**Appendix to the manuscript “Aiming Higher: The Consequences of Progressive Ambition among MPs in European Parliaments”**

Table A-1: Ambitions stated by MPs (only those MPs included in the regression analyses)

*Members of national parliaments*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Stated ambition** |  |
|   | **National MP** | **Regional MP** | **Senator** | **MEP** | **National Gov\*** | **President** | **Regional Gov** | **Prov. Governor** | **Mayor** | **Other\*\*** | **Retired** | **Total** |
| **AUT** | 26 | 1 |  | 1 | **6** |  | **5** |  | 5 | 1 | *8* | 40 |
| **BEL** | 37 | 4 | 1 | 6 | **5** |  | **5** | **0** | 25 | 1 | *3* | 61 |
| **FRA** | 36 | 4 | 5 | 0 | **11** | **0** | **5** | **5** | 17 | 1 | *3* | 45 |
| **GER** | 98 | 2 |  | 1 | **27** |  | **3** | **0** | 2 | 4 | *7* | 128 |
| **HUN** | 50 |  |  | 1 | **7** |  |  |  | 16 | 3 | *19* | 83 |
| **IRE** | 10 |  |  | 0 | **18** |  |  |  |  |  | *3* | 28 |
| **ISR** | 8 |  |  |  | **19** |  |  | **2** | 0 | 6 | *7* | 38 |
| **ITA** | 18 | 1 | 2 | 4 | **8** |  | **1** | **0** | 2 | 1 | *9* | 43 |
| **NOR** | 18 |  |  |  | **11** |  |  | **1** | 3 | 9 | *11* | 46 |
| **POL** | 18 |  |  | 5 | **5** |  |  | **0** | 7 | 2 | *6* | 39 |
| **POR** | 32 | 0 |  | 6 | **8** |  | **1** | **0** | 5 | 1 | *9* | 59 |
| **SPA** | 46 | 3 |  | 10 | **7** |  | **2** | **2** | 16 | 6 | *16* | 82 |
| **SWI** | 31 | 0 |  |  | **0** |  | **4** |  | 2 | 4 | *6* | 42 |
| **UK** | 33 | 3 |   | 0 | **16** |  | **1** |  |   | 3 | *4* | 52 |
| **Total** | 461 | 18 | 8 | 34 | **148** | **0** | **27** | **10** | 100 | 42 | *111* | 786 |

Empty cell = not applicable (office does not exist or option not given in the survey)

Bold print = progressive ambition

Regular print = static ambition

Italics: leave office

\* Coded as static ambition of MP already serves as minister on this level of government

\*\* Coded as progressive or static ambition based on the specific ambition stated; coded as static ambition if no specific office is mentioned.

*Members of regional parliaments*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Stated ambition** |  |
|   | **National MP** | **Regional MP** | **Senator** | **MEP** | **National Gov\*** | **President** | **Regional Gov** | **Prov. Governor\*** | **Mayor** | **Other\*\*** | **Retired** | **Total** |
| **AUT** | **23** | 97 |  | 9 | **3** |  | **23** |  | 25 | 7 | *19* | 156 |
| **BEL** | **4** | 39 | **4** | 3 | **2** |  | **12** | **0** | 26 | 7 | *10* | 78 |
| **GER** | **7** | 91 |  | 6 | **1** |  | **25** | **8** | 11 | 1 | *9* | 125 |
| **ITA** | **13** | 29 | **7** | 3 | **4** |  | **10** | **2** | 5 | 9 | *6* | 67 |
| **SPA** | **11** | 49 |  | 7 | **3** |  | **17** | **1** | 14 | 8 | *14* | 96 |
| **SWI** | **108** | 175 |  |  | **8** |  | **55** |  | 48 | 21 | *77* | 379 |
| **UK** | **1** | 21 |  | 0 | **1** |  | **12** |  |   | 2 | *7* | 38 |
| **Total** | **167** | 501 | **11** | 28 | **22** |  | **154** | **11** | 129 | 55 | *142* | 939 |

Legend: see above.

Table A-2: The effects of progressive ambition and electoral system incentives on attitudes towards personal campaigning and the party level targeted by European MPs

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **H** | **Personal Campaigning** | **High Party Level Targeted** |
| **Fixed Part** |  |  |  |
| Progressive Ambition | +/+ | 0.160\*\*\*(0.0578) | 0.189\*\*\*(0.0550) |
| Single Member District | +/- | 0.292\*\*(0.138) | -0.299\*\*(0.129) |
| Candidate Vote | +/? | 0.231\*\*(0.115) | -0.183\*(0.106) |
| Primary | +/- | 0.303\*\*(0.144) | -0.249\*(0.134) |
| Collectivist Ideology | +/0 | -0.461\*\*\*(0.0622) | -0.0665(0.0612) |
| Executive Opportunity Structure |  | -0.0352(0.208) | 0.331\*(0.188) |
| Leader |  | 0.0231(0.0680) | 0.0567(0.0647) |
| Female |  | -0.0700(0.0563) | 0.0244(0.0536) |
| Year of Birth |  | 0.00103(0.00283) | 0.000906(0.00269) |
| Seniority |  | -0.00364(0.00450) | -0.00615(0.00429) |
| Regional Parliament |  | -0.0719(0.132) | -0.0583(0.118) |
| Constant |  | 2.061(8.605) | 7.477(8.192) |
| **Random Part** |  |  |  |
| Between parliaments std. dev. |  | 0.338\*\*\*(0.0516) | 0.288\*\*\*(0.0434) |
| Between parties within parliaments std. dev. |  | 0.220 \*\*\*(0.0534) | 0.238\*\*\*(0.0403) |
| Log likelihood |  | -2518.28 | -2423.23 |
| BIC |  | 5148 | 4976 |
| N (MP level)N (Party level)N (Parliament level) |  | 172631868 | 172631868 |

3-level hierarchical linear regression (MPs nested in parties nested in parliaments) with random intercepts on the party and parliament level.

\* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01

H lists the hypothesized direction of the effect for the two dependent variables.

Table A-3: Robustness tests I: Interactions between ambition and electoral system incentives

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Personal Campaigning** | **High Party Level Targeted** |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| **Fixed Part** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Progressive Ambition | 0.153\*\*(0.0629) | 0.203\*(0.106) | 0.140\*\*(0.0637) | 0.209\*\*\*(0.0599) | 0.209\*\*(0.101) | 0.221\*\*\*(0.0606) |
| Single Member District | 0.281\*\*(0.143) | 0.290\*\*(0.138) | 0.299\*\*(0.139) | -0.271\*\*(0.134) | -0.300\*\*(0.129) | -0.307\*\*(0.129) |
| Progressive Ambition X SMD | 0.0473(0.152) |  |  | -0.118(0.144) |  |  |
| Candidate Vote | 0.231\*\*(0.115) | 0.247\*\*(0.120) | 0.227\*\*(0.115) | -0.184\*(0.106) | -0.175(0.111) | -0.179\*(0.106) |
| Progressive Ambition X Candidate Vote |  | -0.0612(0.126) |  |  | -0.0285(0.120) |  |
| Primary | 0.302\*\*(0.144) | 0.300\*\*(0.144) | 0.258\*(0.155) | -0.248\*(0.135) | -0.249\*(0.134) | -0.182(0.145) |
| Progressive Ambition X Primary |  |  | 0.117(0.150) |  |  | -0.178(0.143) |
| Collectivist Ideology | -0.461\*\*\*(0.0622) | -0.461\*\*\*(0.0621) | -0.463\*\*\*(0.0621) | -0.0660(0.0612) | -0.0665(0.0612) | -0.0633(0.0612) |
| Executive Opportunity Structure | -0.0343(0.208) | -0.0381(0.209) | -0.0365(0.209) | 0.328\*(0.188) | 0.329\*(0.188) | 0.333\*(0.188) |
| Leader | 0.0229(0.0680) | 0.0244(0.0680) | 0.0263(0.0681) | 0.0572(0.0647) | 0.0574(0.0647) | 0.0519(0.0648) |
| Female | -0.0693(0.0563) | -0.0706(0.0563) | -0.0702(0.0563) | 0.0226(0.0536) | 0.0241(0.0536) | 0.0247(0.0536) |
| Year of Birth | 0.00101(0.00283) | 0.00115(0.00284) | 0.00108(0.00283) | 0.000958(0.00269) | 0.000959(0.00270) | 0.000822(0.00269) |
| Seniority | -0.00371(0.00451) | -0.00366(0.00450) | -0.00362(0.00450) | -0.00597(0.00429) | -0.00616(0.00429) | -0.00618(0.00428) |
| Regional Parliament | -0.0711(0.133) | -0.0715(0.133) | -0.0650(0.133) | -0.0601(0.119) | -0.0582(0.118) | -0.0685(0.119) |
| Constant | 2.241(8.624) | 1.856(8.614) | 1.931(8.605) | 7.016(8.209) | 7.384(8.202) | 7.691(8.190) |
| **Random Part** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Between parliaments std. dev. | 0.338\*\*\*(0.0516) | 0.338\*\*\*(0.0517) | 0.339\*\*\*(0.0517) | 0.289\*\*\*(0.0435) | 0.287\*\*\*(0.0435) | 0.289\*\*\*(0.0434) |
| Between parties within parliaments std. dev. | 0.220\*\*\*(0.0534) | 0.219\*\*\*(0.0536) | 0.218\*\*\*(0.0534) | 0.238\*\*\*(0.040) | 0.238\*\*\*(0.040) | 0.237\*\*\*(0.040) |
| Log likelihood | -2518.24 | -2518.17 | -2517.98 | -2431.89 | -2432.20 | -2431.45 |
| BIC | 5156 | 5156 | 5155 | 4983 | 4984 | 4982 |
| N (MP level)N (Party level)N (Parliament level) | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 |

3-level hierarchical linear regression (MPs nested in parties nested in parliaments) with random intercepts on the party and parliament level.

\* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A-4a: Robustness tests II: The effect of progressive ambition in alternative model specifications (Dependent Variable: Personal Campaigning)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Personal Campaigning** |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| **Fixed Part** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Progressive Ambition | 0.149\*\*(0.0582) |  | 0.168\*\*\*(0.0533) | 0.159\*\*\*(0.0579) | 0.164\*\*\*(0.0578) | 0.160\*\*\*(0.0578) | 0.163\*\*\*(0.0578) | 0.160\*\*\*(0.0578) | 0.152\*\*(0.0608) | 0.198\*\*\*(0.0668) | 0.160\*\*\*(0.0571) |
| Executive Ambition |  | 0.160\*\*(0.0637) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single Member District | 0.292\*\*(0.139) | 0.290\*\*(0.139) | 0.294\*\*(0.138) |  | 0.306\*\*(0.138) | 0.298\*\*(0.140) | 0.295\*\*(0.139) | 0.289\*\*(0.138) | 0.276\*(0.147) | 0.302\*(0.155) | 0.322\*\*(0.133) |
| District Magnitude |  |  |  | 0.0000144(0.00185) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Candidate Vote | 0.231\*\*(0.115) | 0.232\*\*(0.115) | 0.227\*\*(0.115) | 0.396\*\*\*(0.0947) | 0.214\*(0.115) | 0.251\*\*(0.125) | 0.218\*(0.116) | 0.232\*\*(0.114) | 0.265\*\*(0.117) | 0.217\*(0.128) | 0.209\*(0.110) |
| Primary | 0.303\*\*(0.144) | 0.287\*\*(0.145) | 0.310\*\*(0.143) | 0.427\*\*\*(0.132) | 0.378\*\*(0.154) | 0.308\*\*(0.145) | 0.271\*(0.145) | 0.312\*\*(0.144) | 0.327\*\*(0.145) | 0.253\*(0.151) | 0.290\*\*(0.142) |
| Candidate Selection by Party Agency |  |  |  |  | 0.160(0.111) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Candidate Selection by Party Leader |  |  |  |  | *baseline* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Candidate Selection: District/Local Level |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0429(0.110) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Collectivist Ideology | -0.461\*\*\*(0.0622) | -0.459\*\*\*(0.0621) | -0.458\*\*\*(0.0617) | -0.465\*\*\*(0.0630) | -0.462\*\*\*(0.0613) | -0.462\*\*\*(0.0624) |  | -0.461\*\*\*(0.0621) | -0.476\*\*\*(0.0642) | -0.342\*\*\*(0.0699) | -0.462\*\*\*(0.0620) |
| Executive Opportunity Struct.  | -0.0346(0.209) | -0.0493(0.210) | -0.0371(0.207) | -0.0346(0.206) | -0.138(0.221) | -0.0519(0.212) | -0.00271(0.215) |  | 0.000863(0.208) | -0.0531(0.316) |  |
| Legislative Opportunity Struct. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.149(0.204) |  |  |  |
| Leader | 0.0227(0.0680) | 0.0193(0.0681) | 0.0289(0.0679) | 0.0251(0.0681) | 0.0209(0.0680) | 0.0237(0.0680) | 0.0326(0.0680) | 0.0255(0.0679) | 0.0229(0.0694) | 0.0141(0.0749) |  |
| Female | -0.0706(0.0563) | -0.0736(0.0562) | -0.0650(0.0564) | -0.0747(0.0563) | -0.0707(0.0563) | -0.0698(0.0563) | -0.0664(0.0567) | -0.0699(0.0563) | -0.0680(0.0596) | -0.127\*\*(0.0625) | -0.0733(0.0557) |
| Year of Birth | 0.00114(0.00283) | 0.00133(0.00282) | 0.000825(0.00283) | 0.00105(0.00283) | 0.000930(0.00283) | 0.00106(0.00283) | 0.00104(0.00283) | 0.00108(0.00283) | 0.00168(0.00299) | -0.000351(0.00318) |  |
| Seniority | -0.00369(0.00451) | -0.00359(0.00451) | -0.00388(0.00450) | -0.00381(0.00451) | -0.00339(0.00451) | -0.00366(0.00451) | -0.00239(0.00452) | -0.00366(0.00450) | -0.00348(0.00471) | -0.00536(0.00480) |  |
| Regional Parliament | -0.0700(0.133) | -0.0463(0.134) | -0.0676(0.132) | -0.147(0.125) | -0.00441(0.141) | -0.0552(0.139) | -0.0632(0.135) | -0.0426(0.135) | -0.0503(0.132) | -0.0476(0.185) |  |
| Agrarian Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.948\*\*(0.380) |  |  |  |  |
| Christian Democrats |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.362\*\*\*(0.0884) |  |  |  |  |
| Communists |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.435(0.265) |  |  |  |  |
| Conservatives |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.354\*\*\*(0.0905) |  |  |  |  |
| Greens |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.297\*\*(0.117) |  |  |  |  |
| Far Right Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.251\*(0.151) |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.383\*\*\*(0.0953) |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.148(0.299) |  |  |  |  |
| Regional Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.138(0.198) |  |  |  |  |
| Religious Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.174(0.237) |  |  |  |  |
| Single Issue Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.967(0.738) |  |  |  |  |
| Social Democrats |  |  |  |  |  |  | *baseline* |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 1.942(8.608) | 1.370(8.593) | 2.925(8.615) | 2.303(8.633) | 1.686(8.604) | 2.063(8.605) | -0.839(8.620) | 2.023(8.601) | 0.408(9.068) | 8.175(9.139) | -3.260\*\*\*(0.107) |
| **Random Part** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Between parliaments std. dev. | 0.339\*\*\*(0.0517) | 0.342\*\*\*(0.0518) | 0.336\*\*\*(0.0514) | 0.328\*\*\*(0.0504) | 0.341\*\*\*(0.0514) | 0.336\*\*\*(0.0519) | 0.350\*\*\*(0.0513) | 0.335\*\*\*(0.0517) | 0.330\*\*\*(0.0536) | 0.385\*\*\*(0.0660) | 0.341\*\*\*(0.0512) |
| Between parties within parliaments std. dev. | 0.220\*\*\*(0.0534) | 0.217\*\*\*(0.0532) | 0.213\*\*\*(0.0542) | 0.230\*\*\*(0.0524) | 0.204\*\*\*(0.0566) | 0.223\*\*\*(0.0535) | 0.177\*\*\*(0.0571) | 0.221\*\*\*(0.0535) | 0.216\*\*\*(0.0576) | 0.193\*\*\*(0.0647) | 0.220\*\*\*(0.0533) |
| Log likelihood | -2518.86 | -2518.98 | -2517.19 | -2520.48 | -2517.29 | -2518.21 | -2509.56 | -2518.04 | -2354.34 | -1952.27 | -2518.95 |
| BIC | 5150 | 5150 | 5146 | 5153 | 5154 | 5156 | 5205 | 5148 | 4819 | 4013 | 5112 |
| N (MP level)N (Party level)N (Parliament level) | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 159831367 | 134719943 | 172631868 |

3-level hierarchical linear regression (MPs nested in parties nested in parliaments) with random intercepts on the party and parliament level.

\* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01

**Description of the specifications:**

1. Alternative coding of progressive ambition in Belgium: regional MPs aiming for national parliament coded as static ambition.
2. Ambition for executive office only (national or regional minister; provincial governor; president) instead of broader definition of progressive ambition.
3. Alternative coding of progressive ambition: Aiming for mayor coded as progressive ambition.
4. Continuous variable district magnitude instead of binary variable single member district.
5. Additional variable for candidate selection by party agency in addition to primary.
6. Additional binary variable controlling for the decentralized candidate selection on the district or local level (as opposed to the regional or national level).
7. Set of binary variables for party families instead of binary variable collective ideology.
8. Legislative opportunity structure (ratio committee chairs to total number of MPs; for presentational reasons multiplied by factor four) instead of executive opportunity structure.
9. Reduced sample without the largest parliament in the sample (German Bundestag).
10. Reduced sample without the large number of Swiss regional MPs.
11. Reduced specification: stepwise backward elimination of clearly insignificant variables (p>0.20).

Table A-4b: Robustness tests II: The effect of progressive ambition in alternative model specifications (Dependent Variable: High Party Level Targeted)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **High Party Level Targeted** |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| **Fixed Part** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Progressive Ambition | 0.182\*\*\*(0.0554) |  | 0.0692(0.0508) | 0.183\*\*\*(0.0548) | 0.191\*\*\*(0.0551) | 0.189\*\*\*(0.0550) | 0.176\*\*\*(0.0551) | 0.192\*\*\*(0.0550) | 0.207\*\*\*(0.0576) | 0.172\*\*\*(0.0633) | 0.192\*\*\*(0.0543) |
| Executive Ambition |  | 0.145\*\*(0.0607) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Single Member District | -0.300\*\*(0.130) | -0.306\*\*(0.129) | -0.304\*\*(0.129) |  | -0.294\*\*(0.129) | -0.295\*\*(0.130) | -0.263\*\*(0.126) | -0.294\*\*(0.130) | -0.277\*\*(0.138) | -0.316\*\*(0.147) | -0.278\*\*(0.125) |
| District Magnitude |  |  |  | 0.00907\*\*\*(0.00153) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Candidate Vote | -0.183\*(0.106) | -0.176\*(0.106) | -0.178\*(0.106) | -0.103(0.0810) | -0.188\*(0.106) | -0.173(0.116) | -0.194\*(0.103) | -0.199\*(0.107) | -0.190\*(0.109) | -0.180(0.120) | -0.196\*(0.101) |
| Primary | -0.249\*(0.135) | -0.256\*(0.135) | -0.233\*(0.134) | -0.344\*\*\*(0.105) | -0.222(0.143) | -0.246\*(0.135) | -0.223\*(0.130) | -0.247\*(0.136) | -0.261\*(0.136) | -0.257\*(0.144) | -0.267\*\*(0.134) |
| Candidate Selection by Party Agency |  |  |  |  | 0.0570(0.104) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Candidate Selection by Party Leader |  |  |  |  | *baseline* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Candidate Selection: District/Local Level |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0229(0.104) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Collectivist Ideology | -0.0665(0.0612) | -0.0652(0.0613) | -0.0668(0.0616) | -0.0703(0.0613) | -0.0674(0.0615) | -0.0671(0.0611) |  | -0.0617(0.0610) | -0.0699(0.0618) | -0.154\*\*(0.0719) |  |
| Executive Opportunity Struct.  | 0.330\*(0.189) | 0.320\*(0.188) | 0.339\*(0.187) | 0.306\*\*(0.154) | 0.296(0.198) | 0.322\*(0.192) | 0.336\*(0.182) |  | 0.315\*(0.191) | 0.288(0.288) | 0.301\*(0.179) |
| Legislative Opportunity Struct. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.270(0.188) |  |  |  |
| Leader | 0.0558(0.0647) | 0.0549(0.0648) | 0.0630(0.0648) | 0.0616(0.0641) | 0.0563(0.0647) | 0.0570(0.0647) | 0.0591(0.0646) | 0.0590(0.0646) | 0.0536(0.0657) | -0.0232(0.0711) |  |
| Female | 0.0242(0.0536) | 0.0177(0.0536) | 0.0172(0.0539) | 0.0277(0.0534) | 0.0239(0.0536) | 0.0246(0.0536) | 0.0267(0.0540) | 0.0221(0.0536) | 0.0397(0.0565) | 0.0378(0.0592) |  |
| Year of Birth | 0.000995(0.00269) | 0.00148(0.00269) | 0.00169(0.00270) | 0.00101(0.00268) | 0.000873(0.00269) | 0.000919(0.00269) | 0.00131(0.00270) | 0.000795(0.00269) | 0.00122(0.00283) | -0.00147(0.00302) |  |
| Seniority | -0.00620(0.00429) | -0.00613(0.00429) | -0.00635(0.00430) | -0.00516(0.00427) | -0.00606(0.00429) | -0.00616(0.00429) | -0.00748\*(0.00430) | -0.00618(0.00429) | -0.00779\*(0.00446) | -0.00270(0.00456) | -0.00624(0.00387) |
| Regional Parliament | -0.0562(0.119) | -0.0329(0.118) | -0.0494(0.118) | -0.0121(0.0888) | -0.0346(0.126) | -0.0491(0.125) | -0.0308(0.112) | -0.0600(0.124) | -0.0655(0.120) | -0.00821(0.168) |  |
| Agrarian Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.147(0.374) |  |  |  |  |
| Christian Democrats |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.0633(0.0883) |  |  |  |  |
| Communists |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.153(0.257) |  |  |  |  |
| Conservatives |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.119(0.0916) |  |  |  |  |
| Greens |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.204\*(0.116) |  |  |  |  |
| Far Right Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.342\*\*(0.149) |  |  |  |  |
| Liberals |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.296\*\*\*(0.0948) |  |  |  |  |
| Other Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.479(0.294) |  |  |  |  |
| Regional Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | -0.0151(0.191) |  |  |  |  |
| Religious Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.457\*\*(0.229) |  |  |  |  |
| Single Issue Party |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.190(0.706) |  |  |  |  |
| Social Democrats |  |  |  |  |  |  | *baseline* |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 7.412(8.195) | 6.322(8.194) | 6.361(8.232) | 5.024(8.164) | 7.348(8.197) | 7.474(8.192) | 9.186(8.214) | 7.786(8.191) | 10.16(8.594) | 5.314(8.681) | 9.407(7.750) |
| **Random Part** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Between parliaments std. dev. | 0.290\*\*\*(0.0435) | 0.286\*\*\*(0.0432) | 0.284\*\*\*(0.0434) | 0.181\*\*\*(0.0495) | 0.284\*\*\*(0.0435) | 0.289\*\*\*(0.0439) | 0.262\*\*\*(0.0442) | 0.296\*\*\*(0.0428) | 0.293\*\*\*(0.0436) | 0.338\*\*\*(0.0543) | 0.289\*\*\*(0.0432) |
| Between parties within parliaments std. dev. | 0.238\*\*\*(0.0402) | 0.239\*\*\*(0.0403) | 0.242\*\*\*(0.0403) | 0.245\*\*\*(0.0395) | 0.241\*\*\*(0.0402) | 0.237\*\*\*(0.0409) | 0.214\*\*\*(0.0427) | 0.237\*\*\*(0.0400) | 0.219\*\*\*(0.0445) | 0.242\*\*\*(0.0459) | 0.248\*\*\*(0.0384) |
| Log likelihood | -2432.73 | -2435.29 | -2437.21 | -2421.83 | -2432.09 | -2432.20 | -2423.76 | -2432.70 | -2267.89 | -1881.49 | -2433.37 |
| BIC | 4977 | 4982 | 4986 | 4955 | 4983 | 4984 | 5033 | 4977 | 4646 | 3871 | 4941 |
| N (MP level)N (Party level)N (Parliament level) | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 172631868 | 159831367 | 134719943 | 172631868 |

3-level hierarchical linear regression (MPs nested in parties nested in parliaments) with random intercepts on the party and parliament level.

\* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01

Description of specifications:see Table A-3a.

Table A-5: Robustness tests III: Ordinal instead of linear model

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Personal Campaigning** | **High Party Level Targeted** |
| **Fixed Part** |  |  |
| Progressive Ambition | 0.315\*\*\*(0.106) | 0.345\*\*\*(0.107) |
| Single Member District | 0.437\*(0.264) | -0.553\*\*(0.256) |
| Candidate Vote | 0.449\*\*(0.224) | -0.376\*(0.212) |
| Primary | 0.613\*\*(0.278) | -0.459\*(0.269) |
| Collectivist Ideology | -0.875\*\*\*(0.121) | -0.146(0.122) |
| Executive Opportunity Structure | -0.0720(0.396) | 0.651\*(0.374) |
| Leader | 0.0456(0.126) | 0.0953(0.129) |
| Female | -0.127(0.104) | 0.0443(0.105) |
| Year of Birth | 0.00277(0.00528) | 0.000963(0.00533) |
| Seniority | -0.00621(0.00826) | -0.0114(0.00839) |
| Regional Parliament | -0.146(0.242) | -0.132(0.240) |
| Cutpoint 1 | -8.947(15.81) | -23.55(16.21) |
| Cutpoint 2 | -7.488(15.81) | -21.92(16.21) |
| Cutpoint 3 | -5.736(15.81) | -19.76(16.20) |
| Cutpoint 4 | -4.038(15.81) | -18.41(16.20) |
| **Random Part** |  |  |
| Between parliaments std. dev. | 0.613\*\*\*(0.0918) | 0.565\*\*\*(0.0848) |
| Between parties within parliaments std. dev. | 0.406\*\*\*(0.0996) | 0.471\*\*\*(0.0805) |
| Log likelihood | -2422.46 | -2357.10 |
| BIC | 4972 | 4841 |
| N (MP level)N (Party level)N (Parliament level) | 172631868 | 172631868 |

3-level hierarchical ordinal regression (MPs nested in parties nested in parliaments) with random intercepts on the party and parliament level.

\* p<0.10 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01