Online Appendix for "Religious Group Cues and American Policy Attitudes"

In this appendix, we show the OLS regression estimates used to produce the predicted values and confidence intervals in Figures 1-6 in the paper. For each analysis, we also present the results of two post-estimation tests of the equality of regression effects. The first is an F-test of the equality of the effects of the evangelical-Catholic treatment and the religious-nonreligious treatment on the same dependent variable (i.e. within the same model, see Gujarati 2003: 267-270). The second is a Chow (1960) test (distributed as a chi-square) of the equality of the effect of each individual treatment across different dependent variables (i.e. across different models, see Gujarati 2003: 273-279).[1] Finally, we present the results of a range of alternative specifications of the regression models, including models with controls for other independent variables and their interactions with our treatment variables.

Figure 1: The Effect of the Religious Group Cues for All Respondents

Table A1 shows the estimates of regressions of policy attitudes on the religious group treatments for all respondents.[2] The evangelical-Catholic treatment has a statistically-significant negative effect, moving respondents in a liberal direction, on both government job protection for homosexuals and government help for blacks. The religious-nonreligious treatment has a significant liberalizing effect on government help for gays and lesbians. Neither treatment has a significant effect on health insurance opinions.

The tests of the equality of the two treatment effects within each model indicate that the treatment pitting evangelical leaders against their Catholic counterparts does have a significantly

[1] The Chow tests were computed using the seemingly unrelated regression (suest) commands in Stata 11.

[2] Because there were systematic differences in race across our experimental groups, all of our regression models include a dummy variable for whites.

larger effect on opinions about government protection against homosexual job discrimination than does the treatment contrasting the positions of religious and non-religious leaders. The evangelical-Catholic treatment's effect is larger than that of the religious-nonreligious treatment in the help for blacks model, and the difference in effects approaches significance, but is not quite statistically significant. There is no difference between the two treatment effects in the health insurance model.

Table A1: The Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes, All Respondents

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-0.95***	-0.47*	-0.17
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	-0.42*	-0.11	-0.01
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Whites	1.23***	1.36***	1.01***
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Constant	6.96***	5.91***	3.48***
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)
N	1183	1246	1277
Adjusted R^2	.03	.03	.01
F-test of the equality of the effects of the evangelical-Catholic and the religious-nonreligious treatment	4.53*	2.21	.37
(df)	(1, 1179)	(1, 1242)	(1, 1273)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

The tests of the difference between the effects of each treatment across the three different policy attitudes, shown in Table A2, indicate that the evangelical-Catholic treatment had a significantly larger effect on views on government help for homosexuals than on either of the other two issues. That treatment's effect is larger for opinion on help for blacks than for health

insurance attitudes, but the difference is not statistically significant. The difference between the religious-nonreligious treatment's effect on help for gays attitudes and views on the other two issues approaches standard levels of significance, but does not quite reach them.

Table A2: Chi-Square Tests of the Equality of Treatment Effects across Dependent Variables, Model for All Respondents

	Treatment	
Model Comparison	Evangelical vs. Catholic	Religious vs. Non-Religious
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	5.60*	2.56
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	9.72**	2.85
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	1.78	.22

Source: Post-estimation tests for regression models in table A1.
Note: Entries are chi-square statistics with one degree of freedom.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

Figure 2: The Effect of Religious Group Cues by Religious Tradition and Commitment

To assess the degree to which the effect of religious group cues on policy attitudes is conditioned by the combination of religious tradition and religious commitment, we estimated regression models in which the independent variables were our religious group treatment variables, dummy variables for individuals with low and high levels of religious commitment within each of the three largest religious traditions (evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics), and interactions between the treatment variables and the tradition-commitment dummy variables. Table A3 shows the results.

To designate the low and high commitment groups for each of the three religious traditions, we first created a religious commitment index based on respondents' frequency of worship attendance, frequency of prayer, and amount of guidance received from religion. We then defined the low commitment group for each tradition as those respondents with levels of

religious commitment at or below the median level of commitment for their tradition, and the high commitment group as those respondents with levels of commitment above the median for their tradition.

We included only evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, Catholics, and individuals with no religious affiliation in our regression analyses, excluding members of smaller faith traditions. This means that the comparison group for our religious tradition and commitment dummy variables is only people with no religious affiliation. Thus, the coefficients on the tradition-commitment dummies represent the difference between each tradition-commitment group and the religiously unaffiliated among our control group respondents. Here, we see familiar patterns such as high-commitment evangelical and mainline Protestants holding significantly more conservative attitudes than do non-religious individuals on all three issue dimensions.

The coefficients on the treatment group variables represent the effects of the treatments for the religiously unaffiliated. The negative and significant effects in the model of opinions toward government assistance for homosexuals in jobs indicate that our cues moved the unaffiliated in a significantly more liberal direction on this issue. The evangelical-Catholic treatment also has a significant coefficient in the model for views on government help for blacks, pushing non-religious respondents in a liberal direction on this issue as well. The F-tests of the equality of the effects of the evangelical-Catholic and religious-nonreligious treatments indicate that the evangelical-Catholic cue had an effect that was significantly larger than that of the religious-nonreligious cue on non-religious individuals' views on help for blacks, but the two treatments had statistically indistinguishable effects on the views of nones on help for gays.

Table A3: The Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes by Religious Tradition and Religious Commitment

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Evangelical Prot, Low Commitment	0.76	1.87***	1.27**
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.45)
Evangelical Prot, High Commitment	1.63***	2.14***	2.51***
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.43)
Mainline Prot, Low Commitment	-0.51	0.82*	0.88
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.47)
Mainline Prot, High Commitment	1.12*	1.30**	1.78***
	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.51)
Catholic, Low Commitment	-0.07	0.66	1.40**
	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.46)
Catholic, High Commitment	0.48	0.86*	1.44**
	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.48)
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-2.78***	-1.42**	-0.29
	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.49)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	-1.92***	-0.42	0.16
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.46)
Low Evangelical × Evan-Cath Treatment	2.56***	1.83**	1.05
	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.79)
High Evangelical × Evan-Cath Treatment	2.89***	1.65*	0.88
	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.81)
Low Mainline × Evan-Cath Treatment	2.22**	1.14	0.19
	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.85)
High Mainline × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.77*	1.08	0.19
	(0.77)	(0.73)	(0.83)
Low Catholic × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.75*	1.33	-0.81
	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.84)
High Catholic × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.57*	0.70	-0.19
	(0.80)	(0.77)	(0.89)
Low Evangelical × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	2.57***	0.88	1.05
	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.77)
High Evangelical × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	2.21**	0.77	-0.31
	(0.69)	(0.72)	(0.80)
Low Mainline × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	2.76***	1.23	1.33
	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.85)
High Mainline × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	1.02	0.01	-0.40
	(0.78)	(0.79)	(0.88)
Low Catholic × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.63	0.30	-1.21
	(0.70)	(0.71)	(0.82)
High Catholic × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	2.05*	1.03	-0.88
	(0.82)	(0.81)	(0.95)
Whites	1.00***	0.71**	0.71*
	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.29)
Constant	6.86***	5.51***	2.63***
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.35)
N	1019	1071	1094
Adjusted R^2	.17	.12	.08
F-test of the equality of the effects of treatments	3.04	4.18*	.67
(df)	(1, 997)	(1, 1049)	(1, 1072)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for religious tradition/religious commitment is people with no religious affiliation. The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

The coefficients on the interaction terms represent the difference in the effect of our religious group cues for each particular tradition-commitment group and the effect of the cues for non-religious people. All of the interactions with the evangelical-Catholic treatment are positive and significant in the help for gays model and some are positive and significant in the help for blacks analysis, indicating that the effect of this treatment on gay rights attitudes is significantly less negative (or liberalizing) for low and high commitment members of the three largest faith traditions than it is for the religiously unaffiliated. The religious-nonreligious treatment also has a significantly less positive effect on gay rights opinions for members of several commitment-tradition groups than it does for religious nones.

Alternative Comparison Groups. The interaction term coefficients indicate whether the effect of a treatment is significantly different for a tradition-commitment group than it is for religiously unaffiliated people, but they do not tell us whether the treatment effect for that particular group is substantively or statistically significant. So, to show the treatment effects for each tradition-commitment group, we re-estimated our models multiple times with each religious group serving as the comparison category. In Table A4, we show the treatment effect for each group.

Here, we see that the effects of religious group cues on policy attitudes are almost entirely confined to the liberalizing effects of both cues on gay rights attitudes and the effect of the evangelical-Catholic cue on views about government help for blacks. As shown in Figure 2, the religious-nonreligious treatment did move low commitment Catholics in a significantly more liberal direction on government help for homosexuals in jobs and other treatment effects approach significance on both gay rights and health insurance attitudes. However, the effects of

Table A4: The Effects of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes for Each Religious Tradition and Religious Commitment Group

	Dependent Variables		
Treatment and Religious Group	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Evangelical-Catholic Treatment			
No Religion	-2.78*** (.45)	-1.42** (0.43)	-0.29 (0.49)
Evangelical Prot, Low Commitment	-.23 (.53)	.49 (.53)	.76 (.62)
Evangelical Prot, High Commitment	.11 (.56)	.31 (.58)	.59 (.65)
Mainline Prot, Low Commitment	-.58 (.60)	-.21 (.60)	-.09 (.70)
Mainline Prot, High Commitment	-1.01 (.62)	-.24 (.59)	-.10 (.68)
Catholic, Low Commitment	-1.05 (.62)	-.02 (.61)	-1.10 (.68)
Catholic, High Commitment	-1.22 (.66)	-.64 (.64)	-.48 (.74)
Religious-Nonreligious Treatment			
No Religion	-1.92*** (.41)	-0.42 (0.41)	0.16 (0.46)
Evangelical Prot, Low Commitment	.53 (.54)	.52 (.53)	1.10 (.61)
Evangelical Prot, High Commitment	.13 (.54)	.39 (.58)	-.31 (.64)
Mainline Prot, Low Commitment	.73 (.62)	.88 (.62)	1.30 (.70)
Mainline Prot, High Commitment	-.98 (.65)	-.27 (.69)	-.38 (.74)
Catholic, Low Commitment	-1.28* (.56)	-.02 (.58)	-1.09 (.66)
Catholic, High Commitment	-.02 (.69)	.70 (.69)	-.84 (.80)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients on the dummy variables for the evangelical-Catholic treatment variable and the religious-nonreligious treatment variable in models in which the particular religious tradition/religious commitment group was the comparison category. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

Table A5: Chow Tests of the Equality of Treatment Effects across Dependent Variables, Models of the Impact of Religious Group Cues by Religious Tradition and Religious Commitment

Religious Group and Model Comparison	Treatment	
	Evangelical vs. Catholic	Religious vs. Non-Religious
No Religion		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	9.24**	13.00***
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	24.03***	16.38***
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	5.44*	1.96
Evangelical, Low Commitment		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	1.65	.001
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	1.70	.72
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.20	.74
Evangelical, High Commitment		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.19	.34
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	.52	.47
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.19	1.10
Mainline, Low Commitment		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.30	.06
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	.34	.59
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.02	.44
Mainline, High Commitment		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.26	.12
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	.29	.68
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.01	.34
Catholic, Low Commitment		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.23	.05
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	.26	.50
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.01	.35
Catholic, High Commitment		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.25	.08
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	.28	.61
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.01	.36

Source: Post-estimation tests for regression models in table A3.
Note: Entries are chi-square statistics with one degree of freedom.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

our cues are limited primarily to what seem to be negative reactions by the non-religious to the positions taken by evangelical leaders.

Tests of Differences in Treatment Effects across Policy Attitudes. In Table A5, we present the results of tests of the equality of our treatment effects across the three policy attitudes. Among the religiously unaffiliated, the evangelical-Catholic treatment has a significantly stronger effect on attitudes toward government help for homosexuals in jobs than on opinions about government help for blacks and especially government providing health insurance. The effect of this treatment is also significantly stronger in the help for blacks model than in the health insurance model. The treatment pitting religious against non-religious leaders also has a significantly stronger effect on views about government help for gays and lesbians than on views about either government help for blacks or a government health insurance plan.

There are not any statistically significant differences in the effects of the religious group cues across the various policy attitudes for any of the religious tradition-commitment groups. Of course, this is not surprising since the treatments did not have significant effects on the attitudes of these groups toward any of the three issues.

Controlling for Party Identification and Ideological Identification. To assess whether the significant effects of our religious group cues on the policy attitudes of non-religious people are due to them being more likely than religious adherents to be Democrats and liberals, we added to our models a dummy variable for Democrats, a dummy variable for liberal identifiers, and the interactions between both of those dummies and the treatment variables. Including these variables in the model means that the coefficients on the treatment variables themselves represent the effects of our religious group cues for the religiously unaffiliated

Table A6: The Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes by Religious Tradition and Religious Commitment, with Controls for Party Identification and Ideological Identification

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Evangelical Prot, Low Commitment	0.35	1.21**	0.35
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.41)
Evangelical Prot, High Commitment	0.64†	0.88*	0.93*
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.41)
Mainline Prot, Low Commitment	-0.73†	0.25	0.43
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.43)
Mainline Prot, High Commitment	0.62	0.57	0.87†
	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.46)
Catholic, Low Commitment	-0.34	0.19	1.01*
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.42)
Catholic, High Commitment	-0.01	0.08	0.53
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.43)
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-1.87***	-1.03*	0.30
	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.56)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	-1.34**	0.01	0.93
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.59)
Low Evangelical × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.62*	1.22†	0.10
	(0.69)	(0.67)	(0.76)
High Evangelical × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.85**	1.26†	0.33
	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.78)
Low Mainline × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.96**	1.31†	0.30
	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.77)
High Mainline × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.94	0.63	-0.24
	(0.73)	(0.69)	(0.77)
Low Catholic × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.71	0.90	-1.31†
	(0.73)	(0.71)	(0.78)
High Catholic × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.78	0.59	-0.61
	(0.76)	(0.73)	(0.83)
Low Evangelical × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	1.43*	-0.07	0.03
	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.73)
High Evangelical × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	1.42*	0.23	-1.19
	(0.69)	(0.72)	(0.78)
Low Mainline × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	2.34**	1.03	0.67
	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.78)
High Mainline × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.55	0.01	-0.43
	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.83)
Low Catholic × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.21	-0.01	-1.69*
	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.75)
High Catholic × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	1.55*	0.97	-1.16
	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.87)
Whites	0.66**	0.42†	0.49†
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)
Democrats	-2.15***	-1.91***	-2.78***
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.29)
Democrats × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.12	-0.57	-0.54
	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.52)
Democrats × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.49	-0.07	-0.59
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.54)
Liberals	-0.88**	-1.47***	-1.14***
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.34)
Liberals × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.60	0.76	0.26
	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.62)
Liberals × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-0.63	0.16	0.12
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.61)
Constant	8.57***	7.44***	4.95***
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.37)
N	954	1007	1023
Adjusted R^2	.34	.30	.32

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for religious tradition/religious commitment, party identification, and ideological identification is people who are either independents or Republicans, and either moderates or conservatives, and have no religious affiliation. The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

who are not Democrats (i.e. either Republicans or independents) and are not liberals (i.e. either conservatives or moderates). The regression estimates are presented in Table A6. In these models, both treatment variables have significant negative effects on help for gays attitudes, and the evangelical-Catholic treatment has a significant negative effect on help for blacks attitudes.

Figure 3: The Conditional Effect of Partisanship on the Impact of Religious Group Cues

To assess the degree to which the effect of religious group cues on policy attitudes is conditioned by party identification, we estimated regression models in which the independent variables were our religious group treatment variables, dummy variables for independent and Republican identifiers, and interactions between the partisan dummy variables and the treatment variables. The estimates are shown in Table A7.

The comparison group for party identification is Democratic identifiers. Thus, the coefficients on the Republican and independent dummies represent the difference between those partisan groups and Democrats among control group respondents. Here, we see an unsurprising set of results with both independents and Republicans taking more conservative positions than Democrats on all three issues, and Republicans taking the most conservative positions.

The coefficients on the treatment variables represent the effects of the treatments on the policy opinions of Democrats. The evangelical-Catholic treatment has statistically significant effects on Democrats' attitudes toward both government job assistance for homosexuals and government help for blacks. In both cases, the cue spurs Democrats to take more liberal positions. The evangelical-Catholic cue also has a negative effect on health insurance attitudes among Democrats that approaches statistical significance (p=.10). The effect of the treatment

Table A7: The Conditional Effect of Party Identification on the Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Independent	1.90***	1.40***	1.02**
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.37)
Republican	2.76***	2.93***	3.56***
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-1.26***	-0.73**	-0.46
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	-0.37	0.01	-0.12
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Independent × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.30	0.13	1.09
	(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.63)
Republican × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.95*	0.78*	0.75
	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Independent × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.35	0.79	1.12
	(0.65)	(0.62)	(0.64)
Republican × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.25	-0.03	0.46
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Whites	0.67**	0.78***	0.35
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Constant	5.92***	4.90***	2.32***
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)
N	1159	1224	1252
Adjusted R^2	.26	.27	.31
F-test of the equality of the effects of treatments	7.38**	5.56*	1.10
(df)	(1, 1149)	(1, 1214)	(1, 1242)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for party identification is Democrats. The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

contrasting the positions of religious and non-religious leaders is not statistically significant in any of the models.

The F-tests of the equality of the effects of the evangelical-Catholic and religious-nonreligious treatments within regression models indicate that the evangelical-Catholic cue had an effect that was significantly larger than that of the religious-nonreligious cue on Democrats' views about government help for gays and lesbians and Democrats' views on government help for blacks.

The interaction term coefficients represent the differences in the effect of the treatments for Republicans and independents and the treatment effect for Democrats. All of these coefficients are positive, indicating that the religious group cues do not push independents and Republicans in as liberal a direction as they push Democrats. This difference in treatment effect is statistically significant for the evangelical-Catholic cue's effect among Republicans on government help for gays and government help for blacks, and comes very close to significance on government providing health insurance. Thus, on all of the issues, the cue contrasting evangelical and Catholic leaders seems to have different effects on the policy opinions of Republicans and Democrats. However, none of the differences between the effects of the religious-nonreligious treatment for Democrats and Republicans approaches statistical significance. Some of the differences in treatment effects between independents and Democrats also approach significance.

In Table A8, we show the effects of the treatments for each of the three partisan groups, with the effects for independents and Republicans computed simply by making them, rather than Democrats, the comparison group in our regression models. Other than the significant treatment effects for Democrats, the only effect that approaches statistical significance is the impact of the evangelical-Catholic cue on the help for gays attitudes of independents ($p<.10$).

Tests of Differences in Treatment Effects across Policy Attitudes. In Table A9, we present the results of tests of the equality of our treatment effects across the three policy attitudes. Among Democrats and independents, the evangelical-Catholic treatment has a significantly larger effect on attitudes toward government job assistance for gays and lesbians than on health insurance opinions. None of the other differences in effects across dependent variables are statistically significant.

Table A8: The Effects of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes for Each Partisan Group

	Dependent Variables		
Treatment and Religious Group	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Evangelical-Catholic Treatment			
Democrats	-1.26***	-.73**	-.46
	(.29)	(.27)	(.28)
Independents	-.97	-.59	.62
	(.58)	(.54)	(.56)
Republicans	-.31	.05	.28
	(.29)	(.27)	(.29)
Religious-Nonreligious Treatment			
Democrats	-.37	.01	-.12
	(.28)	(.27)	(.28)
Independents	-.02	.80	.99
	(.59)	(.57)	(.58)
Republicans	-.11	-.02	.33
	(.28)	(.28)	(.30)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients on the dummy variables for the evangelical-Catholic treatment variable and the religious-nonreligious treatment variable in models in which the particular partisan group was the comparison category. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

Table A9: Chow Tests of the Equality of Treatment Effects across Dependent Variables, Models of the Impact of Religious Group Cues by Party Identification

	Treatment	
Religious Group and Model Comparison	Evangelical vs. Catholic	Religious vs. Non-Religious
Democrats		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	2.51	1.39
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	4.31*	.44
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.64	.17
Independents		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.35	1.46
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	4.35*	1.68
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	2.67	.11
Republicans		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	1.92	.73
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	2.58	2.23
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.49	1.18

Source: Post-estimation tests for regression models in table A7.
Note: Entries are chi-square statistics with one degree of freedom.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

Controlling for Respondent Religion and Ideological Identification. To assess whether the significant effects of our religious group cues on the policy attitudes of Democrats are due to Democrats being more likely than independents and Republicans to be liberals and to have either no religious preference or a low level of religious devotion, we introduced several control variables into the regression models. These included a dummy variable for liberal identifiers; a dummy variable for people with no religious affiliation; dummy variables for evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics with low levels of religious commitment; and interactions between those variables and the treatment variables. The regression estimates are shown in Table A10.

With these controls in the models, the coefficients on the treatment variables themselves represent the effects of our religious group cues for Democrats who are not liberals (i.e. identify themselves as either moderates or conservatives) and who are committed members of the evangelical, mainline, or Catholic traditions.[3] Even when the treatment effects are for the types of Democrats who should be least predisposed toward negative views of evangelical Christians (i.e. non-liberal, religiously devout Democrats), the effect of the evangelical-Catholic cue comes close to statistical significance ($p<.10$) for attitudes toward government help for homosexuals in jobs and government help for African Americans.

[3] To ensure that the comparison category for religion includes only high-commitment evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics, we limit this analysis (like the analysis of the conditional effect of religious tradition and religious commitment on our religious group cue effects) to only evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, Catholics, and people with no religious affiliation.

Table A10: The Conditional Effect of Party Identification on the Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes, with Controls for Religion and Ideology

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Independent	1.66***	0.68	0.80
	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.44)
Republican	2.34***	2.33***	3.33***
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.29)
Liberal	-0.80*	-1.33***	-0.95**
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.33)
No Religion	-0.36	-0.31	-0.56†
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Evangelical Prot, Low Commitment	-0.08	0.69*	-0.38
	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.37)
Mainline Prot, Low Commitment	-1.13**	-0.17	-0.20
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.39)
Catholic, Low Commitment	-0.73*	-0.23	0.35
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.39)
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-0.88†	-0.82†	-0.41
	(0.49)	(0.48)	(0.53)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	0.31	0.54	-0.52
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.55)
Independent × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.12	0.71	1.13
	(0.72)	(0.68)	(0.74)
Republican × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.38	0.66	0.59
	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.53)
Independent × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-0.08	1.64*	1.85*
	(0.75)	(0.73)	(0.78)
Republican × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-0.53	-0.43	0.31
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.54)
Liberal × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.57	0.67	0.18
	(0.58)	(0.54)	(0.60)
Liberal × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-0.70	-0.01	-0.05
	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.59)
No Religion × Evan-Cath Treatment	-1.11	-0.72	0.25
	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.60)
No Religion × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-1.12*	-0.62	0.99†
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.60)
Low Evangelical × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.44	0.49	0.31
	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.66)
Low Evangelical × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.25	-0.46	0.93
	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.65)
Low Mainline × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.78	0.51	0.42
	(0.66)	(0.64)	(0.71)
Low Mainline × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	1.15	0.53	1.53*
	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.74)
Low Catholic × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.51	0.13	-1.11
	(0.68)	(0.66)	(0.71)
Low Catholic × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-0.95	-0.52	-0.73
	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.71)
Whites	0.72**	0.48*	0.53*
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Constant	6.71***	5.81***	2.70***
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.34)
N	954	1007	1023
Adjusted R^2	.33	.32	.35

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for party identification, ideology, and religion is Democrats who are not liberal and who are committed evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, or Catholics. The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

Figure 4: The Conditional Effect of Ideology on the Impact of Religious Group Cues

To assess the degree to which the effect of religious group cues on policy attitudes is conditioned by ideological identification, we estimated regression models in which the independent variables were our religious group treatment variables, dummy variables for moderate and conservative identifiers, and interactions between the ideological dummy variables and the treatment variables. The regression estimates are shown in Table A11.

Table A11: The Conditional Effect of Ideological Identification on the Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Moderate	1.37***	1.60***	1.17***
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Conservative	3.18***	3.42***	4.27***
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-1.82***	-0.51	-0.25
	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.41)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	-0.77	-0.13	-0.20
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.40)
Moderate × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.12*	-0.08	0.03
	(0.52)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Conservative × Evan-Cath Treatment	1.42**	0.61	0.62
	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.52)
Moderate × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.65	0.21	0.23
	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Conservative × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.73	0.24	0.57
	(0.51)	(0.50)	(0.51)
Whites	0.77***	0.91***	0.53*
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Constant	5.53***	4.31***	1.84***
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)
N	1128	1191	1213
Adjusted R^2	.25	.25	.33
F-test of the equality of the effects of treatments	4.96*	.70	.01
(df)	(1, 1118)	(1, 1181)	(1, 1203)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for ideological identification is liberals. The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

The comparison group for ideological identification is liberal identifiers. Thus, the coefficients on the moderate and conservative dummies represent the difference between those partisan groups and liberals among control group respondents. Not surprisingly, both moderates and conservatives take more conservative positions than liberals on all three issues, with conservative identifiers taking the most conservative positions.

The coefficients on the treatment variables represent the effects of the treatments on the policy opinions of liberals. The evangelical-Catholic treatment has a strong and statistically significant effect on liberals' attitudes toward government job assistance for homosexuals, and the effect of the religious-nonreligious cue on liberals' views on this issue is very close to statistical significance ($p<.06$). In both cases, the cues spur liberal identifiers to take more liberal positions.

The F-tests of the equality of the effects of the evangelical-Catholic and religious-nonreligious treatments within regression models indicate that the evangelical-Catholic cue had an effect that was significantly larger than that of the religious-nonreligious cue on liberals' views about government help for gays and lesbians. The difference between the effects of the two treatments on the other policy opinions was not statistically significant.

The interaction term coefficients represent the differences in the effect of the treatments for conservatives and moderates and the treatment effect for liberals. Nearly all of these coefficients are positive, indicating that the religious group cues do not push moderate and conservatives in as liberal a direction as they push liberals. In fact, in the homosexual job assistance model, the evangelical-Catholic cue pushes both moderates and conservatives in a significantly less liberal direction than it pushes liberal identifiers.

In Table A12, we show the effects of the treatments for each of the three ideological groups, with the effects for moderates and conservatives computed simply by making them, rather than liberals, the comparison group in our regression models. The only significant effects of the treatments are both on the government help for gays and lesbians issue, with the cue moving both liberals and moderates toward greater support for government assistance.

Table A12: The Effects of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes for Each Partisan Group

	Dependent Variables		
Treatment and Religious Group	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Evangelical-Catholic Treatment			
Liberals	-1.82*** (.42)	-.51 (.39)	-.25 (.51)
Moderates	-.70* (.31)	-.59 (.30)	-.22 (.30)
Conservatives	-.40 (.32)	.09 (.31)	.38 (.32)
Religious-Nonreligious Treatment			
Liberals	-.77 (.40)	-.13 (.39)	-.20 (.40)
Moderates	-.12 (.31)	.08 (.38)	.03 (.31)
Conservatives	-.03 (.31)	.11 (.31)	.37 (.32)

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients on the dummy variables for the evangelical-Catholic treatment variable and the religious-nonreligious treatment variable in models in which the particular religious tradition/religious commitment group was the comparison category. Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

Tests of Differences in Treatment Effects across Policy Attitudes. In Table A13, we present the results of tests of the equality of our treatment effects across the three policy attitudes. Among liberals, the evangelical-Catholic treatment has a significantly larger effect on

Table A13: Chow Tests of the Equality of Treatment Effects across Dependent Variables, Models of the Impact of Religious Group Cues by Ideological Identification

Religious Group and Model Comparison	Treatment	
	Evangelical vs. Catholic	Religious vs. Non-Religious
Liberals		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	6.88**	2.19
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	9.07**	1.32
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.29	.03
Moderates		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	.11	.35
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	1.41	.12
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	1.14	.03
Conservatives		
Help for Gays vs. Help for Blacks	2.86	2.95
Help for Gays vs. Health Insurance	3.60	3.88
Help for Blacks vs. Health Insurance	.59	.54

Source: Post-estimation tests for regression models in table A7.
Note: Entries are chi-square statistics with one degree of freedom.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05

attitudes toward government job assistance for gays and lesbians than on attitudes toward either government help for African Americans or government providing health insurance.

Controlling for Respondent Religion and Party Identification. It is possible that the effects of our religious group cues are explained by the religious and partisan characteristics of respondents. In particular, the strong liberalizing effect of the evangelical-Catholic cue on the gay rights attitudes of liberals may be due to liberals being more likely than moderates and conservatives to be Democrats and to have either no religious affiliation or a low level of religious commitment. To assess this possibility, we introduced several control variables into the regression models. These included a dummy variable for Democratic identifiers; a dummy variable for people with no religious affiliation; dummy variables for evangelical Protestants,

Table A14: The Conditional Effect of Ideological Identification on the Impact of the Religious Group Treatments on Policy Attitudes, with Controls for Non-Religion and Party Identification

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Moderate	0.72*	1.28***	0.74*
	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Conservative	1.41***	2.34***	3.00***
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.41)
Democrat	-1.86***	-1.46***	-1.68***
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.31)
No Religion	-0.27	-0.24	-0.36
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.32)
Evangelical Prot, Low Commitment	-0.04	0.77*	-0.25
	(0.35)	(0.33)	(0.36)
Mainline Prot, Low Commitment	-1.10**	-0.19	-0.17
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.38)
Catholic, Low Commitment	-0.64†	-0.16	0.49
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.38)
Evangelical vs. Catholic Treatment	-1.39†	0.49	0.23
	(0.76)	(0.70)	(0.75)
Religious vs. Non-Religious Treatment	-0.84	0.78	-0.27
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.77)
Moderate × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.63	-0.69	-0.18
	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.59)
Conservative × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.84	-0.64	0.07
	(0.75)	(0.71)	(0.76)
Moderate × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.72	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.58)
Conservative × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.64	-0.54	0.25
	(0.73)	(0.72)	(0.76)
Democrat × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.06	-0.55	-0.42
	(0.56)	(0.53)	(0.57)
Democrat × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.44	-0.22	-0.38
	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.58)
No Religion × Evan-Cath Treatment	-1.22*	-0.90†	0.13
	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.58)
No Religion × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-1.12*	-0.57	1.14†
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.59)
Low Evangelical × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.39	0.33	0.20
	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.64)
Low Evangelical × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	0.23	-0.52	0.84
	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.64)
Low Mainline × Evan-Cath Treatment	0.94	0.66	0.83
	(0.67)	(0.65)	(0.70)
Low Mainline × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	1.13	0.54	1.51*
	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.72)
Low Catholic × Evan-Cath Treatment	-0.52	0.05	-1.07
	(0.68)	(0.66)	(0.69)
Low Catholic × Rel-Nonrel Treatment	-0.92	-0.49	-0.42
	(0.65)	(0.65)	(0.70)
Whites	0.70**	0.45*	0.47†
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)
Constant	7.74***	5.90***	3.37***
	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.45)
N	954	1007	1023
Adjusted R^2	.3	.31	.38

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative). The comparison group for ideological identification, party identification, and religion is liberals who are not Democrats and who are committed evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, or Catholics. The comparison group for the religious group treatment is control group respondents.
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

mainline Protestants, and Catholics with low levels of religious commitment; and interactions between those variables and the treatment variables. The regression estimates are shown in Table A14.

With these controls in the models, the coefficients on the treatment variables themselves represent the effects of our religious group cues for liberals who are not Democrats (i.e. identify themselves as either independents or Republicans) and who are committed members of the evangelical, mainline, or Catholic traditions.[4] Even when the treatment effects are for this group of liberals, the effect of the evangelical-Catholic cue comes very close to statistical significance ($p<.10$) for attitudes toward government help for homosexuals in jobs.

Figure 5: Political Awareness and the Impact of Religious Group Cues

Our analysis of the conditional effect of political awareness on the influence of religious group cues on policy attitudes focuses on the effect of the evangelical-Catholic treatment among religiously unaffiliated people, Democratic identifiers, and liberal identifiers. For each of these three groups, we regressed each of the policy attitudes on the dummy variable for the evangelical-Catholic treatment (now coded zero only for control group respondents), our political awareness measure, and their interaction. The results are shown in Table A15. The coefficient on the treatment variable represents the treatment effect for people at the lowest level of political awareness. The coefficient on political awareness represents the effect of awareness for control group respondents. The interaction term coefficient indicates how the effect of the treatment changes as political awareness increases.

[4] We limited this analysis to only evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, Catholics, and people with no religious affiliation.

Table A15: The Conditional Effect of Political Awareness on the Impact of the Evangelical-Catholic Cue for Non-Religious People, Democrats, and Liberals

	Dependent Variables		
Independent Variables	Govt. Help for Gays	Govt. Help for Blacks	Health Insurance
Non-Religious			
Evangelical-Catholic Treatment	-5.82**	-4.29*	0.06
	(1.84)	(1.80)	(1.65)
Political Awareness	-1.76	-4.23**	0.87
	(1.63)	(1.62)	(1.47)
Evan-Cath Treatment × Awareness	4.68†	4.26†	-0.56
	(2.74)	(2.60)	(2.45)
Whites	0.93	0.73	0.95
	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.55)
Constant	8.07***	8.35***	1.87†
	(1.29)	(1.31)	(1.16)
N	173	192	199
Adjusted R^2	.15	.08	.004
Democrats			
Evangelical-Catholic Treatment	-3.62**	-3.38**	-1.05
	(1.20)	(1.04)	(0.84)
Political Awareness	-2.67*	-5.10***	-0.99
	(1.05)	(0.91)	(0.73)
Evan-Cath Treatment × Awareness	3.60*	4.01**	0.95
	(1.78)	(1.54)	(1.24)
Whites	0.68†	0.67*	0.03
	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.26)
Constant	7.67***	8.35***	3.19***
	(0.80)	(0.70)	(0.56)
N	388	430	440
Adjusted R^2	.05	.09	.003
Liberals			
Evangelical-Catholic Treatment	-6.14***	-3.48*	-2.36*
	(1.66)	(1.51)	(1.14)
Political Awareness	-3.60*	-6.62***	-3.05**
	(1.57)	(1.45)	(1.07)
Evan-Cath Treatment × Awareness	6.54**	4.47*	3.32*
	(2.48)	(2.23)	(1.68)
Whites	1.25*	0.63	0.10
	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.36)
Constant	7.56***	8.89***	4.15***
	(1.24)	(1.15)	(0.84)
N	188	208	211
Adjusted R^2	.13	.13	.03

Source: 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
Note: Top entries are OLS regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables all range from 1 (most liberal) to 10 (most conservative).
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

The results strongly support our expectation that that the attitudinal impact of the religious group cues should be strongest for the least politically-aware citizens and diminish as awareness increases. For the religiously unaffiliated, Democrats, and liberals, the effect of the evangelical-Catholic cue on both government job assistance for homosexuals and government help for African Americans is strong and statistically-significant for people at the lowest levels of awareness, consistently spurring them to more liberal positions on these issues. Then, for all three groups, the interaction term coefficients in the help for gays and help for blacks models are all positive and either statistically significant or very close to it ($p<.10$). This indicates that as political awareness increases, the liberalizing effect of the evangelical-Catholic cue grows weaker.

Among non-religious people and Democrats, the results for health insurance attitudes follow the patterns that we have seen consistently for this issue—no effect of religious group cues and thus no conditional effect of awareness on the treatment effect. However, among liberals, we see a conditional effect of political awareness on the influence of the religious cue even on this social welfare issue. There is a significant liberalizing effect of the treatment for the least-aware liberals. However, the positive and significant interaction term means that that effect diminishes as political awareness increases.

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