**Appendix 1. Sample versus National Distribution of North Korean Defectors in South Korea**

National statistics are from the Ministry of Unification website.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Gender | Age category | | | | | | | Education | | | |
|  | Female | 0-9 | 10-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60+ | None-elementary | Middle/  High school | Professional college | College plus |
| National | 70% | 4% | 12% | 28% | 30% | 16% | 5% | 4% | 14% | 70% | 9% | 7% |
| Sample | 70% | 0% | 1% | 12% | 32% | 41% | 10% | 4% | 3% | 54% | 23% | 20% |

**Appendix 2. Descriptive Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **N** | **Mean** | **Standard deviation** | **Min, Max** |
| Duty to vote (binary)  *Voting is a responsibility (1), voting is a choice (0)* | 224 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0, 1 |
| Duty to vote  *None (0), not very strongly (1), somewhat strongly (2), very*  *strongly (3)* | 216 | 0.50 | 1.08 | 0, 3 |
| Duty to pay taxes  *Not very important (0), somewhat important (1), very*  *important(2)* | 226 | 1.43 | 0.67 | 0, 2 |
| National identification  *Weak (0), moderate (1), strong (2)* | 224 | 1.55 | 0.60 | 0, 2 |
| Fairness of state  *Not fair at all/not very fair (0), somewhat fair (1), very*  *fair (2)* | 226 | 1.02 | 0.62 | 0, 2 |
| Satisfaction with state aid  *Dissatisfied (0), weakly satisfied (1), somewhat satisfied*  *(2), very satisfied (3)* | 227 | 1.27 | 1.03 | 0, 3 |
| Political interest  *Not interested/not very interested (0), somewhat interested*  *(1), very interested (2)* | 228 | 1.17 | 0.80 | 0, 2 |
| South Koreans in personal network  *Mostly North Koreans (0)*  *More North Koreans (1)*  *About the same (2)*  *More South Koreans (3)*  *Mostly South Koreans (4)* | 221 | 0.87 | 0.97 | 0, 4 |
| Years since defection | 218 | 3.24 | 2.35 | 0, 14 |
| Female | 221 | 0.70 | 0.46 | 0, 1 |
| Age (years) | 213 | 39.95 | 10.18 | 18, 70 |
| Party member in North (binary) | 222 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0, 1 |
| Education  *Low (0): none to elementary*  *Moderate (1): middle to high school*  *High (2): professional university or higher* | 227 | 1.00 | 0.63 | 0, 2 |

**Appendix 3. Is Strength of National Identification Largely Independent of Post-Defection Attitudes?**

An assumption in the analysis is that defectors’ strength of national identification is largely independent of post-defection experiences. In the table, I regress strength of national identification on relevant post-defection measures: perceived *fairness of the state, satisfaction with state aid, trust in South Koreans, perception of prejudice* from South Koreans, and *felt difference in the belief of one nationality.* If strength of national identification is an epiphenomenal response to experiences in South Korea, then we should observe strong correlations across the board. On the other hand, if it is a stable part of self-identity as scholars of nationalist socialization claim, then the correlations should be negligible, especially for recent defectors (less than two years of residence). The table shows that post-defection experiences are remarkably unrelated to strength of national identification for recent defectors and therefore not reducible to post-defection experiences.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Fairness of state | | Satisfaction with state aid | | Trust in  South Koreans | | Perception of prejudice | | Felt difference in belief of one nation | |
|  | All | Recent | All | Recent | All | Recent | All | Recent | All | Recent |
| National identification | 0.05  (0.07) | 0.05  (0.14) | 0.25\*\*\*  (0.09) | 0.08  (0.15) | 0.05  (0.06) | -0.11  (0.14) | -0.16  (0.10) | 0.17  (0.21) | -0.04  (0.06) | 0.01  (0.10) |
| Constant | 0.75\*\*\*  (0.04) | 0.72\*\*\*  (0.09) | 0.64\*\*\*  (0.05) | 0.70\*\*\*  (0.10) | 0.76\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.78\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.81\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.70\*\*\*  (0.06) | 0.78\*\*\*  (0.03) | 0.74\*\*\*  (0.04) |
| N | 223 | 52 | 214 | 49 | 224 | 52 | 218 | 50 | 222 | 95 |
| R-squared | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.04 | 0.006 | 0.003 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.001 | 0.0002 |

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10. OLS regressions with all variables rescaled 0-1. “All” indicates full sample.

**Appendix 4. Comparison of Different Measures of National Identification**

The table compares the original measure (1) with two common measures of national identification that in this case are not as theoretically relevant. National pride (2) does not account for the contested nature of national identity for defectors, and national classification (3) captures the objective, but not subjective belonging that communitarian theorists claim is the source of obligation. We see that the original measure handily outperforms the others. The results clarify which specific part of “national identification” is most responsible for fostering a sense of democratic commitment in defectors.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Measures of “national identification” | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | *When there is a joyful event for South Koreans, do you feel happy as if it were your own?* | *How proud are you to be Korean?* | *How similar are South Koreans on the belief of one nation?* |
| *National identification* | 0.33\*\*  (0.11) | 0.17\*\*  (0.06) | 0.15\*\*\*  (0.03) |
| *Fairness of state* | -0.05  (0.05) | -0.08\*  (0.04) | -0.06  (0.05) |
| *Satisfaction with state aid* | -0.15  (0.19) | -0.13  (0.14) | -0.05  (0.16) |
| *Collective values* | 0.21\*\*  (0.07) | 0.17  (0.09) | 0.18  (0.10) |
| *Political interest*  *South Koreans in network* | 0.15\*\*  (0.05)  0.19\*\*  (0.05) | 0.14\*  (0.06)  0.14\*  (0.06) | 0.14\*  (0.06)  0.14\*  (0.06) |
| *Years since defection* | 0.02  (0.07) | 0.004  (0.09) | 0.03  (0.11) |
| *Female* | 0.01  (0.05) | 0.05  (0.04) | 0.03  (0.04) |
| *Age* | -0.09  (0.10) | -0.004  (0.10) | -0.05  (0.10) |
| *Party member* | 0.08  (0.08) | 0.13  (0.07) | 0.11  (0.07) |
| *Education*  Constant | -0.05  (0.06)  -0.17  (0.11) | -0.009  (0.05)  -0.06  (0.10) | -0.04  (0.05)  -0.08  (0.09) |
| N | 183 | 183 | 181 | |
| R-squared | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.09 | |

\*\*\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*p<.10. OLS regressions with all variables rescaled 0-1.

**Appendix 5. Likeliness of an Unobserved Confounder**

I conduct a formal sensitivity analysis to proxy how extreme a hypothetical confounder would need to be in order to wash out the main effect of national identification (Imbens 2003; Blattman 2009). The curve identifies how strongly an unobserved third factor would have to be correlated with both the duty to vote and strength of national identification to negate the observed relationship. Such a variable would have to explain significantly more variation than *collective values* or *political interest*, two of the strongest observed correlates in the model. The existence of such a confounder seems unlikely.

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The x- and y-axes show the additional explanatory power a variable has for national identification and the duty to vote, respectively, formalized by the movement in R-squared when adding that covariate to the regression. + represents where observed covariates fall on this spectrum.