**Online Appendix**

**Table A1. Description of Key Measures**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Variable Name** | **Description** |
| Gendered Nationalism | Measured with a single survey item asking whether “Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.” Responses were provided on a four-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. |
| Vote Choice | A dummy variable coded 1 if the survey respondent voted for Trump and 0 if they voted for Clinton. |
| Respondent Gender | Gender is a dummy variable coded 1 if a survey respondent is female and 0 otherwise. |
| Partisanship | Partisanship is a series of dummy variables, with Democratic identifiers serving as the baseline or comparison category. |
| Ideology | Ideology is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. |
| Marital Status | Marital status is a dummy variable coded 1 if a respondent is married and 0 otherwise. |
| Racial Identification | Racial and ethnic identification is captured by a series of dummy variables. “Black” is coded 1 if the respondent is African-American and 0 otherwise. “Hispanic” is coded 1 if the respondent is Hispanic and 0 otherwise. “Other race” is coded 1 for all other racial identification excluding whites. White is the baseline or comparison category. |
| Age | A respondent’s age in years. |
| College Educated | Education is measured by a dummy variable coded 1 if a survey respondent has a college degree and 0 otherwise. |
| Church Attendance | Church attendance was measured on a six-point Likert scale, ranging from newer to more than once a week. |
| Evangelical | Evangelical is a dummy variable coded 1 if a survey respondent identifies with an Evangelical tradition and 0 otherwise. |
| Socioeconomic Class | A series of dummy variables indicating survey respondents’ self-identified class. “Upper class” is coded 1 if respondents identified as upper class and 0 otherwise. “Working class” is coded 1 if respondents identified as working class and 0 otherwise. “Lower class” is coded 1 if respondents identified as lower class and 0 otherwise. Middle class (the modal category) is the baseline or comparison category. |

**Additional Analysis Conducted During the Review Process**

**Racial and Ethnic Differences in Gendered Nationalism**

Unfortunately, our sample does not contain sufficient racial diversity to comprehensively evaluate whether there are meaningful racial and ethnic differences in gendered nationalism. Seventy-three percent of survey respondents identify as white and non-Hispanic. Ten percent of the sample (n=116) identified as Black and non-Hispanic, and about 10 percent identified as Hispanic (n=110), but this group consists of white, black, and unspecified Hispanics. These numbers don’t support rigorous multivariate analysis, but we consider bivariate racial comparisons below. We dichotomized responses to the gendered nationalism item and compare support for the idea that the country has grown too soft and feminine across race and race-gender groups.

Basic differences among racial and ethnic groups are presented in table A2. White and Hispanic Americans endorse gendered nationalism at comparable rates, but black respondents are significantly less likely to support this viewpoint (p<.001). A look at gender differences within these racial and ethnic groups is also instructive (see Table A3). There is a gender gap among whites and Hispanics, where men are significantly more likely to endorse gendered nationalism compared to women. However, among African-Americans, support for gendered nationalism is low and similar among men and women. These figures suggest that race intersects with gender in ways that may be relevant for understanding gendered nationalism.

Table A2. Racial and Ethnic Differences in Support for Gendered Nationalism

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | % Support | Chi-Squared Test |
| White | 44.46 |  |
| Black | 26.23 | 13.49\*\*\* |
| Hispanic | 42.99 | 0.08 |

Chi-squared tests compare each racial and ethnic group to white survey respondents.

Table A3. Racial and Ethnic Differences in Support for Gendered Nationalism

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | % Support | Chi-Squared Test |
| White Men | 55.58 | 40.10\*\*\* |
| White Women | 33.50 |
| Black Men | 26.00 | 0.01 |
| Black Women | 26.56 |
| Hispanic Men | 54.39 | 6.46\* |
| Hispanic Women | 30.00 |

Chi-squared tests compare men and women within each racial group.

**Comparison of Income and Class Measures**

The survey included a measure of self-reported household income in addition to the class identification question used in our analysis. To determine whether class identification reflects meaningful differences in household income, we compared average incomes across the four class categories. The results are plotted in Figure A1 and show a monotonic increase in income from the lower to upper class categories. Income was measured in intervals. Rounding to the nearest interval, average incomes were as follows: lower class – $15,000 but less than $25,000; working class – $40,000 but less than $50,000, middle class – $50,000 but less than $75,000, and upper class – $100,000 to under $150,000. A one-way ANOVA indicates that the mean differences across categories are statistically significant [F(3, 1013)=142.83, p<.001]. These preliminary figures suggest that the class categories reflect meaningful differences in household income.

Figure A1. Average Household Income by Self-Reported Class



Next, we considered whether our results hold when using household income rather than class. We partitioned income into quartiles and created a series of dummy variables, with the third quartile serving as the baseline category. In our class-based analysis, we excluded the middle class, which was the third class category. Excluding the third quartile should facilitate more direct comparisons across the models. First, we replicated Figure 1 from the original manuscript using the income measures. In Figure A2, the original figure is provided on the left and the new figure on the right for comparison purposes.

Looking first at the bivariate relationships in Panel A, one can see modest differences in support for gendered nationalism depending on whether the sample is partitioned by class or income. In the class figure (left), nationalism is appreciably higher among men who identify as lower or working class compared to men who identify as middle or upper class. In the income figure, men in the lowest income quartile (0-25%) report higher levels of gendered nationalism than men in quartiles 2 through 4, and the differences across categories are less stark. Differences are also apparent among women. Looking at class, the major division appears to be between lower class women and women in the working, middle, and upper classes. The gap between lower class women and women of other class identifications is at least 10 percentage points. Differences based on self-reported income are somewhat less pronounced. There is a 10 point gap in support for gendered nationalism between women in the lowest and highest income quartile. However, support is more middling among women in the second and third income quartiles.

In the bottom half Figure A2, we revisited the relationship between gender, class, and party, substituting income for class in the bottom right figure. The results for Republican are roughly comparable, though the relationship between income and gendered nationalism among Republican women looks a bit more linear than the relationship between gendered nationalism and class. The results for Democrats are more variable depending on whether the sample is divided based on class or income, particularly when looking at the lower two class and income categories. In the class-based comparisons, gendered nationalism is more pronounced among Democratic men in the lower and working classes, relative to those in the upper or middle classes. These beliefs are also more pronounced among lower class women. In the income-based comparisons, by contrast, gendered nationalism is especially pronounced among voters in the lowest income quartile and declines more markedly as income increases.

Figure A2. Relationships between Income and Gendered Nationalism





We also replicated the analysis presented in Tables 1 and 2 of the original manuscript using self-reported household income in place of class identification. The results are provided in Tables A4 and A5 below. In Table M4, we consider the determinants of gendered nationalism beliefs. We re-estimated Model I, using the income quartiles in place of the class identification variables. No differences are observed across the income quartiles. In the original models, working class Americans were significantly more likely to endorse gendered nationalist beliefs. In Model 2, we considered interactions between party identification and income quartiles. We find that Democrats in the lowest income quartile were more likely to endorse gendered nationalist beliefs relative to Democrats in the third income quartile, with no other differences among Democrats based on income. Republicans and Independents were more likely to endorse gendered nationalism beliefs, and the tendency to do so increased as income increased. The findings differ somewhat from the original models, which did not find that income moderated beliefs among Independents and Republicans. Lastly, we re-estimated Model III, evaluating the interaction between college education and party, controlling for income. Here the effects of education by party are the same as in the original models; however, no differences are observed based on income, whereas in the original model working class Americans were more likely to endorse gendered nationalism.

We also re-estimated the vote choice models (Table A5). In the original models, we found that voters in the upper class category were significantly less likely to vote for Donald Trump. In the new models, we do not observe a difference between voters in the 3rd and 4th income quartile. We do find that when controlling for gendered nationalist beliefs, voters in the lowest income quartile were somewhat less likely to vote for Donald Trump.

Based on this new analysis, we can conclude that while income and class are related, it’s not accurate to treat class as a proxy for income. The results vary depending on whether the sample is partitioned based on income or class. Collectively, the results suggest that class is especially useful for differentiating among voters with lower household incomes. In particular, selecting the working class label seems to be associated with a distinctive set of views on the issue of whether the country has grown too soft and feminine. This result tracks with accounts of voting behavior in 2016 emphasizing support for Donald Trump among working class voters. While past scholarship has argued that there is limited evidence of class consciousness among American voters, it did emerge as a dominant theme in the election, and thus may have been more salient than in the past. Our results points to the need for further research into class consciousness and class politics in the American electorate. Because class identifications do seem to reflect meaningful differences in political orientations, we have retained the focus on class in our manuscript.

Table A4. Determinants of Gendered Nationalism Beliefs, Substituting Income for Class

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Baseline Model  I | Party X Class Interactions  II | Party X Edu. Interactions  III |
|  |  |  |  |
| Female | -0.62\*\*\* | -0.60\*\*\* | -0.62\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q4 | -0.11 | -0.33 | -0.10 |
|  | (0.18) | (0.36) | (0.18) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q2 | -0.02 | 0.47 | -0.03 |
|  | (0.19) | (0.32) | (0.20) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q1 | 0.23 | 0.97\*\* | 0.18 |
|  | (0.17) | (0.29) | (0.17) |
|  |  |  |  |
| College | -0.77\*\*\* | -0.73\*\*\* | -1.18\*\*\* |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.25) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q4 X Independent |  | -0.28 |  |
|  |  | (0.44) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q4 X Republican |  | 0.87+ |  |
|  |  | (0.50) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q2 X Independent |  | -0.80+ |  |
|  |  | (0.45) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q2 X Republican |  | -0.59 |  |
|  |  | (0.48) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q1 X Independent |  | -1.15\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.38) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Income Q1 X Republican |  | -1.10\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.42) |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| College X Independent |  |  | 0.25 |
|  |  |  | (0.31) |
|  |  |  |  |
| College X Republican |  |  | 0.99\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.34) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Independent | 0.70\*\*\* | 1.32\*\*\* | 0.63\*\* |
|  | (0.18) | (0.29) | (0.21) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Republican | 1.21\*\*\* | 1.51\*\*\* | 0.87\*\*\* |
|  | (0.22) | (0.32) | (0.25) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Ideology | 0.46\*\*\* | 0.45\*\*\* | 0.44\*\*\* |
|  | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Married | 0.25+ | 0.26+ | 0.24+ |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Black | -0.40+ | -0.38+ | -0.43+ |
|  | (0.22) | (0.22) | (0.22) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Hispanic | -0.14 | -0.17 | -0.21 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.25) | (0.25) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Other Race | -0.11 | -0.13 | -0.08 |
|  | (0.26) | (0.27) | (0.25) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Age | -0.01\* | -0.01\* | -0.01\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Church Attend | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Evangelical | 0.25+ | 0.25+ | 0.23 |
|  | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Cut 1 | 0.03 | 0.29 | -0.21 |
|  | (0.33) | (0.36) | (0.35) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Cut 2 | 1.51\*\*\* | 1.80\*\*\* | 1.29\*\*\* |
|  | (0.33) | (0.36) | (0.35) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Cut 3 | 2.86\*\*\* | 3.17\*\*\* | 2.63\*\*\* |
|  | (0.34) | (0.38) | (0.36) |
| *N* | 879 | 879 | 879 |

Entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. + *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

Table A5. The Effect of Gendered Nationalism on Vote Choice in 2016

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Trump Vote  (w/o mediator)  I | Trump Vote  (w. mediator)  II |
| Soft and Feminine |  | 0.66\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.16) |
|  |  |  |
| Female | -0.65\* | -0.24 |
|  | (0.28) | (0.30) |
|  |  |  |
| Income Q4 | -0.42 | -0.35 |
|  | (0.38) | (0.42) |
|  |  |  |
| Income Q2 | -0.15 | -0.21 |
|  | (0.42) | (0.43) |
|  |  |  |
| Income Q1 | -0.35 | -0.61+ |
|  | (0.36) | (0.36) |
|  |  |  |
| Independent | 2.29\*\*\* | 2.31\*\*\* |
|  | (0.34) | (0.35) |
|  |  |  |
| Republican | 3.89\*\*\* | 3.48\*\*\* |
|  | (0.45) | (0.44) |
|  |  |  |
| Ideology | 1.07\*\*\* | 1.12\*\*\* |
|  | (0.16) | (0.20) |
|  |  |  |
| Married | 0.40 | 0.17 |
|  | (0.29) | (0.29) |
|  |  |  |
| Black | -4.32\*\*\* | -4.03\*\*\* |
|  | (0.83) | (0.87) |
|  |  |  |
| Hispanic | -0.49 | -0.22 |
|  | (0.45) | (0.54) |
|  |  |  |
| Other Race | -0.15 | -0.49 |
|  | (0.63) | (0.75) |
|  |  |  |
| Age | -0.00 | 0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |
| College | -0.80\*\* | -0.53 |
|  | (0.31) | (0.33) |
|  |  |  |
| Church Attendance | 0.06 | 0.02 |
|  | (0.10) | (0.11) |
|  |  |  |
| Evangelical | 1.12\*\* | 0.91\* |
|  | (0.38) | (0.39) |
|  |  |  |
| Constant | -5.17\*\*\* | -7.10\*\*\* |
|  | (0.69) | (0.89) |
|  | 687 | 687 |

Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. + *p* < .10, \* *p* < .05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001