**Gender and Family Ties in Latin American Legislatures**

**Online Appendix**

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**Table A1: PELA Survey Response Rates and Gender Quotas**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country name | Survey Wave | Study | Legis-lature | # Respon-dents | # Women Resp | # Seats in Chamber | # Women in Chamber | % Women in Chamber | % Women in Survey | Total Response Rate | Women Response Rate | Men Response Rate | Quota |
| ARGENTINA | Wave 2 | 5 | 1997-2001 | 128 | 31 | 257 | 71 | 27.6 | 24.2 | 49.81 | 43.65 | 52.15 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 51 | 2003-2007 | 105 | 34 | 257 | 87 | 34 | 32.4 | 40.86 | 39.08 | 41.75 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 67 | 2007-2011 | 110 | 37 | 257 | 103 | 40 | 33.59 | 42.79 | 35.91 | 47.4 | YES |
| Wave 5 | 73 | 2009-2013 | 70 | 26 | 257 | 99 | 38.5 | 37.09 | 27.23 | 26.26 | 27.85 | YES |
| BOLIVIA | Wave 2 | 9 | 1997-2002 | 98 | 14 | 130 | 14 | 9.399 | 14.3 | 75.37 | 100 | 72.41 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 47 | 2002-2006 | 80 | 13 | 130 | 24 | 18.5 | 16.29 | 61.54 | 54.16 | 63.2 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 62 | 2006-2010 | 98 | 13 | 130 | 22 | 16.89 | 13.3 | 75.37 | 59.09 | 78.69 | YES |
| BRAZIL | Wave 3 | 55 | 2003-2007 | 134 | 11 | 513 | 44 | 8.6 | 8.199 | 26.12 | 25 | 26.22 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 75 | 2007-2011 | 129 | 14 | 513 | 45 | 8.8 | 10.89 | 25.14 | 31.11 | 24.56 | YES |
| CHILE | Wave 2 | 3 | 1997-2001 | 89 | 9 | 120 | 13 | 10.8 | 10.1 | 74.16 | 69.23 | 74.76 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 42 | 2002-2006 | 88 | 9 | 120 | 15 | 12.5 | 10.19 | 73.33 | 60 | 75.23 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 60 | 2006-2010 | 90 | 13 | 120 | 18 | 15 | 14.39 | 75 | 72.22 | 75.48 | NO |
| Wave 5 | 77 | 2010-2014 | 86 | 10 | 120 | 17 | 14.19 | 11.6 | 71.66 | 58.81 | 73.79 | NO |
| COLOMBIA | Wave 2 | 13 | 1998-2002 | 88 | 9 | 161 | 20 | 12.69 | 10.19 | 54.65 | 45 | 56.02 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 46 | 2002-2006 | 95 | 12 | 166 | 20 | 12 | 12.6 | 57.22 | 60 | 56.84 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 59 | 2006-2010 | 107 | 15 | 163 | 15 | 8.399 | 14 | 65.63 | 100 | 62.15 | NO |
| Wave 5 | 83 | 2010-2014 | 91 | 8 | 166 | 21 | 12.69 | 8.8 | 54.81 | 38.09 | 57.24 | NO |
| COSTA RICA | Wave 2 | 15 | 1998-2002 | 49 | 9 | 57 | 11 | 19.29 | 18.39 | 85.95 | 81.81 | 86.95 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 43 | 2002-2006 | 51 | 19 | 57 | 19 | 31.6 | 37.29 | 89.47 | 100 | 84.2 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 56 | 2006-2010 | 57 | 22 | 57 | 22 | 38.59 | 38.59 | 100 | 100 | 100 | YES |
| DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | Wave 2 | 29 | 1998-2002 | 103 | 13 | 149 | 24 | 16.1 | 12.6 | 69.12 | 54.16 | 72 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 44 | 2002-2006 | 118 | 12 | 150 | 26 | 17.29 | 10.19 | 78.66 | 46.15 | 85.48 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 64 | 2006-2010 | 93 | 14 | 178 | 35 | 19.7 | 15.1 | 52.25 | 40 | 55.24 | YES |
| Wave 5 | 82 | 2010-2016 | 78 | 16 | 183 | 38 | 20.79 | 20.5 | 42.61 | 42.11 | 42.75 | YES |
| ECUADOR | Wave 2 | 23 | 1998-2002 | 112 | 15 | 120 | 21 | 17.39 | 13.39 | 93.33 | 71.43 | 97.98 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 45 | 2002-2006 | 98 | 16 | 100 | 16 | 16 | 16.29 | 98 | 100 | 97.62 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 65 | 2007-2008 | 98 | 36 | 130 | 46 | 35 | 36.7 | 75.37 | 78.26 | 73.8 | YES |
| Wave 5 | 72 | 2009-2012 | 95 | 32 | 124 | 40 | 32.29 | 33.7 | 76.61 | 80 | 75 | YES |
| EL SALVADOR | Wave 2 | 7 | 1997-2000 | 58 | 11 | 84 | 14 | 16.7 | 19 | 69.05 | 78.56 | 67.13 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 27 | 2000-2003 | 64 | 7 | 84 | 8 | 9.52 | 10.89 | 76.19 | 87.5 | 75 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 48 | 2003-2006 | 80 | 7 | 84 | 7 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 95.23 | 100 | 94.8 | NO |
| Wave 6 | 70 | 2009-2011 | 68 | 14 | 84 | 16 | 19 | 20.6 | 80.94 | 87.5 | 79.41 | NO |
| GUATEMALA | Wave 2 | 38 | 2000-2004 | 79 | 4 | 113 | 10 | 8.8 | 5.099 | 69.91 | 40 | 72.81 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 52 | 2004-2008 | 121 | 10 | 158 | 13 | 8.199 | 8.3 | 76.58 | 76.91 | 76.55 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 68 | 2008-2012 | 97 | 13 | 158 | 19 | 12 | 13.39 | 61.38 | 68.41 | 60.43 | NO |
| HONDURAS | Wave 2 | 11 | 1997-2001 | 71 | 8 | 128 | 12 | 9.399 | 11.3 | 55.47 | 66.66 | 54.31 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 40 | 2002-2006 | 102 | 11 | 128 | 11 | 5.5 | 10.8 | 79.69 | 100 | 77.77 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 57 | 2006-2010 | 91 | 21 | 128 | 30 | 23.39 | 23.1 | 71.08 | 70 | 71.43 | YES |
| Wave 5 | 74 | 2010-2014 | 91 | 21 | 128 | 23 | 18 | 23.1 | 71.08 | 91.3 | 66.66 | YES |
| MEXICO | Wave 2 | 1 | 1997-2000 | 126 | 31 | 500 | 87 | 17.39 | 24.6 | 25.2 | 35.63 | 23 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 37 | 2000-2003 | 124 | 28 | 500 | 80 | 16 | 22.6 | 24.79 | 35 | 22.86 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 50 | 2003-2006 | 124 | 21 | 500 | 113 | 22.6 | 16.89 | 24.79 | 18.57 | 26.61 | YES |
| Wave 5 | 63 | 2006-2009 | 128 | 34 | 500 | 113 | 22.6 | 26.6 | 25.6 | 30.09 | 24.29 | YES |
| Wave 6 | 79 | 2009-2012 | 98 | 28 | 500 | 131 | 26.2 | 28.6 | 19.6 | 21.37 | 18.96 | YES |
| NICARAGUA | Wave 2 | 17 | 1996-2001 | 70 | 9 | 90 | 10 | 10.8 | 12.89 | 77.77 | 90 | 76.25 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 39 | 2001-2006 | 60 | 16 | 90 | 19 | 20.7 | 26.7 | 66.66 | 84.2 | 61.97 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 66 | 2007-2011 | 69 | 12 | 90 | 17 | 18.5 | 17.39 | 76.66 | 70.58 | 78.08 | NO |
| PANAMA | Wave 2 | 41 | 1999-2004 | 64 | 7 | 71 | 7 | 9.899 | 10.89 | 90.13 | 100 | 89.05 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 53 | 2004-2009 | 68 | 9 | 73 | 12 | 16.7 | 13.19 | 93.15 | 75 | 96.72 | YES |
| Wave 4 | 71 | 2009-2013 | 64 | 5 | 71 | 6 | 8.5 | 7.8 | 90.13 | 83.33 | 90.76 | YES |
| PERU | Wave 2 | 31 | 2001-2006 | 83 | 15 | 120 | 21 | 17.5 | 18.1 | 69.16 | 71.43 | 68.69 | YES |
| Wave 3 | 61 | 2006-2011 | 96 | 27 | 120 | 35 | 29.2 | 28.1 | 80 | 77.13 | 81.18 | YES |
| URUGUAY | Wave 2 | 33 | 2000-2005 | 68 | 8 | 99 | 12 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 68.69 | 66.66 | 68.97 | NO |
| Wave 3 | 54 | 2005-2010 | 86 | 11 | 99 | 11 | 11.1 | 12.8 | 86.87 | 100 | 85.23 | NO |
| Wave 4 | 76 | 2010-2015 | 79 | 9 | 99 | 15 | 15.19 | 11.39 | 79.8 | 60 | 83.33 | NO |
| VENEZUELA | Wave 2 | 35 | 2000-2005 | 100 | 11 | 165 | 16 | 9.689 | 11 | 60.61 | 68.75 | 59.72 | NO |

**Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Family Ties to Different Types of Political Offices**

Table A.2 shows the frequency and percentages of legislators in the sample with family ties to politicians that have previously held political office. The table shows information about the office, the number of people with family ties who held/hold each office, and its percentage, by gender and by quota.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Office** | **Total** | |  | **Pre-Quota** | | | **Post-Quota** | | |
| **Men** | **Women** | **Total** | **Men** | **Women** | **Total** | **Men** | **Women** | **Total** |
| Cabinet Minister  (%) | 111 | 22 | **133** | 57 | 7 | **64** | 54 | 15 | **69** |
| 2.81 | 2.61 | **2.77** | 3.23 | 2.53 | **3.13** | 2.47 | 2.65 | **2.51** |
| City Council Member  (%) | 170 | 32 | **202** | 79 | 8 | **87** | 91 | 24 | **115** |
| (%) | 4.30 | 3.79 | **4.21** | 4.47 | 2.89 | **4.26** | 4.17 | 4.23 | **4.18** |
| Constitutional Convention  (%) | 4 | 1 | **5** | 1 | 0 | **1** | 3 | 1 | **4** |
| 0.10 | 0.12 | **0.10** | 0.06 | 0.00 | **0.05** | 0.14 | 0.18 | **0.15** |
| Governor  (%) | 49 | 12 | **61** | 17 | 2 | **19** | 32 | 10 | **42** |
| 1.24 | 1.42 | **1.27** | 0.96 | 0.72 | **0.93** | 1.47 | 1.76 | **1.53** |
| House Representative  (%) | 404 | 66 | **470** | 191 | 27 | **218** | 213 | 39 | **252** |
| 10.23 | 7.82 | **9.81** | 10.82 | 9.75 | **10.67** | 9.76 | 6.88 | **9.16** |
| Mayor  (%) | 327 | 84 | **411** | 151 | 40 | **191** | 176 | 44 | **220** |
| 8.28 | 9.95 | **8.58** | 8.55 | 14.44 | **9.35** | 8.06 | 7.76 | **8.00** |
| President | 64 | 20 | **84** | 28 | 7 | **35** | 36 | 13 | **49** |
| (%)  (%) | 1.62 | 2.37 | **1.75** | 1.59 | 2.53 | **1.71** | 1.65 | 2.29 | **1.78** |
| Senator  (%) | 75 | 17 | **92** | 44 | 8 | **52** | 31 | 9 | **40** |
| 1.90 | 2.01 | **1.92** | 2.49 | 2.89 | **2.55** | 1.42 | 1.59 | **1.45** |
| Speaker  (%) | 11 | 1 | **12** | 7 | 0 | **7** | 4 | 1 | **5** |
| 0.28 | 0.12 | **0.25** | 0.40 | 0.00 | **0.34** | 0.18 | 0.18 | **0.18** |
| State Representative  (%) | 42 | 12 | **54** | 11 | 3 | **14** | 31 | 9 | **40** |
| 1.06 | 1.42 | **1.13** | 0.62 | 1.08 | **0.69** | 1.42 | 1.59 | **1.45** |
| State Senator  (%) | 5 | 0 | **5** | 0 | 0 | **0** | 5 | 0 | **5** |
| 0.13 | 0.00 | **0.10** | 0.00 | 0.00 | **0.00** | 0.23 | 0.00 | **0.18** |
| Vice President  (%) | 9 | 5 | **14** | 3 | 0 | **3** | 6 | 5 | **11** |
| 0.23 | 0.59 | **0.29** | 0.17 | 0.00 | **0.15** | 0.27 | 0.88 | **0.40** |
| Total  (%) | 1271 | 272 | **1543** | 589 | 102 | **691** | 682 | 170 | **852** |
| 32.19 | 32.23 | **32.19** | 33.35 | 36.82 | **33.82** | 31.24 | 29.98 | **30.98** |

**Table A3: Descriptive Statistics of Political Family Relationships**

Table A.3 shows the frequencies and percentages of the type of relatives with political offices that elected legislators reported in our analysis. These are the exact answers that legislators gave to PELA.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Relationship** | **Total**  **N and %** | | | **Pre-Quota**  **N and %** | | | **Post-Quota**  **N and %** | | |
| **Men** | **Women** | **Total** | **Men** | **Women** | **Total** | **Men** | **Women** | **Total** |
| Grandfather and Grandmother | 148 | 29 | **177** | 73 | 12 | **85** | 75 | 17 | **92** |
| 3.75 | 3.44 | **3.69** | 4.13 | 4.33 | **4.16** | 3.44 | 3.00 | **3.35** |
| Great-grandfather | 4 | 0 | **4** | 4 | 0 | **4** | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0.10 | 0.00 | **0.08** | 0.23 | 0.00 | **0.20** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Spouse | 7 | 18 | **25** | 4 | 7 | **11** | 3 | 11 | **14** |
| 0.18 | 2.13 | **0.52** | 0.23 | 2.53 | **0.54** | 0.14 | 1.94 | **0.51** |
| Sister/bother in Law | 1 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | **1** |
| 0.03 | 0.00 | **0.02** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.00 | **0.04** |
| Sister/Brother | 188 | 29 | **217** | 80 | 10 | **90** | 108 | 19 | **127** |
| 4.76 | 3.44 | **4.53** | 4.53 | 3.61 | **4.41** | 4.95 | 3.35 | **4.62** |
| Daughter/Brother | 12 | 2 | **14** | 3 | 0 | **3** | 9 | 2 | **11** |
| 0.30 | 0.24 | **0.29** | 0.17 | 0.00 | **0.15** | 0.41 | 0.35 | **0.40** |
| Mother | 32 | 19 | **51** | 18 | 9 | **27** | 14 | 10 | **24** |
| 0.81 | 2.25 | **1.06** | 1.02 | 3.25 | **1.32** | 0.64 | 1.76 | **0.87** |
| Others | 55 | 23 | **78** | 16 | 5 | **21** | 39 | 18 | **57** |
| 1.39 | 2.73 | **1.63** | 0.91 | 1.81 | **1.03** | 1.79 | 3.17 | **2.07** |
| Father | 564 | 110 | **674** | 263 | 46 | **309** | 301 | 64 | **365** |
| 14.28 | 13.03 | **14.06** | 14.89 | 16.61 | **15.12** | 13.79 | 11.29 | **13.27** |
| Cousin | 82 | 7 | **89** | 41 | 1 | **42** | 41 | 6 | **47** |
| 2.08 | 0.83 | **1.86** | 2.32 | 0.36 | **2.06** | 1.88 | 1.06 | **1.71** |
| Father/Mother in Law | 1 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | **1** |
| 0.03 | 0.00 | **0.02** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.00 | **0.04** |
| Great Uncle | 1 | 0 | **1** | 1 | 0 | **1** | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0.03 | 0.00 | **0.02** | 0.06 | 0.00 | **0.05** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Uncle/Aunt | 176 | 35 | **211** | 86 | 12 | **98** | 90 | 23 | **113** |
| 4.46 | 4.15 | **4.40** | 4.87 | 4.33 | **4.80** | 4.12 | 4.06 | **4.11** |
| No Family Ties | 2678 | 572 | **3250** | 1177 | 175 | **1352** | 1501 | 397 | **1898** |
| 67.81 | 67.77 | **67.81** | 66.65 | 63.18 | **66.18** | 68.76 | 70.02 | **69.02** |
| **Total** | **3949** | **844** | **4793** | **1766** | **277** | **2043** | **2183** | **567** | **2750** |
| **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** |

**Table A4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Multivariate Models**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Obs. | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
| Family Ties | 5011 | 0.326 | 0.469 | 0 | 1 |
| Women | 5042 | 0.176 | 0.381 | 0 | 1 |
| Quota | 5067 | 0.575 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 4987 | 47.67 | 9.858 | 22 | 86 |
| Education | 5046 | 4.986 | 0.947 | 1 | 6 |
| Previous experience in Politics | 5020 | 0.408 | 0.492 | 0 | 1 |
| First time in Legislature | 5046 | 0.651 | 0.477 | 0 | 1 |
| Legislator's Ideology | 4965 | 4.973 | 2.050 | 1 | 10 |

**Table A5: Multilevel Logistic Regression on the Moderating Effects of Quotas with Random Effects by Country and Survey Wave**

In Table A.5 we replicate the three models of Table 1 with random effects instead of fixed effects by country and survey wave to test for unexplained variance between countries. Results are consistent with what we presented in the paper.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1  DV: Relatives in political offices | Model 2  DV: Relatives in political offices | Model 3  DV: Relatives in political offices |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Women | 0.0949 | 0.216 | 0.305\*\* |
|  | (0.0851) | (0.133) | (0.139) |
| Quota |  | -0.0913 | -0.0746 |
|  |  | (0.132) | (0.135) |
| Women \* Quota |  | -0.234 | -0.329\* |
|  |  | (0.169) | (0.175) |
| Age | -0.00461 |  | -0.00459 |
|  | (0.00343) |  | (0.00343) |
| Level of Education | 0.166\*\*\* |  | 0.167\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0359) |  | (0.0359) |
| Legislator Ideology | 0.0987\*\*\* |  | 0.101\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0161) |  | (0.0161) |
| Previous Experience in Politics | 0.114\* |  | 0.117\* |
|  | (0.0681) |  | (0.0681) |
| First Time in Legislature | -0.265\*\*\* |  | -0.264\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0697) |  | (0.0697) |
| Constant | -1.789\*\*\* | -0.726\*\*\* | -1.759\*\*\* |
|  | (0.299) | (0.129) | (0.308) |
| Country (Variance) | -0.972\*\*\* | -0.920\*\*\* | -0.965\*\*\* |
|  | (0.201) | (0.196) | (0.202) |
| Survey wave (Variance) | -2.537\*\*\* | -3.296\*\* | -2.664\*\*\* |
|  | (0.617) | (1.465) | (0.681) |
| N | 4793 | 4990 | 4793 |

*Estimates are based on multi-level logistic regressions using family ties as the dependent variable with fixed effects for survey wave (not shown) and random effects for country and political party. Standard errors are in parentheses.*

*\*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.*

**Table A6: Analysis of Residuals**

Table A.6 tests the assumption that the control variables are not collinear with the independent variables of interest in Table 1, Model 3. It presents the residual estimates from that model regressed against each control variable. The only pattern that appears is for legislator ideology, with the residuals showing positive and large values for those legislators leaning toward the right. However, since this variable is poorly correlated with both legislator gender (*r*=-0.0717) and quotas (*r*=-0.0136), legislator ideology reduces the error variance of our model without inducing multicollinearity in our data. This increases our confidence that the results in Table 1 are valid.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1: No Controls | Model 2: With Controls |
| Ideology of Legislator | 0.0212\*\* | 0.0210\*\* |
|  | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Age |  | 0.0005 |
|  |  | (0.001) |
| Education |  | 0.010 |
|  |  | (0.016) |
| Previous Experience |  | 0.001 |
|  |  | (0.030) |
| First Time in Legislature |  | -0.021 |
|  |  | (0.320) |
| Constant | -0.122\*\* | -0.181 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.125) |
| *R2* | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| *N* | 4899 | 4793 |

*Estimates are from an OLS model using the residuals of Model 3 from Table 1 as the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses.*

*\*\*\* is significant at the 1% level; \*\* is significant at the 5% level; and \* is significant at the 10% level.*

**Table A.7: Multivariate Model with All Control Variables and the Interaction between Gender and Ideology**

This table shows our second test of whether ideology creates any bias in our analysis. It presents a re-estimation of Table 1, Model 3 with an additional interaction term for legislator ideology and gender. It shows that the coefficients of interest for gender, quotas, and their interaction remain significant while the ideology and gender interaction is not statistically different from zero. This robustness check underscores the validity of the findings from Table 1, Model 3; thus, our analyses support the hypothesis that differences in the probability of family ties for men and women legislators only exists in non-gender quota settings.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | Model 1: DV: Relatives in political offices |
| Women | 0.450\* |
|  | (0.230) |
| Quota | -0.113 |
|  | (0.180) |
| Women x Quota | -0.304\* |
|  | (0.175) |
| Age | -0.005 |
|  | (0.003) |
| Level of Education | 0.172\*\*\* |
|  | (0.036) |
| Previous Experience in Politics | 0.114 |
|  | (0.069) |
| First Time in Legislature | -0.259\*\*\* |
|  | (0.070) |
| Legislator Ideology | 0.105\*\*\* |
|  | (0.018) |
| Women x Legislator Ideology | -0.032 |
|  | (0.039) |
| Constant | -1.915\*\*\* |
|  | (0.356) |
| Chi2 | 260.19 |
| N | 4793 |
| Log-likelihood | -2893.941 |

*Standard errors are in parentheses. Fixed effects for country and survey wave included in models but not presented in table.*

*\*\*\* denotes significant the 1% level; \*\* denotes significance at the 5% level; and \* denotes significance at the 10% level.*

**Figure A.1: Matching Results**

This figure compares the legacy rates between men and women legislators after matching on their sociodemographic characteristics and legislative experience. For the matching procedure, we apply the sparse optimal matching method using the *rcbalance* Rpackage (Pimentel 2017)*.* This method simultaneously matches treated units to control units, allowing for an exact balance among nominal covariates and the shortest covariance distance between treated units and control ones. We try to reduce the distance between treated and control units for legislators’ age and education and include an exact matching by ideology (on a 1-10 scale). We made sure that male legislators belong to the same party and country wave as their correspondent female legislators. We find very similar results to what we presented in Figure 2. No overall gender differences exist, and the only country with a significant difference is Peru (*p*=0.05), just as we find in the paper.

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**Figure A.2: Results including only Surveys with Response Rates for at least 70% of Legislators**

We run a robustness check to ensure that sample size and non-responses are not biasing the results of Figure 2. As shown in Table A.1, PELA response rates vary across waves from 19.6% to 100%. For that reason, we replicated the models of Figure 2 just for those waves with at least 70% of the response rate. Figure A.2 shows those results by country. Results from Figure A2 are very similar to Figure 2. The only relevant difference between the two figures is in the case of Peru. In Figure 2, Peru was the only case where women legislators were significantly more likely to have family ties than men legislators. In Figure A2, where waves with less than 70% of the chamber responding were excluded, the difference is still present but the level of statistical significance gets lower. The p-value goes from 0.02 in Figure 2, to 0.07 in Figure A2. This result suggests that non-response bias and smaller sample sizes in some country-waves do not bias our analyses.

