**APPENDIX I**

**Simple Slopes Tests**

To gain more insight into the interaction effects, we plotted the significant interactions-based Models 4 and 5 in Figures A1 and A2. We also followed Aiken, West, and Reno’s (1991) procedure and conducted simple slope tests for significant interactive terms. In separate equations, we split the sample into two groups – other industry and socially contested industry – and estimated the effects of private ownership and financial media coverage for different groups. We find that private ownership significantly predicts CSR scope conformity in the other industry group ($β\_{Private Ownership}$= 0.145, *p* < 0.01), but not in the socially contested industry group ($β\_{Private Ownership}$= -0.115, *p* > 0.10). And we find that financial media coverage significantly predicts CSR scope conformity in the socially contested industry group ($β\_{Financial Media Coverage}$= 0.145, *p* < 0.001), but not in the other industry group ($β\_{Financial Media Coverage}$= 0.016, *p* > 0.10).

In Figures A3 and A4, we plot the significant interactions based on Models 8 and 9. We again ran a simple slopes test by splitting competitive intensity into a low (below the mean) and high (above the mean) group and estimating the effects of private ownership and financial media coverage on CSR emphasis differentiation in different groups. The results show that the effect of private ownership is significant in the low competitive intensity group ($β\_{Private Ownership}$= 0.359, *p* < 0.001), but not in the high competitive intensity group ($β\_{Private Ownership}$= 0.063, *p* > 0.10). And the results similarly indicate that the effect of financial media coverage is significant in the low competitive intensity group ($β\_{Financial Media Coverage}$= 0.119, *p* < 0.001), but not in the high competitive intensity group ($β\_{Financial Media Coverage}$= -0.016, *p* > 0.10).



Figure A1. Interaction between private ownership and socially contested industry

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Figure A2. Interaction between financial media coverage and socially contested industry



Figure A3. Interaction between private ownership and competitive intensity



Figure A4. Interaction between financial media coverage and competitive intensity

**APPENDIX II**

**Robustness Tests**

We conducted a series of robustness checks to further validate our findings. First, not all publicly listed firms in China choose to disclose their CSR practices. To account for the potential selection issues in CSR reporting, we estimated our models using a two-stage Heckman selection approach (Heckman, 1979). The first stage dependent variable was a dummy variable with value one indicating firms that have disclosed their CSR practices in the form of a stand-alone CSR report. We followed previous studies (e.g., Marquis & Qian, 2014) and used *stock market exchange* – a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is listed on the Shanghai (SH) or Shenzhen (SZ) Stock Exchange (coded as one if listed on SH and 0 if SZ) – as the exclusion restriction. The stock market exchange serves as a valid restriction criterion here because the two stock exchanges stipulated their disclosure policies at different times, and the types of firms that are encouraged to report such information also vary in the two different markets. However, neither made specific standards regarding the actual information quality or preferences for certain CSR issues in their policy (Marquis & Qian, 2014). Findings based on this correction of potential selection issues in reporting are consistent with our main results.

 Another valid concern is that the financial media coverage of a firm may be endogenous. Unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both financial media coverage and CSR practices could bias the results (i.e., the omitted variable concern), or firms with different CSR practices may variably attract financial media attention (i.e., the reverse causality concern). We constructed an instrument for financial media coverage and used the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to address these concerns. The ideal instrument should help capture variations in financial media coverage yet is exogenous to firms’ CSR practices. The instrument we used was *expected financial media coverage*, which has been employed in prior studies investigating the causal relationship between financial media coverage and other organizational outcomes such as firm innovation (He & Tian, 2013). This instrument reflects the change in press size (i.e., the number of reporters and editors in the press), which is usually dependent on the change in the press’s own revenue or profit and is unlikely to be related to the CSR profiles of certain firms that the press covers. Therefore, the change in coverage driven by the change in press size is an exogenous variation that helps us establish causality. We followed Yu (2008) to calculate the expected financial media coverage and used 2008, the beginning year of our sample, as the benchmark year. The validity of our findings was further confirmed by this instrumental variable approach.

 We report the results on the instrument *expected financial media coverage* in Table A1 (see the next page). Column 1 shows the first-stage regression results with *financial media coverage* as the dependent variable to check the relevance of the instrument. All other variables are the same as those in the baseline model 3. We included firm- and year-fixed effects and suppressed the coefficients of these variables for the sake of simplicity. The coefficient of the instrument expected coverage is significantly and positively associated with our independent variable financial media coverage. Columns 2 and 3 report the results from the second-stage regressions on CSR scope conformity and emphasis differentiation with the main variable of interest replaced by the fitted value of financial media coverage from the first-stage regression. The results are consistent with our main findings: financial media coverage has a significant and positive impact on both CSR scope conformity and emphasis differentiation.

 Finally, we replaced the CEO power index with its components in our models, which again generated results that are consistent with our main findings.

Table A1. Two-stage least squares regressions with the instrument of expected financial media coverage

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | First-stage Regression | Second-stage Regressions |
|  | 1. Financial Media Coverage
 | 1. CSR Scope Conformity
 | 1. CSR Emphasis Differentiation
 |
| Expected coverage | 0.195 | -- | -- |
|  | (0.012) |  |  |
| Financial media coverage | -- | 0.143 | 0.060 |
| (Instrumented) |  | (0.028) | (0.025) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Control variables  | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|  |  |  |  |
| N | 4885 | 4885 | 4885 |

*Note*: Standard errors in parentheses.

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