Hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and American elections

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ONLINE SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS

A1. Question wording

Hostile sexism

"When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors."

"Women who complain about discrimination often cause more problems than they solve."

"Women must overcome more obstacles than men to be professionally successful." (R)

"Feminists are making reasonable demands of men." (R)

Benevolent sexism

"Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess."

"Compared to men, women tend to have a superior moral sensibility."

"Men have no special obligation to provide financially for the women in their lives." (R)

"There is no need for men to cherish or protect women." (R)

Party identification

"Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...?" [Answer options "Democrat," "Republican," "Independent," "Other"

[If "Democrat" or "Republican"] "Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat / Republican] or a not so strong [Democrat / Republican]?"

[If "Independent," or "Other"] "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican party?"

Sociotropic economic evaluations

"Would you say that over the past year the nation's economy has: gotten much better, gotten better, stayed about the same, gotten worse, gotten much worse?" (variable CC16_302)

"Would you say that over the next year, do you think the nation's economy will: get much better, get better, stay about the same, get worse, get much worse?" (variable CC16_304)

Personal financial situation

"Over the past four years, has your household's annual income: increased a lot, increased somewhat, stayed about the same, decreased somewhat, decreased a lot?" (variable CC16_303)

Racism

"White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin" (CC16_422A)

"Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations" (CC16_422B)

"I am angry that racism exists" (CC16_422C)

"I often find myself fearful of people of other races." (CC16_422D)

Presidential candidate thermometers

"How warmly or coldly do you feel about:"
"Hillary Clinton"
"Donald Trump"

[answer options: 101-degree feeling thermometer slider]

Emotional reactions to candidates:

"Has Hillary Clinton, because of the kind of person she is, or because of something she has done, ever made you feel:"
"Angry or mad"
"Disgusted or sickened"

"Has Donald Trump, because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done, ever made you feel:"
"Angry or mad"
"Disgusted or sickened"

[answer options "Rarely," "Occasionally," "Fairly often," "Very often"]

Vote choice

"For whom did you vote for President of the United States?"
[answer options "Hillary Clinton (Democrat)," "Donald Trump (Republican)," "Other," "I did not vote in this race," "I did not vote," "Not sure."] (variable CC_401A)

Approval of current congressional representative

"We'd now like to ask you some questions about the people who represent you in Washington DC and in your state. Do you approve of the way each is doing their job?"

Each respondent's current Congressional Representative was included, by name, in the question battery. [Answer options "Strongly approve," "Somewhat approve," "Somewhat disapprove," "Strongly disapprove," "not sure."] (CC16_320F)

A2. Reliability of hostile and benevolent sexism

Cronbach's α for hostile sexism is a respectable 0.80; for benevolent sexism, on the other hand, it is rather low: 0.47. However, Cronbach's α is accurately measures reliability only when all of the items are tau-equivalent (i.e., that all items have the same mean and same factor loading), and when measurement error is independent across items (Sijtsma 2008; Cho and Kim 2015). As with most Likert survey scales, the items used to measure each face of sexism almost certainly include *systematic* measurement error that is correlated across questions. This is caused by individual variability in response acquiescence—the tendency of some respondents to agree with survey questions, regardless of their content, and of other to disagree, again regardless of the substance (Couch and Kenniston 1960; Schuman and Presser 1982). In the presence of response acquiescence or other systematic measurement error, reverse-worded items will correlate less with forward-coded items, and will load less well on common factors.

By design, two of the four items in each scale have reversed wording. This ensures that each respondent's acquiescence is averaged out when the coding of half the items is reversed prior to averaging the items together.

HOSTILE SEXISM ITEMS

1. When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors.
2. Feminists are making reasonable demands of men. [R]
3. Women who complain about discrimination often cause more problems than they solve.
4. Women must overcome more obstacles than men to be professionally successful. [R]

BENEVOLENT SEXISM ITEMS

1. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.
2. Compared to men, women tend to have a superior moral sensibility.
3. Men have no special obligation to provide financially for the women in their lives. [R]
4. There is no need for men to cherish or protect women. [R]

The presence of both forward- and reverse-worded items is a notorious cause of (seemingly) low scale reliability as it suppresses the correlations between items with opposite wording. Indeed, Glick and Fiske report substantially lower loadings for reverse-worded versions of several of their questions (1996, table 3), and Schaffner finds that reverse-worded sexism items—especially for benevolent sexism—load less well (2021). Conversely, for scales without reversed items, acquiescence artificially *inflates* reliability estimates by increasing the correlation among all of the items. In both

cases, "failure to account for nonrandom error distorts the estimated reliabilities of the measures, exaggerating the contrast in quality between oppositely worded survey items" (D. P. Green and Citrin 1994, 268; also see S. B. Green and Hershberger 2000).

The pattern of correlations among the individual benevolent sexism items is exactly what we would expect in the presence of response acquiescence for a unidimensional scale that includes both forward- and reverse-worded items. The pairs of items with the same sense (forward or reverse) correlate substantially. For benevolent sexism, the two forward-coded items correlate 0.53 and the two reverse-coded items, 0.50. In contrast, the pairwise correlations between opposite-worded items average almost exactly zero (0.01), and each is less than 0.10 in absolute value.

Correlations among benevolent sexism items

(obs=1,457)

	bs1	bs2	bs3	bs4
bs1	1.0000			
bs2	0.5260	1.0000		
bs3	0.0999	0.0323	1.0000	
bs4	-0.0063	-0.0807	0.5032	1.0000

The hostile sexism items show the same basic pattern, though the contrast between same- and opposite-sense items is much less dramatic: the two same-sense pairwise correlations average 0.60 (0.68 and 0.52); the four opposite-sense correlations average 0.45.

Correlations among hostile sexism items

(obs=1,455)

	hs1	hs2	hs3	hs4
hs1	1.0000			
hs2	0.6764	1.0000		
hs3	0.4368	0.3694	1.0000	
hs4	0.5057	0.4804	0.5165	1.0000

Thus, the correlations among items suggest that the estimated reliability for both scales is artificially reduced by acquiescence. I suspect that the reliability of benevolent sexism is particularly affected by the presence of reverse-worded items, as benevolent sexism involves respect for traditional authority—a trait that is itself associated with acquiescence (Brown 1965, 510–14; Kirscht and Dillehay 2014). Benevolent sexism also looks somewhat less reliable—beyond acquiescence—than hostile. Consistent with this, the reliabilities of pairs of benevolent sexism items are 0.69 for the

forward-worded items, and 0.67 for the reversed items. For hostile sexism, the pairwise α coefficients are 0.81 (forward items) and 0.68 (reversed items).

In the presence of systematic measurement error, artificially-low reliability coefficients do not preclude the scale's validity. To further explore this, I estimate a structural equation model (SEM) that explicitly accounts for systematic measurement error among the scale items. The model I estimate is analogous to that employed by Green and Citrin (1994). In this model, the pattern of covariances among the eight items is assumed to arise from three systematic latent factors: HS (i.e., hostile sexism, which affects the four hostile sexism items); BS (i.e., benevolent sexism, which affects the four benevolent sexism items); and a Method factor that captures systematic response bias that affects all eight items equally.[1] The HS and BS latent factors are assumed to be correlated with each other. Each of the eight items is constrained to load equally on the methods factor, which is assumed to be independent of the two substantive factors. Because the reverse-worded items are *not* reversed when estimating this model, I expect the first two items on each scale to load positively, and the second two to load negatively, on the appropriate sexism factor. The scale for the latent sexism factors is fixed by constraining the first item on each to a loading of one; the methods factor's scale is fixed by constraining all items to have a loading of one on that factor as well. I estimate the SEM using Stata 17 via maximum likelihood, with the standard CCES sampling weights.[2]

[1] I estimate a single SEM rather than separate models for HS and BS on the grounds that the questions were administered in a single battery with the order of the individual items randomized. Therefore, systematic method variance should be the same across all of the items in both sexism scales.

[2] The use of sampling weights precludes estimation by weighted least squares—arguably more appropriate in the presence of non-normal variables. However, as is frequently the case, unweighted WLS estimates are practically identical.

The figure below shows the structure of the model graphically, as well as the unstandardized parameter estimates. The standardized factor loadings are presented in appendix Table A17.



There are several notable features of this model. First, all of the loadings on the HS and BS factors have the expected signs: positive for the first two items, and negative for the last two. The loadings vary a bit from item to item, with the third hostile sexism item and the fourth benevolent sexism item loading somewhat less than the others (–0.60 and –0.68, respectively, compared with loadings above 0.75 for the others). All are highly statistically significant ($p<0.001$). Overall, these findings are similar to those of Schaffner, who finds that reverse-worded sexism items load substantially less-well in factor models, and that accounting for systematic method variance improves those loadings (2021; see p.5 and online appendix 4).

The covariance between BS and HS of –0.008 implies a correlation of –0.20 between the two scales; larger than the correlation of –0.13 between the simple scales, but not reliably different from

zero (p=0.16). This confirms that the items associated with BS and HS are indeed measuring distinct concepts.

The individual-level BS and HS scores produced by this model are essentially identical to the simple additive scales I employ in the paper, correlations are 0.98 (BS) and 0.99 (HS) with the simple averages. This makes sense because both approaches remove the systematic measurement error from the final scale: in the SEM by modelling it directly, and in the averaged scale through the reversal of half of the items in each. The substantive difference between the approaches lies in the somewhat unequal weighting of individual items in the SEM estimates, which has negligible effect on the final scale. Therefore, I stick with the simpler scale-construction approach for clarity and ease of exposition.

As a final point, I note that low scale reliability should mitigate *against* substantively meaningful and statistically significant results, insofar as remaining random error biases estimates toward zero. Therefore, in the worst case I may be missing or underestimating the impact of benevolent sexism (especially) in the empirical models I estimate.

A3. Comparing the impact of sexism with other independent variables

To facilitate comparisons of the effects of the independent variables across the dependent variables, I constructed an additive pro-Clinton scale from the five individual variables (α=0.93). The figure below shows the marginal effect (slope) of each variable on this scale from a model analogous to the one described in the main text.



Not surprisingly, the most powerful predictors are racism, with a coefficient of –0.405, and party identification, where the two coefficients together place Democrats 0.373 higher on the pro-Clinton scale than Republicans. Sociotropic economic evaluations also drive Clinton support (b=0.326), while respondents' personal financial barely do (b=0.088). Thus, the impact of hostile sexism is about three quarters as large as racism's, about 80 percent the size of the partisan divide, and on a par with sociotropic economic evaluations. Benevolent sexism has an additional impact about 40 percent the size of racism and partisanship, half that of sociotropic economic evaluations, and double that of personal finances.

A4. Moderation by partisanship

Presidential models

The figure below shows the marginal effects on each dependent variable of hostile and benevolent sexism, from models that interact each of the independent variables with respondent partisanship. The full set of results from these models are available in appendix Table A18. Although the standard errors are relatively large and the estimates therefore vary from model to model, the overall pattern is relatively consistent. The impact of hostile sexism on all of the dependent variables is somewhat larger among independents, and somewhat smaller among both Democrats and Republicans. The impact of benevolent sexism, on the other hand, is essentially similar among Republicans and independents and is basically zero among Democrats. While the statistical significance of these differences in marginal effects comes and goes across the models, they are consistent enough to warrant additional future research.



This attention is all the more warranted, given findings in the literature on political participation. Banda and Cassese (2021) found that both hostile sexism and racial resentment reduced various forms of participation among Democrats but not Republicans, and Berry and

colleagues (2019) found that racial linked fate mobilizes Republicans but not Democrats. In both cases, this variation is presumably due to the cross-pressures that racism, sexism, and racial linked fate create for Democratic partisans, which undermines the mobilizing effects of those attitudes.

Congressional models



Figure shows the contrast in marginal effect of hostile sexism; i.e., the *difference* in slopes for male and female candidates shown in the congressional vote figure

For the congressional vote models, I do not have enough data to unpack any moderating effect of respondent partisanship on my findings. The figure below displays the contrast in marginal effects for hostile sexism on voting for male vs. female candidates, separately by respondent partisanship. That is, each point shows the difference in slopes between the two lines from Figure 4 in the main text; it shows the difference in the impact of hostile sexism on the probability of voting for a male Democrat vs. the impact of hostile sexism on the probability of voting for a female Democrat on the left side, and the corresponding contrasts for republican male vs. female candidates on the right side. The full model results are shown in appendix table A19. For Democratic candidates, the estimated contrasts are quite similar across respondent partisanship, though the noisiness of the estimates prevents any definite conclusions. For Republican candidates, on the other hand, the estimates are even less precise.

A5. Model control variables

In this appendix I present results confirming that the findings I report for presidential and congressional voting are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. The baseline models presented in the text include controls for other attitudinal predispositions that are correlated with sexism and plausibly also affect vote: racism, sociotropic economic evaluations, and evaluations of the respondent's personal financial situation. In addition, they include an indicator for respondent partisanship.

To those I add a number of additional demographic controls: education (as a set of six indicators running from less than high school through graduate degree); racial identity (indicators for white, Black, Asian-American, and "other"); ethnicity (indicator for Latinx); age (a set of five indicators corresponding to quintiles of the sample age distribution); income (five indicators for income groups, plus one for income unknown), plus one additional attitudinal control, ideology. I operationalized the latter two different ways: as a continuous predictor in one model specification, and as a set of categorical indicators for liberal, moderate, conservative, and unknown in a second specification.

The estimated marginal effects of hostile and benevolent sexism for the presidential race, under the three specifications, are shown in the figure below; complete results are in Tables A20-A25. Across the various dependent variables, the estimated impact of both hostile and benevolent sexism is reduced somewhat with the inclusion of the additional control variables, though the basic patterns are the same: hostile sexism has large and consistent effects across all of the variables, and benevolent sexism has somewhat smaller effects that are larger for evaluations focusing on Trump than on Clinton.



Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).

Turning to the congressional vote models, the figure below compares the three model specifications (see table A26). The results here corresponds to those depicted in figure 4 in the main text, though to facilitate comparisons across model specifications, it plots the marginal effect of hostile sexism on probability of voting for a congressional candidate, depending on that candidate's party and gender. Thus, each plotted point corresponds to the slope of a line from figure 4.



Plots show marginal effect of hostile sexism on probability of vote for male or female Democratic (left) or Republican (right) House candidate
Corresponds to slopes from panels of [[figure 5]]

Again the results are quite consistent across the specifications: for male candidates, the extra control variables have no effect on the relationship between hostile sexism and vote. For female Democratic candidates, the inclusion of demographic and ideology controls reduces the impact of hostile sexism somewhat; for female Republicans that impact is perhaps a bit stronger, though the standard errors are huge across all models. Finally, the lack of an impact of benevolent sexism on congressional voting is entirely consistent across the three model specifications. In sum, the estimated impact of sexism is often a bit smaller with the inclusion of the additional demographic controls, though the basic pattern of results in these models is the same.



Plots show marginal effect of benevolent sexism on probability of vote for male or female Democratic (left) or Republican (right) House candidate
Corresponds to slopes from panels of figure 5 in the main text

A6. Conjoint experiment: marginal effect of candidate sex and traits

In this section I present the conjoint experiments in terms of the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) of candidate sex and candidate leadership style, at different levels of sexism. This is a shift from the presentation (though not the underlying statistical model) from the main paper. There, the analysis and presentation of the conjoint experiment focuses on the difference in the marginal effect of sexism on vote across the experimental conditions. This is the standard approach for experimental studies of priming, in which a treatment is hypothesized to affect the impact of a predisposition on an outcome variable. Thus, I treat the conjoint like any other factorial experiment, and estimate the priming effect on two predispositions (hostile and benevolent sexism) of each of two experimental dimensions (candidate sex and candidate leadership style).

Estimating AMCEs across different levels of respondent sexism involves the same statistical model (though note that the model specification imposes a linearity constraint on the interaction effect, which I discuss and evaluate below). This is because in a model that interacts X1 and X2, it is equivalent to think of the marginal effect of X1 depending on X2, or the marginal effect of X2 depending on X1. Considering just hostile sexism and candidate sex, the basic model is:

$$\text{vote} = b0 + b1(\text{Female candidate}) + b2(\text{HS}) + b3(\text{Female} \times \text{HS}) + \langle \textit{other variables} \rangle$$

When focusing on priming of hostile sexism, we compare the marginal effect of hostile sexism for a male candidate (b2) with the marginal effect of hostile sexism for a female candidate (b2+b3). The difference between those two is b3, the priming effect. To frame this model in terms of the AMCE of a female candidate, we rearrange the algebra:

$$\text{AMCE(female)} = b1 + b3(\text{HS})$$

This AMCE at a particular level of hostile sexism is simply the distance between the male candidate and female candidate lines at that point on the relevant graph. In the left-hand panel of figure 8 in the paper, for example, a respondent at the fifth percentile of hostile sexism has a probability of 0.59 of voting for a (feminine) female Democrat vs. a 0.52 probability of voting for a (feminine) male Democrat. The difference between these two, (i.e., +0.07), is the AMCE for a female (vs. male)

feminine candidate for this level of hostile sexism; this AMCE is significant at p<0.05. In contrast, at the 95th percentile of hostile sexism, the AMCE for a female candidate (vs. male) is –0.03 (i.e., 0.50 – 0.53; n.s.). For a masculine candidate, the corresponding AMCEs are +0.08 (p<0.05) and –0.05 (n.s.). The figures that follow focus on the AMCEs, highlighting the values at the second, fifth, 50th, 95th, and 98th percentiles of sexism.



Plot indicates marginal effect of female candidate (vs. male candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent hostile sexism, by candidate traits



Plot indicates marginal effect of female candidate (vs. male candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent benevolent sexism, by candidate traits



Plot indicates marginal effect of feminine candidate (vs. masculine candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent hostile sexism, by candidate sex



Plot indicates marginal effect of feminine candidate (vs. masculine candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent benevolent sexism, by candidate sex

A7. Linearity of conjoint interactions

In this section I evaluate the linearity of the interaction effects in the conjoint anaysis. Hainmueller et al. (2018) detail two potential issues in models with interaction effects: common support and linearity. In a models like mine, common support refers to the distribution of a continuous variable (e.g., hostile sexism) across the levels defined by a categorical variable (e.g., candidate sex category). If there are ranges of the continuous variable that do not appear—or are very sparse—at one level of the categorical variable, then the estimates of the interaction effect are highly model-dependent; that is, they are defined solely by the linearity implied by the regression model. Happily, in this experiment the categorical predictors (candidate sex and candidate leadership style) are both randomly assigned to respondents, which ensures that the distribution of the continuous predictors (benevolent and hostile sexism) are equivalent across the categories.

To assess linearity for this sort of interaction, Hainmueller and colleagues recommend inspecting Linear Interaction Diagnostic (LID) plots. These are scatterplots of the continuous predictor against the dependent variable with linear and loess fit lines, separately for each level of the categorical variables. For models that include other variables (such as mine), the plotted variables are first residualized with respect to the covariates; that is, I plot the residuals from auxiliary regressions of the dependent variable and continuous variable of interest on the other covariates. Loess does not accommodate sampling weights, so I instead estimate a first-order local polynomial. This is similar to loess, without an iterative reweighting step (Gijbels and Prosdocimi 2010), which means it generates somewhat more volatile (i.e., less smooth and linear) estimates.

The LID plots are presented below; each includes the linear fit (red line) and the polynomial (green line). The first figure focuses on hostile sexism; it shows the fit between hostile sexism and vote, separately for the four categories of candidate sex-by-leadership style. The second figure shows the analogous analyses for benevolent sexism. The grey shading in each plot covers 99 percent of the data (i.e., it runs from 0.5 percentile to the 99.5 percentile). In many cases the polynomial fit does diverge at extremely high and low levels of (residualized) sexism; this is likely as much a function of the instability of (un-reweighted) local polynomials as of important nonlinearity in the impact of

sexism on vote. Overall, the polynomial and linear fit lines are quiet similar over the central 99 percent of the data, indicating that the linearity assumptions inherent in the interaction models I estimate do not seriously distort my estimates and inferences.

Conjoint experiment: linearity of impact of hostile sexism on vote
by candidate sex and leadership style



Red line is linear estimate; green line is local polynomial estimate; shaded area includes 99 percent of weighted cases.
Vote and sexism both residualized with respect to other variables in the model.

Conjoint experiment: linearity of impact of benevolent on vote
by candidate sex and leadership style



Red line is linear estimate; green line is local polynomial estimate; shaded area includes 99 percent of weighted cases.
Vote and sexism both residualized with respect to other variables in the model.

A8. Congressional vote model that allows racism to vary by condition

This section presents a model showing that the priming effect of candidate sex on hostile sexism, displayed in figure 4 of the main paper, is robust to a model that also allows the effect of racism to vary by candidate sex. The full model results are in table A17. As shown in the figure below, the priming effect of candidate sex on hostile sexism is quite similar under both specifications; for Democratic candidates the priming effect is slightly smaller and less statistically clear; for Republican candidates it is somewhat sharper, statistically.



Comparison of model presented in main paper with one that adds an interaction between racism and candidate sex

A9. Additional appendix figures & tables

Additional figures and tables follow the references section, below.

Online Supplement References

Banda, Kevin K., and Erin C. Cassese. 2021. "Hostile Sexism, Racial Resentment, and Political Mobilization." *Political Behavior* (online first). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09674-7 (February 2, 2021).

Berry, Justin A., David Ebner, and Michelle Cornelius. 2019. "White Identity Politics: Linked Fate and Political Participation." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* (online first): 1–19.

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Additional Appendix Figures & Tables

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List of Tables

Figure A1: Distribution of hostile and benevolent sexism, by respondent gender



Figure A2: Distribution of hostile and benevolent sexism, by party identification



Figure A3: Marginal effects of variables on pro-Clinton scale



Figure A4: Impact of benevolent sexism by candidate characteristics (conjoint experiment)



Marginal effect of benevolent sexism on support for candidates of indicated types; p-level for the difference in marginal effects

Figure A5: Impact of hostile sexism by candidate characteristics (conjoint experiment)



Marginal effect of hostile sexism on support for candidates of indicated types; p-level for the difference in marginal effects

Figure A6: Presidential models by partisanship



Figure A7: Contrasts in marginal effect of hostile sexism on voting for female v. male candidate



Figure shows the contrast in marginal effect of hostile sexism; i.e., the *difference* in slopes for male and female shown in the congressional vote figure

Figure A8: Presidential vote model with and without additional control variables



Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).

Figure A9: Hostile sexism in congressional vote model, with and without additional control variables



Plots show marginal effect of hostile sexism on probability of vote for male or female Democratic (left) or Republican (right) House candidate
Corresponds to slopes from panels of figure 4 in the main text

Figure A10: Benevolent sexism in congressional vote model, with and without additional control variables



Plots show marginal effect of benevolent sexism on probability of vote for male or female Democratic (left) or Republican (right) House candidate
Corresponds to slopes from panels of figure 5 in the main text

Figure A11: AMCE of candidate sex category at different levels of hostile sexism



Plot indicates marginal effect of female candidate (vs. male candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent hostile sexism, by candidate traits

Figure A12: AMCE of candidate sex category at different levels of benevolent sexism



Plot indicates marginal effect of female candidate (vs. male candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent benevolent sexism, by candidate traits

Figure A13: AMCE of candidate leadership style at different levels of hostile sexism



Plot indicates marginal effect of feminine candidate (vs. masculine candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent hostile sexism, by candidate sex

Figure A14: AMCE of candidate leadership style at different levels of benevolent sexism



Plot indicates marginal effect of feminine candidate (vs. masculine candidate) on probability of vote at different levels of respondent benevolent sexism, by candidate sex

Figure A15: Conjoint experiment: linearity of impact of hostile sexism on vote by candidate sex and leadership style



Red line is linear estimate; green line is local polynomial estimate; shaded area includes 99 percent of weighted cases.
Vote and sexism both residualized with respect to other variables in the model.

Figure A16: Conjoint experiment: linearity of impact of benevolent on vote by candidate sex and leadership style



Red line is linear estimate; green line is local polynomial estimate; shaded area includes 99 percent of weighted cases.
Vote and sexism both residualized with respect to other variables in the model.

Figure A17: Congressional vote: model that allows impact of racism to vary by candidate sex



Comparison of model presented in main paper with one that adds an interaction between racism and candidate sex

Table A1: Relationships among sexism, racism, and economic evaluations

	Hostile Sexism	*Benevolent Sexism*	*Racism scale*	*Economic evaluations*	*Personal finances*
Hostile Sexism	–	−0.108**	0.394**	−0.235**	−0.026
		(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.045)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.120**	–	0.014	−0.081*	−0.096
	(0.042)		(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.054)
Racism scale	0.510**	0.016	–	−0.180**	−0.033
	(0.038)	(0.045)		(0.045)	(0.057)
Economic evaluations	−0.196**	−0.061*	−0.116**	–	0.344**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.046)
Personal finances	−0.014	−0.049	−0.014	0.232**	–
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.032)	
R Party Identification: Democrats	−0.046**	0.021	−0.045**	0.129**	0.036
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.024)
R Party Identification: Republicans	0.079**	0.031*	0.013	0.010	0.011
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Female	−0.090**	0.024*	0.002	−0.058**	−0.025
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Intercept	0.472**	0.641**	0.210**	0.529**	0.430**
	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.049)
N	1,244	1,244	1,244	1,244	1,244
Std. error of regression	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.19	0.23
R^2	0.48	0.04	0.40	0.38	0.16

** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A2: Presidential regressions

	Clinton thermometer rating	*Negative emotion: Clinton*	*Trump thermometer rating*	*Negative emotion: Trump*	*Voted Clinton (2-party)*	*Pro-Clinton scale*
Hostile Sexism	−0.283**	0.283**	0.230**	−0.363**	−0.310**	−0.296**
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.040)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.074	0.152*	0.157**	−0.225**	−0.126*	−0.162**
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.060)	(0.078)	(0.054)	(0.047)
Racism scale	−0.218*	0.390**	0.422**	−0.508**	−0.573**	−0.405**
	(0.085)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.051)
Economic evaluations	0.395**	−0.403**	−0.238**	0.240**	0.362**	0.326**
	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.036)
Personal finances	0.135**	−0.043	−0.109*	0.089	0.065	0.088*
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.036)
Democrat	0.208**	−0.186**	−0.115**	0.136**	0.269**	0.176**
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.020)
Republican	−0.123**	0.207**	0.211**	−0.180**	−0.258**	−0.197**
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.019)
Female	0.012	−0.014	−0.036	0.071**	0.025	0.035*
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Intercept	0.311**	0.370**	0.222**	0.750**	0.637**	0.628**
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.042)
N	1,069	1,236	1,032	1,236	999	1,244
R^2	0.55	0.57	0.48	0.53	0.68	0.70
Root MSE	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.20

** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A3: Presidential regressions, separately by respondent gender (1 of 2)

	Clinton thermometer rating		*Negative emotion: Clinton*		*Trump thermometer rating*	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Hostile Sexism	−0.370**	−0.208**	0.353**	0.229**	0.215*	0.228**
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.084)	(0.077)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.021	−0.119	0.330** †	0.005	0.219*	0.107
	(0.103)	(0.083)	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.082)
Racism scale	−0.051	−0.345**	0.384**	0.400**	0.478**	0.379**
	(0.098)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.088)	(0.098)	(0.092)
Economic evaluations	0.425**	0.372**	−0.409**	−0.401**	−0.368**	−0.154*
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.098)	(0.071)	(0.098)	(0.070)
Personal finances	0.157*	0.104	−0.054	−0.043	−0.052	−0.151*
	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.061)
Democrat	0.209**	0.213**	−0.184**	−0.178**	−0.089*	−0.131**
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.036)
Republican	−0.129**	−0.118**	0.165**	0.243**	0.204**	0.215**
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Intercept	0.243**	0.382**	0.258*	0.446**	0.201*	0.219**
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.105)	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.069)
N	1,069		1,236		1,032	
R^2	0.56		0.57		0.49	
Root MSE	0.25		0.27		0.27	

** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed. For differences between coefficients, ‡p<0.01; †p<0.05.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A4: Presidential regressions, separately by respondent gender (2 of 2)

	Negative emotion: Trump		*Voted Clinton (2-party)*	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Hostile Sexism	−0.383**	−0.326**	−0.374**	−0.218**
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.072)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.160	−0.296*	−0.151	−0.129
	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.081)	(0.077)
Racism scale	−0.460**	−0.545**	−0.643**	−0.533**
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.118)	(0.110)
Economic evaluations	0.391** †	0.143*	0.411**	0.329**
	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.086)
Personal finances	0.058	0.117	0.098	0.053
	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Democrat	0.063	0.186**	0.210**	0.302**
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.047)
Republican	−0.165**	−0.192**	−0.211**	−0.307**
	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.050)
Intercept	0.671**	0.874**	0.669**	0.642**
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.081)
N	1,236		999	
R^2	0.54		0.69	
Root MSE	0.28		0.28	

** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed. For differences between coefficients, ‡p<0.01; †p<0.05. Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A5: Predicted probability of voting for Democrat, by candidate sex

	Probability of vote for Democrat who is			*p-level*
Hostile sexism level	*male*	*female*	Δ	*for* Δ
5th percentile (0.063)	0.54	0.72	0.18	0.001**
25th percentile (0.250)	0.51	0.61	0.10	0.005**
50th percentile (0.438)	0.47	0.49	0.02	0.554
75th percentile (0.563)	0.45	0.42	–0.04	0.386
95th percentile (0.875)	0.40	0.24	–0.16	0.019*

Predicted probability of voting for male or female Democrat running against male Republican, based on probit model discussed in text.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A6: Predicted probability of voting for Republican, by candidate sex

	Probability of vote for Republican who is			*p-level*
Hostile sexism level	*male*	*female*	Δ	*for* Δ
5th percentile (0.063)	0.46	0.48	0.01	0.834
25th percentile (0.250)	0.49	0.44	–0.05	0.171
50th percentile (0.438)	0.53	0.41	–0.12	0.006**
75th percentile (0.563)	0.55	0.39	–0.16	0.008**
95th percentile (0.875)	0.60	0.33	–0.26	0.019*

Predicted probability of voting for male or female Republican running against male Democrat, based on probit model discussed in text.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A7: Predicted probability of voting for Democrat running against male Republican, by candidate sex

	Probability of vote for Democrat who is			*p-level*
Benevolent sexism level	*male*	*female*	Δ	*for* Δ
5th percentile (0.313)	0.48	0.51	0.03	0.536
25th percentile (0.500)	0.48	0.51	0.03	0.270
50th percentile (0.563)	0.48	0.51	0.03	0.231
75th percentile (0.688)	0.48	0.51	0.03	0.341
95th percentile (0.833)	0.49	0.52	0.03	0.536

Predicted probability of voting for male or female Democrat running against male Republican, based on probit model discussed in text.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A8: Predicted probability of voting for Republican running against male Democrat, by candidate sex

	Probability of vote for Republican who is			*p-level*
Benevolent sexism level	*male*	*female*	Δ	*for* Δ
5th percentile (0.313)	0.52	0.32	−0.20	0.004**
25th percentile (0.500)	0.52	0.38	−0.14	0.003**
50th percentile (0.563)	0.52	0.40	−0.12	0.011*
75th percentile (0.688)	0.52	0.44	−0.07	0.189
95th percentile (0.833)	0.51	0.49	−0.03	0.761

Predicted probability of voting for male or female Republican running against male Democrat, based on probit model discussed in text.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A9: Predicted Approval of current Representative, by Representative sex

	Average approval for Rep. who is			*p-level*
Hostile sexism level	*male*	*female*	Δ	*for* Δ
5th percentile (0.063)	0.50	0.58	0.08	0.110
25th percentile (0.250)	0.52	0.52	0.00	0.994
50th percentile (0.438)	0.54	0.46	−0.08	0.015*
75th percentile (0.563)	0.55	0.43	−0.13	0.001**
95th percentile (0.875)	0.58	0.33	−0.25	0.000**

Predicted approval level, based on regression model discussed in text.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A10: Predicted Approval of current Representative, by Representative sex

	Average approval for Rep. who is			*p-level*
Benevolent sexism level	*male*	*female*	Δ	*for* Δ
5th percentile (0.313)	0.53	0.49	−0.04	0.387
25th percentile (0.500)	0.53	0.48	−0.06	0.066^
50th percentile (0.563)	0.54	0.47	−0.06	0.037*
75th percentile (0.688)	0.54	0.47	−0.08	0.039*
95th percentile (0.833)	0.55	0.46	−0.09	0.089^

Predicted approval level, based on regression model discussed in text.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A11: Analysis of House Voting and Member Approval

	Democratic House vote (2-party) [PROBIT]	*Approval of current Representative* [OLS]	*Placebo: Approval: Obama* [OLS]	*Placebo: Trump thermometer rating* [OLS]	*Placebo: Clinton thermometer rating* [OLS]	*Democratic House vote or preference (2-party)* [PROBIT]
Hostile Sexism	−0.755	0.098	−0.183**	0.240**	−0.319**	−0.617
	(0.429)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.423)
Benevolent Sexism	0.076	0.033	−0.188**	0.185**	−0.107	−0.368
	(0.482)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.476)
Female Republican	0.649	–	–	–	–	1.489*
	(0.703)					(0.594)
Female Democrat	0.938	–	–	–	–	0.719
	(0.659)					(0.664)
Female Republican × Hostile Sexism	1.541	–	–	–	–	1.256
	(0.929)					(0.882)
Female Democrat × Hostile Sexism	−1.996**	–	–	–	–	−2.173**
	(0.641)					(0.625)
Female Republican × Benevolent Sexism	−1.397	–	–	–	–	−2.486**
	(0.906)					(0.832)
Female Democrat × Benevolent Sexism	0.040	–	–	–	–	0.494
	(0.910)					(0.899)
Female Representative	–	0.153	−0.058	0.094	−0.131	–
		(0.116)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.091)	
Female Representative × Hostile Sexism	–	−0.406**	0.087	−0.038	0.145	–
		(0.128)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.110)	
Female Representative × Benevolent Sexism	–	−0.090	0.170	−0.172	0.182	–
		(0.147)	(0.134)	(0.130)	(0.144)	
Democratic member	–	−0.034	0.029	−0.062	−0.014	–
		(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	
Democratic respondent	0.981**	−0.183**	0.228**	−0.126**	0.179**	1.026**
	(0.151)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.144)
Republican respondent	−0.907**	0.146**	−0.211**	0.189**	−0.117**	−0.907**
	(0.225)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.221)
Democratic respondent × Democratic member	–	0.522**	−0.002	0.034	0.057	–
		(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.054)	
Republican respondent × Democratic member	–	−0.293**	−0.011	0.053	−0.024	–
		(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.043)	
Racism scale	−1.984**	0.105	−0.486**	0.418**	−0.213**	−2.168**
	(0.419)	(0.076)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.404)
Economic evaluations	1.315**	0.033	0.447**	−0.227**	0.390**	1.142**
	(0.292)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.279)
Personal finances	−0.458	0.056	0.122**	−0.110*	0.131*	−0.327
	(0.268)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.262)
Female respondent	0.225	0.003	−0.005	−0.036	0.009	0.124
	(0.159)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.155)
Intercept	0.181	0.363**	0.472**	0.226**	0.349**	0.475
	(0.458)	(0.079)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.462)
N	1,000	849	1,203	1,029	1,065	1,070
Log likelihood	−306.73	−162.06	−12.57	−106.19	−30.64	−337.26
R^2	.	0.27	0.67	0.49	0.56	.
Root MSE	.	0.30	0.25	0.27	0.25	.

Weighted estimation; cell entries are probit or OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by Congressional district, in parentheses.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed.

Table A12: Analysis of House Voting and Member Approval, by respondent gender

	Democratic House vote (2-party)		*Approval of current Representative*		
	Men	Women	Men		Women
Hostile Sexism	−0.760	−0.536	0.138		0.046
	(0.607)	(0.558)	(0.097)		(0.103)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.189	0.100	0.024		0.015
	(0.767)	(0.616)	(0.093)		(0.137)
Female Republican	0.317	0.492	–		–
	(1.247)	(0.847)			
Female Democrat	0.543	1.453*	–		–
	(1.138)	(0.651)			
Female Republican × Hostile Sexism	1.681	2.083	–		–
	(1.315)	(1.436)			
Female Democrat × Hostile Sexism	−1.901	−2.496**	–		–
	(1.150)	(0.818)			
Female Republican × Benevolent Sexism	−1.116	−1.290	–		–
	(1.550)	(1.058)			
Female Democrat × Benevolent Sexism	0.777	−0.596	–		–
	(1.412)	(1.005)			
Female Representative	–	–	0.056		0.185
			(0.146)		(0.170)
Female Representative × Hostile Sexism	–	–	−0.343*		−0.402*
			(0.166)		(0.180)
Female Representative × Benevolent Sexism	–	–	0.030		−0.155
			(0.191)		(0.235)
Democratic member	–	–	−0.138*	†	0.101
			(0.055)		(0.075)
Democratic respondent	0.772**	1.075**	−0.241**		−0.118
	(0.244)	(0.181)	(0.069)		(0.060)
Republican respondent	−0.745*	−1.032**	0.116*		0.197**
	(0.312)	(0.300)	(0.057)		(0.066)
Democratic respondent × Democratic member	–	–	0.663**	‡	0.359**
			(0.084)		(0.084)
Republican respondent × Democratic member	–	–	−0.216*		−0.399**
			(0.087)		(0.114)
Racism scale	−2.655**	−1.654**	−0.007		0.201*
	(0.640)	(0.513)	(0.110)		(0.095)
Economic evaluations	1.654**	1.126**	0.002		0.069
	(0.515)	(0.364)	(0.105)		(0.077)
Personal finances	−0.301	−0.488	0.044		0.070
	(0.438)	(0.314)	(0.068)		(0.078)
Intercept	0.322	0.317	0.446**		0.289**
	(0.750)	(0.443)	(0.101)		(0.110)
N	1,000		849		
Log likelihood	−302.78		−154.15		
R^2	.		0.28		
Root MSE	.		0.30		

Weighted estimation; cell entries are probit (vote) or OLS regression (approval) coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by Congressional district, in parentheses.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed. For differences between coefficients, ‡p<0.01; †p<0.05.

Table A13: Conjoint analysis models

	Candidate choice		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Hostile Sexism	–	0.120**	0.154**
		(0.037)	(0.054)
Benevolent Sexism	–	0.154*	0.013
		(0.067)	(0.090)
Female candidate × Hostile Sexism	–	−0.166**	−0.164**
		(0.061)	(0.061)
Female candidate × Benevolent Sexism	–	−0.075	−0.065
		(0.110)	(0.107)
Feminine candidate × Hostile Sexism	–	−0.101	−0.100
		(0.065)	(0.065)
Feminine candidate × Benevolent Sexism	–	−0.323**	−0.322**
		(0.101)	(0.099)
Female candidate	0.027	0.139*	0.132*
	(0.017)	(0.068)	(0.066)
Feminine candidate	0.078**	0.305**	0.305**
	(0.018)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate	−0.001	−0.105	−0.108
	(0.025)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Democrat	0.165**	0.165**	0.164**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Republican	−0.152**	−0.150**	−0.151**
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Republican candidate	0.030	0.031	0.032
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Democrat × Republican candidate	−0.321**	−0.323**	−0.321**
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Republican × Republican candidate	0.287**	0.288**	0.289**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Highly effective	0.265**	0.264**	0.287**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.055)
Held state-level office	0.014	0.013	−0.069
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.051)
Ivy League degree	−0.022	−0.023	−0.090*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.044)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate × Benevolent Sexism	–	0.158	0.164
		(0.151)	(0.147)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate × Hostile Sexism	–	0.034	0.034
		(0.094)	(0.094)
Held state-level office × Hostile Sexism	–	–	−0.052
			(0.046)
Highly effective × Hostile Sexism	–	–	−0.010
			(0.045)
Ivy League degree × Hostile Sexism	–	–	−0.007
			(0.044)
Held state-level office × Benevolent Sexism	–	–	0.179*
			(0.080)
Highly effective × Benevolent Sexism	–	–	−0.033
			(0.087)
Ivy League degree × Benevolent Sexism	–	–	0.120
			(0.065)
Intercept	0.303**	0.165**	0.233**
	(0.020)	(0.047)	(0.063)
Number of candidates rated	10,124	10,116	10,116
Number of respondents	1,268	1,267	1,267
Log likelihood	−6605.63	−6579.62	−6569.63

OLS regression coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimated with sampling weights, clustered by respondent.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed.

Table A14: Conjoint analysis—robustness to party ID coding

	Candidate choice		
	Model 1	Model 4	Model 5
Hostile Sexism	0.120**	0.116**	0.117**
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Benevolent Sexism	0.154*	0.131*	0.143*
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.068)
Female candidate × Hostile Sexism	−0.166**	−0.151*	−0.144*
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Female candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−0.075	−0.056	−0.082
	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.109)
Feminine candidate × Hostile Sexism	−0.101	−0.088	−0.087
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Feminine candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−0.323**	−0.288**	−0.310**
	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.103)
Female candidate	0.139*	0.123	0.139*
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Feminine candidate	0.305**	0.279**	0.294**
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate	−0.105	−0.074	−0.114
	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate × Benevolent Sexism	0.158	0.125	0.198
	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate × Hostile Sexism	0.034	0.007	−0.004
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.088)
Held state-level office	0.013	0.016	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Democrat	0.165**	–	–
	(0.019)		
Republican	−0.150**	–	–
	(0.018)		
Republican candidate	0.031	0.037	0.392**
	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.021)
Democrat × Republican candidate	−0.323**	–	–
	(0.037)		
Republican × Republican candidate	0.288**	–	–
	(0.035)		
Highly effective	0.264**	0.267**	0.268**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Ivy League degree	−0.023	−0.021	−0.023
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Democrat (w. leaners)	–	0.159**	–
		(0.023)	
Republican (w. leaners)	–	−0.149**	–
		(0.023)	
Democrat (w. leaners) × Republican candidate	–	−0.318**	–
		(0.046)	
Republican (w. leaners) × Republican candidate	–	0.274**	–
		(0.046)	
Party Identification (continuous)	–	–	0.380**
			(0.017)
Republican candidate × Party Identification (continuous)	–	–	−0.732**
			(0.033)
Intercept	0.165**	0.176**	−0.018
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.046)
Number of candidates rated	10,116	10,116	9,884
Number of respondents	1,267	1,267	1,238
Log likelihood	−6579.62	−6510.67	−6346.82

OLS regression coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimated with sampling weights, clustered by respondent.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed.

Table A15: Conjoint analysis—by respondent gender

	Candidate choice		
	Male Rs		Female Rs
Hostile Sexism	0.114		0.144**
	(0.058)		(0.053)
Benevolent Sexism	0.199		0.104
	(0.103)		(0.084)
Female candidate × Hostile Sexism	−0.127		−0.229**
	(0.100)		(0.074)
Female candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−0.110		−0.013
	(0.173)		(0.135)
Feminine candidate × Hostile Sexism	−0.185*		−0.040
	(0.092)		(0.091)
Feminine candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−0.422**		−0.249
	(0.142)		(0.139)
Female candidate	0.165		0.107
	(0.117)		(0.080)
Feminine candidate	0.403**		0.239**
	(0.099)		(0.086)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate	−0.217		−0.028
	(0.153)		(0.129)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate × Benevolent Sexism	0.262		0.061
	(0.215)		(0.203)
Female candidate × Feminine candidate × Hostile Sexism	0.076		0.043
	(0.144)		(0.127)
Held state-level office	−0.021	†	0.039*
	(0.020)		(0.017)
Democrat	0.198**		0.136**
	(0.031)		(0.022)
Republican	−0.135**		−0.171**
	(0.029)		(0.022)
Republican candidate	0.080		−0.014
	(0.047)		(0.034)
Democrat × Republican candidate	−0.377**		−0.274**
	(0.060)		(0.043)
Republican × Republican candidate	0.267**		0.312**
	(0.055)		(0.042)
Highly effective	0.254**		0.275**
	(0.020)		(0.019)
Ivy League degree	−0.027		−0.021
	(0.019)		(0.016)
Intercept	0.131		0.199**
	(0.075)		(0.058)
Number of candidates rated	10,116		
Number of respondents	1,267		
Log likelihood	−6562.05		

OLS regression coefficients with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimated with sampling weights, clustered by respondent.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05 two tailed. For differences between coefficients, ‡p<0.01; †p<0.05.

Table A16: Marginal effects and contrasts

Marginal effects	*Hostile sexism*	*Benevolent sexism*
Male candidate; Feminine candidate	0.019	−0.169**
	(0.044)	(0.055)
Female candidate; Feminine candidate	−0.113**	−0.087
	(0.044)	(0.073)
Male candidate; Masculine candidate	0.120**	0.154*
	(0.037)	(0.067)
Female candidate; Masculine candidate	−0.046	0.079
	(0.042)	(0.068)
Contrasts		
Male v. Female candidate (Feminine candidate)	**−0.132**^	0.083
	(0.070)	(0.097)
Male v. Female candidate (Masculine candidate)	**−0.166****	−0.075
	(0.061)	(0.110)
Decisive v. Collaborative (Male candidate)	−0.101	**−0.323****
	(0.065)	**(0.101)**
Decisive v. Collaborative (Female candidate)	−0.067	**−0.165**
	(0.069)	**(0.115)**

Marginal effects indicate the impact of hostile or benevalent sexism on probability of voting for candidate. Contrasts indicate the difference between pairs of marginal effects; i.e., the difference between types of candidates in the impact of sexism on voting.

OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.

Table A17: Sexism items—structural equation model

Variable	*HS*	*BS*	*Method*	
hs1	0.800		0.286	When women demand equality, actually seeking special favors
hs2	0.755		0.296	Women who complain about discrimination cause more problems
hs3*	–0.562		0.335	Women must overcome more obstacles than men
hs4*	–0.698		0.328	Feminists are making reasonable demands of men
bs1		0.586	0.373	Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess
bs2		0.511	0.397	Women tend to have a superior moral sensibility
bs3*		–0.471	0.335	Men have no special obligation to provide financially
bs4*		–0.397	0.369	There is no need for men to cherish or protect women

* Reverse-coded item. N=1,437.
Entries are standardized factor loadings. All items constrained to equal (unstandardized) loadings on the method factor. Method factor is constrained to be uncorrelated with HS and BS; $\rho_{HS,BS} = -0.191$.

Table A18: Presidential models by partisanship

	Clinton thermometer rating	*Negative emotion: Clinton*	*Trump thermometer rating*	*Negative emotion: Trump*	*Voted Clinton (2-party)*	*Pro-Clinton scale*
Hostile Sexism	−0.430**	0.375**	0.343**	−0.461**	−0.453**	−0.402**
	(0.100)	(0.116)	(0.100)	(0.106)	(0.117)	(0.081)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.060	0.240	0.275**	−0.328**	−0.147	−0.247**
	(0.118)	(0.149)	(0.103)	(0.114)	(0.124)	(0.090)
Racism scale	−0.122	0.523**	0.585**	−0.660**	−0.812**	−0.512**
	(0.111)	(0.136)	(0.102)	(0.111)	(0.145)	(0.081)
Economic evaluations	0.465**	−0.421**	−0.215**	0.216*	0.556**	0.356**
	(0.070)	(0.109)	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.133)	(0.064)
Personal finances	0.150^	−0.110	−0.194*	0.159^	0.141	0.149*
	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.088)	(0.102)	(0.066)
Women	−0.004	−0.021	−0.016	0.032	0.006	0.024
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.029)
Democrat	0.142	−0.107	−0.033	−0.008	0.347*	0.099
	(0.145)	(0.151)	(0.138)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.098)
Republican	−0.007	0.279^	0.501**	−0.475**	−0.400*	−0.352**
	(0.138)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.138)	(0.167)	(0.107)
Democrat × Hostile Sexism	0.246	−0.248^	−0.184	0.107	0.265^	0.183^
	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.133)	(0.156)	(0.149)	(0.103)
Republican × Hostile Sexism	0.247*	−0.091	−0.190	0.233^	0.238^	0.191^
	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.099)
Democrat × Benevolent Sexism	0.058	−0.295^	−0.308*	0.220	0.154	0.230*
	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.121)	(0.191)	(0.141)	(0.109)
Republican × Benevolent Sexism	−0.126	0.111	−0.050	0.089	−0.088	0.008
	(0.152)	(0.178)	(0.167)	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.118)
Democrat × Racism scale	−0.153	−0.135	−0.148	0.171	0.259	0.102
	(0.204)	(0.182)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.204)	(0.124)
Republican × Racism scale	−0.141	−0.301^	−0.380*	0.329*	0.568**	0.264*
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.195)	(0.123)
Democrat × Economic evaluations	−0.094	0.179	0.085	−0.000	−0.412*	−0.113
	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.165)	(0.086)
Republican × Economic evaluations	−0.202*	−0.084	−0.078	0.009	−0.308^	−0.047
	(0.095)	(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.110)	(0.160)	(0.087)
Democrat × Personal finances	0.024	0.180^	0.282**	−0.218^	−0.262*	−0.179*
	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.078)
Republican × Personal finances	−0.107	0.062	0.052	−0.013	−0.027	−0.046
	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.138)	(0.096)
Women × Democrat	0.018	0.027	0.017	0.074	0.030	0.006
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.035)
Women × Republican	0.032	0.028	−0.036	0.012	−0.013	−0.001
	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.036)
Intercept	0.308**	0.276*	0.066	0.900**	0.690**	0.725**
	(0.105)	(0.128)	(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.080)
N	1,069	1,236	1,032	1,236	999	1,244
Std. error of regression	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.19
R^2	0.56	0.59	0.51	0.55	0.72	0.72

** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A19: Congressional vote model, by partisanship

	Democratic House vote (2-party)
Female Democratic House candidate	1.478^
	(0.815)
Female Republican House candidate	1.338
	(1.289)
Hostile Sexism	−1.834**
	(0.559)
Benevolent Sexism	0.189
	(0.787)
Female Democratic House candidate × Hostile Sexism	−1.925*
	(0.913)
Female Democratic House candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−1.121
	(1.210)
Female Republican House candidate × Hostile Sexism	0.755
	(1.401)
Female Republican House candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−2.517
	(1.806)
Racism scale	−2.329**
	(0.664)
Economic evaluations	1.312**
	(0.479)
Personal finances	−0.305
	(0.476)
Female R	0.130
	(0.189)
Democratic R	−0.462
	(0.990)
Republican R	−1.527
	(1.367)
Female Democratic House candidate × Democratic R	−1.257
	(1.834)
Female Democratic House candidate × Republican R	−1.452
	(1.548)
Female Republican House candidate × Republican R	0.134
	(2.189)
Democratic R × Hostile Sexism	2.345*
	(0.970)
Republican R × Hostile Sexism	1.155
	(0.893)
Democratic R × Benevolent Sexism	−0.286
	(1.021)
Republican R × Benevolent Sexism	0.333
	(1.476)
Female Democratic House candidate × Democratic R × Hostile Sexism	0.407
	(2.038)
Female Democratic House candidate × Republican R × Hostile Sexism	−0.218
	(1.597)
Female Democratic House candidate × Democratic R × Benevolent Sexism	2.737
	(2.383)
Female Democratic House candidate × Republican R × Benevolent Sexism	2.375
	(2.225)
Female Republican House candidate × Republican R × Hostile Sexism	1.743
	(2.165)
Female Republican House candidate × Republican R × Benevolent Sexism	−1.109
	(3.190)

Table A19 continued . . .

	Democratic House vote (2-party)
Democratic R × Racism scale	−0.469 (1.016)
Republican R × Racism scale	1.707^ (0.983)
Democratic R × Economic evaluations	1.260 (0.813)
Republican R × Economic evaluations	−1.142 (0.709)
Democratic R × Personal finances	−0.426 (0.691)
Republican R × Personal finances	−0.383 (0.693)
Female R × Democratic R	0.458 (0.324)
Female R × Republican R	−0.086 (0.403)
Intercept	0.705 (0.645)
N	948
Std. error of regression	.
R^2	.

** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A20: Additional control variables: Clinton thermometer rating

	Clinton thermometer rating		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Hostile Sexism	−0.283**	−0.236**	−0.234**
	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.074	−0.010	−0.011
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Racism scale	−0.218*	−0.206**	−0.201*
	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.082)
Economic evaluations	0.395**	0.370**	0.363**
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Personal finances	0.135**	0.098^	0.104^
	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.054)
R Party Identification: Democrat	0.208**	0.185**	0.178**
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)
R Party Identification: Republican	−0.123**	−0.128**	−0.133**
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Female	0.012	0.038^	0.039^
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: HS graduate	–	0.229*	0.216*
		(0.096)	(0.088)
Education: Some college	–	0.204*	0.191*
		(0.097)	(0.089)
Education: 2-year degree	–	0.242*	0.228*
		(0.100)	(0.092)
Education: College grad	–	0.217*	0.205*
		(0.097)	(0.089)
Education: Post-grad	–	0.243*	0.230*
		(0.103)	(0.094)
R Race: Black	–	0.042	0.047
		(0.034)	(0.033)
R Race: Asian	–	0.020	0.022
		(0.048)	(0.046)
R Race: Other	–	0.082	0.064
		(0.055)	(0.049)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	0.072^	0.069^
		(0.041)	(0.041)
R age: 30-41	–	0.078*	0.084*
		(0.037)	(0.035)
R age: 42-54	–	0.089*	0.087*
		(0.036)	(0.035)
R age: 55-64	–	0.080*	0.084*
		(0.035)	(0.034)
R age: 65+	–	0.047	0.053
		(0.036)	(0.035)
Family income: <30k	–	−0.059	−0.054
		(0.038)	(0.037)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	−0.065*	−0.061*
		(0.029)	(0.028)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	−0.034	−0.031
		(0.027)	(0.026)
Family income: 150k+	–	−0.040	−0.038
		(0.038)	(0.037)
Family income: NA	–	−0.096**	−0.092*
		(0.037)	(0.036)
Ideology	–	0.093^	–
		(0.050)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	0.048

Table A20 continued . . .

	Clinton thermometer rating		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
			(0.032)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	–0.020
			(0.029)
Ideology: NA	–	–	–0.066
			(0.045)
Intercept	0.311**	–0.008	0.037
	(0.062)	(0.113)	(0.105)
N	1,069	1,032	1,069
Std. error of regression	0.25	0.25	0.24
R^2	0.55	0.59	0.59

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A21: Additional control variables: Negative emotion: Clinton

	Negative emotion: Clinton		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Hostile Sexism	0.283**	0.327**	0.296**
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Benevolent Sexism	0.152*	0.176**	0.167**
	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Racism scale	0.390**	0.355**	0.327**
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Economic evaluations	−0.403**	−0.395**	−0.410**
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.054)
Personal finances	−0.043	−0.071	−0.064
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.044)
R Party Identification: Democrat	−0.186**	−0.164**	−0.171**
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
R Party Identification: Republican	0.207**	0.189**	0.159**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Female	−0.014	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Education: HS graduate	–	0.164*	0.104
		(0.068)	(0.075)
Education: Some college	–	0.149*	0.106
		(0.067)	(0.074)
Education: 2-year degree	–	0.076	0.029
		(0.072)	(0.078)
Education: College grad	–	0.161*	0.111
		(0.068)	(0.074)
Education: Post-grad	–	0.168*	0.118
		(0.071)	(0.077)
R Race: Black	–	−0.097**	−0.109**
		(0.029)	(0.030)
R Race: Asian	–	−0.048	−0.071
		(0.056)	(0.056)
R Race: Other	–	0.004	−0.032
		(0.038)	(0.042)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	−0.066	−0.075^
		(0.044)	(0.045)
R age: 30-41	–	−0.031	−0.041
		(0.038)	(0.037)
R age: 42-54	–	−0.036	−0.044
		(0.033)	(0.034)
R age: 55-64	–	0.013	0.006
		(0.032)	(0.032)
R age: 65+	–	−0.009	−0.008
		(0.033)	(0.034)
Family income: <30k	–	0.014	0.017
		(0.030)	(0.030)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	0.011	0.011
		(0.029)	(0.029)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	0.034	0.033
		(0.027)	(0.027)
Family income: 150k+	–	0.024	0.023
		(0.044)	(0.044)
Family income: NA	–	0.023	0.015
		(0.028)	(0.028)
Ideology	–	−0.015	–
		(0.047)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	0.001

Table A21 continued . . .

	Negative emotion: Clinton		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
			(0.027)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	0.053^
			(0.031)
Ideology: NA	–	–	–0.048
			(0.097)
Intercept	0.370**	0.230*	0.300**
	(0.063)	(0.099)	(0.102)
N	1,236	1,194	1,236
Std. error of regression	0.27	0.26	0.27
R^2	0.57	0.60	0.59

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A22: Additional control variables: Trump thermometer rating

	Trump thermometer rating		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Hostile Sexism	0.230**	0.174**	0.171**
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Benevolent Sexism	0.157**	0.102	0.098
	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.063)
Racism scale	0.422**	0.384**	0.349**
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Economic evaluations	−0.238**	−0.198**	−0.215**
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.058)
Personal finances	−0.109*	−0.104*	−0.092^
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)
R Party Identification: Democrat	−0.115**	−0.099**	−0.095**
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)
R Party Identification: Republican	0.211**	0.184**	0.153**
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Female	−0.036^	−0.040^	−0.040^
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Education: HS graduate	–	0.028	−0.012
		(0.070)	(0.066)
Education: Some college	–	0.017	−0.005
		(0.070)	(0.065)
Education: 2-year degree	–	−0.002	−0.031
		(0.076)	(0.072)
Education: College grad	–	−0.010	−0.039
		(0.071)	(0.067)
Education: Post-grad	–	0.002	−0.023
		(0.075)	(0.071)
R Race: Black	–	−0.083**	−0.083**
		(0.026)	(0.026)
R Race: Asian	–	0.054	0.038
		(0.065)	(0.063)
R Race: Other	–	0.074	0.041
		(0.056)	(0.058)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	0.007	0.002
		(0.046)	(0.045)
R age: 30-41	–	0.023	0.022
		(0.039)	(0.039)
R age: 42-54	–	0.017	0.013
		(0.039)	(0.039)
R age: 55-64	–	0.007	0.008
		(0.037)	(0.037)
R age: 65+	–	0.059	0.057
		(0.037)	(0.038)
Family income: <30k	–	−0.008	0.000
		(0.034)	(0.034)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	−0.036	−0.022
		(0.032)	(0.031)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	−0.007	−0.010
		(0.030)	(0.030)
Family income: 150k+	–	−0.047	−0.047
		(0.046)	(0.046)
Family income: NA	–	−0.001	−0.006
		(0.035)	(0.034)
Ideology	–	−0.156**	–
		(0.056)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	−0.033

Table A22 continued . . .

	Trump thermometer rating		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
			(0.029)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	0.114**
			(0.033)
Ideology: NA	–	–	0.016
			(0.076)
Intercept	0.222**	0.327**	0.270**
	(0.060)	(0.112)	(0.099)
N	1,032	1,000	1,032
Std. error of regression	0.27	0.27	0.27
R^2	0.48	0.51	0.51

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A23: Additional control variables: Negative emotion: Trump

	Negative emotion: Trump		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Hostile Sexism	−0.363**	−0.281**	−0.277**
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.225**	−0.143^	−0.148*
	(0.078)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Racism scale	−0.508**	−0.467**	−0.444**
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.070)
Economic evaluations	0.240**	0.223**	0.198**
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Personal finances	0.089^	0.084^	0.089^
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.050)
R Party Identification: Democrat	0.136**	0.125**	0.119**
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)
R Party Identification: Republican	−0.180**	−0.153**	−0.147**
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Female	0.071**	0.068**	0.075**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Education: HS graduate	–	0.038	0.079
		(0.101)	(0.088)
Education: Some college	–	0.112	0.139
		(0.099)	(0.087)
Education: 2-year degree	–	0.081	0.113
		(0.102)	(0.091)
Education: College grad	–	0.126	0.155^
		(0.100)	(0.088)
Education: Post-grad	–	0.105	0.137
		(0.102)	(0.091)
R Race: Black	–	−0.026	−0.010
		(0.039)	(0.040)
R Race: Asian	–	−0.043	−0.065
		(0.055)	(0.055)
R Race: Other	–	−0.036	−0.012
		(0.044)	(0.043)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	−0.002	0.004
		(0.042)	(0.042)
R age: 30-41	–	−0.022	−0.028
		(0.039)	(0.040)
R age: 42-54	–	0.004	−0.012
		(0.038)	(0.038)
R age: 55-64	–	0.009	−0.003
		(0.037)	(0.038)
R age: 65+	–	0.002	−0.005
		(0.037)	(0.037)
Family income: <30k	–	0.023	0.015
		(0.034)	(0.035)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	0.063^	0.046
		(0.035)	(0.034)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	0.005	0.005
		(0.028)	(0.028)
Family income: 150k+	–	0.083*	0.081*
		(0.039)	(0.039)
Family income: NA	–	0.039	0.036
		(0.037)	(0.037)
Ideology	–	0.187**	–
		(0.048)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	0.086*

Table A23 continued . . .

	Negative emotion: Trump		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
			(0.038)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	–0.074*
			(0.032)
Ideology: NA	–	–	0.084
			(0.078)
Intercept	0.750**	0.471**	0.541**
	(0.067)	(0.113)	(0.107)
N	1,236	1,194	1,236
Std. error of regression	0.28	0.28	0.28
R^2	0.53	0.57	0.56

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A24: Additional control variables: Voted Clinton (2-party)

	Voted Clinton (2-party)		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Hostile Sexism	−0.310**	−0.274**	−0.244**
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.126*	−0.063	−0.059
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Racism scale	−0.573**	−0.513**	−0.487**
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Economic evaluations	0.362**	0.350**	0.313**
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Personal finances	0.065	0.055	0.067
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.054)
R Party Identification: Democrat	0.269**	0.227**	0.224**
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.034)
R Party Identification: Republican	−0.258**	−0.201**	−0.186**
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Female	0.025	0.019	0.022
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Education: HS graduate	–	−0.010	0.070
		(0.059)	(0.068)
Education: Some college	–	0.035	0.107
		(0.058)	(0.067)
Education: 2-year degree	–	0.026	0.104
		(0.064)	(0.072)
Education: College grad	–	0.032	0.101
		(0.060)	(0.069)
Education: Post-grad	–	0.015	0.091
		(0.066)	(0.075)
R Race: Black	–	0.084*	0.100**
		(0.035)	(0.036)
R Race: Asian	–	0.120^	0.101
		(0.063)	(0.065)
R Race: Other	–	0.030	0.050
		(0.045)	(0.050)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	0.039	0.049
		(0.047)	(0.048)
R age: 30-41	–	−0.042	−0.038
		(0.048)	(0.049)
R age: 42-54	–	−0.049	−0.052
		(0.051)	(0.052)
R age: 55-64	–	−0.070	−0.068
		(0.047)	(0.048)
R age: 65+	–	−0.054	−0.060
		(0.048)	(0.049)
Family income: <30k	–	0.010	0.015
		(0.036)	(0.037)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	−0.000	−0.003
		(0.028)	(0.028)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	−0.049	−0.049
		(0.031)	(0.031)
Family income: 150k+	–	0.041	0.043
		(0.045)	(0.045)
Family income: NA	–	−0.007	0.001
		(0.036)	(0.036)
Ideology	–	0.200**	–
		(0.055)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	0.087**

Table A24 continued . . .

	Voted Clinton (2-party)		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
			(0.032)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	–0.109**
			(0.038)
Ideology: NA	–	–	–0.006
			(0.133)
Intercept	0.637**	0.509**	0.529**
	(0.065)	(0.106)	(0.107)
N	999	983	999
Std. error of regression	0.28	0.27	0.27
R^2	0.68	0.71	0.71

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A25: Additional control variables: Pro-Clinton scale

	Pro-Clinton scale		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Hostile Sexism	−0.296**	−0.264**	−0.250**
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Benevolent Sexism	−0.162**	−0.118*	−0.114*
	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Racism scale	−0.405**	−0.367**	−0.345**
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Economic evaluations	0.326**	0.309**	0.303**
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Personal finances	0.088*	0.084*	0.083*
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.039)
R Party Identification: Democrat	0.176**	0.156**	0.153**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)
R Party Identification: Republican	−0.197**	−0.174**	−0.160**
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Female	0.035*	0.035*	0.039**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education: HS graduate	–	0.003	0.040
		(0.047)	(0.045)
Education: Some college	–	0.032	0.059
		(0.047)	(0.046)
Education: 2-year degree	–	0.049	0.078
		(0.051)	(0.050)
Education: College grad	–	0.043	0.072
		(0.049)	(0.047)
Education: Post-grad	–	0.031	0.060
		(0.053)	(0.051)
R Race: Black	–	0.056*	0.066**
		(0.022)	(0.023)
R Race: Asian	–	0.006	0.008
		(0.036)	(0.034)
R Race: Other	–	−0.006	0.013
		(0.031)	(0.030)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	0.038	0.042
		(0.025)	(0.026)
R age: 30-41	–	0.009	0.012
		(0.029)	(0.028)
R age: 42-54	–	0.016	0.014
		(0.026)	(0.026)
R age: 55-64	–	0.005	0.005
		(0.025)	(0.025)
R age: 65+	–	−0.006	−0.007
		(0.026)	(0.026)
Family income: <30k	–	0.000	−0.003
		(0.025)	(0.025)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	0.012	0.006
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	−0.017	−0.016
		(0.021)	(0.021)
Family income: 150k+	–	0.024	0.024
		(0.030)	(0.029)
Family income: NA	–	−0.011	−0.008
		(0.024)	(0.024)
Ideology	–	0.115**	–
		(0.034)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	0.050*

Table A25 continued . . .

	Pro-Clinton scale		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
			(0.021)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	–0.064**
			(0.023)
Ideology: NA	–	–	0.019
			(0.054)
Intercept	0.628**	0.495**	0.514**
	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.068)
N	1,244	1,202	1,244
Std. error of regression	0.20	0.19	0.19
R^2	0.70	0.72	0.72

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A26: Additional control variables: Congressional vote model

	Democratic House vote (2-party)		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican	0.649	0.150	0.052
	(0.754)	(0.791)	(0.820)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democrat	0.938	0.363	0.138
	(0.630)	(0.596)	(0.583)
Hostile Sexism	−0.755^	−0.776^	−0.901*
	(0.394)	(0.460)	(0.452)
Benevolent Sexism	0.076	−0.080	−0.225
	(0.499)	(0.491)	(0.484)
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican × Hostile Sexism	1.541^	2.615**	2.612**
	(0.918)	(1.002)	(0.979)
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican × Benevolent Sexism	−1.397	−1.166	−0.953
	(1.028)	(1.048)	(1.079)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democrat × Hostile Sexism	−1.996**	−1.569*	−1.450*
	(0.615)	(0.674)	(0.655)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democrat × Benevolent Sexism	0.040	0.629	0.942
	(0.932)	(0.872)	(0.848)
Racism scale	−1.984**	−1.736**	−1.716**
	(0.394)	(0.480)	(0.482)
Economic evaluations	1.315**	1.533**	1.335**
	(0.301)	(0.352)	(0.334)
Personal finances	−0.458^	−0.285	−0.177
	(0.269)	(0.288)	(0.282)
Female	0.225	0.315*	0.309*
	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.144)
R Party Identification: Democrat	0.981**	0.594**	0.548**
	(0.154)	(0.166)	(0.170)
R Party Identification: Republican	−0.907**	−0.754**	−0.811**
	(0.227)	(0.185)	(0.188)
Education: HS graduate	–	−1.019^	−0.931^
		(0.569)	(0.525)
Education: Some college	–	−1.094^	−1.041^
		(0.575)	(0.534)
Education: 2-year degree	–	−1.059^	−0.960^
		(0.606)	(0.566)
Education: College grad	–	−1.106^	−1.052^
		(0.587)	(0.544)
Education: Post-grad	–	−1.274*	−1.187*
		(0.596)	(0.554)
R Race: Black	–	0.766**	0.818**
		(0.243)	(0.246)
R Race: Asian	–	0.654^	0.601
		(0.389)	(0.373)
R Race: Other	–	−0.311	−0.404
		(0.263)	(0.270)
R ethnicity: Latinx	–	1.289**	1.263**
		(0.301)	(0.284)
R age: 30-41	–	0.264	0.347
		(0.248)	(0.249)
R age: 42-54	–	0.308	0.338
		(0.247)	(0.251)
R age: 55-64	–	0.387	0.435^
		(0.242)	(0.245)
R age: 65+	–	0.695**	0.713**
		(0.254)	(0.262)
Family income: <30k	–	0.143	0.198

Table A26 continued . . .

	Democratic House vote (2-party)		
	BASELINE	CONTROLS 1	CONTROLS 2
		(0.207)	(0.210)
Family income: 30k-50k	–	0.282	0.233
		(0.195)	(0.192)
Family income: 80k-150k	–	0.030	0.014
		(0.206)	(0.205)
Family income: 150k+	–	0.186	0.151
		(0.278)	(0.276)
Family income: NA	–	0.149	0.160
		(0.221)	(0.222)
Ideology	–	1.863**	–
		(0.316)	
Ideology: Liberal	–	–	0.810**
			(0.181)
Ideology: Conservative	–	–	−0.435*
			(0.173)
Ideology: NA	–	–	0.211
			(0.428)
Intercept	0.181	−0.427	0.478
	(0.470)	(0.820)	(0.753)
N	1,000	987	1,000

Baseline model includes racism, economic evaluations, personal financial situation, party identification, and respondent gender. "Controls" models also
include respondent education, race, ethnicity, age, income, and either continuous ideology (1) or ideology categories (2).
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]

Table A27: Comparison of congressional vote model presented in main paper with one that adds an interaction between racism and candidate sex

	Democratic House vote (2-party)	
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican House candidate	0.649	0.543
	(0.754)	(0.743)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democratic House candidate	0.938	1.191^
	(0.630)	(0.666)
Hostile Sexism	−0.755^	−0.959*
	(0.394)	(0.400)
Benevolent Sexism	0.076	0.015
	(0.499)	(0.488)
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican House candidate × Hostile Sexism	1.541^	2.101^
	(0.918)	(1.123)
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican House candidate × Benevolent Sexism	−1.397	−1.036
	(1.028)	(1.067)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democratic House candidate × Hostile Sexism	−1.996**	−1.558*
	(0.615)	(0.695)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democratic House candidate × Benevolent Sexism	0.040	0.239
	(0.932)	(0.953)
Racism scale	−1.984**	−1.481**
	(0.394)	(0.490)
Economic evaluations	1.315**	1.369**
	(0.301)	(0.305)
Personal finances	−0.458^	−0.476^
	(0.269)	(0.268)
R Party Identification: Democrat	0.981**	0.969**
	(0.154)	(0.157)
R Party Identification: Republican	−0.907**	−0.909**
	(0.227)	(0.228)
Female	0.225	0.226
	(0.158)	(0.159)
Female Republican House candidate: Female Republican House candidate × Racism scale	–	−1.053
		(1.156)
Female Democratic House candidate: Female Democratic House candidate × Racism scale	–	−1.771*
		(0.769)
Intercept	0.181	0.130
	(0.470)	(0.469)
N	1,000	1,000
Log Likelihood	−306.73	−304.31
Degrees of Freedom	14	16
Chi^2	271.03	303.71

** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed.
Weighted estimation: [pweight= weight]