**Supplementary Materials**

**Appendix 1**

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Data**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Mean** | **Sd** | **N** |
| Female | 0.517 | 0.5 | 315 |
| Years of Education  | 9.3 | 4.0 | 316 |
| Monthly Income (Millions of Rp) | 1.6 | 4.2 | 267 |
| Muslim | 0.997 | 0.06 | 317 |
| Trips to Mosque per week | 9.5 | 9.9 | 312 |
| People per HH | 5.1 | 1.8 | 315 |
| Children under 18 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 312 |
| Age of Respondent | 41 | 16 | 306 |
| Turnout | 0.899 | 0.30 | 317 |

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Political Variables**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Mean** | **Sd** | **N** |
| Turnout | 0.899 | 0.30 | 317 |
| Paid Cash | 0.39 | 0.49 | 318 |
| Paid In-Kind | 0.35 | 0.48 | 318 |
| Paid Both | 0.26 | 0.44 | 317 |
| Paid Cash and Voted for that Candidate | 0.84 | 0.36 | 118 |
| Paid In Kind Good(s) and Voted for that Candidate | 0.85 | 0.37 | 105 |

**Appendix 2: Survey Details and Methodology**

The overall response rate for this survey was 56 percent, which totaled 318 completed surveys. Response rates for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* are 57 percent and 55 percent respectively. Local election officials indicated that a large percentage of individuals who did not vote in these elections were citizens from these areas that worked abroad or in another part of Indonesia.[[1]](#footnote-1) Their permanent address remained in their home village with their families, however, they generally return home for the end of Ramadan celebrations and spend most of their time elsewhere. If citizens keep all their government papers, including their voter registration, at their village address the actual number of potential voters in local elections is smaller than the voter rolls would suggest. This has two sample design implications: first, response rates for the survey should resemble voter turnout rates. Those individuals, who spend their time outside their home village, should not be present for the campaign, the election, or when enumerators visit their houses to administer a survey. Second, when estimating the effective number of completed surveys, one would need to draw larger samples in areas where turnout was lower.

 In Table 1 of this appendix, one can see that turnout rates from the *KPU* are 56 percent and 58 percent for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* respectively. These numbers are close to the survey’s response rates. Also in that table, one can see an adjusted response rate. When a survey respondent refused or was unable to complete a survey, the reason for refusal was recorded. The adjusted response rate subtracts those individuals whose family indicated they work or study in a different location, individuals who passed away after the KPU census, and those persons who moved in with their in-laws after marriage. This decreased the potential sample to 406 and the overall adjusted response rate to 78 percent.

**Table 1: Turnout Rates and Survey Response Rates**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Voter Turnout**  |   |   |
|   |  | **Kota Tegal** | **Kab.Tegal** | **Overall** |
| Registered Voters |  | 196,339 | 1,183,537 | 1,379,876 |
| Ballots |  | 110,893 | 685,280 | 796,173 |
| Turnout Rate |  | 0.56 | 0.58 | 0.58 |
|   |  |  |  |   |
| **Survey Responses** |   |   |   |   |
|  |  | **Kota Tegal** | **Kab. Tegal** | **Overall** |
| Surveys Complete |  | 157 | 161 | 318 |
| Respondents Drawn |  | 274 | 291 | 565 |
| Overall RR |  | 0.57 | 0.55 | 0.56 |
|   |  |  |  |   |
| **Adjusted Response Rates** |   |   |   |   |
|  |  | **Kota Tegal** | **Kab. Tegal** | **Overall** |
| Voters Outside Area |  | 73 | 83 | 156 |
| Adjusted Denominator |  | 201 | 208 | 409 |
| Turnout Rate |   | 0.78 | 0.77 | 0.78 |

Note: Voter Turnout Data was obtained from the General Election Commission

 Table 1 also shows that the number of respondents drawn were not random across the entire list, but drawn within each regency. This was done to leave open the possibility of comparative analysis across regencies because a true random sample would have produced too few respondents from *Kota Tegal* as it is about one-fifth the population of *Kabupaten Tegal*. Therefore simple inverse probability weights were constructed and used in the analysis unless stated otherwise. These are calculate by simply taking the inverse of the likelihood that a given respondent was chosen. Since the sample was drawn from the complete voter list, this means the number of people on the voter list, divided by the number of people sampled for each regency.

 The survey itself was conducted using nine enumerators recruited by the researcher at the small university located in Tegal. Each was in the undergraduate in the Social and Political Science department and from one of the two regencies. Tegal uses a distinct Javanese dialect that incorporates a number of Sundanese words given its proximity to the West Java border. This ensured that older respondents, who may be less fluent in Indonesian, could converse with the enumerator. Each enumerator was trained with the survey for two days by the researcher, then sent out for one week to pilot the survey. It was stressed that the enumerators find a relatively private place at the respondent’s house to ensure free responses.

The researcher created a separate voter list for the pilot. For five days the enumerators went out and attempted to find three respondents on their list to conduct interviews. If they found that person, they completed an interview. If they could not, they marked why they could not find that person. Then each evening the enumerators met with the researcher to go over issues from each day, turn in their surveys so they could be reviewed, and trade ideas about how best to locate addresses with the information provided by the voter lists. After five days of piloting, the enumerators switched to the randomly sampled list and the survey began.

**Appendix 3: Probit Regressions with Full Controls**

The in-text regressions focus on economic variables because the theory outlined in this paper is directly related to each voter’s economic preferences. However, the below models use a much larger set of voter-level controls and find the same relationship between income and transfer-type.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Cash** | **In-Kind** |
| Income | 0.09 | 0.29 ȶ |
|  | (0.09) | (0.11) |
| Income Squared | -0.01 | -0.02ϯ |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Female | -0.23 | 0.10 |
|  | (0.22) | (0.22) |
| Formal Employment | 0.13 | 0.22 |
|  | (0.3) | (0.3) |
| Savings | -0.00ϯ | -0.00\* |
|  | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Age (years) | -0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Education (years) | -0.05 | 0.07 |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Muslim Party | -0.71 ȶ | -0.23 |
|  | (0.25) | (0.24) |
| Kids (# in HH) | 0.05 | -0.05 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Attend Mosque (#/week) | -0.01 | -0.00 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Rooms (# in House) | 0.13 | 0.08 |
|  | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Constant | -0.03 | -1.78ϯ |
|  | (0.8) | (0.88) |
| R^2 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| *N* | 210 | 210 |

\* *p*<0.1; ϯ *p*<0.05; ȶ *p*<0.01

**Table 2: Weighted Multinomial Probit Regressions**

The dependent variable here is zero for individuals who did not receive anything from any campaign, one for individuals who accepted cash only, two for individuals who accepted in-kinds goods only, and three for individuals who accepted both.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome** |  | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
| Cash  | Income | -0.039 | -0.02 | -0.05 |
|  |  | (0.065) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
|  | Income^2 |  | -0.0 | 0.00 |
|  |  |  | (0.002) | (0.00) |
|  | Formal Employment |  |  | -0.41 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.52) |
|  | Constant | -1.2 \*\*\* | -1.3 \*\*\* | -1.0 \*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.22) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| In-Kind  | Income | 0.07 | 0.41 \*\*\* | 0.34\*\* |
|  |  | (0.043) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
|  | Income^2 |  | -0.02\*\* | -0.02\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  | Formal Employment |  |  | 0.28 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.48) |
|  | Constant | -1.42 ȶ | -1.71 \*\*\* | -1.66 \*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.18) | (0.24) | (0.29) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Both | Income | 0.03 | 0.25\*\* | 0.21\* |
|  |  | (0.04) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
|  | Income^2 |  | -0.02\* | -0.01 |
|  |  |  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  | Formal Employment |  |  | 0.3 |
|  |  |  |  | (0.4) |
|  | Constant | -0.62\*\*\* | -0.78\*\*\* | -0.75\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.21) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| *N* |  | 267 | 267 | 233 |

\* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01

Note: The base outcome for these regressions is those voters who didn’t accept cash or in-kind goods from any campaign.

**Appendix 4: List Experiment**

The list experiment included three options in the control group and four options in the treatment group. The treatment question was written as follows:

How many of these things did you do during the campaign?

-Involve themselves in the political arena

-Discuss with a friend who you will vote for

-Work for a candidate for free or give money to a candidate

-Receive money or Sembako from a candidate

Write Total [ ]

The control group was given the first three options only. The reader should note that the final two options somewhat contradict each other as one indicates the respondent donanted time or money to the candidate, while the last one indicates they received something from the candidate. While it is possible a respondent could respond yes to both, these two options were included to mitigate the number of respondents who would answer four and thus undermine the anonymity of the treatment. Note, eight respondents (or 5.4 percent of the 148 treatment surveys) did write in 4 as their response.

**Appendix 5: Sample Restricted to Respondents with Campaign Contact**

One concern with the analysis here might be that the dependent variable records zeros both for voters who were not in contact with a campaign and therefore did not accept a transfer and voters who were in contact with a campaign, but did not accept a transfer. This appendix reran the regressions that produced the Figure 2 in the text, which showed the inverted-U shape for predicted probabilities of accepting a good, and reproduced the graph. Note, this is the same procedure used in the text, the only different is the sample has been limited to the 180 individuals who were in contact with any campaign at any point leading up to the election. The coefficients on the income variable stays the same at 0.42 for both models and the coefficients on the income squared variable similarly stay the same at -0.033. All of these coefficients produce a z-score above an absolute value of 2 so they maintain their significance. Moreover, the intercept shifts upwards from -0.59 to -0.17.

**Table 1: Weighted Probit Regressions: Restricted Sample by Campaign Contact**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Cash | In-Kind | Cash | In-Kind |
| Income | -0.05 | 0.23\*\* | -0.09 | 0.19\* |
|  | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Income^2 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Employed |  |  | -0.06 | 0.27 |
|  |  |  | (0.30) | (0.30) |
| Constant | 0.15 | -0.12 | 0.26 | -0.15 |
|  | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.18) | (0.17) |
| *N* | 180 | 180 | 160 | 160 |

\* *p*<0.1; \*\* *p*<0.05; \*\*\* *p*<0.01

1. Interview with election officials from the *KPU* in *Kabupaten Tegal*. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)