Appendix

Appendix A: Measurement

Religious belief question wordings

2016 SSI

- Barna likert scale questions
  - I, personally, have a responsibility to share my beliefs with other people.
  - If a person is generally good, or does enough good things for others during their life, he or she will earn a place in Heaven.
  - When Jesus Christ lived on Earth, He committed sins like other people.
  - My religious faith is very important in my daily life.
  - The Devil, or Satan, is not a living being but is a symbol of evil.
  - I have no doubt that God exists.
- Additional questions that go into the Barna scale
  - Which of the following statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? (The Bible is the actual Word of God to be take literally, word for word; The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in the Bible should be take literally, word for word; The Bible is written by men and is not the Word of God.

2012 Omni Barna Poll

- Have you ever made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important in your life today?

- Which one of these statements best describes your own belief about what will happen to you after you die. [When you die you will go to Heaven because you have tried to obey the 10 Commandments; When you die you will go to Heaven because you are basically a good person; When you die you will go to Heaven because you have confessed your sins and have accepted Jesus Christ as your savior; When you die you will go to Heaven because God loves all people and will not let them perish; When you die you will not go to Heaven; You do not know what will happen after you die.

- There are many different beliefs about God or a higher power. Please choose which one of the following descriptions comes closest to what you, personally, believe about God. [Everyone is god; God is the all-powerful, all-knowing, perfect creator of the universe who rules the world today; God refers to the total realization of personal, human potential; There are many gods, each with different power and authority; God represents a state of higher consciousness that a person may reach; There is so such thing as God.]

- Which one of these statements best describes your own belief about what will happen to you after you die. [When you die you will go to Heaven because you have tried to obey the 10 Commandments. When you die you will go to Heaven because you are basically a good person. When you die you will go to Heaven because you have confessed your sins and have accepted Jesus Christ as your savior; When you die you will go to Heaven because God loves all people and will not let them perish; When you die you will not go to Heaven; You don't know what will happen after you die.]

- Likert scale

  - The Bible is totally accurate in all of the principles it teaches.
  - You, personally, have a responsibility to tell other people your religious beliefs.
  - Your religious faith is very important in your life.

  - The devil, or Satan, is not a living being but is a symbol of evil.
  - When He lived on earth, Jesus Christ was human and committed sins, like other people.

Other SSI survey questions

Other religiosity questions

- Not counting weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
- How often, if ever, do you pray by yourself?
- And aside from attending services, are you involved in any special activities, programs, volunteer work, committees, or small groups in your religious community?
- Please mark whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Most of my friends are part of my religious community.
- Extrinsic religiosity
  - While I am a religious person, I do not let religion influence my daily life.
  - Occasionally, I compromise my religious beliefs to protect my social and economic being.
  - One reason for me going to church is that it helps establish me in the community.
  - I go to church because it helps me to feel at home in my neighborhood.
  - One reason for me praying is that it helps me to gain relief and protection.
  - I pray chiefly because it makes me feel better.
- Intrinsic religiosity
  - My religious beliefs really shape my whole approach to life.
  - I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.

  - I allow almost nothing to prevent me from going to church on Sundays.
  - The church is most important to me as a place to share fellowship with other Christians.
  - I stay at home because it helps me to be aware of God's presence.
  - I pray chiefly because it deepens my relationship with God.
- Quest religiosity
  - I was driven to ask religious questions by a growing awareness of the tensions in my world.
  - My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious beliefs.
  - I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
  - For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.
  - As I grow and change, I expect my religion to grow and change as well.
  - I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.

Predispositions, outlooks, and attitudes

- Likert scale statements
  - We need to protect traditional American values from foreign influence.
  - Please mark whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The right of religious liberty is under threat in America today.
  - Symbolic racism
    * Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

    * Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
  - Populism
    * What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.
    * The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
    * The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
    * Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
  - Social Dominance Orientation
    * There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, and political factions. We want to know your views about groups in general. For each statement, select a number from 1 (extremely oppose) to 10 (extremely support) to show your opinion.
      · In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.
      · We should not push for group equality.
      · Group equality should be our ideal.
      · Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

- In December, do you think stores and businesses should greet their customers by saying 'Merry Christmas', or do you think stores and businesses should use less religious phrases such as 'happy holidays' and 'season's greetings'?
- How big a problem is sexism in our society today?
- Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are on one

end of the scale, at point 1. Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on the scale?

- There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Below is a short list of opinions. Which one of these options best agrees with your views? [By law, abortion should never be permitted; The law should permit abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger; The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established; By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.]

- As you may know, the Affordable Care Act, also referred to as Obamacare, was signed into law in 2010. Given what you know about the Affordable Care Act, do you have a generally favorable or generally unfavorable opinion of it?

- There has been much talk recently about whether gays and lesbians should have the legal right to marry someone of the same sex. Which of the following options comes closest to your position on this issue? [I support full marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples; I support civil unions or domestic partnerships, but not gay marriage; I do not support any form of legal recognition of the relationships of gay and lesbian couples]

- Political efficacy

  - How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?

  - In general, do you think the best candidates win the elections or is it just the candidates who raise the most money that get elected, or something in between?

  - In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Do you believe presidential elections in the United States are generally...

- Authoritarian Personality

  - Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. For each pair, choose which one you think is **more important** for a child to have:

    * Independence; Respect for their elders
    * Good manners; Curiosity
    * Obedience; Self-reliance
    * Being considerate; Being well-behaved

Measuring evangelicals

The main text describes three common ways of measuring evangelicals in surveys: self-identification, religious denomination, and religious beliefs. Each strategy of measuring evangelicals has advantages and drawbacks. While the most obvious benefit to a single self-identification question is its ease and convenience (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 1999), there are other theoretical reasons to employ this line of questioning. First, there is a great deal of diversity both between denominations that make up a religious tradition as well as between congregations of the same denomination (see Djupe and Calfano (2014) and Djupe and Gilbert (2009) for a more detailed discussion of this critique). It would therefore be a mistake to assume that just because a person belongs to a certain church that she is exposed to specific messages or interacts with a certain type of person. Second, when respondents self-identify as a born-again or evangelical Christians they are adopting an identity, whereas they passively receive evangelical denominational identities when researchers classify them based church affiliation. Therefore, researchers can use the born-again Christian measure as an identity measure as they can be certain, rather than assume, the respondent holds a particular identification.

That said, it is easy to question whether a simple yes/no question can accurately classify individuals into a religious camp, especially in light of the fact that non-Protestants can and do identify as evangelicals on surveys. On the other hand, self-identification as an evangelical allows individuals to express their "identification with a movement" (Lindsay and Hackett 2008) and allows researchers to account for the heterogeneity across religious denominations within a broad religious family or even across churches within a single denomination (Djupe and Calfano 2015; Djupe and Gilbert 2009), as aspects of evangelical theology and practice appear within some mainline churches (Wilcox and Larson 2006). Identifying respondents based on religious denomination has the benefit of relying on official church doctrine and objective classification by trained scholars. Additionally, whereas survey respondents may have motivations separate from religion–such as politics–to self identify as

an evangelical or born-again Christian or not (Margolis 2018), church membership may be less vulnerable to this sort of expressive responding. This strategy, however, raises scholarly debates about the classification scheme (see Burge and Lewis 2017; Steensland et al. 2000). But, as discussed above, differences among denominations within a religious tradition as well as among churches in a specific denominations both impact the classification scheme, possibly categorizing some as mainline who might be more appropriately considered to be evangelical and vice versa. Additionally, the classification scheme is quite specific, with for example, the American Baptist Association being classified as evangelical and the American Baptist Churches USA being classified as mainline churches. It is difficult for scholars to measure the amount of measurement error present, as even multi-wave surveys usually only ask religious denomination once. But the General Social Survey ran a panel study in 2006 and 2008 in which religious denomination was asked in both waves. Approximately 30% of self-identified Protestants changed their denomination in a two-year period. While some of these changes may reflect true changes in affiliation, many of these changes are between denominations with similar names. Moreover, the sharp increase in non-denominational churches as well as the increasing number of Christians who choose not to identify with a specific denomination make classifying larger groups of people more difficult. And while classifying evangelicals based on their beliefs circumvents the issue that researchers do not know exactly what sort of church an evangelical–classified through their denominational affiliation–actually attends, this strategy raises questions surrounding which beliefs are so fundamental to evangelicalism that individuals can be classified as evangelical or not based on these views. Moreover, focusing solely on beliefs might miss individuals who identify as an evangelical and view themselves as part of the evangelical team, despite not adhering to all the requisite beliefs.

Validating the belief scale measure

Has "evangelical" lost its religious meaning?

One explanation for why evangelicals are so politically cohesive is because the term evangelical is devoid of religious meaning. Instead, the term "evangelical" operates as a cultural or political label in the United States, signaling something about a person's culture, values, and politics that is separate from religion. To investigate this claim, I use the additive scale of religious beliefs from the 2016 SSI data to answer a series of descriptive questions. In contrast to the claims that most self-identified evangelicals do not hold evangelical beliefs or that evangelicalism is a religiously meaningless term today, I find ample evidence that self-identified evangelicals maintain an evangelical worldview.

First, do white self-identified evangelicals hold religious beliefs associated with the Barna Group's conception of evangelicalism? The top-left panel Figure A1 shows the distribution of the number of religious beliefs that self-identified white evangelicals hold.[26] Two trends are immediately evident, which arguably muddle the interpretation of these data. On the one hand, there is a noticeable left skew in these data. Only 13% of the sample hold two religious beliefs or fewer, and 44% hold six or seven beliefs. The strong skew in the data can be interpreted as evidence that the term evangelical retains much of its religious meaning. On the other hand, there is also a second peak in the middle of the distribution, with 24% holding four beliefs. In particular, many of the self-ascribed evangelicals in this category accept the arguably "easy" beliefs that are accepted by many non-evangelicals–such as agreeing that God exists and reporting that faith is important–while not accepting the more uniquely evangelical beliefs surrounding views about Jesus living a sinless life, that good deeds alone are not enough to earn a place in heaven, and the importance of sharing one's religious beliefs with others. These results offer merit to the claims that the term

[26]The distributions look similar when using a denominational classification to classify white evangelicals. The main text focuses on self-identified evangelicals, as it is the self use of the label "evangelical" that is currently being questioned by academics and media pundits. These distributions rely on weighted data but do not include the evangelical oversample. Unweighted data produce substantively identical results.

evangelical has become a term that denotes Christians who respect religion and God but without adhering to some of the main tenets of evangelicalism.

Second, what do these distributions look like for non-white evangelicals and white non-evangelical Christians? While the emphasis in the paper is on white evangelicals, non-white evangelicals represent an important comparison group in assessing whether or not "evangelical" remains a religious term. If, for example, virtually all non-white evangelicals hold all the religious beliefs laid out by the Barna Group, then the distribution of white evangelicals' beliefs would look even less impressive by comparison. This, in turn, would further give credence to the idea that white Americans have adopted the evangelical label for reasons separate from religion. The top-right panel of Figure A1 presents the distribution of beliefs among non-white evangelicals using white bars with black outlines.[27] Non-white evangelicals, as it turns out, look similar in their distribution of evangelical beliefs to white evangelicals. It is also worthwhile to look at the distribution of beliefs among white people who identify as Protestant or Christian but do *not* consider themselves to be evangelical. It would be reasonable to question the Barna Group's evangelical classification strategy if it turned out that white non-evangelicals, who are nonetheless Christians, hold similar beliefs to white evangelicals. The dark gray boxes in the top-right panel show the distribution of beliefs among white non-evangelicals and reveal a skew in the opposite direction: The most common number of religious beliefs is one, 91% hold four beliefs or fewer, and just shy of 4% hold six or seven evangelical beliefs. The sharp contrast in distributions between white evangelicals and white non-evangelicals illustrates that the scale differentiates self-identified evangelicals and non-evangelical Christians with respect to their religious beliefs.[28] Table A1 in the

[27]This group includes African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. Separate distributions for each of the three racial and ethnic groups produce similar trends to the full non-white group.

[28]These results also offer a response to those who criticize the classification of evangelicals based holding certain beliefs on the grounds that the beliefs are not unique to evangelical traditions (e.g., Gloege 2018). While this is certainly true and non-evangelicals–both when classified by self-identification and denomination–hold some of these beliefs, evangelicals are much more likely to accept these beliefs. So while there may be theoretical reasons to be worried about this measurement strategy, the empirical results indicate a strong correlation between these beliefs and membership in evangelical communities. These findings comport with Fea (2018) who recognizes that each individual feature may not be unique to evangelicalism, the combination of these beliefs paints a uniquely evangelical profile.

Appendix presents the results from regression models comparing the number of evangelical beliefs held for white evangelicals, white non-evangelicals, and non-white evangelicals. These results show that the gap between white evangelical Christians and white non-evangelicals (but still Christians) remains even after controlling for a host of socio-demographic, religious, and political characteristics. The small gap in which white evangelicals hold, on average, more religious beliefs than non-white evangelicals (difference in average number of beliefs = 0.39; p-value = 0.052) disappears once various control indicators are included in the model.

Third, would classifying evangelicals based on religious denomination change our understanding about the distribution of beliefs among white evangelicals? Perhaps the ease with which one can self-identify as an evangelical means that evangelicals–classified based on where people attend church–will yield a more religious subsample. While a plurality of those who identify as an evangelical or belong to an evangelical denomination would actually be considered an evangelical using either classification strategy (48%), roughly similar percentages of respondents–26%–self-identify without belonging to an evangelical denomination and belong to an evangelical denomination without self-identifying as an evangelical. That scholars would categorize different people as evangelical using the different classifications schemes lends credibility to the claim that the problem lies in pollsters tendency to use a simple, catch-all self-identification question for measurement.[29] The bottom-left panel of Figure A1 addresses this possibility by looking at subsamples of respondents who would be considered evangelical under one classification scheme but not the other. Here, the white bars with black outline represent respondents who call themselves evangelical but do not belong to a religious denomination that scholars would classify as evangelical (N=118). The gray bars denote the opposite: those who belong to an evangelical denomination but do not self-identify (N=98). The divergent trends highlight that evangelicals classified by denomi-

[29]Scholars have previously shown that despite there being differences in who calls themselves evangelicals on a survey and who scholars classify as evangelical using a scholarly coding scheme (such as Steensland et al.'s (2000) RELTRAD), the groups look similar in their social and political outlooks (Burge and Lewis 2017). The SSI data similarly show that the distributions of beliefs among self-identified evangelicals and evangelicals classified based on denomination produce similar distributions of beliefs.

nation alone actually hold fewer religious beliefs, on average, than self-identified evangelicals who do not belong to an evangelical denomination.[30] While it is difficult to say why this result appears–it may be due to measurement error of religious denominations or real differences across members of these different groups–the data rule out that the self-identification measure is to blame for the term evangelical losing its religious meaning.

And fourth, what is the partisan breakdown of religious beliefs among evangelicals? While the emphasis is usually placed on white evangelicals and their close relationship with the Republican Party, roughly one-third of white self-identified evangelicals in the SSI data identify as Democrats or Democratic leaners.[31] Knowing the distribution of beliefs for Democratic and Republican evangelicals can further help us evaluate the claim that the term evangelical has become devoid of religious meaning, instead becoming a term for cultural conservatives or Christian Republicans. The bottom-right panel of Figure A1 presents the distribution of beliefs among self-identified Democrats (gray bars) and Republicans (white bar with black outlines) who also self-identify as evangelicals. The distributions clearly look different for Democrats and Republicans. First, Democrats have a single high peak at four beliefs. Looking back at the distribution of full sample of white evangelicals (top-left panel), it becomes clear that most of the people in this bin are Democrats. The distribution of beliefs among the Republican subsample, on the other hand, shows a stark skew toward holding a large number of beliefs: the most populated bin consists of holding all seven beliefs and 60% of white evangelical Republicans hold six or seven beliefs. In contrast, only about 10% hold two beliefs or fewer. This result calls into question the claim that "evangelical" has become a purely political term that Republicans who believe in God and respect religion have adopted. While these results cannot rule out the possibility that Republicans adopted the evangelical label for political reasons and then subsequently internalized the corresponding beliefs, the results do not support the claim that there are many *nominal* evangelical Republicans, those

[30]Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals who both self-identify and are part of evangelical denominations hold, on average, a greater number of religious beliefs. Two-thirds hold either six or seven beliefs. In contrast, only about 15% hold three beliefs or fewer.

[31]N=115 in the sample that excludes the evangelical oversample.

who self-identify but have not accepted the corresponding beliefs.

These results present important descriptive results showing that evangelicalism has not lost its religious meaning and that nominal evangelicals are more prevalent among Democrats, casting doubt on the claim that evangelicalism merely denotes culturally conservative Republicans in today's society.

Figure A1: "Evangelical" maintains a religious meaning



Note: The dependent variable is the number of beliefs held using a modified seven-item scale created by the Barna Group to identify evangelical respondents. The top-left panel includes all white respondents who reported "identifying as an evangelical or born-again Christian." The top-right panel includes white respondents who do not self identify as evangelical or born again but identify as Protestant or Christian (gray boxes) and non-white respondents who self-identify as evangelical or born again (white boxes with black outlines). The bottom-left panel includes white respondents who would be classified as evangelical using either the denominational or self-identification approaches, but not both. The bottom-right panel includes white self-identifying evangelicals who identify as Democrat (gray boxes) or Republican (white boxes with black outlines). These distributions represent weighted data from the main survey without the evangelical oversample.
Source: 2016 SSI

While the findings from Figure A1 in the main text tell us something specific about the relationship between holding an evangelical label and accepting specific religious beliefs, these findings rely on scholars (such as Bebbington (1989)), religious umbrella organizations (such as the NAE), and Christian polling companies (such as LifeWay Research and the Barna Group) who claim that evangelicalism should be a belief-based classification. Scholars, however, may prefer to distinguish among self-identified evangelicals empirically using other measures. For example, researchers might think that religious behaviors–the frequency with which people attend church or pray–are important measures when trying to identify cultural evangelicals from the highly devout. Alternatively, scholars may want to measure evangelicalism based on involvement in the evangelical sub-culture and therefore might care about whether people are involved in their churches (outside of attending religious services) or whether most of their friends are the same religion. These are all reasonable ways a researcher may want to distinguish between evangelicals who are deep in the religious fold versus more nominal evangelicals.

Importantly, however, these variables correlate with the Barna Group's belief scale, as shown in Figure A2. For example, self-identified white evangelicals who attend church weekly or more are more likely to hold a greater number of evangelical beliefs than those who attend rarely (an average of five beliefs versus three). Similar trends appear for questions that measure frequency of prayer, involvement in church groups, and the number of friends who share the respondents' religious beliefs. This result is perhaps not surprising if we think that different forms of religiosity likely reinforce each other. For example, those who attend church frequently are more likely to be invited to join a church group or to participate in the Bible study, and people who pray often may come to be more involved in their church communities. A similar logic applies to holding evangelical beliefs: people may come to adopt these beliefs through their involvement in their religious communities or they may change their levels of involvement in their religious communities on account of holding certain beliefs.

As such, the correlations found between holding evangelical beliefs and various po-

litical attitudes can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, holding evangelical beliefs (or not) can distinguish *true* or strict evangelical Christians from their nominal or cultural counterparts. This interpretation–adopted by Christian research groups such as Barna and LifeWay Research as well as the NAE–uses beliefs as the important distinguishing feature in identifying evangelical Christians. A second interpretation is that holding evangelical beliefs is a proxy for, rather than a clear indicator of, evangelical identity. A measurement based on belief, by virtue of being strongly correlated with other plausible measures of evangelical identity strength, can be interpreted as a variable that indirectly measures evangelical identity.[32]

The four panels of Figure A2 look at church attendance, prayer, church involvement, and having friends of the same religion for self-identified white evangelicals, white non-evangelicals (who nonetheless identify as Christian or Protestant) and non-white evangelicals. Two important trends emerge. First, the positive correlation that exists between other measures of religiosity and average number of beliefs held exists among these other subgroups. Religious behaviors and involvement in a religious community are both positively correlated with private religious beliefs, even among non-evangelicals. But the second trend highlights that evangelicals are distinct on account of their beliefs. For example, white evangelicals who report rarely or never attending church hold more of the Barna religious beliefs, on average, than non-evangelical Christians who attend church weekly. Similarly, those white evangelicals who are not involved in church activities and strongly disagree with the statement that most of their friends are part of their religious communities hold a greater number of beliefs than those non-evangelical Christians who are very involved in church activities and report that most of their friends are part of their religious communities. These trends indicate that evangelicals, even those who scholars would not otherwise classify as religious, hold beliefs and outlooks that are distinct from non-evangelicals, even those who are religious involved. While these findings do not negate the importance of religious behav-

[32]With either interpretation, models controlling for other measures of religiosity help rule out that another measure of religious identification actually represents the key association between evangelicalism and politics.

iors and involvement in politics, they highlight that beliefs represent an important part of evangelical identity and that beliefs seem to separate evangelicals from non-evangelicals.

Figure A2: Validating measure



Note: The dependent variable is the average number of religious beliefs held, which can range between 0 and 7. The various religious measures which make up the independent variables are: church attendance (top-left panel), frequency of prayer (top-right panel), level of involvement in church separate from services (bottom-left panel), and agreement with a statement about whether most of the respondents' friends are part of their religious communities (bottom-right). Within each panel, the first set of bars represents the results for self-identified white evangelicals, the second set of bars represent the results for white non-evangelicals who nonetheless identify as Protestant or Christian, and the third set of bars represent the results for non-white evangelicals.
Source: 2016 SSI.

Table A1 presents the analyses described in the main text comparing the average number of religious beliefs held for white evangelicals, white non-evangelicals, and non-white evangelicals. White non-evangelicals, despite still identifying as Christian or Protestant, hold fewer beliefs on average than white evangelicals. This relationship holds even when including demographic, religious, and political control variables in the models. Non-white evangelicals, on the other hand, look similar in the average number of religious beliefs held relative to white evangelicals.

Table A1: White evangelicals are more likely to hold evangelical beliefs

	Number of beliefs held (0-7)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
White non-evangelicals	-2.37*	-2.31*	-1.08*	-0.98*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Non-white evangelicals	-0.39*	-0.33	-0.22	-0.09
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Intercept	4.61*	2.67*	1.34*	0.48
	(0.10)	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.66)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
religious controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
political controls	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.265	0.316	0.577	0.614
Observations	774	744	644	562

Note: Coefficients represent the difference in the average number of beliefs held for white non-evangelicals and non-white evangelicals relative to white self-identified evangelicals, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of beliefs held using a modified Barna evangelical belief scale. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. Religious controls include: church attendance and frequency of prayer. Political controls include party identification and ideology. † < 0.10; * < 0.05
Source: 2016 SSI.

Appendix B: 2016 electoral results (SSI sample)

Sample sizes in various SSI subsamples

Table B1: Sample size

	full sample (no oversample)	white evangelical (no oversample)	white evangelical (w/ oversample)	white evan Rep (no oversample)	white evan Rep (w/oversample)
0	126	11	14	5	8
1	205	15	29	4	13
2	244	30	45	14	21
3	282	38	60	14	21
4	382	79	132	29	46
5	215	37	85	16	46
6	260	62	162	37	110
7	326	80	248	68	210
Total	2040	352	775	187	475

Note: The columns consist of sample sizes.

Source: 2016 SSI.

Replication of results

Figure B1: Evangelicals beliefs and 2016 vote choice (alternative binning strategies)



Note: The panels present the weighted distribution of general election preferences among self-identified white evangelicals in the 2016 SSI data, including the evangelical oversample. Each panel presents a slightly different binning strategy.
Source: 2016 SSI

Figure 1 in the main text presents both raw trends as well as findings that come from regression models that include control variables. Despite the evangelical over sample, it is reasonable to be concerned about the number of respondents in each belief category and whether the results appear due to just a handful of people. This concern is valid as there are not a large number of white self-identified evangelicals in each bin: 58 in two beliefs or fewer, 29 in three beliefs, 54 in four beliefs, 61 in five beliefs, 138 in six beliefs, and 248 in seven beliefs. Figure B1 replicates these raw results using different binning strategies in order to show that the results are robust to having a greater number of bins (top-left panel) or fewer bins that group the beliefs together in different ways (top-right, bottom-left, and bottom-right). Having a greater number of bins has the benefit that the results do not appear on account of the researcher's decision about how to collapse the scale but has the drawback of there being a small number of respondents in certain bins. Having fewer bins results in an opposite set of concerns. Finding similar trends using alternative binning strategies should strengthen our confidence in the results.

Tables such as B2 present the parametric results associated with the figures from the main text. In general, the estimates are OLS regressions and standard errors are in parentheses. Column 1 presents a model without any control variables and only includes the ordered religious belief scale. Coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. The second column includes the following demographic control variables: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. The third column also includes church attendance and frequency of prayer as religious controls. The fourth column includes political variables, namely, binary indicators of party identification and ideology. Identifying as a Democrat and liberal serve as the partisan and ideological reference category, respectively. The fifth column adds in a whole host of additional traits, outlooks, and beliefs that are likely associated with both religious and political attitudes. Racial conservatism is based on two questions from the symbolic racism

scale (Henry and Sears 2002; Tarman and Sears 2004). A social dominance orientation scale (Pratto et al. 2012) measures respondents' preference for hierarchy and adherence to a social order. A four-item parenting battery that asks whether it is preferable for children to be independent or respectful serves as a measure of authoritarian tendencies (Ehrenfreund 2016; Feldman and Stenner 1997). The populist attitudes are measured using a modified four-item scale (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016). The political efficacy measure uses three questions that come from the NAES / ISCAP study asking about whether the government is responsive to the people. The sexism question asks respondents to indicate how large of a problem sexism currently is in today's society, which ranges from "not at all" to "a big problem". Finally, the external threat includes a question that asks respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: "We need to protect traditional American values from foreign influence." The final column presents the results specifically for the sub-sample of white evangelicals who are also Republicans.

Importantly, it is not clear whether all of these control variables are appropriate. If, for example, religious beliefs encourage a person to identify as a Republican or Democrat, then it is inappropriate to control for party identification as it is post-treatment. Doing so will produce a biased estimate of the relationship between religious beliefs and political support. The same logic goes for the politically relevant traits and outlooks. If holding beliefs associated with evangelicalism causes these people to hold certain views about obedience and hierarchy, then it would again be a mistake to include these control variables in the model. If, however, having certain traits or worldviews shapes which religious beliefs a person holds, then it is quite important to include the controls in the model. To account for this uncertainty, the tables incorporate different sorts of models incrementally, which allows readers to see how the inclusion of different variables changes the results.

Table B2: Support for Trump

	Self-identified evangelicals					Evangelical & Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Religious beliefs						
4 beliefs	-7.17	-7.10	-5.26	7.19†	7.13†	4.23
	(6.01)	(6.03)	(6.21)	(3.80)	(3.89)	(5.80)
5 beliefs	19.37*	14.61*	16.71*	13.27*	12.71*	14.62*
	(7.02)	(7.12)	(7.36)	(4.53)	(4.53)	(5.83)
6 beliefs	27.56*	17.93*	20.65*	9.62*	8.57*	16.00*
	(6.12)	(6.18)	(6.67)	(4.07)	(4.09)	(5.08)
7 beliefs	42.96*	31.55*	34.59*	9.15*	7.98†	13.41*
	(5.32)	(5.64)	(6.42)	(4.09)	(4.11)	(4.95)
Religious controls						
Church attendance			0.87	1.03	1.13	0.45
			(2.02)	(1.24)	(1.25)	(1.54)
Frequency of prayer			-2.75	-2.27*	-2.26*	-1.46
			(1.85)	(1.13)	(1.14)	(1.41)
Political controls						
Independent				80.10*	77.44*	
				(7.40)	(7.54)	
Republican				77.14*	74.68*	
				(3.05)	(3.26)	
Moderate				10.97*	10.07*	6.97
				(3.75)	(3.80)	(6.55)
Conservative				13.66*	12.30*	10.81†
				(3.57)	(3.62)	(6.00)
Other outlooks						
Racial conservatism					9.64†	6.06
					(5.78)	(6.77)
Hierarchy & status					5.38	3.10
					(5.96)	(6.26)
Obedience & submission					5.91	4.70
					(5.39)	(6.15)
Populist attitudes					7.31	12.85
					(7.27)	(8.29)
Sexism					4.79	1.59
					(4.18)	(4.70)
External threat					-2.12	2.03
					(4.70)	(6.27)
Intercept	45.63*	60.82*	59.23*	-7.39	-19.20	42.20*
	(4.26)	(22.54)	(23.21)	(14.33)	(14.99)	(17.32)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.179	0.261	0.265	0.749	0.754	0.159
Observations	548	525	525	502	502	316

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who self identify as evangelical or born again. Belief coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05

Source: 2016 SSI.

Table B3 replicates the main electoral results from the paper but use a denominational classification scheme to identify evangelicals rather than through a self-identification question. The results are substantively similar to the self-identification question, indicating that the broader trend about the association between number of beliefs held and support for Trump is robust to both main strategies used to classify evangelicals.

Table B3: Support for Trump

	White evangelicals (by denomination)					Evangelical & Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Religious beliefs						
4 beliefs	0.01	8.15	7.51	12.22*	12.88*	7.61
	(6.69)	(6.71)	(7.11)	(4.42)	(4.48)	(5.85)
5 beliefs	21.04*	24.14*	23.24*	13.35*	13.35*	14.30*
	(7.98)	(8.11)	(8.53)	(5.30)	(5.24)	(5.97)
6 beliefs	25.17*	23.47*	22.41*	10.53*	9.65*	17.57*
	(6.45)	(6.44)	(7.17)	(4.50)	(4.47)	(5.14)
7 beliefs	36.67*	34.84*	33.50*	9.19*	8.26†	13.73*
	(5.41)	(5.60)	(6.83)	(4.41)	(4.43)	(4.91)
Religious controls						
Church attendance			0.94	0.07	0.09	0.32
			(2.43)	(1.53)	(1.53)	(1.79)
Frequency of prayer			0.06	-0.87	-0.60	-1.73
			(2.01)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.44)
Political controls						
Independent				84.36*	80.45*	
				(8.24)	(8.21)	
Republican				76.13*	70.44*	
				(3.49)	(3.70)	
Moderate				13.76*	12.21*	20.87*
				(4.42)	(4.37)	(7.17)
Conservative				11.88*	9.47*	14.50*
				(4.36)	(4.34)	(6.78)
Other outlooks						
Racial conservatism					21.75*	11.85
					(6.61)	(7.22)
Hierarchy & status					8.50	-0.09
					(6.49)	(6.54)
Obedience & submission					3.82	-1.99
					(5.73)	(6.10)
Populist attitudes					3.88	7.56
					(7.82)	(8.46)
Sexism					2.72	4.14
					(4.57)	(4.80)
External threat					1.55	7.05
					(5.18)	(6.32)
Intercept	51.46*	73.03*	70.71*	7.86	-8.15	37.99*
	(4.22)	(24.67)	(25.34)	(15.69)	(16.22)	(17.52)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	448	428	428	409	409	278
R^2	0.124	0.227	0.228	0.726	0.739	0.204

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who belong to an evangelical denomination according to the RELTRAD coding scheme (Steensland et al. 2000). Belief coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05

Source: 2016 SSI.

Primary results

Figure B2 replicates the distributions presented in the main text of the paper using an alternative binning strategy (top row) and a classification strategy that relies on denominational affiliation and the Steensland et al (2000) coding scheme to identify evangelicals (middle and bottom rows). Tables B4 and B5 present the primary results from parametric models using both a self-identification and denominational approach to measure evangelicals. Tables B6 and B7 present the general election results among those white evangelical Republicans who wanted a candidate other than Trump to be the nominee.

Figure B2: Distribution of primary support and general election support among those who wanted someone other than Trump to be the nominee



Note: The top row of panels replicates the main findings from the text using an alternative binning strategy. The top-left panel presents the distribution of primary election preferences among self-identified white evangelical Republicans in the 2016 SSI data, including the evangelical oversample. The top-right panel presents the distribution of general election preferences among those individuals who wanted someone other than Trump to be the nominee. The middle set of panels replicates the main findings from the text using religious denomination (Steensland et al. 2000) to identify evangelicals. The bottom set of panels replicates the denominational findings using an alternative binning strategy.
Source: 2016 SSI

Table B4: Support for Trump in primary

	self-identified evangelical Republicans				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religious beliefs					
4 beliefs	4.17	4.57	4.65	1.30	-0.33
	(8.06)	(8.44)	(8.57)	(8.87)	(8.96)
5 beliefs	-14.42†	-14.53†	-14.13	-10.82	-11.76
	(8.12)	(8.60)	(8.89)	(9.26)	(9.24)
6 beliefs	-15.66*	-15.02*	-13.30†	-11.36	-11.62
	(6.55)	(6.83)	(7.56)	(7.89)	(7.90)
7 beliefs	-20.00*	-20.79*	-18.27*	-17.67*	-19.39*
	(5.97)	(6.40)	(7.50)	(7.89)	(7.91)
Religious controls					
Church attendance			-4.29†	-3.51	-2.92
			(2.28)	(2.37)	(2.38)
Frequency of prayer			1.37	1.02	0.47
			(2.10)	(2.15)	(2.17)
Political controls					
Moderate				-2.36	-0.38
				(10.04)	(10.09)
Conservative				-3.66	-4.51
				(9.27)	(9.40)
Other outlooks					
Racial conservatism					6.59
					(9.92)
Hierarchy & status					-4.99
					(9.66)
Obedience & submission					13.18
					(9.30)
Populist attitudes					9.58
					(12.61)
Sexism					9.15
					(7.24)
External threat					19.58*
					(9.39)
Intercept	33.93*	-9.77	-1.33	-7.45	-24.58
	(5.28)	(21.41)	(21.92)	(23.53)	(24.81)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.045	0.082	0.090	0.092	0.125
Observations	444	424	424	404	403

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who self identify as evangelical or born again. Belief coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05

Source: 2016 SSI.

Table B5: Support for Trump in primary

	White evangelicals (by denomination)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religious beliefs					
4 beliefs	1.17	5.47	3.78	-0.51	0.01
	(8.32)	(8.56)	(8.96)	(9.38)	(9.47)
5 beliefs	-10.95	-7.09	-7.72	-7.24	-6.85
	(8.47)	(8.89)	(9.32)	(9.55)	(9.50)
6 beliefs	-17.35*	-14.23*	-15.53*	-13.81†	-10.60
	(6.67)	(6.75)	(7.80)	(8.22)	(8.23)
7 beliefs	-24.31*	-21.26*	-22.50*	-21.82*	-19.48*
	(5.94)	(6.18)	(7.69)	(8.12)	(8.14)
Religious controls					
Church attendance			-2.55	-2.55	-3.31
			(2.67)	(2.77)	(2.79)
Frequency of prayer			2.35	2.70	2.23
			(2.20)	(2.28)	(2.27)
Political controls					
Moderate				0.20	-1.54
				(11.78)	(11.72)
Conservative				-5.13	-6.14
				(11.10)	(11.14)
Other outlooks					
Racial conservatism					11.67
					(10.68)
Hierarchy & status					-21.52*
					(10.49)
Obedience & submission					12.43
					(9.53)
Populist attitudes					8.52
					(13.31)
Sexism					14.36†
					(7.73)
External threat					9.74
					(9.64)
Intercept	36.67*	27.82	30.19	28.10	17.89
	(5.14)	(22.35)	(22.92)	(25.41)	(26.41)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.060	0.134	0.138	0.139	0.176
Observations	398	377	377	360	360

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who belong to an evangelical denomination according to the RELTRAD coding scheme (Steensland et al. 2000). Belief coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05
Source: 2016 SSI.

Table B6: Support for Trump in general election

	self-identified evangelical Republicans Trump not preferred candidate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religious beliefs					
4 beliefs	13.12*	7.86	7.44	6.15	4.51
	(7.62)	(8.48)	(8.65)	(8.32)	(8.53)
5 beliefs	30.77**	28.26**	27.77**	21.05**	21.30**
	(6.99)	(7.63)	(7.79)	(7.92)	(8.11)
6 beliefs	26.85**	25.04**	24.22**	22.97**	21.73**
	(5.89)	(6.44)	(6.95)	(6.90)	(6.95)
7 beliefs	27.07**	24.49**	23.66**	18.83**	17.40**
	(5.23)	(5.88)	(6.55)	(6.64)	(6.76)
Religious controls					
Church attendance			-0.30	-0.18	-0.48
			(2.04)	(1.98)	(2.04)
Frequency of prayer			0.67	-0.33	-0.60
			(1.88)	(1.82)	(1.86)
Political controls					
Moderate				7.35	7.43
				(8.67)	(8.94)
Conservative				17.57**	16.96**
				(7.81)	(8.02)
Other outlooks					
Racial conservatism					2.10
					(8.95)
Hierarchy & status					12.20
					(7.81)
Obedience & submission					5.07
					(7.59)
Populist attitudes					14.40
					(10.45)
Sexism					-0.08
					(6.50)
External threat					1.06
					(8.50)
Intercept	69.23**	47.55**	47.47**	46.75**	33.32
	(4.79)	(18.64)	(19.49)	(19.39)	(20.58)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.118	0.193	0.193	0.228	0.245
Observations	252	238	238	230	230

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who self identify as evangelical or born again. Belief coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05

Source: 2016 SSI.

Table B7: Support for Trump in general election

	evangelical Republicans (by denomination) Trump not preferred candidate				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religious beliefs					
4 beliefs	21.90*	19.57*	18.96*	16.16*	16.51*
	(7.67)	(8.37)	(8.56)	(7.90)	(8.03)
5 beliefs	28.57*	27.64*	27.44*	19.01*	18.87*
	(7.24)	(7.99)	(8.23)	(7.70)	(7.83)
6 beliefs	26.13*	25.05*	24.48*	20.94*	19.50*
	(5.88)	(6.21)	(6.82)	(6.49)	(6.57)
7 beliefs	24.37*	21.10*	20.48*	15.57*	14.22*
	(5.04)	(5.50)	(6.48)	(6.19)	(6.27)
Religious controls					
Church attendance			-0.64	-1.75	-1.37
			(2.46)	(2.36)	(2.43)
Frequency of prayer			0.83	-0.08	-0.41
			(2.00)	(1.86)	(1.87)
Political controls					
Moderate				35.93*	35.22*
				(9.30)	(9.40)
Conservative				34.11*	32.83*
				(8.69)	(8.80)
Other outlooks					
Racial conservatism					6.62
					(8.96)
Hierarchy & status					11.47
					(7.68)
Obedience & submission					0.65
					(7.30)
Populist attitudes					15.19
					(10.23)
Sexism					3.39
					(6.21)
External threat					3.48
					(8.29)
Intercept	71.43*	31.70	31.93	23.59	7.94
	(4.53)	(19.85)	(20.59)	(19.44)	(20.49)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.112	0.228	0.229	0.275	0.305
Observations	221	208	208	200	200

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who belong to an evangelical denomination according to the RELTRAD coding scheme (Steensland et al. 2000). Belief coefficients represent the difference in the support for Donald Trump relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05
Source: 2016 SSI.

Appendix C: 2012 Barna Omni Poll results

Figure C1 presents the distribution of beliefs among those who have "made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important today". These trends in these data corroborate the results from the SSI data presented in the main text of the paper.

Figure C1: Distribution of religious beliefs in the Barna poll



Note: The dependent variable is the number of beliefs held using the eight-point scale created by the Barna Group to identify evangelical respondents. There is no evangelical self-identification question, rather self-identification is measured by a question asking whether respondents "have ever made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important in your life today."The top panel presents the distribution of religious beliefs for all those who say that they have made this personal commitment to Jesus Christ. The middle panel presents the distribution of religious beliefs among white non-evangelicals (gray boxes) and non-white evangelicals (white boxes with black lines). Respondents who did not report having made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ did not receive a question asking respondents their beliefs about what happens after dying. As such, the belief scale for those who have not made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ ranges from 0 to 7 (gray boxes in middle panel), whereas the scale for those who answered in the affirmative have a scale that ranges from 0 to 8. The bottom panel presents the distribution of religious beliefs among Democratic evangelicals (gray boxes) and Republican evangelicals (white boxes with black lines).
Source: 2012 Barna Omni Poll

Table C1: Self-identified evangelicals

	Self-identified evangelicals				evangelical Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religious beliefs					
4-5 beliefs	0.1	0.1	0.1†	0.1	0.1
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
6-7 beliefs	0.2*	0.2*	0.2*	0.2*	0.2*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
8 beliefs	0.4*	0.4*	0.4*	0.3*	0.3*
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Religious controls					
Church last 7 days			-0.0	-0.0	-0.1
			(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Pray last 7 days			-0.2†	-0.0	-0.1
			(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Political controls					
Independent				0.4*	
				(0.1)	
Republican				0.5*	
				(0.0)	
Intercept	0.5*	0.7*	0.8*	0.2	0.8*
	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.115	0.138	0.146	0.358	0.155
Observations	407	407	407	349	192

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who report that they have made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important today. Belief coefficient represent the difference in the support for Mitt Romney relative to those holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. The dependent variable is a four-point measure that ranges between 0 (definitely vote for Obama) and 1 (definitely vote for Romney). Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-scale, education, marital status, and parental status. Political controls include party identification.† < 0.10; * < 0.05

Source: 2012 Barna Omni Poll.

Table C2: Self-identified evangelicals

	Romney evaluation				Obama evaluation			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Religious beliefs								
4-5 beliefs	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.07	-0.10†	-0.10†	-0.12*	-0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
6-7 beliefs	0.12*	0.13*	0.09*	0.07	-0.21*	-0.20*	-0.23*	-0.18*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
8 beliefs	0.06	0.06	0.02	-0.03	-0.37*	-0.36*	-0.40*	-0.29*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Religious controls								
Church last 7 days			0.09*	0.10*			0.06	0.08†
			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Pray last 7 days			-0.02	0.00			0.09	0.03
			(0.06)	(0.08)			(0.08)	(0.09)
Political controls								
Independent				0.12*				-0.17*
				(0.05)				(0.06)
Republican				0.19*				-0.39*
				(0.04)				(0.05)
Intercept	0.54*	0.44*	0.43*	0.22	0.51*	0.50*	0.42*	0.72*
	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.04)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.020	0.083	0.102	0.160	0.128	0.144	0.153	0.330
Observations	354	354	354	309	354	354	354	309

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who report that they have made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important today. Belief coefficients represent the difference in evaluations relative to those holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. The dependent variables are four-point evaluations of Mitt Romney (columns 1-3) and Barack Obama (columns 4-6), which range between 0 (very unfavorable) to 1 (very favorable). Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-scale, education, marital status, and parental status. Political controls include party identification.† < 0.10; * < 0.05

Source: 2012 Barna Omni Poll.

Appendix D: 2016 Barna Omni poll

The 2016 Barna Omni poll is a nationally representative survey conducted by Neilsen. The online survey was completed online in two waves. The first wave was in the field from November 4-6, 2016. The second wave was in the field from November 9-16, 2016. The results presented below look similar when looking at the two collection windows separately. The sample size is 1,281.

Unlike the 2012 Barna Omni poll, the 2016 poll asks a question which allows individuals to self-identify as a born-again Christian. I use the self-identification measure in this instance and use the question, "Have you ever made a personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important in your life today?", as another measure on the evangelical religious belief scale.

These results look quite similar to the 2016 SSI electoral results. Holding evangelical beliefs is positively associated with a Trump vote in the general election; however, these results seem to appear largely on account of more devout evangelicals identifying as Republicans. There is no correlation between number of beliefs held and Trump support when looking at Republican identifiers. While more devout evangelical Republicans were less likely to want Trump to be the nominee than their less devout counterparts, members of the former group were more likely to rally around Trump once he became the nominee.

Figure D1: Religious beliefs correlate with electoral decisions

2016 electoral decisions among white evangelicals



Primary preferences and rallying around Donald Trump



Note: The top-left panel presents the distribution of general election preferences among self-identified white born-again Christians in the 2016 Barna Omni data. The top-right panel presents the distribution of general election preferences among self-identified white born-again Christian Republicans. The bottom-left panel presents the percentange of self-identified white born-again Christian Republican respondents who reported wanting Trump to be the Republican nominee. The bottom-right panel presents the distribution of general election preferences among self-identified white born-again Christian Republican respondents who reported wanting someone other than Trump to be the Republican nominee.
Source: 2016 Barna Omni Poll

Appendix E: 2017 Alabama Senate exit polling

I replicate the 2016 and 2012 presidential election results using aadditional data that comes from an originally collected exit poll taken on December 12, 2017, the day of the special election for Senate in Alabama. Similar to the 2016 presidential election, the Republican nominee for Senate–Roy Moore–was a controversial candidate and received a lot of negative attention on account of allegations of sexual misconduct. The 321 surveys come from voters at two precincts, one in Anniston and one in Weaver, Alabama. The brief exit poll only had room for two religious questions, one self-identification question asking whether the respondent identifies as an evangelical or born-again Christian, and one belief statement from the Barna battery that reads: "I personally have a responsibility to share my religious beliefs with others." Respondents could strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, or strongly agree with this statement.[33] The survey also asked respondents who they voted for in that day's the Senate election, who they voted for in the 2016 presidential election, and whether they approve of Trump's job in office.

Of the 138 white evangelicals who took the exit poll, the majority strongly agreed with the religious statement (51%) while 36% somewhat agreed, leaving a small number of white evangelicals to disagree strongly (6%) or disagree somewhat (7%) with the religious statement. Due to restrictions based on the sample size, the religious belief variable is a binary measure distinguishing between those white evangelicals who "strongly" agree with the religious statement (1) versus everyone else (0). Column 1 of Table E1 presents the basic difference in Moore support between those white evangelicals who do *not* strongly agree with the statement about sharing religious beliefs (interception = 69%) and those who do strongly agree with the statement (82%; difference = 13.3; p-value = 0.07). Column 2 shows that a 10-point gap between those who strongly agree and everyone else remains after

[33] I chose this statement for two related reasons. First, the notion of evangelizing or "spreading the news" is a characteristic that is thought to apply more to evangelical Christians than other Christians. And second, this statement from the Barna Group is the measure that is most closely related to the NAE's four-point measurement of evangelicals, which reads: "It is very important for me personally to encourage non-Christians to trust Jesus Christ as their Savior."

controlling for: gender, age, age-squared, education, and three-point party identification (p-value = 0.051), and column 3 shows that these results hold even after including a question about Trump approval as a control variable. Columns 4, 5, and 6 present the results from additional analyses that compare those white evangelicals who strongly agree versus those who only somewhat agree, excluding those who disagree with the statement. This robustness check ensures that the main findings do not emerge on account of a small handful of people who disagreed about spreading their faith and also supported Doug Jones, the Democratic candidate. These respondents did not produce the main results. While these results should certainly be taken with caution–they are based on a non-representative exit poll and only ask one religious belief question–the results corroborate findings from national samples during both the 2016 and 2012 elections.

Table E1: Religious beliefs correlate with a Roy Moore vote

	All white evangelicals			Dropping disagree		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strongly agrees	13.3†	9.8†	11.9*	17.5*	11.0*	13.1*
	(7.5)	(4.9)	(4.2)	(8.1)	(5.3)	(4.5)
Intercept	68.8*	-47.0†	-27.8	64.6*	-42.1	-25.9
	(5.3)	(25.1)	(21.7)	(6.2)	(27.2)	(23.1)
standard controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
approve of Trump	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.024	0.631	0.732	0.040	0.643	0.748
Observations	131	120	120	115	106	106

Note: Coefficients are Ordinary Least Squares regression coefficients. Standard controls include female, age, age-squared, education, and party identification. † < 0.10 ** < 0.05
Source: 2017 AL exit poll

Appendix F: NAES / ISCAP data

2008-2016 NAES / ISCAP survey

An additional data source is a combination of the five-wave National Annenberg Election Study (NAES), conducted over the course of the 2008 presidential election, and data from the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics (ISCAP), where affiliated researchers conducted multiple follow-up surveys with a subsample of the original respondents between 2008 and 2016. The resultant panel dataset of 1,121 respondents spans eight years. These data allow researchers to classify evangelicals both through a self-identification question as well as through denominational affiliation, both of which were measured at the panel's outset. Wave 10 of the survey, which took place in January of 2016 at the beginning of the primary season, asked about nomination preferences, and wave 11, which took place in October of 2016, asked about general election preferences. Earlier waves of the survey also measure various predispositions and political attitudes that are known predictors of electoral choice. Importantly, these data do not ask questions about religious belief, and instead serve as a way to corroborate the cross-sectional findings by testing whether similar correlations appear when the independent variables of interest are measured prior to the political outcomes.

Replication of results using the NAES / ISCAP data

Primary analyses

I use the NAES / ISCAP data to test whether the SSI primary results are likely a function of retrospective reporting, arising from asking about people's preferred nominee on the even of the general election. The ISCAP panel data asked Republican respondents in January of 2016 to state which candidate they wanted to receive the Republican nomination and then asked these same people about their intended vote choice in the general election in October of 2016. And while the ISCAP data do not have measures of religious beliefs, the NAES survey

measures evangelical self-identification in 2008. White evangelical Republicans preferred a non-Trump nominee at higher rates than white non-evangelical Republicans (32% to 53%) when the primary season began in January. But these white evangelicals rallied around Trump to a greater extent than their non-evangelical counterparts. Among Republicans who wanted *someone other than* Trump to be the nominee, 94% of white evangelicals reported in October that they were planning on voting for Trump in the general election compared to 85% of white non-evangelicals.[34] These results comport with Lewis's (2018) prospective findings, measured in Spring of 2016, in which white evangelicals were less likely to report that they would consider defecting if Trump were to become the Republican nominee compared to other Republicans.

[34]The same results appear when using an evangelical measure from January of 2016.

Appendix G: Explanations for Trump support (SSI)

Negative partisanship

Tables G1 and G2 present the parametric results of the candidate feeling thermometer among self-identified evangelicals and denominational evangelicals, respectively.

Table G1: Self-identified white evangelicals

	Trump FT				Clinton FT			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Religious beliefs								
4 beliefs	4.63	4.36	4.14	6.38	5.72	4.25	3.92	-1.24
	(4.07)	(4.13)	(4.26)	(4.14)	(3.81)	(3.72)	(3.83)	(2.91)
5 beliefs	3.72	1.72	1.40	-3.70	-17.50*	-12.89*	-13.19*	-7.77*
	(4.56)	(4.73)	(4.89)	(4.79)	(4.27)	(4.26)	(4.40)	(3.36)
6 beliefs	4.30	2.41	2.03	-6.34	-27.27*	-22.12*	-22.93*	-12.96*
	(3.84)	(3.94)	(4.32)	(4.23)	(3.60)	(3.54)	(3.88)	(2.97)
7 beliefs	10.08*	7.49*	7.08	-6.27	-35.50*	-28.38*	-29.71*	-12.90*
	(3.48)	(3.70)	(4.32)	(4.33)	(3.27)	(3.34)	(3.89)	(3.04)
Religious controls								
Church attendance			-0.24	-1.00			1.92	3.06*
			(1.34)	(1.31)			(1.21)	(0.92)
Frequency of prayer			0.46	1.38			-0.68	-1.58†
			(1.25)	(1.21)			(1.13)	(0.85)
Political controls								
Independent				9.47†				-43.94*
				(5.24)				(3.68)
Republican				30.87*				-46.16*
				(3.28)				(2.30)
Moderate				-2.08				-9.99*
				(4.11)				(2.88)
Conservative				4.95				-14.73*
				(3.97)				(2.79)
Intercept	44.01*	36.97*	37.15*	13.53	51.38*	26.67*	23.26†	66.66*
	(2.79)	(13.99)	(14.26)	(14.13)	(2.61)	(12.60)	(12.82)	(9.92)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.012	0.048	0.049	0.218	0.224	0.317	0.319	0.666
Observations	747	719	718	663	747	719	718	663

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who self identify as evangelical or born again. Belief coefficients represent the difference in feeling thermometer scores relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status.
† < 0.10; * < 0.05
Source: 2016 SSI.

Table G2: white evangelicals (by denomination)

	Trump FT				Clinton FT			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Religious beliefs								
4 beliefs	5.39	8.18†	6.41	5.12	3.25	-1.61	-2.58	-3.33
	(4.53)	(4.52)	(4.76)	(4.63)	(4.25)	(4.23)	(4.46)	(3.50)
5 beliefs	8.08	9.07†	6.82	-0.14	-15.87*	-16.75*	-17.97*	-9.74*
	(5.16)	(5.28)	(5.56)	(5.35)	(4.84)	(4.94)	(5.21)	(4.04)
6 beliefs	3.41	3.76	0.86	-8.94*	-20.67*	-21.30*	-22.87*	-11.89*
	(4.02)	(3.99)	(4.58)	(4.45)	(3.77)	(3.74)	(4.29)	(3.36)
7 beliefs	8.67*	8.75*	5.17	-8.29†	-29.22*	-28.57*	-30.74*	-13.25*
	(3.56)	(3.66)	(4.59)	(4.53)	(3.34)	(3.42)	(4.30)	(3.42)
Religious controls								
Church attendance			0.98	0.07			2.22	3.59*
			(1.58)	(1.54)			(1.48)	(1.16)
Frequency of prayer			1.21	1.01			-0.57	-0.82
			(1.31)	(1.27)			(1.23)	(0.96)
Political controls								
Independent				8.28				-40.00*
				(5.74)				(4.33)
Republican				32.33*				-46.13*
				(3.60)				(2.71)
Moderate				-1.95				-9.61*
				(4.56)				(3.44)
Conservative				1.23				-13.85*
				(4.57)				(3.45)
Intercept	44.42*	49.66*	46.33*	32.78*	44.20*	30.95*	27.77*	62.33*
	(2.78)	(14.77)	(15.09)	(14.64)	(2.61)	(13.84)	(14.13)	(11.05)
demographic controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.011	0.089	0.092	0.266	0.155	0.236	0.238	0.608
Observations	624	597	596	547	624	597	596	547

Note: The sample consists of white respondents who belong to an evangelical denomination according to the RELTRAD coding scheme (Steensland et al. 2000). Belief coefficients represent the difference in feeling thermometer scores relative to white evangelicals holding 3 beliefs or fewer, who serve as the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic controls include: gender, age, age-squared, region of residence, education, income, marital status, and parental status. † < 0.10; * < 0.05
Source: 2016 SSI.