**Appendix 1.** *Information on the construction of the dependent variable and additional robustness checks based on the SIEPOL dataset*

**Construction of the dependent variable**

The dependent variable of this article has been constructed using the SIEPOL database “Institutional Change in Advanced European Democracies” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012). The dependent variable counts the number of reforms adopted in a given legislature, ranging from zero to seven (observed maximum). In order to build this dependent variable, six dimensions of the SIEPOL database “Institutional Change in Advanced European Democracies” have been taken into account. The six categories included are electoral system reforms (1), parliamentary reforms (2), federal reforms or reforms of decentralization (3), direct election of the head executive at the national or local level (4), provisions for referendums and citizens’ initiative at the national level (5), and finally, the regulation of the access to suffrage (6).

The paper presenting the SIEPOL database mentions a list of 173 reforms, including reforms of the public subsidies of the parties, which I have left aside in the general models. This list indicates several pieces of information on the reforms: the country in which it has been adopted, the year of adoption, the dimension reformed, and the content of the reform. In addition to this information, the PhD thesis of Bedock (2014), based extensively on the SIEPOL database, indicates the manner in which the reforms have been classified in function of their direction (inclusive or exclusive) and of their scope (substantial or minor).

Using the list of reforms in the SIEPOL database, I have counted as a case of reform any modification of the formal rules on one of the six dimensions of interest. In some cases, reforms affecting several dimensions have been adopted through a single law, whereas at other times, multiple dimensions have been modified through separated laws. These two alternatives are not distinguished in my data, since the original dataset does not contain any information on the format of the reform packages.

Bedock, Mair and Wilson argue that the reforms included focus on “key types of change of the core democratic rules, defined as changes that affect the *direct* relationship between elites, parties, citizens, governments and parliaments” (2012, 3). The authors also underline that the initial phase of data collection had been completed through the access to primary and secondary sources (*EJPR Political Data Yearbook*, dataset on Regional Authority by Marks et al., 2008, *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* by Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005, IDEA dataset, etc.), carried out by a team of political scientists involved in the SIEPOL project. The national data files have then been sent to national experts for verification and to be completed and corrected if needed. In other words, the SIEPOL team was “primarily concerned with building a systematic inventory and analysis of the various reforms to the core political institutions that have been carried out since 1990” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 3).

The complete list of reforms and the working paper is accessible online:

http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/20817/RSCAS\_2012\_11.pdf?sequence=1

Some examples of the reforms included are mentioned below:

1. *Electoral system reform*

The reforms labeled as “electoral system reforms” in the SIEPOL dataset are concerned with the rules modifying the electoral formula, the system translating votes into seats, and the expression of votes. These reforms range from the modification or substitution of the electoral formula, to the modification of the boundaries of the constituencies, the introduction of corrective tiers or of a legal threshold, etc. It should be noted that in the SIEPOL dataset, reforms modifying the access to elections, or changes of the assembly size have been included in different categories (respectively, access to suffrage, and parliamentary reforms).

The dataset includes, for example, the introduction of an additional electoral tier in Austria in 1992 in the 43 districts, or the modification of the boundaries of the electoral constituencies for the parliamentary elections adopted in 2009 in France.

1. *Parliamentary reforms*

This category includes reforms altering the composition, the essential legislative procedures, and the number of lower and upper chambers, the relationships between the executive and the parliament, and the duration of the term at the national level.

Reforms classified in this second category comprise, for example, the introduction of a single legislature to replace the tri-cameral legislature in 1991 in Iceland, the reduction of the number of MPs enacted in 1997 in Portugal in the lower chamber, or the reform increasing the power of the parliament *vis-à-vis* adopted by the president in 2000 in Finland.

1. *State decentralization and federal reforms*

The third category encompasses reforms modifying the balance of powers between the national level and the regions/federal entities in terms of competences, fiscal autonomy and instruments of control, as well as provisions regulating the number and the organization of subnational entities.

This dimension encompasses reforms such as the amendment of the Basic Law to give German Lander direct involvement in EU decision-making in 1992, or the change in regional financing allowing regional governments to raise a substantial part of their own taxation in Spain enacted in 1996.

1. *Direct election of executive heads at the national or local level*

This category encompasses reforms introducing the direct election of the president at the national level, the mayors or the presidents of regions or provinces adopted in the national parliament for part or the totality of the territory.

This covers, for instance, the introduction of the direct election of the Finnish president by a two-round system adopted in 1994, or the series of reforms organizing the direct election of the mayors, the presidents of regions and provinces implemented in Italy from 1993 to 1999.

1. *Reforms of direct democracy at the national level*

This group of reforms includes cases in which provisions for citizens’ initiative (not necessarily binding, but also agenda initiatives) or referendums were introduced or modified at the national level.

This fifth category includes the authorization of citizen-petitioned local and national consultative referendums in the Netherlands in 2004, or the introduction of a constitutional amendment allowing citizens to propose a referendum, which must be approved by Parliament before it is held in Portugal in 1997.

1. *Access to suffrage*

This category of reforms concerns all cases in which suffrage was expanded to new categories of population (people under 21, foreigners), or in which alternative methods of voting were introduced or facilitated, ranging from the introduction of postal voting, electronic voting, constituencies for citizens living abroad, right to vote for overseas citizens, and proxy vote.

This final dimension covers for example the expansion of voting rights for local elections to non-EU citizens living in Luxembourg in 2003, or the reform of postal and proxy voting facilitating voting for citizens away from their place of residence, enacted in 1999 in UK.

**Robustness checks on the scope of the reforms**

In the paper presenting the SIEPOL dataset, substantial reforms are defined as the ones “that significantly alters the balance of power and/or the nature of the relationship between parties, executive and legislative, citizens and elites” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 9). For each of the categories of reform, a classification into substantial and minor reforms is made and specific criteria for each of the types of reform is developed by specialised secondary sources (such as Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010). As indicated by Bedock (2014, 73), “in cases when the content of a given institutional reform could be assessed through quantifiable set-off points (such as district magnitude, the number of seats in the parliament, the number of citizens entitled to vote, and so on), a threshold of 20% was used to determine the scope of the reform, as proposed by Lijphart in his dealings with electoral reforms (1994). Overall, reforms are classified as substantial when they affect the national level (the whole country), have a direct impact on the relationship between the citizenry and the political system, and between the actors within the political system, and when their quantifiable dimensions meet the 20% threshold.”

To take a few examples, the following categories lead to the classification of a reform as substantial:

* the introduction of a national threshold for representation in parliament (electoral reform),
* an increase of the decrease by more than 20% of the size of the parliament (parliamentary reform),
* the fact that subnational entities gain fiscal autonomy for the first time (state decentralization and federal reform),
* the first introduction of the direct election of mayors or presidents of regions for all or the great majority of the municipalities/regions/provinces of the territory (direct election),
* the first historical introduction of mechanisms of citizens’ initiative / direct democracy (reform of direct democracy),
* all regulations regarding means of voting, access to vote for citizens living abroad, etc., resulting in a net change in the size of the electorate in access of 20% (access to suffrage).

Substantial reforms include, for instance, the transformation of the Belgium state into a federal one in 1993 with a major increase of competences by the municipalities and the regions, the merging of 271 municipalities into 198 in Denmark in 2005, the introduction of a new constitution in Finland in 2000 reducing considerably the powers of the president, or the authorisation of citizen-petitioned local and national consultative referendums in the Netherlands in 2004.

In the following robustness checks, the six general statistical models have been conducted again including only substantial reforms.

**Robustness checks on the direction of the reforms**

Inclusive reforms are defined as “reforms which *open up the decision-making process to new political actors/citizens*(dispersing power). Exclusive reforms, on the other hand, are reforms which *close off the decision-making process to some political actors/citizens* (concentrating power)” (Bedock 2014, 74). Bedock, Mair and Wilson give the following indications on the classification of the reforms into exclusive and inclusive categories: “Since the database provides a description of each reform, all of them were classified to assess to what extent they opened-up or closed-off the process of decision-making to citizens or to new political actors. This general criterion was further delineated with several sub-criteria for each type of reform. Three categories were considered: inclusive reforms, opening-up decision-making, reforms with multiple logics, containing elements both opening up and closing off decision-making, and exclusive reforms that close off decision-making” (2012, 12).

To take a few examples, the following categories lead to the classification of a reform as inclusive:

* the increase of a preference vote (electoral reform),
* the decrease of the duration of the term for MPs/the president (parliamentary reform),
* the increase in the competences of the regions or federal entities (state decentralization and federal reform),
* the introduction of the direct election of the mayor / president of region or province (direct election),
* the introduction of citizens’ initiative and other provisions for direct democracy (reform of direct democracy),
* the facilitation of the registration procedures on electoral lists (access to suffrage).

Inclusive reforms comprise the introduction of the direct election of the mayors with a two-round system in Greece in 1990, the replacement of the tri-cameral system by a unicameral legislature in 1991 in Iceland, the constitutional amendment recognising the role of local government for local democracy introduced in Ireland in 1999, or the reform reducing the time for registration and the duration of residence requirement for voting in Luxembourg in 2008.

Robustness checks were conducted using inclusive reforms only on the general models and the six general statistical models.

**Appendix 2**. *Explanatory and control variables*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variables** | **Measurement** | **Source** | **Range** |
| *Explanatory variables* |  |  |  |
| **Shifts in satisfaction with democracy** | Shift in percentage from one legislature to another of the percentage of respondents “fairly” or “very” satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their country (phrasing of the original question: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (YOUR COUNTRY)?” | Eurobarometers 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.0, 39.0, 40, 41.0, 42, 43.1, 44.3, 47.1, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54.1, 56.2, 58.1, 59.1, 60.1, 61, 62, 62.2, 63.4, 65.2, 68.1, 72.4, 73.4  For Iceland, Norway and Switzerland: Module 1, 2 and 3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems released in 2003, 2007 and 2011, and some complements at the beginning of the period with the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file, 1970-2002 for Norway, 1990-1995 | Minimum: -55.9% (Germany, 1990-1994)  Maximum: +89.8% (Norway 1989-1993) |
| **Shifts in total volatility ª** | Shift in percentage of the level of total volatility from one election to another | Computed from the electoral data for parliamentary elections of the Parlgov dataset  <http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data.html> | Minimum: -77.1% (Portugal 1999-2002)  Maximum: +357.4% (Netherlands 1994-1998) |
| **Political alternation ᵇ** | Dummy variable: 1 if the head executive and the ideological orientation of a cabinet changed at the beginning of a legislature, 0 otherwise. | Computed from the data about cabinet composition of the Parlgov dataset  <http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data.html> |  |
| *Control variables* |  |  |  |
| **Partisan veto players** | Number of parties present in the government | Computed from the data about cabinet composition of the Parlgov dataset  <http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data.html> | Minimum: 1  Maximum: 7 (Italy 2006-08) |
| **Ideological orientation of the legislature ᵇ** | Classification of the legislatures based on the ideological orientation of the cabinets, divided in three categories: left/center left, right/center right, grand coalition.  Grand coalitions include all of the main political parties of the left and the right in power. When one or several of the main parties are excluded, and the cabinet still contains left-wing and right-wing parties, we looked at who is the prime minister to know whether the cabinet was classified as a left-wing or a right-wing cabinet.  In cases when a legislature experiences cabinets with different ideological orientations, the classification depends on the cabinet that lasted longer. Caretaker governments were included in the “grand coalition” category. | Computed from the data about cabinet composition of the Parlgov dataset  <http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data.html> |  |
| **Economic growth** | Average percentage of growth of the GDP in constant prices for a given legislature | Data of the International Monetary Fund  [www.imf.org](http://www.imf.org) | Minimum: -5.19% (Iceland 2009-2010)  Maximum: +8.65% (Ireland 1997-2002) |
| **Country dummies** | 18 dummy variables for each of the countries included: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK |  |  |

ª The formula is the following: Total Volatility = |PiV| + |PjV| …. + |PnV| / 2 with |PiV| being the change in absolute terms of the vote for party i from election and another, |PjV| the change in absolute terms of the votes for party j from one election to another. The total sum is divided by two to avoid counting twice losses and gains.

ᵇ The classification of cabinets between center-left, center-right and grand coalition cabinets was not always necessarily straightforward, especially in countries characterized by large coalitions (such as Finland, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium), or by a political life not well defined by left-right dimensions (Ireland). Grand coalitions were defined as government coalitions including **all of the main parties in power** at once. In Germany, it would be the FDP, CSU-CDU and the SDP, for example. When one or several of the main parties are excluded, and the cabinet still contains left-wing and right-wing parties, we looked at who is the prime minister to know whether the cabinet was classified as a left-wing or a right-wing cabinet. All of the cabinets in Ireland were classified as centre-right, given the fact that the two main parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail cannot be adequately qualified as centre-left. In the few cases in which the ideological orientation of the cabinets has changed during the legislature, I classified the legislature as left/center left, right/center right, or grand coalition based on the cabinet that lasted longer. When caretakers cabinets took over, like in Belgium (Verhofstadt III in 2007), Italy (Dini in 1995 and in the Netherlands (Balkenende V in 2010), I considered they could be included within the category ‘grand coalition’.

**Appendix 3.**  *Actual distribution of the total number of reforms adopted by legislature compared to the Poisson and the negative binomial distribution*



|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Without electoral reforms | Without parliamentary reforms | Without federal reforms | Without citizens' initiative | Without direct election | Without alternative vote |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Evolution of the total volatility in % | **1.004 \*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.004 \*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.004 \*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.004\*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.004 \*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.004 \*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of parties in the government | 1.058 (0.80-1.40) | 1.021 (0.77-1.35) | 1.262 (0.89-1.78) | 1.111 (0.86-1.43) | 1.102 (0.84-1.44) | 1.105 (0.86-1.42) |
| Ideological orientation (ref. cat.: left/center-left)  *Right/Center-right government*  *Grand coalition government* | 0.948 (0.59-1.51)  0.941 (0.45-1.95) | 0.987 (0.60-1.61)  1.098 (0.52-2.34) | 1.688 (0.88-3.23)  1.389 (0.54-3.58) | 1.108 (0.70-1.75)  1.100 (0.54-2.23) | 1.072 (0.67-1.71)  1.105 (0.53-2.28) | 1.103 (0.71-1.72)  1.222 (0.61-2.44) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth | 1.076 (0.80-1.40) | **1.118\* (1.00-1.25)** | 1.140 (0.97-1.34) | **1.107\* (0.99-1.23)** | **1.127\*\* (1.00-1.26)** | 1.081 (0.97-1.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alpha | 0.000 (0.00-0.00) | 0.095 (0.00-1.63) | 0.218 (0.03-1.43) | 0.079 (0.00-1.37) | 0.086 (0.01-1.30) | 0.033 (0.00-15.54) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
| Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.30 |
| Likelihood-ratio chi2 | 39.70 | 33.65 | 44.37 | 39.14 | 36.31 | 40.89 |
| Prob>chi2 | 0.001 | 0.053 | 0.003 | 0.112 | 0.028 | 0.009 |

**Appendix 4**. *Determinants of the number of institutional reforms adopted by legislature in Western Europe (1990-2010), omitting one category*

Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislature between 1990 and 2010. Other control variables not reported here include 18 country dummies. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Without electoral reforms | Without parliamentary reforms | Without federal reforms | Without citizens' initiative | Without direct election | Without alternative vote |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alternation in government | **1.896 \*\*\* (1.24-2.90)** | **1.895 \*\*\* (1.21-2.97)** | **1.876 \*\* (1.06-3.33)** | **1.783 \*\*\* (1.16-2.73)** | **1.642 \*\* (1.06-2.54)** | **1.774 \*\*\* (1.16-2.70)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of parties in the government | 0.965 (0.74-1.26) | 0.932 (0.70-1.23) | 1.133 (0.79-1.62) | 1.018 (0.78-1.32) | 1.023 (0.77-1.35) | 1.014 (0.78-1.31) |
| Ideological orientation (ref. cat.: left/center-left)  *Right/Center-right government*  *Grand coalition government* | 0.992 (0.63-1.20)  0.837 (0.41-1.72) | 1.010 (0.61-1.66)  0.972 (0.45-2.07) | 1.677 (0.86-3.28)  1.188 (0.44-3.20) | 1.143 (0.72-1.82)  0.960 (0.46-1.99) | 1.107 (0.68-1.79)  0.955 (0.45-2.03) | 1.126 (0.72-1.77)  1.054 (0.52-2.15) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth | 1.075 (0.96-1.20) | **1.115\* (0.99-1.25)** | 1.121 (0.95-1.32) | **1.101\* (0.99-1.23)** | **1.119\* (0.99-1.26)** | 1.079 (0.97-1.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alpha | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.128 (0.01-1.16) | 0.310 (0.08-1.26) | 0.125 (0.02-0.82) | 0.150 (0.03-0.81) | 0.072 (0.00-1.54) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.12 |
| Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.29 |
| Likelihood-ratio chi2 | 39.56 | 32.77 | 44.13 | 37.89 | 33.98 | 39.61 |
| Prob>chi2 | 0.012 | 0.100 | 0.003 | 0.019 | 0.049 | 0.012 |

Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislatures between 1990 and 2010. Other control variables not reported here include 18 country dummies. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Without electoral reforms | Without parliamentary reforms | Without federal reforms | Without citizens' initiative | Without direct election | Without alternative vote |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alternation in government | **1.619 \*\* (1.02-2.54)** | **1.595 \* (1.00-2.54)** | 1.578 (0.87-2.87) | **1.512 \* (0.97-2.435)** | 1.381 (0.88-2.18) | **1.509 \* (0.97-2.34)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Evolution of volatility in % | **1.003 \*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.003 \*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.003\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.003 \*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.003 \*\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.003 \*\* (1.00-1.01)** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Number of parties in the government | 1.000 (0.76-1.31) | 0.966 (0.73-1.27) | 1.171 (0.82-1.67) | 1.052 (0.83-1.36) | 1.053 (0.80-1.38) | 1.047 (0.81-1.34) |
| Ideological orientation (ref. cat.: left/center-left)  *Right/Center-right government*  *Grand coalition government* | 0.964 (0.60-1.53)  0.873 (0.42-1.79) | 0.998 (0.61-1.62)  1.004 (0.48-2.09) | 1.673 (0.87-3.21)  1.291 (0.50-3.33) | 1.113 (0.71-1.75)  1.005 (0.50-2.02) | 1.081 (0.68-1.73)  1.033 (0.50-2.13) | 1.104 (0.71-1.72)  1.112 (0.56-2.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Growth | 1.076 (0.97-1.20) | **1.118\* (1.00-1.25)** | 1.134 (0.96-1.34) | **1.107\* (0.99-1.23)** | **1.125 \*\* (1.00-1.26)** | 1.082 (0.98-1.20) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alpha | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.070 (0.00-2.84) | 0.224 (0.04-1.37) | 0.069 (0.00-1.62) | 0.089 (0.00-1.21) | 0.025 (0.00-66.56) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.13 |
| Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared | 0.32 | 0.28 | 0.33 | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.32 |
| Likelihood-ratio chi2 | 43.88 | 37.46 | 46.68 | 42.55 | 38.27 | 44.28 |
| Prob>chi2 | 0.005 | 0.029 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.024 | 0.005 |

Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislature between 1990 and 2010. Other control variables not reported here include 18 country dummies. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01.

**Appendix 5**. *Determinants of the number of institutional reforms adopted by legislature in Western Europe (1990-2010), adding one category (party funding)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
| Evolution of the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in % | |  | 1.003 (0.99-1.01) |  |  |  | 1.004 (0.99-1.01) | |
| Evolution of the total volatility in % | |  |  | **1.003\*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** |  | **1.002\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.002\* (1.00-1.01)** | |
| Alternation in government | |  |  |  | **1.860\*\*\* (1.26-2.76)** | **1.636\*\* (1.08-2.46)** | **1.605\*\* (1.07-2.41)** | |
| Number of parties in the government | | 1.117 (0.86-1.45) | 1.085 (0.83-1.43) | 1.128 (0.88-1.45) | 1.024 (0.80-1.32) | 1.051 (0.82-1.34) | 1.023 (0.80-1.32) | |
| Ideological orientation (ref. cat.: left/center left) | |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| *Right/center-right government*  *Grand Coalition government* | | 1.000 (0.64-1.57)  0.949 (0.47-1.92) | 1.022 (0.65-1.60)  0.910 (0.45-1.60) | 0.986 (0.64-1.51)  1.014 (0.52-1.97) | 0.976 (0.63-1.50)  0.856 (0.44-1.67) | 0.979 (0.64-1.49)  0.920 (0.48-1.76) | 0.999 (0.66-1.51)  0.887 (0.46-1.69) | |
| Growth | | **1.111\*\* (1.00-1.24)** | **1.100\* (0.99-1.23)** | **1.115\*\* (1.01-1.23)** | **1.110\*\* (1.00-1.23)** | **1.113\*\* (1.01-1.23)** | **1.102\* (0.99-1.22)** | |
| Observations | | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | |
|  | |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Alpha | | 0.211 (0.07-0.64) | 0.197 (0.06-0.65) | 0.131 (0.03-0.65) | 0.147 (0.04-0.61) | 0.110 (0.02-0.67) | 0.095 (0.01-0.77) | |
| Pseudo R-squared | | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 | |
| Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared | | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.32 | |
| Likelihood-Ratio chi2 | | 31.64 | 32.10 | 38.72 | 41.08 | 44.28 | 44.88 | |
| Prob>chi2 | | 0.064 | 0.076 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.005 | 0.006 | |
|  | Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislature between 1990 and 2010. Other control variables not reported here include 18 country dummies. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01. | | | | | | |

**Appendix 6**. *Determinants of the number of inclusive institutional reforms adopted by legislature in Western Europe (1990-2010)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
| Evolution of the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in % | |  | 1.007 (1.00-1.02) |  |  |  | 1.007 (1.00-1.02) | |
| Evolution of the total volatility in % | |  |  | **1.004\*\* (1.00-1.01)** |  | 1.002 (1.00-1.01) | 1.002 (1.00-1.01) | |
| Alternation in government | |  |  |  | **2.426\*\*\* (1.48-3.96)** | **2.151\*\*\* (1.29-3.58)** | **2.050\*\*\* (1.24-3.40)** | |
| Number of parties in the government | | 1.133 (0.82-1.57) | 1.052 (0.76-1.46) | 1.116 (0.86-1.58) | 1.021 (0.76-1.37) | 1.053 (0.79-1.41) | 0.995 (0.74-1.34) | |
| Ideological orientation (ref. cat.: left/center left) | |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| *Right/center-right government*  *Grand Coalition government* | | 0.791 (0.45-1.40)  0.753 (0.31-1.80) | 0.826 (0.48-1.43)  0.673 (0.28-1.59) | 0.749 (0.43-1.29)  0.771 (0.34-1.74) | 0.744 (0.43-1.27)  0.664 (0.29-1.48) | 0.734 (0.43-1.25)  0.693 (0.32-1.50) | 0.763 (0.45-1.28)  0.630 (0.29-1.36) | |
| Growth | | 1.057 (0.93-1.21) | 1.032 (0.90-1.18) | 1.059 (0.93-1.20) | 1.053 (0.93-1.20) | 1.055 (0.93-1.20) | 1.033 (0.91-1.17) | |
| Observations | | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | |
|  | |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Alpha | | 0.203 (0.03-1.21) | 0.130 (0.01-2.12) | 0.077 (0.00-4.98) | 0.067 (0.00-5.65) | 0.02 (0.00-112881) | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | |
| Pseudo R-squared | | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.14 | |
| Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared | | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.31 | |
| Likelihood-Ratio chi2 | | 26.26 | 27.83 | 31.75 | 38.78 | 40.49 | 42.24 | |
| Prob>chi2 | | 0.088 | 0.182 | 0.082 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.012 | |
|  | Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislature between 1990 and 2010. Other control variables not reported here include 18 country dummies. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01. | | | | | | |

**Appendix 7**. *Determinants of the number of substantial institutional reforms adopted by legislature in Western Europe (1990-2010)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
| Evolution of the level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in % | |  | 1.006 (0.99-1.02) |  |  |  | 1.004 (0.99-1.02) | |
| Evolution of the total volatility in % | |  |  | **1.005\*\*\* (1.00-1.01)** |  | **1.004\* (1.00-1.01)** | **1.004\* (1.00-1.01)** | |
| Alternation in government | |  |  |  | **2.799\*\*\* (1.37-5.72)** | **2.397\*\* (1.14-5.05)** | **2.331\*\* (1.10-4.93)** | |
| Number of parties in the government | | 1.317 (0.88-1.97) | 1.265 (0.84-1.90) | 1.451 (0.93-2.26) | 1.206 (0.82-1.78) | 1.305 (0.85-2.00) | 1.262 (0.82-1.95) | |
| Ideological orientation (ref. cat.: left/center left) | |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| *Right/center-right government*  *Grand Coalition government* | | 1.767 (0.84-3.70)  1.237 (0.38-4.02) | 1.833 (0.88-3.84)  1.136 (0.34-3.74) | 1.720 (0.81-3.66)  1.186 (0.37-3.79) | 1.653 (0.79-3.45)  1.002 (0.32-3.10) | 1.685 (0.80-3.56)  1.013 (0.33-3.15 | 1.708 (0.82-3.59)  0.934 (0.29-2.99) | |
| Growth | | 1.001 (0.86-1.17) | 0.978 (0.83-1.14) | 1.009 (0.86-1.18) | 1.013 (0.87-1.18) | 1.015 (0.87-1.19) | 1.000 (0.85-1.18) | |
| Observations | | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | 116 | |
|  | |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Alpha | | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | 0.00 (0.00-0.00) | |
| Pseudo R-squared | | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.18 | |
| Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared | | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.26 | |
| Likelihood-Ratio chi2 | | 23.15 | 23.83 | 29.62 | 31.81 | 35.16 | 35.55 | |
| Prob>chi2 | | 0.336 | 0.356 | 0.100 | 0.081 | 0.050 | 0.046 | |
|  | Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislature between 1990 and 2010. Other control variables not reported here include 18 country dummies. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01. | | | | | | |

(N.B: the complete STATA file is available upon request writing to the author)