Supplementary Information for "Political Accountability, Legislator Gender, and the Status Quo Bias"

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Contents

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1 Outline

This appendix contains supplementary information for "Political Accountability, Gender, and the Status Quo Bias". I first provide by-country results for the status-quo experiment. I then provide the process and results of the balanced assignment simulation replicating the analysis reported in the paper. Subsequently, I present robustness checks consisting of re-estimating the main model with party fixed effects and with a control for electoral safety. This is followed by treatment balance checks, and descriptive statistics on survey attrition rates for the participating politicians. Finally, I provide information on the partisan proportionality of the sample used, compared to the actual proportions in the relevant legislatures at the time of the study.

2 By-Country Status-Quo Preference of Politicians

Subgroup		Proportion Choosing Status Quo		
		Low Acc.	High Acc.	Overall
Politicians (Belgium)	Women	0.60	0.70	0.65
		[0.46-0.72]	[0.54-0.82]	[0.54-0.74]
	Men	0.68	0.61	0.65
		[0.56-0.78]	[0.51-0.72]	[0.57-0.72]
	All	0.64	0.64	0.64
		[0.57-0.72]	[0.55-0.72]	[0.59-0.70]
Citizens (Belgium)	Women	0.66	0.62	0.64
		[0.62-0.69]	[0.59-0.66]	[0.62-0.66]
	Men	0.66	0.66	0.66
		[0.62-0.70]	[0.62-0.69]	[0.63-0.68]
	All	0.66	0.64	0.65
		[0.63-0.68]	[0.61-0.66]	[0.63-0.67]
Politicians (Canada)	Women	-	-	-
		[-]	[-]	[-]
	Men	0.83	0.60	0.74
		[0.68-0.93]	[0.36-0.81]	[0.59-0.85]
	All	0.77	0.75	0.76
		[0.63-0.87]	[0.58-0.89]	[0.65-0.85]
Citizens (Canada)	Women	0.53	0.63	0.59
		[0.45-0.61]	[0.56-0.71]	[0.52-0.64]
	Men	0.59	0.64	0.61
		[0.51-0.67]	[0.56-0.71]	[0.56-0.66]
	All	0.56	0.63	0.60
		[0.51-0.62]	[0.58-0.69]	[0.56-0.63]
Politicians (Israel)	Women	0.59	0.48	0.54
		[0.20-0.91]	[0.17-0.78]	[0.27-0.79]
	Men	0.83	0.55	0.72
		[0.61-0.95]	[0.30-0.79]	[0.54-0.86]
	All	0.79	0.53	0.68
		[0.59-0.92]	[0.31-0.73]	[0.53-0.80]
Citizens (Israel)	Women	0.63	0.64	0.63
		[0.57-0.68]	[0.58-0.69]	[0.59-0.68]
	Men	0.65	0.65	0.65
		[0.59-0.71]	[0.59-0.71]	[0.61-0.69]
	All	0.64	0.64	0.64
		[0.59-0.68]	[0.60-0.68]	[0.61-0.67]

Table 1: Proportion of respondents opting for the plan presented as the status-quo, by country, subgroup and accountability treatment condition. 95% confidence intervals reported in square brackets. All results reported are estimates obtained using Clarify. Estimates for female politicians in Canada could not be derived because assignment to the high accountability condition was perfectly correlated with status quo preference (i.e., all 10 Canadian female politicians assigned to the high accountability condition chose the plan presented as the status-quo, and none chose the alternative.)

3   Models Used to Simulate Predicted Probabilities for the Quantities Reported

To overcome potential skewing of the results owing to imbalanced treatment assignment, I conduct an analysis deriving the quantities of interest reported in the paper by simulating a fully random (0.5 chance of being assigned to a cell) for each of the two treatments used in the experiment. This procedure is done using the Clarify software (Tomz et al., 2003), which conducts the simulation and derives the resulting predicted probabilities using a standard logit model, the estimation results of which are reported below. Subsequently, I report the figures obtained from this procedure, which very closely mirror the raw probabilities I report in the paper.

	All, Men	All, Women	BE, Men	BE, Women	CA, Men	CA, Women	IL, Men	IL, Women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Accountability	−0.587**	0.543	−0.272	0.453	−1.173	19.167	−1.554*	−0.500
	(0.278)	(0.377)	(0.337)	(0.440)	(0.719)	(3,389.730)	(0.843)	(1.195)
SQ Plan (5+5)	−0.420	0.368	−0.438	0.528	−1.258*	0.405	0.940	0.399
	(0.285)	(0.373)	(0.345)	(0.434)	(0.723)	(1.155)	(0.855)	(1.160)
Constant	1.288***	0.241	0.964***	0.139	2.279***	0.288	1.285*	0.250
	(0.259)	(0.307)	(0.316)	(0.362)	(0.664)	(0.764)	(0.743)	(1.017)
Observations	245	132	155	96	51	23	39	13
Log Likelihood	−149.762	−83.220	−100.214	−61.191	−24.997	−8.599	−20.027	−8.851
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 2: Estimation results: skeleton models used for deriving Clarify estimates of status-quo preference proportions reported in the paper. All results are for politicians only. Models reported are logit, with the dependent variable being the choice type made in the status-quo experiment, coded 1 for the choice presented as the status-quo and 0 for the alternative. Accountability is 0 for low, 1 for high. SQ Plan is 0 for the 3+3 plan, 1 for the 5+5 plan. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

| | | Proportion Choosing Status Quo | | |
Subgroup		Low Acc.	High Acc.	Overall
Politicians	Women	0.60	0.72	0.66
		[0.49-0.71]	[0.59-0.81]	[0.58-0.75]
	Men	0.74	0.62	0.67
		[0.66-0.81]	[0.52-0.71]	[0.63-0.75]
	All	0.69	0.65	0.67
		[0.62-0.75]	[0.58-0.72]	[0.62-0.72]
Citizens	Women	0.63	0.63	0.63
		[0.60-0.66]	[0.60-0.66]	[0.61-0.65]
	Men	0.65	0.65	0.65
		[0.62-0.68]	[0.62-0.68]	[0.63-0.67]
	All	0.64	0.64	0.64
		[0.62-0.66]	[0.62-0.66]	[0.63-0.65]

Table 3: Proportion of respondents opting for the plan presented as the status-quo, by subgroup and accountability treatment condition. 95% confidence intervals reported in square brackets. All results reported are estimates obtained using Clarify and the model reported above.

4   Main Model Estimation with Party Fixed Effects

The following table presents estimation results from an additional logit model to those reported in the paper. The model estimated here is identical to Model 3 but includes party fixed effects.

The dependent variable is the choice type made in the status-quo experiment, coded 1 for the choice presented as the status-quo and 0 for the alternative. Accountability is 0 for low, 1 for high. SQ Plan is 0 for the 3+3 plan, 1 for the 5+5 plan. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Maximum likelihood pseudo R^2 values reported.

	Model 4
Female Politician	-0.486
	(0.344)

Accountability	−0.565*
	(0.308)
SQ Plan (5+5)	−0.083
	(0.247)
Female Pol. X Accountability	1.231**
	(0.510)
Tenure (years)	0.039*
	(0.021)
Year of Birth	−0.005
	(0.013)
Canada (FE)	14.930
	(2,399.545)
Israel (FE)	−0.758
	(1.085)
Women X Accountability	−0.562
	(0.921)
Female Pol. X SQ Plan	−1.423
	(1.004)
Accountability X SQ Plan	−14.883
	(2,399.545)
Female Pol. X Accountability X SQ Plan	−1.066
	(1.203)

Party Fixed Effects:

FDF	−1.285
	(1.352)
Groen	0.464
	(1.075)
Habayit Hayehudi	16.559
	(1,063.688)
Hadash	16.683
	(2,399.545)
Halikud	0.634

	(1.103)
Hareshima Hameshutefet	1.158
	(1.348)
Hatenua	0.716
	(1.371)
Israel Beitenu	16.251
	(2,399.545)
Kulano	−0.202
	(1.563)
Labor	0.395
	(0.913)
Liberal	−13.998
	(2,399.545)
Meretz	16.616
	(1,035.377)
MR	−0.288
	(0.963)
N-VA	−0.038
	(0.902)
New Democratic Party	−14.720
	(2,399.545)
Open VLD	−0.280
	(0.943)
PP	15.635
	(2,399.545)
PS	0.061
	(0.964)
Shas	−16.534
	(1,694.909)
sp.a	−0.129
	(0.964)
Vlaams Belang	
Yehadut HaTorah	16.206

	(2,399.545)
Yesh Atid	
Constant	11.456
	(26.456)
Observations	369
Log Likelihood	-211.492
Pseudo R^2	0.134

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5   Main Model Estimation Controlling for Electoral Safety

When looking for explanations of the dynamics of gender and political accountability, electoral vulnerability is likely suspect: if women are on average more electorally vulnerable than men, and know that to be the case, then their stronger preference for the status-quo policy under conditions of heightened accountability could be a response to this reality. Nevertheless, it is unclear that women are more electorally vulnerable than men in the countries studied here, or that this indicator is predictive of status-quo preference. Accounting for this possibility, I construct a measure of electoral safety, providing a more reliable assessment of the electoral circumstances of the participating politicians. Here, I explain how the measure was constructed, report mean values for male and female politicians, and then reported a robustness check in which this variable was added to the main model reported in the paper, substantiating that the results are invariable to its inclusion.

Assessing electoral vulnerability (or, conversely, safety - I sue the two interchangeably here) is empirically complex. Ideally, respondents would be asked how electorally safe they felt going into the next election and this would be used as a (subjective) indicator. However, this question was not included in the survey used for this project. An alternative is aggregating voting intention polls from the time of the interviews, but in all three countries, those surveys report results for party vote share rather than for individual politicians, meaning that I lose on important variance (e.g. if a party in Israel receives 10 seats in a poll, the politician placed

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first on the list is far safer than the one placed at the 8th place, and applying party polling performance to both masks that).

Instead, I create an individual measure of electoral safety by looking at the electoral attainment for each participating politician in the election preceding their interview. I do this because recent election performance is a strong predictor of future electoral attainment, above and beyond other determinants of vote choice (e.g. Alesina, 1993; Healy and Malhotra, 2009). Because each country studied here has a different election system, I construct a separate measure in each one. In Canada, where representatives are elected from single-member districts, I use the proportion of the vote obtained by the politician in their riding, as naturally those who were elected with a greater share of the votes are more likely to be re-elected. In Israel, I look at the distance between the list position of the politician and their partys total number of seats. This captures the notion that a politician placed first in a party with 10 seats (scoring 9 on this measure) is more electorally safe than a politician placed 8th on the same list (who scores 2), and also from a politician placed first on the list of a party that only received 4 seats (who scores 3). Belgium has multi-member districts, so parties run separate lists in each one. I therefore take the distance of a politicians list position in their district from the number of seats the party received in that district. This is very similar to the procedure in Israel. In all cases, I rescale the measure to [0,1], for comparability.

The mean 'safety scores' are 0.53 in Belgium, 0.30 in Canada, and 0.29 in Israel. Breaking this down by gender, the mean overall electoral safety score for men is 0.43, and 0.46 for women very similar figures that trend towards higher overall electoral safety for female politicians. The per-country gender gaps are small and inconsistent. In Belgium the figures for men and women are 0.53 and 0.54; in Canada they are 0.32 and 0.25, and in Israel they are 0.29 and 0.27. Overall then, women do not appear to be more electorally vulnerable than men in the studied sample

Table 5 reports the results of a logistic regression identical to the main model reported in the paper, with electoral safety included as a control. The quantities of interest are all similar and remain statistically significant.

As in the original model, the dependent variable is the choice type made in the status-quo experiment, coded 1 for the choice presented as the status-quo and 0 for the alternative. Accountability is 0 for low, 1 for high. SQ Plan is 0 for the 3+3 plan, 1 for the 5+5 plan. Tenure is operationalized in years spent in current role.

Electoral Safety is continuous, ranging form 0 (low) to 1 (high). Standard errors reported in parentheses. Maximum likelihood pseudo R^2 values reported.

Table 5: Regression Results

	Model 1 With Electoral Safety As Control
Female Politician	−0.379
	(0.352)
Accountability	−0.696**
	(0.307)
SQ Plan (5+5)	0.119
	(0.245)
Female Pol. X Accountability	1.080**
	(0.507)
Tenure (years)	0.049**
	(0.022)
Electoral Safety	0.258
	(0.547)
Year of Birth	−0.003
	(0.013)
Canada (FE)	0.684*
	(0.369)
Israel (FE)	0.388
	(0.390)
Constant	6.429
	(25.877)
Observations	334
Log Likelihood	−200.414
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

6 Treatment Balance Checks

The following table presents results of a multinomial logistic regression on treatment condition assignment. I look at predictors of imbalances in assignment to one of the four conditions, based on the 2x2 treatment design: SQ plan is 3+3 X low accountability; SQ plan is 3+3 X high accountability; 5+5 X low accountability, and 5+5 X high accountability. The base rate for comparison the 3+3 X low accountability. As is evident, age is a significant predictor of assignment to the first condition, and so is being a Canadian politician. To partially offset these imbalances, I control for all of these indicators in the main model analyzed in the paper.

Table 6: Treatment Assignment Balance Checks, Politicians

	Treatment Condition:		
	3+3, High Acc.	5+5, Low Acc.	5+5, High Acc.
Gender	0.362*	−0.228	−0.190
	(0.191)	(0.185)	(0.187)
Tenure	−0.022	−0.024	−0.031
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Year of Birth	−0.033***	0.003***	−0.022***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Canada (FE)	−0.534*	−0.345	−1.362***
	(0.273)	(0.252)	(0.224)
Israel (FE)	−0.521**	0.062	0.235
	(0.257)	(0.268)	(0.260)
Constant	65.660***	−5.547***	43.202***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

7 Attrition Rates

The table below reports the proportion of participating politicians who completed the status-quo module, out of all politicians beginning an interview in the second

round of INFOPOL interviews. The large majority of interviewed politicians participated in this experiment.

Module	Belgium	Canada	Israel	All	Proportion
First Question	269	76	65	410	
Status Quo Module	251	74	52	377	92%

8   Politicians Sample by Partisan Proportionality

The following table presents a by-party breakdown of all interviewed politicians in the second round of INFOPOL interviews, during which the status-quo experiment was administered. Numbers and proportions reported include interviewed politicians for whom a response on the status-quo experiment was not recorded (33 out of 410 interviewees, see attrition table above.)

Parliament	Party	Proportion of Sample (N interviewed)	Proportion in Parliament (N Parliament)
Chamber of Representatives, Belgium		% N	% N
	CD&V	14.6% 16	12.3% 21
	Ecolo	2.6% 3	4.7% 8
	FDP	1.7% 2	1.2% 2
	Groen	4.4% 5	3.5% 6
	MR	13.3% 15	15.8% 27
	N-VA	26.5% 30	22.2% 38
	Open VLD	9.7% 11	9.9% 17
	PP	0.9% 1	1.2% 2

		%	%
	PS	10.6%	13.4%
		12	23
	PTB-GO!	0%	1.2%
		0	2
	Vlaams Belang	2.6%	1.7%
		3	3
	cdH	4.4%	5.3%
		5	9
	sp.a	8.8%	7.6%
		10	13
	Total	100%	100%
		113	171
Flemish Parliament, Belgium		%	%
		N	N
	CD&V	21.7%	22.6%
		23	30
	Groen	8.5%	7.5%
		9	10
	N-VA	33%	35.3%
		35	47
	Open VLD	17.9%	15.8%
		19	21
	UF	0%	0.7%
		0	1
	sp.a	14.1%	13.5%
		15	18
	Vlaams Belang	4.7%	4.5%
		5	6
	Total	100%	100%
		106	133
Waloon Parliament, Belgium		%	%
		N	N
	Ecolo	10%	5.5%
		5	6
	FDF	6%	2.7%
		3	3
	MR	26%	28.4%
		13	31

		%	%
	PP	0%	0.9%
		0	1
	PS	36%	42.2%
		18	46
	PTB-GO!	0%	1.8%
		0	2
	cdH	22%	18.3%
		11	20
	Total	100%	100%
		50	109
House of Commons, Canada		%	%
		N	N
	Bloc Quebecois	2.2%	1.3%
		1	4
	Conservative	21.7%	53.9%
		10	166
	Green	0%	0.3%
		0	1
	Liberal	17.4%	11%
		8	34
	NDP	58.7%	33.4%
		27	103
	Total	100%	100%
		46	308
The Knesset, Israel		%	%
		N	N
	Israel Beitenu	0%	5%
		0	6
	Jewish Home	4.5%	6.7%
		2	8
	Joint Arab List	9.1%	10.8%
		4	13
	Kulanu	9.1%	8.3%
		4	10
	Likud	13.6%	25%
		6	30
	Meretz	11.4%	4.1%
		5	5
	Shas	2.3%	5.8%

		% / N	% / N
	Yehadut Hatorah	1 4.5%	7 5%
	Yesh Atid	2 15.9%	6 9.2%
	Zionist Camp	7 29.5%	11 20%
	Total	13 100% 44	24 100% 120

The Knesset (Exiting Members), Israel		% N	% N
	Balad	0 0	2.5% 3
	Hadash	16.7% 3	3.3% 4
	Hatnua	22.2% 4	5% 6
	Israel Beitenu	5.6% 1	10.8% 13
	Jewish Home	16.7% 3	10% 12
	Kadima	0% 0	1.6% 2
	Labor	5.6% 1	12.5% 15
	Likud	0% 0	15% 18
	Meretz	5.6% 1	5% 6
	Ra'am-Ta'al	0% 0	3.3% 4
	Shas	5.6% 1	9.2% 11
	Yehadut Hatorah	0% 0	5.8% 7
	Yesh Atid	22.2% 4	15.8% 19
	Total	100% 18 (of 38 exiting)	100% 120

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