# Appendix: Conditions of civilian control in new democracies: an empirical analysis of 28 ‘third wave’ democracies

### Appendix 1: Areas and indicators of civilian control

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Area** | **Dimension** | **Indicator** | **Degree of Civilian Control** |
|  |  |  | *High* | *Medium* | *Low* |
| **Elite Recruitment** | *Competition for public office* | Reserved representation for military personnel | No formal or informal guarantees for military representation in political bodies | Some privileged access to political office | Majority of decisive political positions are reserved for the military |
| Military influence on the rules of political competition | Military has no influence on the selection of political decision-makers | Some authority over the process of selecting political decision-makers but cannot dominate procedures or outcomes of the process | Military dominates rule-setting, process and outcomes of elite selection. |
|  | *Political participation* | Eligibility of active duty military officers | Active duty officers are not eligible for political office | Active duty officers are eligible in a few individual cases. | Regular eligibility of military officers or existing rules of non-eligibility are regularly ignored |
| Military veto power over formation and dissolution of governments | No military influence on the making and breaking of governments | Occasional and isolated de facto influence | Formal regulations establish military as veto actor or military systematically demands a tutelary role |
| **Public Policy** | *Policy-making* | Military influence on state budget | No military participation in the allocation of state expenditures | Institutionalized military prerogatives or de facto capture of some budget items | Military dominance over budgetary process |
| Military influence on public policy-making  | No institutionalized prerogatives or informal intervention | Some isolated institutionalized or informal military participation | Systematic exclusion of civilians from at least one policy field |
|  | *Policy implementation* | Military authority over public administration | No military-dominated state-in-state structures and no military oversight of civilian administrative authorities | Military replaces civilian administration in certain (functional or geographical) areas | Civilian administrative authorities are under military oversight, or significant militarized parallel structures |
| **Internal Security** | *Policy-making* | Military influence on internal security policy-making | No institutionalized prerogatives or informal intervention | Some institutionalized or informal military authority | Systematic exclusion of civilians from internal security decision making |
|  | *Control over security agents* | Separation of police/other security agents and military | Strict separation; no military command over internal security agents except in clearly defined emergencies | Subordination of police or other agencies in limited specified geographic areas or missions | Police or other security agents subordinate to military command, or no separate civilian police |
| Civilian oversight over military internal security operations | Institutional framework for monitoring military operations; military accepts civilian oversight | Civilian capability to monitor military internal security operations is limited | No effective civilian oversight; military autonomous in the conduct of operations  |
| **National Defense** | *Policy-making* | Civilian influence on defense policy making  | Institutionalized civilian dominance over defense policy and active day-to-day participation of civilians in defense policy-making; military accepts civilians’ policy prerogative | Lacking or ambiguous legal regulations; military personnel dominates defense bureaucracy; occasional instances of ad hoc military contestation against civilian authority | Civilians are systematically excluded from defense policy decision-making |
|  | *Policy implementation* | Civilian oversight over military defense activities | Civilians in all branches of government are able to monitor military activities | Military has the ability to selectively withdraw itself from effective oversight | Military’s defense operations are not subject to civilian monitoring |
| **Military Organization** | *Policy-making* | Civilian influence on decision-making about military ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ | Civilians have full authority over decisions about military organization the rules of conduct, and the limits of military autonomy, and provide the guidelines for the armed forces’ corporate identity | Civilian decision making is limited to certain aspects of military organization due to lack of institutionalized channels, or the military exerts veto power over decisions. | The military alone defines military organization and determines the scope of its professional autonomy. |
|  | *Policy implementation* | Military compliance with and civilian monitoring of decisions on ‘hardware’ and ‘software’  |  Civilians are able to monitor and audit military activities to guarantee the implementation of their decisions. |  Military does not implement civilian decisions, or civilians lack institutionalized oversight mechanisms. | No civilian oversight; military completely autonomous in internal affairs |

Source: XXX

### Appendix 2: Countries of the Third Wave of democratization

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Africa** | **Asia** | **Europe** | **Latin America** |
| Benin | Bangladesh | Albania | Argentina |
| Burundi | Indonesia\* | Belarus | Bolivia |
| Ghana | Korea, South\* | Bulgaria | Brazil\* |
| Guinea-Bissau | Lebanon | Croatia | Chile |
| Kenya | Mongolia | Czech Republic\* | Dominican Republic |
| Lesotho | Nepal\* | Estonia | Ecuador |
| Liberia\* | Pakistan | Georgia | El Salvador |
| Madagascar | Philippines\* | Greece\* | Guatemala |
| Malawi | Sri Lanka\* | Hungary | Honduras\* |
| Mali\* | Taiwan\* | Latvia | Mexico\* |
| Namibia\* | Thailand\* | Lithuania | Nicaragua\* |
| Niger |  | Macedonia | Paraguay |
| Nigeria\* |  | Moldova | Peru\* |
| Senegal\* |  | Poland\* | Uruguay |
| Sierra Leone |  | Portugal\* |  |
| South Africa\* |  | Romania\* |  |
| Sudan\* |  | Russia\* |  |
| Zambia\* |  | Slovak Republic |  |
|  |  | Slovenia |  |
|  |  | Spain |  |
|  |  | Turkey\* |  |
|  |  | Ukraine |  |
|  |  | Yugoslavia/Serbia |  |

**Notes:** Asterisks (\*) marks the 28 countries that are included in this study.

### Appendix 3: Summary of the cases

| **label** | **id** | **case** | **Civ Con** | **ER** | **PP** | **IS** | **ND** | **MO** | **inthreat** | **intif** | **autinst** | **civsoc** | **age** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| BRA1 | 1 | Brazil 1, 1985-1987 | 0.13 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| BRA2 | 2 | Brazil 2, 1988-1998 | 0.65 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 |
| BRA3 | 3 | Brazil 3, 1999-2010 | 0.95 | 1 | 0.85 | 1 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| CZE1 | 4 | Czech Republic 1, 1993-2010 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| CZK1 | 5 | Czechoslovakia 1, 1990-1992 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.3 | 1 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| GRC1 | 6 | Greece 1, 1974-2010 | 0.97 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| HND1 | 7 | Honduras 1, 1980-1984 | 0.18 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| HND2 | 8 | Honduras 2, 1989-1993 | 0.18 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| HND3 | 9 | Honduras 3, 1994-1997 | 0.25 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| HND4 | 10 | Honduras 4, 1998-2008 | 0.44 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
| HND5 | 11 | Honduras 5, 2009-2010 | 0.42 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 1.0 |
| IDN1 | 12 | Indonesia 1, 1999-2000 | 0.25 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| IDN2 | 13 | Indonesia 2, 2001-2004 | 0.33 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 0 | 0.6 | 0.1 |
| IDN3 | 14 | Indonesia 3, 2005-2010 | 0.78 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.6 |
| KOR1 | 15 | Korea South 1, 1987-1994 | 0.33 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| KOR2 | 16 | Korea South 2, 1995-2002 | 0.89 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| KOR3 | 17 | Korea South 3, 2003-2010 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| LBR1 | 18 | Liberia 1, 2003-2010 | 0.73 | 0.85 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| MLI1 | 19 | Mali 1, 1992-2001 | 0.95 | 1 | 1 | 0.85 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.4 |
| MLI2 | 20 | Mali 2, 2002-2010 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.7 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.9 |
| MEX1 | 21 | Mexico 1, 1997-2010 | 0.59 | 0.7 | 0.85 | 0.45 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.9 | 0.7 |
| NAM1 | 22 | Namibia 1, 1990-2010 | 0.89 | 1 | 1 | 0.85 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| NPL1 | 23 | Nepal 1, 1999-2001 | 0.74 | 1 | 0.85 | 0.6 | 0 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| NPL2 | 24 | Nepal 2, 2006-2010 | 0.86 | 1 | 1 | 0.55 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |
| NIC1 | 25 | Nicaragua 1, 1990-1994 | 0.51 | 0.7 | 0.85 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| NIC2 | 26 | Nicaragua 2, 1995-2010 | 0.54 | 0.85 | 0.55 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.1 | 1.0 |
| NGA1 | 27 | Nigeria 1, 1978-1979 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| NGA2 | 28 | Nigeria 2, 1980-1983 | 0.67 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PAK1 | 29 | Pakistan 1, 1988-1996 | 0.33 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.2 |
| PAK2 | 30 | Pakistan 2, 1997-1998 | 0.32 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| PER1 | 31 | Peru 1, 1978-1982 | 0.34 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PER2 | 32 | Peru 2, 1983-1989 | 0.34 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.4 |
| PER3 | 33 | Peru 3, 1990-1991 | 0.41 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.2 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.6 |
| PER4 | 34 | Peru 4, 2001-2010 | 0.6 | 0.85 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.4 |
| PHL1 | 35 | Philippines 1, 1986-2000 | 0.36 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.7 |
| PHL2 | 36 | Philippines 2, 2001-2010 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 1.0 |
| POL1 | 37 | Poland 1, 1991-1998 | 0.89 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 |
| POL2 | 38 | Poland 2, 1999-2010 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.9 |
| PRT1 | 39 | Portugal 1, 1974-1975 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| PRT2 | 40 | Portugal 2, 1976-1982 | 0.08 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| PRT3 | 41 | Portugal 3, 1983-2010 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| ROU1 | 42 | Romania 1, 1996-2010 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| RUS1 | 43 | Russia 1, 2000-2006 | 0.79 | 0.85 | 1 | 0.75 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.1 |
| SEN1 | 44 | Senegal 1, 2000-2010 | 0.84 | 1 | 0.55 | 0.85 | 0.4 | 1 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.2 | 0.5 |
| ZAF1 | 45 | South Africa 1, 1992-1993 | 0.8 | 1 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| ZAF2 | 46 | South Africa 2, 1994-2010 | 0.92 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| LKA1 | 47 | Sri Lanka 1, 2001-2002 | 0.76 | 1 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.0 |
| LKA2 | 48 | Sri Lanka 2, 2006-2009 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.0 |
| SDN1 | 49 | Sudan 1, 1985-1988 | 0.41 | 0.5 | 0.55 | 0.45 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| TWN1 | 50 | Taiwan 1, 1992-2001 | 0.89 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| TWN2 | 51 | Taiwan 2, 2002-2010 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.9 |
| THA1 | 52 | Thailand 1, 1992-2000 | 0.75 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| THA2 | 53 | Thailand 2, 2001-2005 | 0.67 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| TUR1 | 54 | Turkey 1, 1983-1997 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.8 |
| TUR2 | 55 | Turkey 2, 1998-2003 | 0.53 | 0.85 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 |
| TUR3 | 56 | Turkey 3, 2004-2010 | 0.62 | 0.7 | 0.85 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| ZMB1 | 57 | Zambia 1, 1991-1995 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.1 | 0.0 |

### Appendix 4: Distribution of Conditions (raw data)





### Appendix 5: Histograms of the distribution of the outcome and conditions



### Appendix 6: XY-Plots of the outcome and the individual conditions



### Appendix 7: Solutions of Boolean minimization procedure

#### Table A: Sufficiency of the outcome civilian control: Complex Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 35/20/0

 Total : 55

Number of multiple-covered cases: 14

M1: AUTINST\*AGE\*INTIF + AUTINST\*CIVSOC\*AGE + CIVSOC\*AGE\*INTIF + INTHREAT\*AGE\*INTIF +

 INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*AGE + INTHREAT\*autinst\*CIVSOC\*age + inthreat\*AUTINST\*CIVSOC\*INTIF +

 INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*civsoc\*INTIF => CC\_SCORE

 incl cov.r cov.u cases

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1 AUTINST\*AGE\*INTIF 0.901 0.393 0.039 CZE1,KOR3,POL2; GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; NIC2,TUR1; HND4,HND5,KOR2

2 AUTINST\*CIVSOC\*AGE 0.974 0.311 0.015 CZE1,KOR3,POL2; BRA3; BRA2,TWN2; GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3

3 CIVSOC\*AGE\*INTIF 0.954 0.342 0.036 CZE1,KOR3,POL2; PRT3,ROU1; GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; IDN3,PHL2

4 INTHREAT\*AGE\*INTIF 0.877 0.328 0.042 GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; MLI2; IDN3,PHL2; NIC2,TUR1

5 INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*AGE 0.878 0.291 0.016 BRA3; NAM1,PER3; GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; NIC2,TUR1

6 INTHREAT\*autinst\*CIVSOC\*age 0.928 0.116 0.041 PER4; IDN2,RUS1

7 inthreat\*AUTINST\*CIVSOC\*INTIF 0.997 0.176 0.014 CZE1,KOR2,POL2; POL1

8 INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*civsoc\*INTIF 0.872 0.340 0.147 NIC2,TUR1; NPL1,NPL2,NIC1,LKA1,LKA2,THA1

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 M1 0.867 0.755

#### Table B: Sufficiency of the outcome civilian control: Parsimonious Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 35/20/0

 Total : 55

Number of multiple-covered cases: 18

M1: AGE + CIVSOC + INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*INTIF <=> CC\_SCORE

 incl cov.r cov.u

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1 AGE 0.826 0.599 0.141

2 CIVSOC 0.919 0.470 0.053

3 INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*INTIF 0.873 0.421 0.129

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 M1 0.821 0.815

 cases

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1 AGE CZE1,KOR3,POL2; BRA3; PRT3,ROU1; BRA2,TWN2; NAM1,PER3; GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; MLI2,PHL1; IDN3,PHL2; NIC2,TUR1; HND4,HND5,KOR2

2 CIVSOC CZE1,KOR3,POL2; BRA3; PRT3,ROU1; BRA2,TWN2; POL1; PER4; GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; IDN3,PHL2; IDN3,PHL2

3 INTHREAT\*AUTINST\*INTIF GRC1,MEX1,ZAF2,THA2,TUR2,TUR3; NIC2,TUR1; NPL1,NPL2,NIC1,LKA1,LKA2,THA1

#### Table C: Sufficiency of the outcome NO civilian control: Complex Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 15/40/0

 Total : 55

Number of multiple-covered cases: 0

M1: autinst\*civsoc\*age\*INTIF + AUTINST\*civsoc\*age\*intif + INTHREAT\*autinst\*age\*intif => cc\_score

 incl cov.r cov.u cases

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1 autinst\*civsoc\*age\*INTIF 0.836 0.415 0.060 IDN1,LBR1,MLI1,PRT1; PRT2

2 AUTINST\*civsoc\*age\*intif 0.801 0.448 0.176 BRA1,TWN1; NGA1,NGA2,PER1,PER2,ZAF1

3 INTHREAT\*autinst\*age\*intif 0.894 0.336 0.049 PAK1,SDN1; PER4

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 M1 0.767 0.641

#### Table D: Sufficiency of the outcome civilian control: Parsimonious Solution

n OUT = 1/0/C: 15/40/0

 Total : 55

Number of multiple-covered cases: 2

M1: age\*intif + autinst\*civsoc\*age => cc\_score

 incl cov.r cov.u cases

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1 age\*intif 0.800 0.590 0.192 PAK1,SDN1; PER4; BRA1,TWN1; NGA1,NGA2,PER1,PER2,ZAF1

2 autinst\*civsoc\*age 0.816 0.459 0.061 PAK1,SDN1; IDN1,LBR1,MLI1,PRT1; PRT2

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 M1 0.755 0.651

### Appendix 8: XY-Plots of partial solution: outcome = Civilian Control

### C:\Users\USER\Dropbox\UNI\PAPERS\2015 - Conditions QCA\graphs\XY_outcome_partial.pngAppendix 9: XY-Plots of partial solution: outcome = No Civilian Control

