**Supplementary File**

The present section compiles additional information on the country samples and the robustness of our empirical results to a series of alternative model specifications. Table A.1 shows the number of respondents in each individual survey used for our empirical analyses. Tables A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5 present the results of several alternative model specifications.

A first concern regarding the robustness of the empirical results of the random-intercept models in Table 1 are unobserved election-level characteristics being correlated with covariates at the individual level, leading to potentially biased estimates (as indicated in footnote 10 in the manuscript). The Models 1 (FE) – 5 (FE) in Table A.5 replicate the original Models 1 – 5 with an alternative fixed-effects specification of clusters (elections), which controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the election-level. Comparing the coefficients between these alternative model specifications we observe that all empirical findings are robust to this alternative specification of the cluster effects.

We also investigate whether our empirical findings are robust to two alternative specifications of the dependent variable (as indicated in footnote 4 in the manuscript). First, Model 6 (Table A.2) shows that we arrive at substantially similar conclusions if we focus on PM vote rather than incumbent vote. Second, we estimate a multinomial logit model (Model 10; Table A.3) where respondents indicate whether they voted for a government party, an opposition party (baseline category), or chose to abstain. In line with the basic idea of retrospective voting models we observe that corruption perceptions have a substantial significant effect on the likelihood to vote for a government party vs. voting for an opposition party (rather than abstaining vs. supporting the opposition).

Model 7 (Table A.2) estimates the moderating effect of corruption severity (Hypothesis 3) using an alternative operationalization based on country means of the individual corruption perceptions (as indicated in footnote 7 in the manuscript). Similar to the original Models 3 and 5 we find that corruption voting is more pronounced in elections where corruption is salient. This finding underlines the robustness of the moderating effect of corruption severity.

We are also concerned whether our null-finding regarding clarity of responsibility (Hypothesis 4) is driven by its operationalization. Model 8 (Table A.2) replicates Model 5 based on the alternative dimension of clarity of responsibility – institutional clarity – outlined by Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci (2013) (as indicated in footnote 15 in the manuscript). In line with the results presented in Table 1, we find no evidence that institutional clarity has a moderating effect on corruption perception voting.

Another often voiced concern in the context of economic performance voting is that political attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics may systematically affect individual perceptions of the economy. In a similar vein, corruption perceptions may not be immune to such subjectivity. Model 9 (Table A.2) thus replicates our analysis for an alternative specification of our key independent variable. Following Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) we first derive corruption perceptions purged of subjective heterogeneity and then estimate their effect on incumbent voting. We do not include interactions with partisanship (Hypothesis 1) in this Model 6 as purged corruption perceptions are by definition independent of partisan effects. For the remaining conditional effects, the results are very similar to those presented Model 5.

Finally, Table A.4 reports the empirical results of three alternative model specifications using GDP per capita growth (Model 11), GDP growth (Model 12) and inflation (Model 13) as alternative macroeconomic indicators. As indicated above, all three alternative measures of economic performance fail to reach conventional levels of significance. Most importantly, our key empirical implications are robust to these alternative measures of economic performance (as indicated in footnote 8 in the manuscript).

**References**

Duch, R.M., Palmer, H.D. and Anderson, C.J, 2000. Heterogeneity in perceptions of national economic conditions. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4), pp.635-652.

Hobolt, S., Tilley, J. and Banducci, S, 2013. Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting. *European Journal of Political Research*. 52(2), pp.164-187.

**Table A.1: Sample**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Country | Election year | Respondents |
| Belgium | 2003 | 1,546 |
| Bulgaria | 2001 | 893 |
| Czech Republic | 2002 | 446 |
| Denmark | 2001 | 1,672 |
| Finland | 2003 | 796 |
| Germany | 2002 | 1,665 |
| Hungary | 2002 | 859 |
| Iceland | 2003 | 998 |
| Ireland | 2002 | 1,373 |
| Italy | 2006 | 549 |
| Netherlands | 2002 | 1,448 |
| Norway | 2001 | 1,492 |
| Poland | 2001 | 751 |
| Portugal | 2002 | 628 |
| Portugal | 2005 | 1433 |
| Romania | 2004 | 791 |
| Slovenia | 2004 | 351 |
| Spain | 2004 | 834 |
| Sweden | 2002 | 787 |
| UK | 2005 | 470 |
| Total |  | 19,782 |

*Note*: Sample: European parliamentary democracies in CSES module 2 (i.e. excluding Switzerland) with data on parliamentary elections (excluding France 2002) – 20 countries/elections.

**Table A.2: Alternative model specifications**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Model 5 | Model 6 | Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 |
|  |  | Full model | Vote for PM party | Average Corruption perception | Institutional clarity | Corruption purged |
|  | Corruption perception | 0.260\* | 0.399\*\*\* | 0.408\* | 0.234\* | -0.188 |
|  |  | (0.103) | (0.105) | (0.179) | (0.115) | (0.416) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H1** | Non-partisan | *Reference category* |
| Close to opposition party | -3.077\*\*\* | -3.122\*\*\* | -3.068\*\*\* | -3.073\*\*\* | -2.616\*\*\* |
|  | (0.247) | (0.296) | (0.246) | (0.247) | (0.0765) |
| Close to government party | 2.851\*\*\* | 2.050\*\*\* | 2.856\*\*\* | 2.858\*\*\* | 2.874\*\*\* |
|  | (0.194) | (0.133) | (0.195) | (0.194) | (0.0671) |
| Corruption perception X Close to opposition party  | 0.127 | 0.147 | 0.124 | 0.125 |  |
|  | (0.0835) | (0.0982) | (0.0833) | (0.0835) |  |
| Corruption perception X Close to government party | 0.0822 | -0.0577 | 0.0805 | 0.0793 |  |
|  |  | (0.0701) | (0.0477) | (0.0704) | (0.0700) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H2** | Perceived effect of government turnover | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.287\*\*\* | 0.265\*\*\* | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.371\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0512) | (0.0504) | (0.0513) | (0.0512) | (0.0855) |
| Corruption perception X Perceived effect of government | -0.0848\*\*\* | -0.0920\*\*\* | -0.0869\*\*\* | -0.0849\*\*\* | -0.126\*\*\* |
|  | turnover | (0.0172) | (0.0169) | (0.0172) | (0.0172) | (0.0301) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H3** | Corruption severity | 0.133 | 0.310\*\*\* |  | 0.114 | 1.994\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0829) | (0.0619) |  | (0.0893) | (0.250) |
| Corruption perception X Corruption severity | -0.0334\* | -0.0742\*\*\* |  | -0.0376\* | -0.541\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0150) | (0.0142) |  | (0.0163) | (0.0758) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H3** | Average corruption perception |  |  | 0.564 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.293) |  |  |
| Corruption perception X Average corruption perception |  |  | -0.0720 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0513) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H4** | Government clarity | -0.393 | 2.330\*\*\* | -0.227 |  | -1.858 |
|  | (0.593) | (0.451) | (0.576) |  | (1.703) |
| Corruption perception X Government clarity | -0.120 | -0.0469 | -0.157 |  | 0.215 |
|  |  | (0.116) | (0.115) | (0.117) |  | (0.583) |
| **H4** | Institutional clarity |  |  |  | -0.164 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.708) |  |
| Corruption perception X Institutional clarity |  |  |  | -0.0666 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.128) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Age | -0.000783 | 0.00174 | -0.000744 | -0.000761 | -0.000195 |
|  |  | (0.00127) | (0.00124) | (0.00127) | (0.00127) | (0.00129) |
|  | Female | 0.0887\* | 0.0945\* | 0.0906\* | 0.0886\* | 0.239\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0392) | (0.0384) | (0.0392) | (0.0392) | (0.0441) |
|  | Educational attainment |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | None | 0.215 | 0.362\*\* | 0.218 | 0.213 | 0.172 |
|  |  | (0.118) | (0.119) | (0.111) | (0.119) | (0.119) |
|  |  | Primary | 0.0622 | 0.182\*\*\* | 0.0627 | 0.0603 | 0.128\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0508) | (0.0491) | (0.0508) | (0.0508) | (0.0516) |
|  |  | Secondary | *Reference category* |
|  |  | Tertiary | -0.0371 | -0.211\*\*\* | -0.0389 | -0.0377 | -0.121\* |
|  |  | (0.0537) | (0.0538) | (0.0527) | (0.0538) | (0.0538) |
|  | Ideology | -0.00568 | 0.00493 | -0.00569 | -0.00545 | -0.0147 |
|  |  | (0.00915) | (0.00873) | (0.00915) | (0.00915) | (0.00925) |
|  | Unemployment | -0.0888\* | -0.0860\*\* | -0.107\*\* | -0.0814\* | -0.0611 |
|  |  | (0.0401) | (0.0264) | (0.0384) | (0.0412) | (0.0512) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Constant | -0.357 | -3.585\*\*\* | -1.549 | -0.531 | 0.202 |
|  |  | (0.519) | (0.411) | (0.865) | (0.600) | (1.237) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Random intercept** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Variance (elections) | 0.281\*\*\* | 0.114\*\*\* | 0.262\*\*\* | 0.303\*\*\* | 0.459\* |
|  |  | (0.0930) | (0.0394) | (0.0870) | (0.0997) | (0.153) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | N (individuals) | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 |
|  | N (elections) | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
|  | Log Likelihood | -8,123.6 | -8,467.2 | -8,124.3 | -8,124.8 | -8,075.3 |
|  | AIC | 16,287.3 | 16,974.4 | 16,288.6 | 16,289.7 | 16,186.6 |
|  | Likelihood ratio test vs. logistic regression (p-value) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

*Note*: Standard errors in parentheses.\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Table A.3: Multinomial logit model of vote choice**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Model 10 |
|  | Multinomial logit model |
|  | Abstention vs. opposition party | Government party vs. opposition party |
| Corruption perception | 0.0540 | -0.282\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0535) | (0.0659) |
|  |  |  |
| **Control variables** |  |  |
| Age | -0.0211\*\*\* | 0.0012 |
|  |  | (0.0028) | (0.0030) |
| Gender | 0.0626 | 0.0841 |
|  |  | (0.0458) | (0.0453) |
| Educational attainment |  |  |
|  | None | 0.804\*\*\* | 0.315 |
|  |  | (0.154) | (0.165) |
|  | Primary | 0.354\*\*\* | 0.0916 |
|  |  | (0.0592) | (0.0682) |
|  | Secondary | *Reference category* |
|  | Tertiary | -0.335\*\* | -0.0302 |
|  |  | (0.105) | (0.0887) |
| Ideology | -0.0124 | 0.0122 |
|  |  | (0.0370) | (0.0910) |
| Constant | -0.809\*\*\* | 1.405\*\* |
|  |  | (0.185) | (0.443) |
|  |  |  |  |
| N (individuals) | 24,222 |
| N (elections)  | 20 |
| Log Likelihood | -22,301.1 |
| AIC | 44,630.1 |

*Note*: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Table A.4: Alternative operationalization of economic performance**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Model 5 | Model 11 | Model 12 | Model 13 |
|  |  | Unemployment | GDP per capita growth | GDP growth | Inflation |
|  | Corruption perception | 0.260\* | 0.252\* | 0.254\* | 0.253\* |
|  |  | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.103) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H1** | Non-partisan | Reference category |
| Close to opposition party | -3.077\*\*\* | -3.079\*\*\* | -3.080\*\*\* | -3.079\*\*\* |
|  | (0.247) | (0.247) | (0.247) | (0.247) |
| Close to government party | 2.851\*\*\* | 2.850\*\*\* | 2.851\*\*\* | 2.852\*\*\* |
|  | (0.194) | (0.194) | (0.194) | (0.194) |
| Corruption perception X Close to opposition party | 0.127 | 0.127 | 0.127 | 0.127 |
|  | (0.0835) | (0.0835) | (0.0835) | (0.0835) |
| Corruption perception X Close to government party | 0.0822 | 0.0818 | 0.0816 | 0.0813 |
|  |  | (0.0701) | (0.0701) | (0.0701) | (0.0701) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H2** | Perceived effect of government turnover | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.260\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0512) | (0.0512) | (0.0512) | (0.0512) |
| Corruption perception X Perceived effect of government turnover | -0.0848\*\*\* | -0.0845\*\*\* | -0.0845\*\*\* | -0.0846\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0172) | (0.0172) | (0.0172) | (0.0172) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H3** | Corruption severity | 0.133 | 0.104 | 0.0875 | 0.113 |
|  | (0.0829) | (0.0871) | (0.0831) | (0.0960) |
| Corruption perception X Corruption severity | -0.0334\* | -0.0327\* | -0.0331\* | -0.0328\* |
|  |  | (0.0150) | (0.0150) | (0.0150) | (0.0150) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H4** | Government clarity | -0.393 | -0.140 | -0.0873 | -0.256 |
|  | (0.593) | (0.622) | (0.632) | (0.622) |
| Corruption perception X Government clarity | -0.120 | -0.113 | -0.114 | -0.113 |
|  |  | (0.116) | (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.117) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |
|  | Age | -0.000783 | -0.000733 | -0.000738 | -0.000757 |
|  |  | (0.00127) | (0.00127) | (0.00127) | (0.00127) |
|  | Female | 0.0887\* | 0.0890\* | 0.0890\* | 0.0890\* |
|  |  | (0.0392) | (0.0392) | (0.0392) | (0.0392) |
|  | Educational attainment |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | None | 0.215 | 0.213 | 0.213 | 0.215 |
|  |  | (0.118) | (0.119) | (0.119) | (0.119) |
|  |  | Primary | 0.0622 | 0.0593 | 0.0596 | 0.0609 |
|  |  |  | (0.0508) | (0.0508) | (0.0508) | (0.0508) |
|  |  | Secondary | *Reference category* |
|  |  | Tertiary | -0.0371 | -0.0380 | -0.0379 | -0.0372 |
|  |  | (0.0537) | (0.0538) | (0.0538) | (0.0538) |
|  | Ideology | -0.00517 | -0.00568 | -0.00547 | -0.00547 |
|  |  | (0.00913) | (0.00915) | (0.00915) | (0.00915) |
|  | Unemployment | -0.0888\* |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.0401) |  |  |  |
|  | GDP per capita growth (annual %) |  | -0.131 |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0941) |  |  |
|  | GDP growth (annual %) |  |  | -0.139 |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.107) |  |
|  | Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) |  |  |  | -0.0617 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0514) |
|  | Constant | -0.357 | -0.747 | -0.658 | -0.714 |
|  |  | (0.519) | (0.502) | (0.512) | (0.508) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Random intercept** |  |  |  |  |
|  | Variance (elections) | 0.281\*\*\* | 0.318\*\*\* | 0.322\*\*\* | 0.326\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0930) | (0.106) | (0.107) | (0.108) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | N (individuals) | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 |
|  | N (elections) | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
|  | Log Likelihood | -8,123.6 | -8,124.9 | -8,125.0 | -8,125.2 |
|  | AIC | 16,287.3 | 16,289.9 | 16,290.1 | 16,290.3 |
|  | Likelihood ratio test vs. logistic regression (p-value) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

*Note*: Standard errors in parentheses.\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.

**Table A.5: Fixed-effects models of incumbent voting**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Model 1 (FE) | Model 2 (FE) | Model 3 (FE) | Model 4 (FE) | Model 5 (FE) |
|  | Corruption perception | -0.284\*\*\* | 0.102 | 0.184\* | 0.188 | 0.259\* |
|  |  | (0.0210) | (0.0675) | (0.0774) | (0.0978) | (0.103) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H1** | Non-partisan | *Reference category* |
| Close to opposition party |  | -3.056\*\*\* | -3.075\*\*\* | -3.061\*\*\* | -3.079\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.244) | (0.247) | (0.244) | (0.247) |
| Close to government party |  | 2.853\*\*\* | 2.860\*\*\* | 2.838\*\*\* | 2.847\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.195) | (0.194) | (0.196) | (0.194) |
| Corruption perception X Close to opposition party  |  | 0.119 | 0.127 | 0.121 | 0.128 |
|  |  | (0.0827) | (0.0836) | (0.0827) | (0.0835) |
| Corruption perception X Close to government party |  | 0.0816 | 0.0786 | 0.0868 | 0.0832 |
|  |  |  | (0.0706) | (0.0700) | (0.0708) | (0.0702) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H2** | Perceived effect of government turnover |  | 0.261\*\*\* | 0.262\*\*\* | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.261\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0512) | (0.0512) | (0.0512) | (0.0512) |
| Corruption perception X Perceived effect of government turnover |  | -0.0852\*\*\* | -0.0851\*\*\* | -0.0849\*\*\* | -0.0848\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0172) | (0.0172) | (0.0172) | (0.0172) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H3** | Corruption severity |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption perception X Corruption severity |  |  | -0.0329\* |  | -0.0319\* |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0151) |  | (0.0151) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **H4** | Government clarity |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Corruption perception X Government clarity |  |  |  | -0.143 | -0.128 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.117) | (0.117) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Control variables** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Age | 0.00169 | -0.000712 | -0.000744 | -0.000726 | -0.000755 |
|  |  | (0.000977) | (0.00128) | (0.00128) | (0.00128) | (0.00128) |
|  | Female | 0.0919\*\* | 0.0930\* | 0.0895\* | 0.0935\* | 0.0901\* |
|  |  | (0.0304) | (0.0392) | (0.0393) | (0.0392) | (0.0393) |
|  | Educational attainment |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | None | 0.311\*\*\* | 0.223 | 0.217 | 0.221 | 0.215 |
|  |  | (0.0875) | (0.0882) | (0.119) | (0.119) | (0.119) |
|  |  | Primary level | 0.0876\* | 0.0628 | 0.0620 | 0.0624 | 0.0617 |
|  |  |  | (0.0394) | (0.0509) | (0.0509) | (0.0509) | (0.0509) |
|  |  | Secondary level | *Reference category* |
|  |  | Tertiary level | -0.0362 | -0.0401 | -0.0345 | -0.0407 | -0.0353 |
|  |  | (0.0413) | (0.0414) | (0.0538) | (0.0538) | (0.0538) |
|  | Ideology | 0.0111 | 0.0106 | -0.00528 | -0.00538 | -0.00546 |
|  |  | (0.0065) | (0.00652) | (0.00916) | (0.00916) | (0.00916) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Constant | 1.380\*\*\* | 0.227 | 0.328 | 0.0677 | 0.182 |
|  |  | (0.103) | (0.228) | (0.233) | (0.262) | (0.268) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Fixed effects** |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Election-level | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | N (individuals) | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 | 19,782 |
|  | N (elections) | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
|  | Log Likelihood | -12,473.2 | -8,080.7 | -8,078.3 | -8,079.9 | -8,077.7 |
|  | AIC | 25,000.3 | 16,227.4 | 16,224.6 | 16,227.9 | 16,225.4 |

*Note*: Standard errors in parentheses.\* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001.