**Appendices**

**Appendix 1: Coding of portfolios**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Category** | **Description** |
| agriculture |  |
| children |  |
| climate |  |
| commerce and industry | Business, business environment, commerce, craft, engineering, coordination, self-employed, services |
| constitutional and institutional affairs | Constitutional affairs, electoral reform, federalism, institutional reforms, devolution |
| construction and public works | Architecture, construction, investment planning |
| consumer | Consumer protection |
| culture | Art, culture, heritage, specific cultural groups, Francophonia |
| defence |  |
| development aid | Development aid, humanitarian aid |
| development cooperation |  |
| economy | Economy, economics, domestic market, economic development, economic planning, economic reform, productivity, public economics, recovery plan, merchant marine |
| education | Education, higher education, universities, professional education |
| elderly |  |
| employment | Employment, labor, work, jobs |
| energy |  |
| enterprise | SMEs, small business, privatization, ownership transformation, enterprise, companies |
| environment | Environment, natural preservation |
| equality | Disabled, equality |
| European | European Affairs, European Union, European Community, European Funds, European integration, Exiting the EU |
| expatriates | Nationals abroad |
| family |  |
| finance | Budget, euro, finance, treasury, revenue, taxation, paymaster general |
| fishery |  |
| food |  |
| foreign | Foreign, exterior |
| forestry |  |
| health |  |
| housing |  |
| immigration | Immigration, integration, citizenship |
| information and communication | Communication, information, information society, press and mass media, public information |
| infrastructure |  |
| interior | Home secretary, interior |
| international cooperation | Cooperation, international cooperation |
| international development |  |
| international trade | Foreign trade, foreign economic relations |
| justice | Justice, attorney general |
| minority |  |
| natural resources | Water, oil, resources |
| planning and development | National development/affairs/planning/government, planning, spatial planning, territorial cohesion, |
| public administration | Administration, public administration, internal administration, public affairs, public reform, administration reform |
| public security | Citizen protection, civil protection, disaster and accidents, internal defense, security, internal security, safety, security trader |
| public service and civil service | Public service, civil service |
| regional | Decentralization, regional reform, Urban/rural, local/regional development/affairs/planning/government, local public administration, regions, municipal issues |
| religious | Church, cults |
| science | Science, research, research activity, scientific research |
| social | Social, social solidarity, social security, social dialogue, social cohesion, solidarity, social integration societal integration |
| sports |  |
| sustainable development | Sustainable development, social economy |
| technology | Technology, telecommunication, digitization, innovation, public innovation |
| tourism |  |
| transportation | Water traffic, traffic, transportation, shipping, mobility |
| welfare | Welfare, fight against precariousness and exclusion, middle class, pensions, relations with social partners, veterans, war victims |
| women | Women, gender equality |
| youth |  |
| *HOG* | *Prime minister, president, chairman* |
| *deputy HOG* | *Deputy or vice PM, president or chairman (without portfolio)* |
| *Others* | *Without portfolio, minster to the HoG, organizational functions (e.g. reporting to parliament or regional authorities, spokespeople), specific regions, public holdings, public enterprises, marine, human resources, interventions in the south* |

**Appendix 2: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Obs. |  | Mean |  |  |  |  |
|  | Men | Women | Men | Women | Dif. | SE | p\_value |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| High prestige position (bivariate) | 3616 | 932 | 0.458 | 0.274 | 0.184 | 0.018 | 0.000 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Month in office before reaching highly prestigious position | 1657 | 255 | 5.167 | 10.5295 | -5.362 | 1.010 | 0.000 |

**Appendix 3: Robustness test for Model 1 and 2 (Test 1).**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1.1 | Model 2.1 |
|  | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.738\*\*\* | 0.739\*\*\* |
|  | (0.059) | (0.059) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.037\*\*\* |
|  | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Minister = woman |  | 0.933 |
| \* Portfolio = feminine |  | (0.246) |
|  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |
| HoG = woman | 0.981 | 0.981 |
|  | (0.107) | (0.107) |
| % women in lower chamber | 1.004 | 1.004 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Post-communist country | 1.008 | 1.008 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.050) |
| Decade = 2000-2009 | 0.895\* | 0.895\* |
|  | (0.050) | (0.050) |
| Decade = 2010-2019 | 0.850\* | 0.850\* |
|  | (0.056) | (0.056) |
|  |  |  |
| ***Tvc*** |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.963 | 0.974 |
|  | (0.049) | (0.064) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 2.533\*\*\* | 2.530\*\*\* |
|  | (0.184) | (0.184) |
| HoG = woman | 1.077 | 1.077 |
|  | (0.082) | (0.082) |
| % women in lower chamber | 0.998 | 0.998 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Observations | 4517 | 4517 |
| N failures | 1897.000 | 1897.000 |
| Log Likelihood | -15014.311 | -15014.276 |

*Annotations:* Cox proportional hazard model for time in office before reaching a high prestige portfolio with time variant components. With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Coefficients display hazard ratios; rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the direction. All models include standard errors clustered at the country level. Since information on the share of women in parliament is missing for 31 cases, the number of observations decreases slightly.

**Appendix 4: Robustness tests for Model 1 (Test 2 to 5).**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1.2 | Model 1.3 | Model 1.4 | Model 1.5 |
|  | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.620\*\*\* | 0.710\*\* | 0.739\*\*\* | 0.718\*\*\* |
|  | (0.066) | (0.085) | (0.062) | (0.043) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 0.722\* | 0.185\*\*\* | 0.208\*\*\* | 0.194\*\*\* |
|  | (0.092) | (0.036) | (0.033) | (0.029) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |
| HoG = woman | 1.312 | 0.936 | 1.057 | 1.072 |
|  | (0.283) | (0.172) | (0.126) | (0.131) |
| % women in lower | 0.985\* | 1.005 | 0.999 | 1.002 |
| chamber | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| Post-communist country | 0.661+ | 1.007 | 0.946 | 0.980 |
|  | (0.149) | (0.109) | (0.053) | (0.059) |
| Decade = 2000-2009 | 1.022 |  | 0.911 | 0.881\* |
|  | (0.179) |  | (0.073) | (0.052) |
| Decade = 2010-2019 | 1.013 |  | 0.886 | 0.832\* |
|  | (0.197) |  | (0.085) | (0.062) |
| right-left ideological |  |  | 1.000 |  |
| index |  |  | (0.002) |  |
| absolute number of seats |  |  | 0.999\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.000) |  |
| Party strength in |  |  |  | 0.999 |
| government |  |  |  | (0.003) |
| Observations | 2947 | 1172 | 2847 | 3780 |
| N failures | 327.000 | 432.000 | 1178.000 | 1583.000 |
| Log Likelihood | -2254.144 | -2847.078 | -8837.360 | -12320.696 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All models are cox proportional hazard model for time in office before reaching a high prestige portfolio. Coefficients display hazard ratios; rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the direction. All models include standard errors clustered at the country level.

**Appendix 5: Robustness tests for Model 1 (Test 6 to 11).**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1.6 | Model 1.7 | Model 1.8 | Model 1.9 | Model 1.10 | Model 1.11 |
|  | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.727\*\*\* | 0.737\*\*\* | 0.736\*\*\* | 0.673\*\* | 0.636\*\* | 0.721\*\*\* |
|  | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.042) | (0.086) | (0.108) | (0.041) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 0.175\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.347\*\* | 0.260\*\*\* | 0.172\*\*\* |
|  | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.118) | (0.055) | (0.026) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HoG = woman | 1.021 | 1.029 | 1.034 | 1.436 | 0.871 | 1.125 |
|  | (0.148) | (0.147) | (0.149) | (0.340) | (0.193) | (0.172) |
| Party leader = woman |  |  |  | 0.769\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.075) |  |  |
| % women in lower | 1.003 |  |  | 1.004 | 1.007\*\* | 1.000 |
| chamber | (0.003) |  |  | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| % women in cabinet |  | 0.977 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.153) |  |  |  |  |
| Quota without sanctions |  |  | 1.111\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.052) |  |  |  |
| with weak sanctions |  |  | 1.125 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.100) |  |  |  |
| with strong sanctions |  |  | 1.041 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.076) |  |  |  |
| Post-communist country | 0.999 | 0.987 | 0.999 |  | 0.961 | 0.883\* |
|  | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.053) |  | (0.090) | (0.056) |
| Nordic country | 0.960 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.062) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Decade = 2000-2009 | 0.889\* | 0.909 | 0.899\* | 0.945 | 0.743\*\* | 0.912 |
|  | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.045) | (0.122) | (0.069) | (0.061) |
| Decade = 2010-2019 | 0.843\*\* | 0.873\* | 0.854\* | 0.845 | 0.853+ | 0.870 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.049) | (0.058) | (0.164) | (0.080) | (0.078) |
| Observations | 4517 | 4548 | 4548 | 548 | 905 | 4517 |
| N failures | 1897.000 | 1912.000 | 1912.000 | 244.000 | 390.000 | 1897.000 |
| Log Likelihood | -15133.319 | -15269.121 | -15268.517 | -1423.464 | -2484.108 | -15119.903 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All models are cox proportional hazard model for time in office before reaching a high prestige portfolio. Coefficients display hazard ratios; rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the direction. All models include standard errors clustered at the country level.

**Appendix 6: Robustness tests for Model 2 (Test 2 to 5).**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 2.2 | Model 2.3 | Model 2.4 | Model 2.5 |
|  | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.583\*\* | 0.738\* | 0.766\*\* | 0.725\*\*\* |
|  | (0.100) | (0.100) | (0.078) | (0.050) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 0.705\* | 0.203\*\*\* | 0.221\*\*\* | 0.197\*\*\* |
|  | (0.102) | (0.049) | (0.038) | (0.033) |
| Minister = woman | 1.121 | 0.752 | 0.803 | 0.937 |
| \* Portfolio = feminine | (0.297) | (0.267) | (0.185) | (0.172) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |
| HoG = woman | 1.313 | 0.937 | 1.058 | 1.072 |
|  | (0.283) | (0.172) | (0.126) | (0.131) |
| % women in lower | 0.985\* | 1.005 | 0.999 | 1.002 |
| chamber | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.002) |
| Post-communist country | 0.661+ | 1.006 | 0.945 | 0.980 |
|  | (0.149) | (0.108) | (0.053) | (0.058) |
| Decade = 2000-2009 | 1.023 |  | 0.911 | 0.881\* |
|  | (0.180) |  | (0.073) | (0.052) |
| Decade = 2010-2019 | 1.012 |  | 0.885 | 0.832\* |
|  | (0.197) |  | (0.085) | (0.062) |
| right-left ideological |  |  | 1.000 |  |
| Index |  |  | (0.002) |  |
| absolute number of seats |  |  | 0.999\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.000) |  |
| Party strength in |  |  |  | 0.999 |
| government |  |  |  | (0.003) |
| Observations | 2947 | 1172 | 2847 | 3780 |
| N failures | 327.000 | 432.000 | 1178.000 | 1583.000 |
| Log Likelihood | -2254.066 | -2846.758 | -8836.891 | -12320.645 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All models are cox proportional hazard model for time in office before reaching a high prestige portfolio. Coefficients display hazard ratios; rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the direction. All models include standard errors clustered at the country level.

**Appendix 7: Robustness tests for Model 2 (Test 6 to 11).**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 2.6 | Model 2.7 | Model 2.8 | Model 2.9 | Model 2.10 | Model 2.11 |
|  | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) | HR/(SE) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.725\*\*\* | 0.736\*\*\* | 0.734\*\*\* | 0.764\* | 0.588\*\* | 0.719\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) | (0.045) | (0.048) | (0.089) | (0.107) | (0.048) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 0.174\*\*\* | 0.173\*\*\* | 0.173\*\*\* | 0.415\*\* | 0.235\*\*\* | 0.171\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.126) | (0.064) | (0.029) |
| Minister = woman | 1.016 | 1.018 | 1.020 | 0.565+ | 1.504 | 1.021 |
| \* Portfolio = feminine | (0.192) | (0.191) | (0.191) | (0.171) | (0.456) | (0.195) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HoG = woman | 1.021 | 1.029 | 1.034 | 1.437 | 0.873 | 1.125 |
|  | (0.148) | (0.147) | (0.150) | (0.336) | (0.194) | (0.172) |
| Party leader = woman |  |  |  | 0.773\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.081) |  |  |
| % women in lower | 1.003 |  |  | 1.005 | 1.008\*\* | 1.000 |
| chamber | (0.003) |  |  | (0.007) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| % women in cabinet |  | 0.977 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (0.154) |  |  |  |  |
| Quota without sanctions |  |  | 1.111\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.052) |  |  |  |
| with weak sanctions |  |  | 1.125 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.100) |  |  |  |
| with strong sanctions |  |  | 1.041 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.076) |  |  |  |
| Post-communist country | 0.999 | 0.987 | 0.999 |  | 0.963 | 0.884\* |
|  | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.053) |  | (0.089) | (0.056) |
| Nordic country | 0.960 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.062) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Decade = 2000-2009 | 0.890\* | 0.910 | 0.899\* | 0.921 | 0.743\*\* | 0.912 |
|  | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.045) | (0.123) | (0.069) | (0.061) |
| Decade = 2010-2019 | 0.843\*\* | 0.873\* | 0.854\* | 0.831 | 0.851+ | 0.870 |
|  | (0.050) | (0.049) | (0.058) | (0.164) | (0.078) | (0.078) |
| Observations | 4517 | 4548 | 4548 | 548 | 905 | 4517 |
| N failures | 1897.000 | 1912.000 | 1912.000 | 244.000 | 390.000 | 1897.000 |
| Log Likelihood | -15133.316 | -15269.117 | -15268.512 | -1422.438 | -2483.575 | -15119.897 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. All models are cox proportional hazard model for time in office before reaching a high prestige portfolio. Coefficients display hazard ratios; rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the direction. All models include standard errors clustered at the country level.

**Appendix 8: Robustness test 12 for Model 1 and 2**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Model 1.12** | **Model 2.12** |
|  | HR/ (SE) | HR/ (SE) |
|  |  |  |
| ***Explanatory variables*** |  |  |
| Minister = woman | 0.590\*\*\* | 0.579\*\*\* |
|  | (0.050) | (0.062) |
| Portfolio = feminine | 0.168\*\*\* | 0.162\*\*\* |
|  | (0.025) | (0.028) |
| Minister = woman |  | 1.151 |
| \* Portfolio = feminine |  | (0.327) |
|  |  |  |
| ***Control variables*** |  |  |
| HoG = woman | 1.025 | 1.026 |
|  | (0.184) | (0.185) |
| % women in lower chamber | 1.009\* | 1.009\* |
|  | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Post-communist country | 1.252\*\* | 1.252\*\* |
|  | (0.107) | (0.107) |
| Decade = 2000-2009 | 0.965 | 0.965 |
|  | (0.059) | (0.060) |
| Decade = 2010-2019 | 0.921 | 0.921 |
|  | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Observations | 4517 | 4517 |
| N failures | 1404.000 | 1404.000 |
| Log Likelihood | -11206.849 | -11206.689 |

*Annotations:* With \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\*\* *p* < 0.001. Coefficients display hazard ratios; rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the direction. All models include standard errors clustered at the country level. Since information on the share of women in parliament is missing for 31 cases, the number of observations decreases slightly. As a consequence of the revised coding of prestigious portfolios, the share of ministers who succeeded in reaching a highly prestigious position decreases from 42% to 31%.