* | 0.966\*\*\* | 1.046\*\*\* | 0.565\*\* | 0.746\*\* |
| (0.084) | (0.086) | (0.131) | (0.171) | (0.213) | (0.249) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(time) | -0.150\*\*\* | -0.148\*\*\* | -0.200\*\*\* | -0.220\*\*\* | -0.132\*\*\* | -0.132\*\*\* |
| (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.032) | (0.035) |
| C-ENMI | 0.116\*\*\* | 0.105\*\* | 0.276\*\*\* | 0.273\*\* | 0.107 | 0.084 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.082) | (0.098) | (0.071) | (0.094) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition | -1.239\*\*\* | -1.148\*\*\* | -0.496 | -0.566 | -1.148\* | -1.264\* |
| (0.234) | (0.225) | (0.613) | (0.619) | (0.516) | (0.534) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition | -1.178\*\*\* | -1.067\*\*\* | -1.673\* | -1.859\* | -1.298\* | -0.943 |
| (0.226) | (0.253) | (0.676) | (0.732) | (0.640) | (0.851) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition | 0.006 | -0.031 | 0.320 | 0.075 | -0.062 | 0.165 |
| (0.147) | (0.168) | (0.357) | (0.484) | (0.458) | (0.472) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median | -0.234 | -0.101 | -0.881+ | -0.597 | -0.886+ | -0.567 |
| (0.171) | (0.173) | (0.484) | (0.616) | (0.476) | (0.556) |
| Parliamentary Range | -0.644\*\*\* | -0.642\*\*\* | -1.604\* | -1.129+ | -0.633 | -1.277 |
|  | (0.172) | (0.188) | (0.671) | (0.656) | (0.629) | (0.892) |
| Presidentialism | -0.613 | -0.665 | -1.928\*\* | -1.411+ | -1.573+ | -1.549 |
|  | (0.935) | (0.981) | (0.672) | (0.808) | (0.943) | (1.388) |
| Bicameralism | -2.612\*\*\* | -2.636\*\*\* | -1.441\* | -2.458\* | -5.770\*\*\* | -8.278\*\*\* |
|  | (0.296) | (0.295) | (0.607) | (0.989) | (1.397) | (2.249) |
| Abs. Majority Confidence | -2.887\*\*\* | -3.198\*\*\* | -0.335 | 14.489\*\*\* | -7.623\*\*\* | -9.529\*\*\* |
| (0.656) | (0.718) | (1.297) | (1.568) | (1.917) | (2.687) |
| Constructive Confidence | -1.793\* | -1.340 | -3.358\*\* | -21.378\*\*\* | -16.887\*\*\* | -14.238\*\*\* |
| (0.729) | (0.969) | (1.246) | (1.914) | (1.476) | (1.541) |
| Unemployment Rate[[15]](#footnote-15) |  | 0.030 |  | -0.207 |  | 0.148 |
|  | (0.029) |  | (0.371) |  | (0.117) |
| Inflation |  | 0.005\*\* |  | 0.001 |  | 0.021\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.002) |  | (0.006) |  | (0.006) |
| Days to next election | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | 0.004\*\* | 0.007\*\*\* | -0.006\*\*\* | -0.007\*\*\* |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| AIC | 384.668 | 352.675 | 327.104 | 238.008 | 212.987 | 188.541 |
| BIC | 540.087 | 506.926 | 493.624 | 324.102 | 372.106 | 349.967 |
| Log Likelihood | -150.334 | -133.337 | -118.552 | -95.004 | -63.494 | -49.270 |
| Observations | 299 | 267 | 299 | 267 | 299 | 267 |

**Table A8. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis Using only the PDDA Sample[[16]](#footnote-16)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (40) | (41) | (42) | (43) | (44) | (45) |
|  | Combined Risk 1 | Combined Risk 2 | Replacement Risk 1 | Replacement Risk 2 | Election Risk 1 | Election Risk 2 |
| Ideological Disagreement | 2.221\*\*\* | 2.211\*\*\* | 2.231\*\*\* | 2.351\*\*\* | 0.051 | 0.665 |
| (0.654) | (0.572) | (0.504) | (0.540) | (1.059) | (1.052) |
| C-ENMI | 0.088\* | 0.095\* | 0.079\*\* | 0.101\*\*\* | 0.025 | 0.043 |
| (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.059) | (0.057) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI | -0.131\*\* | -0.134\*\* | -0.134\*\* | -0.153\*\*\* | 0.009 | -0.023 |
| (0.050) | (0.046) | (0.041) | (0.043) | (0.080) | (0.081) |
| Coalition Agreement | 0.092 | 0.295 | -0.450 | -0.642 | 0.181 | 0.750+ |
| (0.351) | (0.341) | (0.335) | (0.398) | (0.539) | (0.441) |
| Policies in Coal Agreement | -0.003 | -0.005 | 0.001 | 0.004 | -0.008 | -0.020\*\*\* |
| (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.005) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition | 0.732\*\* | 0.600\* | 0.627\*\* | 0.779\*\*\* | -0.293 | -1.176+ |
| (0.225) | (0.236) | (0.200) | (0.205) | (0.442) | (0.634) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition | -1.622\*\*\* | -1.295\*\*\* | -1.076\*\*\* | -1.008\*\*\* | -1.232\* | -1.006+ |
| (0.293) | (0.307) | (0.272) | (0.283) | (0.481) | (0.588) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition | 0.107 | 0.139 | 0.123 | 0.019 | -0.066 | -0.001 |
| (0.194) | (0.210) | (0.169) | (0.184) | (0.306) | (0.305) |
| New Cabinet | -0.031 | -0.014 | -0.530+ | -0.417+ | 0.125 | 0.302 |
| (0.304) | (0.283) | (0.282) | (0.250) | (0.461) | (0.479) |
| Investiture Vote | 0.492 | 0.303 | 0.447 | 0.179 | 0.709 | 0.684 |
| (0.355) | (0.342) | (0.280) | (0.324) | (0.562) | (0.520) |
| Presidentialism | 0.719\* | 0.336 | 1.159\*\*\* | 1.176\*\*\* | 0.582 | 0.304 |
| (0.316) | (0.305) | (0.271) | (0.263) | (0.495) | (0.574) |
| Bicameralism | 0.959\*\* | 0.820\*\* | 0.869\*\* | 1.030\*\* | 0.380 | 0.364 |
| (0.329) | (0.315) | (0.289) | (0.335) | (0.517) | (0.544) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median | -0.598+ | -0.498 | -0.187 | -0.111 | -1.083 | -1.114 |
| (0.311) | (0.304) | (0.224) | (0.233) | (0.676) | (0.694) |
| Parliamentary Range | -0.356 | -0.254 | -0.313 | -0.116 | 0.020 | -0.131 |
| (0.277) | (0.257) | (0.226) | (0.228) | (0.350) | (0.353) |
| Days to Next Election | -0.001\*\*\* | -0.001\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.002\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* | -0.003\*\*\* |
| (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Inflation |  | 0.022\* |  | 0.006 |  | 0.057\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.009) |  | (0.011) |  | (0.013) |
| Unemployment Rate |  | 0.065\*\* |  | 0.024 |  | 0.184\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |  | (0.021) |  | (0.038) |
| AIC | 1416.993 | 1200.486 | 1504.276 | 1241.928 | 477.212 | 395.310 |
| BIC | 1469.934 | 1257.628 | 1557.218 | 1299.070 | 530.153 | 452.452 |
| χ2 | 92.766 | 90.499 | 178.791 | 139.470 | 77.987 | 112.410 |
| Log Likelihood | -693.496 | -583.243 | -737.138 | -603.964 | -223.606 | -180.655 |
| Observations | 252 | 213 | 252 | 213 | 252 | 213 |

**Table A9. Non-Proportional Hazards Analysis Using only the PDDA Sample[[17]](#footnote-17)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (46) | (47) | (48) | (49) | (50) | (51) |
|  | Combined Risk 1 | Combined Risk 2 | Replacement Risk 1 | Replacement Risk 2 | Election Risk 1 | Election Risk 2 |
| Ideological Disagreement | 0.913 | 0.558 | 1.294 | 1.096 | -1.268 | -0.555 |
| (1.013) | (0.934) | (0.833) | (0.786) | (1.191) | (1.101) |
| C-ENMI | 2.267\*\*\* | 2.537\*\*\* | 1.813\*\*\* | 2.121\*\*\* | 2.471\*\*\* | 2.381\*\*\* |
|  | (0.282) | (0.302) | (0.210) | (0.228) | (0.512) | (0.493) |
| C-ENMI X ln(days) | -0.355\*\*\* | -0.395\*\*\* | -0.276\*\*\* | -0.318\*\*\* | -0.387\*\*\* | -0.370\*\*\* |
| (0.046) | (0.050) | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.079) | (0.076) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI | 0.307\* | 0.411\*\* | 0.229 | 0.342\* | 0.423\* | 0.570\* |
| (0.148) | (0.158) | (0.147) | (0.161) | (0.180) | (0.239) |
| Ideological Disagreement X C-ENMI X ln(days) | -0.046 | -0.058+ | -0.040 | -0.055\* | -0.047 | -0.073+ |
| (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.036) | (0.039) |
| Coalition Agreement | 0.639+ | 0.816+ | -0.044 | -0.304 | 0.878 | 1.519\* |
| (0.329) | (0.425) | (0.295) | (0.351) | (0.568) | (0.600) |
| Policies in Coal Agreement | -0.003 | -0.007 | 0.000 | 0.003 | -0.012\* | -0.026\*\*\* |
| (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) |
| Surplus Majority Coalition | 0.295 | 0.279 | 0.321+ | 0.534\* | -1.060\* | -1.749\* |
| (0.183) | (0.216) | (0.192) | (0.223) | (0.514) | (0.694) |
| Minimum Winning Coalition | -1.040\*\* | -0.653\* | -0.502 | -0.365 | -0.472 | -0.146 |
| (0.340) | (0.265) | (0.379) | (0.360) | (0.427) | (0.527) |
| Ideol. Connected Coalition | -0.051 | -0.132 | -0.127 | -0.300+ | -0.445 | -0.284 |
| (0.182) | (0.177) | (0.187) | (0.179) | (0.290) | (0.309) |
| New Cabinet | 0.107 | 0.233 | -0.508 | -0.278 | 0.014 | 0.374 |
|  | (0.255) | (0.283) | (0.336) | (0.332) | (0.498) | (0.532) |
| Investiture Vote | 0.076 | -0.197 | -0.089 | -0.377 | 0.187 | 0.033 |
|  | (0.286) | (0.314) | (0.322) | (0.416) | (0.505) | (0.495) |
| Presidentialism | 0.274 | -0.221 | 0.679\* | 0.556+ | -0.184 | -0.712 |
|  | (0.311) | (0.288) | (0.327) | (0.296) | (0.523) | (0.606) |
| Bicameralism | 0.942\*\*\* | 0.799\*\* | 0.865\*\* | 0.951\* | 0.370 | 0.142 |
|  | (0.280) | (0.290) | (0.322) | (0.382) | (0.424) | (0.466) |
| Dimension By Dimension Median | -0.138 | 0.036 | 0.249 | 0.507\* | -0.490 | -0.565 |
| (0.231) | (0.257) | (0.217) | (0.251) | (0.485) | (0.505) |
| Parliamentary Range | -0.815\*\* | -0.556\* | -0.471+ | -0.240 | 0.169 | -0.009 |
| (0.297) | (0.225) | (0.257) | (0.220) | (0.312) | (0.334) |
| Days to Next Election | 0.001\* | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.001+ | -0.001\* |
| (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) |
| Inflation |  | 0.015+ |  | -0.007 |  | 0.059\*\* |
|  |  | (0.008) |  | (0.010) |  | (0.019) |
| Unemployment Rate |  | 0.028 |  | -0.012 |  | 0.183\*\*\* |
|  | (0.023) |  | (0.026) |  | (0.048) |
| AIC | 1009.800 | 821.588 | 1211.835 | 962.385 | 343.342 | 287.491 |
| BIC | 1069.801 | 885.452 | 1271.835 | 1026.250 | 403.342 | 351.356 |
| χ2 | 200.516 | 178.406 | 191.955 | 183.301 | 120.838 | 92.986 |
| Log Likelihood | -487.900 | -391.794 | -588.917 | -462.192 | -154.671 | -124.746 |
| Observations | 252 | 213 | 252 | 213 | 252 | 213 |

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1. For additional applications of this type of measure see Nyblade (2004), Stoll (2011), Greene and Jensen (2014) and Greene (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The minimum ENMI has a .89 Pearson’s correlation coefficient and maximum ENMI has a .92 coefficient. Maximum and minimum ENMI capture somewhat more distinct information as they only hold a.68 correlation coefficient. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Alternate models including only the value of the lowest or only the value of the highest ENMI suggest that the lowest ENMI performs slightly better than the highest, but the results are largely parallel to those using the average coalition ENMI. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The increased levels of non-proportionality likely reflect issues generated by violating the independence assumption and including party level data as independent variables and coalition level data as the dependent variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. These models use coalition ENMI based on the Herfindahl index rather than Shannons’ H (see Greene 2015). The results are substantively similar using either measure. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The unemployment rate and inflation variables caused the joint models to not converge. The results presented in Model 23 use transformed values of these variables, using the inverse of the unemployment rate (1/unemployment rate) and the natural log of inflation. Model 25 and Model 27 use the untransformed values. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Model 31 for replacement cabinets would not converge when the raw unemployment rate was included. Model 31 in Table A6 presents the results transformed with unemployment rate transformed to one divided by the natural log of the unemployment rate. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed. + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Model 37 for replacement cabinets would not converge when the raw unemployment rate was included. Model 37 in Table A7 presents the results with the natural log of the unemployment rate. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Results are from a Cox Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Results are from a Cox Non-Proportional Hazards model of coalition duration. Coefficients represent the change in the baseline hazard of termination. Standard errors are clustered on the election date. I present *p*-values in parentheses. All significance tests are two tailed: + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)