**Appendix A: Background on selected parties**

JI and JUI-F are “normal” political parties, ASWJ is the present-day version of the “banned” Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and JuD is the social-political wing of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist organization. There are assuredly denominational, political, social, and geographic differences among these parties and their supporters, but it is important to not overstate these. By and large, these parties agree on making Pakistan an explicitly Islamic state and campaign for Islamist policies in the social and political spheres. Additionally, while I do not explicitly consider them here, my argument is applicable to Shia organizations such as Imamia Students Organization (ISO) and Majlis-e-Wehdat-e-Muslameen (MWM), as well as other minor Sunni parties, such as Sunni Tehreek (ST).

JI is one of the oldest Islamist parties in South Asia, with active branches in India and Bangladesh, founded by one of political Islam’s most seminal figures: Maulana Abul A’la Maududi (Iqtidar 2011, 4). It is a highly organized, disciplined, and democratic party. For most of JI’s history in Pakistan, it sought to introduce an Islamic state from above, though in the last two decades – during Qazi Hussain’s tenure and thereafter – it has assumed a more populist politics, concerned with quotidian issues as much as constitutional ones. Its supporters are generally found in middle and upper-middle class areas of the major urban centers of the country, such as Karachi and Lahore (Nasr 1994). Its influence in Pakistani society is not restricted to the strictly political: the media is dominated by JI supporters or sympathizers. Husain Haqqani, a former activist in JI’s student wing (IJT), told me in an interview that “all my former colleagues are now in the media, especially television”[[1]](#footnote-1) and JI enjoys particularly strong representation in the Urdu print media landscape (Nasr 1994, 62). It has also served as an organizational and rhetorical model for other Islamist parties in Pakistan (Iqtidar 2011, 5), and its student-militant wing (the IJT) was employed as paramilitary forces by the army in the 1971 civil war (Nasr 1994). JI’s heyday occurred during the Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship during the 1980s, when it was showered with state patronage owing to the Islamist President’s ideological affinity with JI. The decline in state support since has led to what one journalist I interviewed called “bitterness” within JI.[[2]](#footnote-2) It has recently assumed a more limited role in formal politics: it was part of an alliance of religious parties voted in the center and North West Frontier Province (today known as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, or KP) in 2002, but for the most part, has spent the last two decades either in opposition or having boycotted elections.

 JUI-F is the only other major Islamist party that is a national electoral player. Led by Fazlur Rehman, it is less a Leninist “vanguard” of an elite-led revolution – terms normally associated with JI – and more a traditional Pakistani political party. It relies more on political patronage, is more personality-driven, regularly wins and loses turncoats from and to other, even non-religious, parties, and is more involved in the wheeling and dealing that is characteristic of Pakistan’s crowded political scene. It draws its support primarily from rural constituencies in KP and Pashtun areas of Balochistan; its electoral power in urban areas in Punjab and Sindh is limited, but on the street in these areas, it is formidable. Multiple journalists told me in interviews that the largest political rally they had ever seen in Karachi was led by JUI-F on January 27, 2012 (a Friday) – rough estimates claimed a quarter million participants.[[3]](#footnote-3) JUI itself is cognizant of this; a party representative told me that the January 2012 rally showed JUI’s strength on the ground plainly and that after JUI showed its strength, “nobody else had the nerve to hold a rally there after us.”[[4]](#footnote-4)

 The other two parties that I study are further along the party-militant spectrum. JuD is not strictly a political party because it does not contest elections: “we are a social organization, a religious organization, and while we are happy to be a pressure group or bring the people’s voice to the ruling class, we are not an electoral party and do not ally with any political party,” a JuD member told me.[[5]](#footnote-5) Thus, while observers generally refer to it as a party, it is more accurately a political organization. JuD is the political-social wing of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization whose primary focus is Kashmiri ascension to Pakistan. As such, its policy focus is India- and Kashmir-centric. JuD’s and LeT’s leadership is one and the same; Hafiz Saeed headed LeT before it was banned by Pervez Musharraf in January 2002, and continues to serve as the head of JuD. The Pakistani government’s treatment of the organization remains one of the key stumbling blocks in Indo-Pak relations, since LeT/JuD remain tools of the Pakistani security establishment, to the considerable consternation of the Indian state.

 Finally, there is ASWJ, a Deobandi organization. The ASWJ is what the Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) renamed itself after being “banned”. It enjoys close relations and linkages with the anti-Shia terrorist group, Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which itself was a splinter group of SSP before its ban. Despite the name change and the formal ban, ASWJ still uses the name SSP in various contexts. For instance, outside Masjid-e-Nauman at Lasbela Chowk, where I attended Friday prayers before a scheduled rally, ASWJ workers were collecting donations using the name “Sipah-e-Sahaba”, and the recorded party songs that are played on loudspeakers at rallies contained lyrics which referenced “SSP”, not ASWJ. Unlike JuD, ASWJ is an electoral organization in that it fields, usually unsuccessfully, candidates in national and provincial elections, and blames rigging for its electoral failures, as one ASWJ representative defiantly did in a conversation with me.[[6]](#footnote-6) Nevertheless, the party is an electoral force to be reckoned with around its birthplace, Jhang, in Punjab – even impelling mainstream political parties such as the PPP and PML(N) to enter into electoral alliances with them (Rafiq 2014, 2). As with all other parties under consideration in this paper, is a strong street force, especially in Karachi.

**Appendix B: Description of fieldwork**

I was in Karachi for a period of six weeks in the summer of 2013. While there, I interviewed six journalists, four Islamist party officials, three security officials, and two “secular” party members/bureaucrats. I attended two rallies, one by the JuD and one by the ASWJ, and attended Friday prayers at a different mosque each week.

I followed a “soak-and-poke” strategy in choosing which mosques to attend Friday prayers at, primarily guided by interviewees. For instance, one interviewee emphasized how the New Memon masjid in Saddar was central to the PNA movement in the late 1970s in organizing protests; I attended prayers at this mosque to gain an appreciation for its size, scale, and layout. Another interviewee informed me about how Islamist parties tend to have a “home” or “headquarter” mosque from which rallies and protests congeal, which made these mosques an obvious target for me. For example, I attended prayers at Masjid-e-Nauman at Lasbela Chowk on the day of an ASWJ rally because this is widely acknowledged to be an ASWJ mosque, and I wished to understand the modalities of the prayer and *dua* on a protest day. Other times I was guided towards specific imams, known for particularly fiery sermons, to attain a sense of the difference between political and apolitical sermons. Sultan Masjid in DHA was one such case. Given my explicit focus on politicized mosques and spaces, the sample of mosques was not – and could not have been – random, but selection bias in this case was unavoidable if I wished to learn more about the relationship between Friday prayers, mosques, and collective action.

One “impressive” fact about the JuD and ASWJ protestors I observed at rallies was their discipline in not answering my questions. During my fieldwork, I approached 3-4 protestors at the rallies I attended to try to get a first-person account of their reasons for protesting. None of the conversations went beyond an awkward greeting and a shuffle away. Indeed, I got the distinct impression that pursuing any line of questioning with protestors who are, after all, members of parties formally banned by the government would arouse both their, and more troublingly, their superiors’, suspicion of my motives. Journalists I interviewed confirmed that Islamist party cadres are unlikely to talk to outsiders; these parties’ messaging comes almost entirely from official spokespeople.

**Appendix C: Dataset on “Protest events” in Pakistan**

I recorded every rally, protest, and demonstration that took place in Pakistan between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2009. To do so, I used the online archives of the Pakistani daily *Dawn*. This newspaper is recognized as Pakistan’s newspaper of record, and has been used in other data-collection efforts based in the country (see Bueno de Mesquita et al 2012).

I recorded a “protest event” as having occurred if an incident reported in *Dawn* had any of the words “protest”, “rally”, or “demonstration” (or variants thereof, such as “rallied” or “demonstrated”) in the headline. I removed all instances where such a word was used but obviously referred to something other than a protest, such as when “stocks rally” or “the foreign minister protested to the ambassador”.

The dataset comprised of 4,123 protest events in a five-year period. Each event was coded for six values. These were

1. *Date* – the date on which the protest event occurred.
2. *Location* – the city or town in which the protest occurred. Some events took place in more than a single city. In these cases, all locations were included. Some events were either province-wide or nation-wide events. In these cases, the largest reported area was used.
3. *Description* – a description of the event according to *Dawn*, that is, whether it was a protest, rally, demonstration, sit-in, hunger strike, procession, or road block.
4. *Size* – if available, a description of the size of the protest event. Precise figures were rare, but were included when reported by *Dawn*. For others, imprecise figures (e.g. “hundreds”) and descriptors (e.g. “large rally”) were used.
5. *Actor* – the main actor involved in the protest event. These could range from organized political parties, such as the Pakistan People’s Party or Jamaat-e-Islami, to civic or professional associations, such as unions, to unorganized groups, such as “local people”, “villagers”, or “a group of farmers”. Some protest events were coordinated by multiple actors; in these cases, all participating actors were included.
6. *Outcome* – whether the protest event was peaceful or violent.

The dataset also includes a hyperlink to each news report used to construct the data.

Table 2 report some summary statistics culled from the dataset.

**Table 2.** Summary statistics from Pakistan protest-events dataset, 2005-2010.

|  |
| --- |
| *PROTESTS BY YEAR* |
| **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** |
| 555 | 761 | 1,037 | 960 | 810 |
| *PROTESTS BY NOTABLE NON-ISLAMIST POLITICAL PARTIES* |
| **ANP** | **MQM** | **PML(N)** | **PPP** | **PTI** |
| 14 | 24 | 60 | 138 | 16 |
| *PROTESTS BY OTHER SOCIAL GROUPS* |
| **BAR ASSOCATIONS** | **DOCTORS** | **FARMERS & GROWERS** | **FISHERMEN** | **STUDENTS** |
| 159 | 38 | 177 | 50 | 252 |
| *PROTESTS IN MAJOR CITIES* |
| **FAISALABAD** | **GUJRANWALA** | **HYDERABAD** | **ISLAMABAD / RAWALPINDI**  | **KARACHI** | **LAHORE** | **MULTAN** | **PESHAWAR** | **QUETTA** |
| 94 | 69 | 398 | 232 | 541 | 283 | 54 | 168 | 359 |
| *PROTESTS IN NOTABLE TOWNS* |
| **DADU** | **JACOBABAD** | **KHAIRPUR** | **LARKANA** | **MIRPURKHAS** | **NAUSHAHRO FEROZE** | **NAWABSHAH** | **SUKKUR** | **TOBA TEK SINGH** |
| 109 | 65 | 90 | 83 | 118 | 90 | 103 | 133 | 64 |

1. Interview. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Interview with Saba Imtiaz. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The scale of the rally can be appreciated best in video form. See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbPCIKdACLs>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Interview with Aslam Ghauri, translation by author. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Interview and translation by author. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Interview with Akbar Saeed. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)