

A Supplementary materials for Authoritarian Legacies and Partisan Bias

A.1 Electoral performances of authoritarian successor parties

Table A.1 summarizes the electoral outcomes of authoritarian successor parties measured at around 2020 across Third-wave democracies. The table further shows that the electoral success of ALPs is present across different electoral systems. Lastly, Table A.1 differentiates ideological positions of former dictatorships (right-wing in boldface and left-wing in italics). Of the 45 countries with available data, twenty countries had right-wing dictatorships and twenty five had left-wing regimes.

Average ALP vote share in recent elections	Countries with ALPs		
	Proportional Representative	Mixed system	Plurality voting
> 50 %	<i>Nicaragua, Guinea-Bissau, Romania</i>		Sierra Leone
40-50 %	<i>Albania, Montenegro, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru</i>		Ghana
30-40 %	<i>Croatia, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Slovakia, Spain (UDC)</i>	<i>Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan</i>	Panama, Bangladesh
20-30 %	<i>Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Spain (PP)</i>	Mexico, Bolivia	
10-20 %	Chile, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Serbia	<i>Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine</i>	Niger, Malawi
0-10 %	Brazil, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Philippines, Poland, Slovenia, Turkey	<i>Thailand, Madagascar, Lesotho, Nepal, Ukraine</i>	Central African Republic
Countries without ALPs	Argentina, Belarus, Columbia, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, Russia, Uruguay, Venezuela		

Note: The list of authoritarian successor parties are from [Loxton and Mainwaring \(2018\)](#) and the author collected election results from each country's parliamentary website. With former regime ideology, rightist regimes are in boldface and leftist regimes are in italics, using data from [Dinas and Northmore-Ball \(2020\)](#) and [Kim-Leffingwell \(2022\)](#). Ideological positions of some former dictatorships are not covered in these sources, and these countries are in regular font.

Table A.1: Variation in ALP Vote Shares in the Third Wave Democracies




Figure A.1: Expert evaluation of ideological positions of two major parties in South Korea: The figure summarizes temporal changes in the ideological positions of the People Power Party and the Democratic Party. Ideological positions are measured through expert judgments by the national collaborators of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, [The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems](#)).

A.2 Ideological orientations of South Korean political parties

Electoral competition in South Korea has centered around the two major parties representing center-right and center-left ideological fronts. Studies have found increasing partisan polarization between the People Power Party (PPP) and the Democratic Party since the general election in 2004 ([Hellmann 2014](#); [Kim et al. 2008](#)). The ideological position of the PPP is 7 or 8 and the position for Democratic Party has shift from 6 in 2000 to 4 since 2004 on a 0-10 left-right ideological scale according to expert surveys by the CSES ([The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2020](#)). The shift in partisan competition represents a decrease in the historical regionalist appeals and an increase in mobilization around socioeconomic cleavages ([Lee 2020c](#)). The PPP has maintained its issue dominance in economic growth, national security, pro-business policies, and hawkish stances towards North Korea while the Democratic Party has emphasized income redistribution, pro-labor policies, and dovish approaches to the North ([Cheng and Huang 2018](#); [Lee 2020c](#)).

A.3 Testing distinguishable patterns between ALP and non-ALP candidates' electoral outcomes

In this section, I investigate if the differences in electoral outcomes between ALP and non-ALP candidates are distinguishable across different partisan groups by conducting a simulation-based test and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test. Figure A.2 reports the distributions of simulated coefficients from the two partisan groups in each election. The figure shows clear bimodal patterns: the distributions of the coefficients from ALPs are clustered closer to zero while the coefficients from non-ALP parties are farther away from zero, with larger negative values. Results from the *t*-test of the two distributions rejects the null hypothesis that the two party groups' distributions are identical in all three elections with *p*-values smaller than 0.01.

Second, I performed the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test to examine the differences between the two distributions. The KS test checks the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same distribution (Corder and Foreman 2014). Test results from the KS test also reject the null hypothesis in all three elections with *p*-values smaller than 0.01, which confirms the finding that the distributions from the ALP and non-ALP parties are distinguishable from each other (Figure A.3).

A.4 Additional results for the individual-level analysis

Table A.2 presents a closer look at the individual-level analysis. While Figure 2 in the main text describes predicted values of voting across corruption perception and partisan attachment, entries in Table A.2 show the proportions of people who voted for the incumbent in either ALP- or DemParty-incumbent districts. The table shows such proportions across different levels of partisan attachment and corruption perception. In order to compare copartisan corruption voting behavior across the ALP and the

	ALP partisans in ALP incumbent districts				Democratic partisans in Democratic incumbent districts			
Corruption perception	Not corrupt	very corrupt	Quite corrupt	Very corrupt	Not corrupt	very corrupt	Quite corrupt	Very corrupt
Strong partisan	1.00 (1)		.96 (26)	1.00 (4)	NA		1.00 (1)	.71 (7)
Moderate partisan	1.00 (11)		.98 (94)	.96 (26)	.88 (16)		.91 (57)	.83 (24)
Weak partisan	1.00 (1)		.72 (18)	1.00 (3)	1.00 (3)		.94 (18)	.70 (10)

Note: Entries are proportions of respondents who voted for a copartisan incumbent in either ALP or Democratic Party incumbent districts. The number of respondents that belong to each category is in parentheses. NA indicates that there is no observation for the category.

Table A.2: Proportions of respondents who voted for the incumbent across partisanship and corruption perception

Democratic Party, I present results from partisans in copartisan districts. The number of observations for each entry is in parentheses.

The entries in the left-hand side of the table show that most of the ALP partisans retained their vote for copartisan candidates regardless of their partisan attachment and corruption perception. The proportions range from .96 to 1.00 in all cases except for weak partisans with a moderate level of corruption perception. This finding corresponds to the flat prediction line in Figure 2, indicating the presence of corruption voting among ALP partisans. Entries from Democratic partisans in the right-hand side of the table contrast these findings and show that the level of support for incumbents decline with the level of corruption perception. For example, whereas around 88-100% voted for copartisans when their level of corruption is low or moderate, the values drop to 70-83% when Democratic partisans' perceived level of corruption is high. This finding also corroborates the steeper slope for Democratic partisans in copartisan districts in Figure 2. Results in Table A.2 further provide evidence for asymmetric partisan bias across ALP and Democratic partisans.




Figure A.2: Distribution of Coefficients from the Simulation-based Test: The figure illustrates the distribution of coefficients from 10,000 resampled datasets of the original dataset from ALP and non-ALP partisan groups. The figure shows the divergence of regression coefficients across ALP and Democratic party groups. The two distributions of coefficients from the two partisan groups are statistically different from each other with t -scores of 124.59, 70.24, and 55.69 in 2004, 2008, and 2016 elections, respectively ($p < 0.01$).




Figure A.3: The Kolmogorov–Smirnov Plots from permutation test distributions: An empirical distribution function from each partisan group is in solid lines and the line between solid dots corresponds to two-sample KS statistic. The large distance between the two graphs shows that the original distributions are statistically distinguishable from each other.