# Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA): causal generalization in case study and multimethod research

### Appendix (*Perspectives on Politics* version)

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In the main text of this paper, we outline the core components of Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA) and its multimethod variant (M-LNQA). Drawing on examples, we suggested that it is an ongoing research practice. In this appendix, we justify that claim by providing a more extensive bibliography of LNQA and multimethod LNQA work, drawing on a still-larger compendium of examples. We undertook this task in three steps. The first was to identify "precursor" examples. This work effectively used the approach we describe here, but prior to the methodological discussions about qualitative and multimethod research that have taken place more recently. The precursors were to be found primarily in the fields of comparative historical analysis (CHA), security studies (including the Cornell and Princeton Security Studies series in particular) and on the comparative politics of particular regions. One example of this work dates to the 1960s (Wolf 1969).

In addition to this bibliographic exercise, a second step was to undertake a more systematic consideration of all comparative politics and international relations books with imprints of 2015–2021 from Cornell (83), Princeton (42) and Cambridge (530) university presses. We used abstracts to identify books that were clearly using altogether different methods, for example those that were predominantly statistical in nature or that focused on one or a very limited number of case studies. Following this initial selection, we surveyed 54 books from Cambridge, 72 from Cornell and all the Princeton titles in more detail. This exercise found about 50 candidates that reflected LNQA methods to varying degrees and we subsequently selected from this sample based on conformity with criteria outlined in more detail below.

Finally, in a third step we identified recent work that has started to draw on other examples of the method or that has independently justified its methodological approach by reference to combining generalizations and large-N process tracing. To our knowledge, Page Fortna (2004) was the first to use the term "large-N qualitative analysis." She clearly outlined the intuition behind LNQA, and identified scope conditions for her study of peace settlements. But her work only reported on – but did not publish – what she called her "mini-case studies." Dale Copeland (2014), drawing on an early discussion in Haggard and Kaufman (2012, extended in Haggard and Kaufman 2018 and 2021), was among the first to articulate the method and through Copeland it received methodological analysis in a symposium (Büthe, 2017, with contributions by Copeland, McKeown, Zaks, and Gartzke). To our knowledge, however, Gary Goertz's (2017) *Multimethod research, causal mechanisms, and case studies* was the first stand-alone methodological treatment (under the moniker "large-N qualitative testing") and included a number of both article and book examples from international relations and comparative politics up until that time. Goertz and Haggard (2021) and Crasnow, Goertz and Haggard (forthcoming) outlined core elements of the method for a philosophy of social science audience, also

introducing some new examples that have self-consciously adopted the method (Schenoni et al. 2020, Staniland 2021).

To undertake these searches required selection criteria, which we outline in more detail in the first section based on the components of the method outlined in the paper. It is important to state at the outset that the examples cited do not typically mirror the template we have provided in all regards. This is not surprising given that LNQA is an evolving research practice, and we erred on the side of inclusion. Clarity in defining scope conditions and the number and share of cases that are subjected to process-tracing are the most variable feature of the examples we identified. Scholars might choose a large number of cases, or even a large share of the those falling within the scope but nonetheless not all of them. Interpretation is sometimes needed to formulate the regularity or causal generalization precisely. Sometimes the language of necessary and sufficient conditions is used, sometimes equivalent language is more prevalent such as the proposition that a given causal factor is "required," or a "prerequisite" for the outcome. One feature of the examples that is relatively constant, however, is the use of multiple case studies not only to demonstrate the operation of a postulated causal mechanism but to generalize.

The remainder of the appendix is divided into two parts: a more detailed discussion of the steps in the process and how we selected cases; and short descriptions of each of the examples. In choosing work from our larger dataset, we include not only single- or co-authored books, but articles, edited volumes, studies with case study appendices and qualitative datasets based on process-tracing of cases.

This appendix is a work in progress, and we welcome suggestions regarding modifications, corrections, and new entries. The current version is available from the authors on request at <u>shaggard@ucsd.edu</u> or <u>ggoertz@nd.edu</u>. In addition, Goertz has collected a set of exercises, including for LNQA methods, including on the definition of scope conditions, identification of regularities in various forms, causal mechanisms and causal mechanism figures and within-case causal inference methods. These exercises are available on request from Goertz or can be downloaded from Princeton University Press <u>here</u>. The exercises are updated on regular basis.

#### **Selection criteria**

Our criteria for selection followed the template:

- 1. The work states not only a clear theory but postulates a causal mechanism that is amenable to within-case causal inference.
- 2. The work establishes scope conditions that limit the phenomenon under investigation to a relatively rare event amenable to LNQA.
  - a. The scope can be stated in terms of a causal regularity or generalization. In addition, many studies outline not only one proposition but multiple X-Y relationships or causal paths.
  - b. The work can be multimethod LNQA, in which case the scope is given by the statistical data set. Case selection will typically be on the (1,1) cases but we have examples in which statistical analysis is followed by causal generalizations

appropriate for LNQA as well (ie. full X or Y generalizations).

- c. LNQA studies can be disconfirmatory in design, ie., they may seek to show that a relationship postulated in theory or other empirical work is not supported by extensive within-case causal inference.
- 3. The work sought to establish an empirical regularity across that scope. Conforming examples undertook analysis of all cases and typically reported generalizations in tabular form. However, we include cases that sought to sample in a systematic way from the scope while conducting a significant share of cases. We also provide some examples of work that conducts many cases, but in which scope conditions are imperfectly defined and generalizations correspondingly difficult to interpret.
- 4. The work explicitly adopted a within-case causal inference design, typically via processtracing techniques, and sought to interrogate all or a significant numbers of the cases in the defined scope. Where less than the entire scope is scrutinized we note possible risk of biased selection and corresponding threats to the claim.

In the following sections we expand on some of these selection criteria in somewhat more detail and identify some ongoing practical problems with the approach.

#### Scope conditions and the problem of "Small-N LNQA"

The scope delimits the cases over which the proposed generalization holds. As a result, it not only defines the universe of cases that are germane; it plays the key function of outlining the denominator of the regularity or generalization. Without a denominator, reporting the strength of the generalization is difficult if not impossible. LNQA work can fall short in providing clear scope conditions in several ways. First, the concept in question may not be defined clearly. For example, the study may invoke the concept of "revolution" without adequate clarity to define a scope of cases. One way of avoiding this problem used in some studies is to turn to extant quantitative datasets or descriptive statistics as a means of defining scopes or to existing categorizations or typologies of phenomena. The second problem we found in some work is that although the scope conditions are clearly defined, the work appears to omit cases or omit them without justification. Clearly, such omission potentially introduces bias if the unreported cases are potentially anomalous.

As we argued in the text of the paper, it is not uncommon for LNQA studies to limit the scope of a claim in a variety of ways, either through conceptual engineering, using the extremes in a distribution (e.g., not "war," but "great power war") and through regional approaches which we take up in more detail below.

An important issue for the approach, however, concerns boundary conditions and both at the lower and upper end. Is it possible to conduct a "large-N" qualitative analysis on a small number of cases? Skocpol (1979) is an extremely famous example. She restricts her analysis to "social revolutions" (Y = 1 cases) in the scope of "non-colonial, agrarian, bureaucratic regimes." At no point in the book does she list all the cases within her scope, and there is debate about whether she has identified all of them (see Mahoney and Goertz 2004). But she suggests that her treatment is exhaustive and the book is built around three Y = 1 cases: France, Russia and

China. She also lists six Y = 0 shadow cases for causal inference purposes. Assuming that she has postulated a theory, identified all social revolutions and conducted detailed process tracing on all of them, the book would appear to us to fall within the scope of LNQA even if the N is in fact quite small. Elizabeth Wood's *Forging Democracy from Below* (2000) identifies only two main cases of the phenomenon of "democratic transition from labor repressive regimes." Taliaferro (2019) similarly has a quite narrow scope – all United States alliances of a certain sort – of which there are only four, and all are treated. The key point is that each of these books covers all the cases in the scope as determined by Y = 1 or X = 1.

We appreciate that these examples introduce an ambiguity, but we think it is a tolerable one. Most of the LNQA that we identified operated in a range of cases running from about five to 70 at the upper end, with the higher number putting the opposite stress on selection; how to do that many cases analytic justice. Since the technique rests on delineation of scope conditions, we allow for the possibility that an LNQA analysis might be quite restrictive in scope. However, the power of generalizations clearly depends on the scope of the generalization and selection issues loom large as scope conditions shrink or cases are omitted. Omitting one of four cases is more consequential than omitting one of ten and arguably more consequential than omitting a similar share of cases when the scope is significantly larger (ie. omitting one of five as opposed to omitting 10 of 50).

#### Geographic and spatial strategies for limiting scope

It is worth emphasizing that a particularly common strategy for limiting scope conditions is to make generalizations across a geographical region: for example, Latin America, Africa, or Southeast Asia. A study might consider all countries in the region, all countries of a particular type, or may focus in on a particular outcome (all Latin American transitions to or from democratic rule). A strategy of this sort naturally raises questions of external validity and whether findings travel to other regions. But efforts at generalization within a region are often in the scope of LNQA because even the region with the most countries – Africa – presents roughly 50 cases depending on which states are included.

The approach might be used at the subnational or metropolitan level as well. Indian states is a plausible way to establish scope conditions or large Chinese cities. We also found more complex strategies in which region and country provide a first cut in defining scope conditions but cases are then identified on the basis of some subnational phenomenon. Cyr (2017), for example, focuses on party system collapse in Latin America, a phenomenon that yields three national cases. However, she then undertakes a consideration of all parties in those three countries. Fairfield (2015) pursues a similar design, also from Latin America, considering three countries but then all cases of a particular policy change. We consider these kinds of cases as falling into LNQA because the researcher is looking at all the cases within a particular scope.

#### *Complex generalizations*

Most books and articles we identify are built around a central, overarching causal generalization. In the main text, we largely focused on these simple generalizations, providing an example of a complex generalization in our consideration of Carnegie and Carson (2019). But most LNQA work involves theories and associated causal mechanisms in which the core

proposition involves a complex mechanistic account with secondary hypotheses that form part of the theory, as we saw in the causal mechanism figures identified in the text.

It is particularly common that *X*-generalizations are complex in one of a variety of ways: the causal factor potentially operates through several distinct mechanisms; the outcome is the result of more than one causal factor; the effect of a given causal factor is conditional on the presence of another one; or the proposed causal mechanism involves a complex causal chain. These complexities do not fundamentally change the methodology but require investigation of the various mechanisms, additional causal factors, interactions or the causal chain that make up these complex generalizations. Such complex generalizations are at the core of the Boolean approach to theory testing in Qualitative Comparative Analysis, in which complexes of INUS conditions can combine to yield one or more paths to an outcome.

A common theoretical system that we discovered in a number of LNQA books and that we reference in the text is one in which there are two independent variables laid out in a 2 × 2 table such that it contains a sufficient conditions generalization of the form "if  $X_1 = 1$  AND  $X_2 = 1$  then Y = 1." The table also includes a necessary conditions generalization of the form "If Y = 0 then  $X_1 = 0$  OR  $X_2 = 0$ ." These generalizations together generate the four cell values for one popular 2 × 2 table.

*Y*-generalizations are more prevalent in the LNQA literature, in part because the rare outcome is the focus of substantive interest and the rarity of the *Y* is what permits the method to be used in the first place. However, two comments are in order. First, as we have seen in the discussion of multiple *X*-generalizations above, it is not uncommon to see designs in which the sum of all *Y*'s is rare, but the author is seeking to explain multiple *Y*'s with multiple causal mechanisms. This might be called the Luebbert research design following his 1991 *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe*. In this book – a classic example of LNQA – Luebbert is trying to explain three outcomes which are in fact three different regime types (liberal democracy, social democracy and fascism). A similar, but not identical, set of variables is used in all of his mechanistic claims, but the way in which they combine accounts for the variance. The approach is methodologically tractable because while the theory involves a relatively complex set of causal factors, the overall number of cases being examined is small.

Second, it is worth noting that while most LNQA studies focus on a rare Y, X-generalizations may select on rare events as causal factors, looking for example at the effects rather than the causes of major power wars, famines or genocides. Typically, these causal factors are themselves complex and tracing their effects requires detailed attention to the conceptualization and operationalization of X.

#### Within-case causal inference of many cases

Inference in LNQA designs arises from within-case analysis. Typically, but not necessarily, this involves some sort of process tracing to make the causal claim; we suggested that within-case counterfactuals or Bayesian approaches are perfectly plausible for pursuing this key component of the strategy.

With respect to the within-case causal inference component of LNQA, only a limited number of works did all cases in the scope equally. More common were those undertaking one of the strategies noted in the main text. A common approach is to undertake a limited number of main case studies complemented by what we call generalizing case studies, which may range from a few paragraphs to four or five pages in length. We also include examples that do cases equally, do not do all of them but nonetheless report on a "large" number of cases, for example considering more than half of the sample. Although we only found several examples, future research might explore more explicit sampling strategies, including stratified ones. In these designs, the researcher is doing a "large" number of cases but not all. In general, we erred on the side of inclusion but note the range of cases included.

A second and related way in which within-case causal inference varied had to do with depth of treatment, which in turn depends in the first instance on the number of cases in the defined scope but also the complexity of the causal mechanism and the range of evidence that can be brought to bear on it. The consideration of a complex causal mechanism in a case with a rich array of evidence can be addressed by chapter-length case studies or through the inclusion of case study appendices. At the other extreme, when the argument in question is narrowly-focused and sharply defined, much shorter cases can achieve the analytic objective and within-case causal inference may look to the outsider like coding. For example, in an early example of LNQA Reiter (1995) explored a generalization about preventive international wars (i.e., that there are virtually none). He considered each case in light of some conditions or processes that were necessary for the war to be "preventive." But in most instances it was quite clear to him that the war was not preventive and so intensive process tracing was not required. The key issue for the case studies, however, is not necessarily their length but whether they are doing within-case causal inference for each individual case; demonstrating the proposed causal mechanism is present and operates to produce the effect.

#### References

Büthe, T. (ed.). 2017. Symposium: causal explanation and the study of rare events through large sweeps of history. *Qualitative & Multi-Method Research* 15:29–57, (with contributions by Copeland, McKeown, Zaks, and Gartzke).

Crasnow, S., G. Goertz and S. Haggard. forthcoming. Pluralism and partnerships: the evidential foundations of multimethod research in political science. In Box-Steffensmeier, J. et al. (eds.) *Oxford handbook of methodological pluralism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goertz, G. 2017. *Multimethod research, causal mechanisms, and case studies: an integrated approach*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goertz, G., and S. Haggard. 2022. Generalization, case studies, and within-case causal inference: Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA). In H. Kincaid and J. Bouwel (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mahoney, J., and G. Goertz. 2004. The Possibility Principle: choosing negative cases in comparative research. *American Political Science Review* 98:653–69.

#### Large-N Qualitative Analysis: an annotated bibliography

The following is a select bibliography of LNQA work drawn from a larger dataset that we maintain. Each short summary seeks to outline the core component of the method deployed in the book: theory, scope conditions, nature and strength of the generalization and the method for within-case causal inference.

- Allison, Graham. 2015. The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War? *The Atlantic* (September).
- Allison, Graham. 2017. *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

We include reference both to the Atlantic article and this popular book because the former leads with classic X-generalization finding: "in 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result has been bloodshed." The theory includes three causal mechanisms drawn directly from Thucydides: actual encroachment on incumbent interests by rising powers; corresponding psychological states that impinge on the rationality of decision-making; and the engagement of behavioral factors, particularly "honor." Outside of the Greek example, the scope is based on a list of cases that starts with the rise of Spain vis-à-vis Portugal in the late 15th century and includes 15 subsequent cases. All are addressed in the book as main cases or shorter generalizing ones. As noted, the generalization is clearly stated. The book inverts the typical order by starting in one chapter with five relatively short case studies, before providing more extended treatment of three others: the effects of the rise of Germany and the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century and the current China case. Particular attention is paid to the nonconforming cases-those cases in which a rising power does not lead to war-and short treatments of those cases are integrated into a chapter seeking to draw "lessons" of the conditions that might mitigate conflict. The book includes an Appendix in the book itself which provides brief summaries of all cases, a qualitative online appendix (the Thucydides Trap Case File) that reproduces this material as well as 14 potential cases (this material can be found at https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/case-file) that could be used to test the theory.

Anderson, Perry. 1975. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: New Left Books.

Anderson identifies a particular European political form—the absolutist state, with Hapsburg Spain as its first exemplar—and offers a Marxist theory of how they functioned. The core elements of the theory include taxation of the peasantry for the purpose of sustaining significant militaries; the exemption of the nobility from taxation, but their integration into the monarchy's bureaucracy and military apparatus; and the use of the military to conquer more lands, which in turn generates more tax revenue. The book has a comparative dimension, considering non-absolutist states in Northern Italy, the Netherlands and England. But the book considers all European examples of the absolutist state: Spain, France. Sweden, Prussia, Austria, Poland and Russia.

Bartusevičius, Henrikas. 2019. A congruence analysis of the inequality-conflict nexus: evidence

#### from 16 cases. Conflict Management and Peace Science 36(4) 339-58.

Bartusevičius provides an example of LNQA that involves stratified sampling from a scope while still doing a relatively large number of cases; in addition, those cases are supplied in an online appendix. The purpose of the piece is to test competing theoretical mechanisms linking inequality and civil conflict: individual deprivation, group deprivation and separatist pathways. The paper is based on a necessary-conditions claim and is quite clear in defining the total scope of conflict onsets over the period (331) and then narrowing scope conditions in several ways (to post-Cold War conflicts, omitting "relapses" and coups). The result is a clearly defined scope of 66 onset cases. One quarter of the cases were randomly selected from each of four conflict categories (ethnic-governmental, ethnic-territorial, non-ethnic governmental and non-ethnic territorial), in part mitigating concerns about selection bias. The paper stipulates evidence that would be consistent with each pathway, and reports on the findings from the case studies—contained in a highly-detailed appendix—through tables showing distributions of the causal variables.

Bas, Muhammet and Andrew J. Coe. 2016. A dynamic theory of nuclear proliferation and preventive war. *International Organization*. 70 (Fall): 655-685.

Bas and Coe provide a formal model of bargaining between two states: a potential proliferator that can invest in nuclear weapons program and a second state which can only imperfectly observe its efforts and progress over time. Chance elements—when the program will make progress and when the other state will discover this—can generate surprise proliferation, crises over the suspected progress of a nuclear program, and "mistaken" preventive wars among other "paths." The paper does not pursue econometric tests but identifies the state-years when countries are pursuing a nuclear weapons program: this yields a scope of 28 cases. They show how those cases fall into seven path types, and clearly identify in tabular material the cases that conform with the theory and those that do not. An interesting feature of the empirical analysis for our purpose is that it draws on an extant online qualitative dataset of all of these episodes by Montgomery and Mount, qualifying those case studies in an online appendix that reviews their coding rules in detail. (Alexander H. Montgomery and Adam Mount. 2014. Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs. *Intelligence and National Security* 29 (3):357–86.

Beckley, Michael. 2015. The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts. *International Security* 39:7–48.

Beckley provides an example of "disconfirmatory LNQA." The theoretical claim is in the form of *Y*-generalization: "if conflict than entangling alliance." By contrast, Beckley argues that the US has been able to maintain "freedom of action" through a host of strategies, such as inserting loopholes into alliance agreements, sidestepping costly commitments, maintaining a diversified alliance portfolio that generates offsetting demands from different allies, and using explicit alliance commitments to deter adversaries and dissuade allies from initiating or escalating conflicts. The research strategy is to consider all militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between 1948 and 2010—a relatively large number for LNQA purposes—and to ascertain whether conflict resulted from "entanglement" in the 60 alliances the United

States maintained over this period. First, he finds only five conflicts—accounting for 18 MIDs—in which the influence of alliances on the conflict was plausible. He demonstrates through case studies, however, that alliances were not implicated in 13 of these 18 and focuses his case analysis on the five nonconforming cases: the 1954–55 and 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crises; U.S. interventions in Indochina culminating in the Vietnam War; and the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Process-tracing of the cases reveals that none of them provide unambiguous support for the entanglement hypothesis. Beckley demonstrates that the necessary conditions generalization "if conflict then entangling alliance" is true at most two percent of the time and possibly never.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: Citizens and the Breakdown of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The purpose of the book is to assess the extent to which citizens are responsible for the breakdown of democracy: through polarization, voting for autocrats or extra-institutional actions such as participation in social movements or strikes. The book undertakes two LNQA exercises. The principle focus is on all transitions from democracy to right-wing authoritarianism in Latin American between 1959-1979, which yields four cases (Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina). Each receives detailed treatment in a separate chapter. In Chapter Two she casts her eyes back to the interwar period and provides short studies of the 13 cases of democratic breakdown, each running to a few pages and sometimes less. The 13 cases constitute the entire universe of authoritarian breakdown and she poses one question to them, paying close attention to within-case chronology and diffusion effects: to what extent were elites vs. publics responsible for the rise of authoritarian rule? She acknowledges that public support for autocrats varied, and in some cases like Germany such support was substantial if by no means a majority. But her LNQA exercise allows her to make two points about that paradigmatic case: that it was an outlier in terms of public support; and the coup de grace to Weimar was not the result of mass public support but the outcome of intra-elite politics that gave Hitler the chancellorship.

Boucoyannis, Deborah H. 2021. *Kings as Judges: Power, Justice and the Origins of Parliaments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Deborah Boucoyannis (2021) comes out of the tradition of comparative historical analysis and demonstrates a number of elements of LNQA designs. Boucoyannis challenges bellicist theories of state formation and those that focus on the weakness of rulers and their accommodation of nobles as a crucial factor in the emergence of parliamentary rule. She argues that it was where states were strong—and particularly in their ability to provide judicial functions—that representative government was most likely to emerge; the claim is explicitly posed in necessary conditions terms. She develops the theory by drawing on approaches to institutional "layering" in which the addition of new functions to existing organizations can fundamentally change their character. She includes clear causal mechanism figures of the process, but also of the distribution of cases. In one (Figure 1.2, p. 23) she situates her cases along a continuum between weaker and stronger states showing how the former typically had weaker representative institutions and allowing an assessment of the strength of the generalization. The empirical range is striking, but nonetheless is bounded by Europe as the region, including a consideration of England, France, Castile, Catalonia, Hungary, Flanders, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia, with briefer consideration of what we call "generalizing" case studies (Chapter 7) of Holland, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, the Swiss Cantons, and the Holy Roman Empire.

Carnegie, Allison and Carson, Austin. 2018. The disclosure dilemma: nuclear intelligence and international organizations. *American Journal of Political Science* 63:269–85.

Carnegie and Carson are exemplary of a strong LNQA design combining a game theoretic model with a detailed online appendix of all cases in their sample. The puzzle of interest is why states with intelligence on violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty might nonetheless fail to disclose that information to the International Atomic Energy Association. The answer is that if the organization cannot protect that information, revealing it will have adverse security implications and it will be withheld, weakening the counter-proliferation effort. In the paper, we show how this could be formulated as necessary or sufficient conditions claims but one simple generalization is "if disclosure, then strong organizational safeguards." The universe of cases is all countries that pursued a nuclear program at some point in time (14), distinguishing however between those that are allies and those that are non-allies of the state holding the intelligence and between two periods between which the regime governing management of state submissions of intelligence changed. The article provides clear tables showing the distribution of conforming and non-conforming cases and reports the generalizations. The article also has a very precise statement of how parameters in the formal model track onto cases and an online Appendix details all cases.

Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collier and Collier provide an important example of the use of LNQA methods in comparative historical analysis. The theory and causal mechanisms in the book center on a path dependent argument with three stages. The critical juncture of labor incorporation can take two basic forms: an accommodationist alliance (among elites) that controls and depoliticizes labor and a populist alliance that incorporates it. Following the incorporation phase, the party system ultimately crystallizes the political relationships during the incorporation phase, generating a second typology of three different party system types. In a final stage, the party system has causal effect on politics, generating patterns of either integrative or conflictual dynamics. The book thus combines complex necessary and sufficient conditions generalizations, in some cases seeking to identify the explanation for an outcome (for example, with respect to incorporation) in other cases looking at the effects of an X (with respect to party systems). However, all X's and Y's in the book are multiple, with different paths to each of the core outcomes (particularly state incorporation and party system structure) and four overarching paths containing two cases each. Collier and Collier slightly truncate the entire scope of Latin American cases, focusing on those with "the longest history of urban commercial and industrial development" (p. 5). This qualification yields eight cases (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). The book explicitly adopts a process-tracing approach to inference, with one or two chapters each

devoted to each phase of the causal chain and with the relevant chapters considering all cases in significant detail. The concluding chapter conducts a somewhat different type of generalizing case study; rather than looking beyond the region, it considers what effects the path dependence processes might have had after the time period covered by the book.

## Comfort, Louise K. 2019. *The Dynamics of Risk: Changing Technologies and Collective Action in Seismic Events*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Comfort selects from a class of events that are relatively rare, but not selected on either *X* or *Y*. Her exact selection criteria are complex, but might be stated as "almost all large earthquakes—greater than magnitude 7—that impact an urban area." Although the entire scope of such earthquakes is not outlined or covered, the number of cases analyzed is plausibly large enough to reach generalizations; in addition to an earlier book on the topic, she covers 23 earthquake response systems with the 2019 book looking at 12 of those. The theory argues that features of earthquake response systems—their technical structure, organizational flexibility and cultural openness—determine the effectiveness of responses, an *X*-generalization claim. Each of these clusters of factors are broken out and coded in more detail with individual chapters focusing on four increasingly efficient response systems are in fact related to the effectiveness of responses. Tables show the distribution of cases on a variety of dimensions including the extent to which the proposed causal factors have the stipulated effect. We consider the book LNQA because the cases draw not only coding of the causal variables, but on a variety of qualitative materials and observations from fieldwork.

### Copeland, Dale C. 2015. *Economic Interdependence and War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Copeland hypothesizes that the effects of interdependence on conflict operate not through the level of current transactions but through expectations of future trade and capital flows. The causal mechanism operates through expectations. The book presents the theory that if key decision-makers think the status quo will continue then peace is more likely. If political leaders anticipate future disruptions, including through the imposition of controls or sanctions, great powers are more likely to take offensive and defensive measures that increase the risks of conflict and war. Copeland clearly defines the scope conditions for the subsequent causal generalization as the onset of all great power crises and wars from 1790 to 1991; the scope includes 40 cases. Copeland reports his regularity finding clearly: in 30 of 40 cases, economic interdependence played a moderate to strong causal role in shaping the events. The claim is supported by detailed case studies that consider possible confounds.

Cyr, Jennifer. 2017. The Fates of Political Parties: Institutional Crisis, Continuity, and Change in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cyr provides an example of a regional design in the context of an extremely rare event: party-system collapse within one region. Cyr defines collapse as a setting in which all major parties effectively dissolve at the same time. Cyr focuses on Latin America, and argues that this has only occurred three times: in Peru in the early 1990s; in Venezuela in 1998; and in Bolivia in 2005. (She notes that other major party disruptions have occurred in four other cases, but they do not reach the threshold of all parties collapsing: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Guatemala). The unit of analysis is not the country, but the party and she considers all eight parties in the three system collapse cases. Cyr's theory focuses on the organizational resources that parties have, and identifies three possible paths that constitute *X*-generalizations: if a particular resource configuration, then one of the three possible outcomes for the parties (survival as a subnational entity, survival in public debate, and revival or reinvention). The book provides a clear causal mechanism figure and distributions of the outcomes are clearly shown. Detailed process-tracing case studies, drawing on quantitative as well as qualitative data, demonstrate the causal links between the inventory of resources that Cyr identifies and the distinct pathways.

Debs, Alexandre, and Nuno P. Monteiro. 2016. *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Debs and Monteiro focus on nuclear proliferation, a classic rare event in international politics. They use a "willingness and opportunity" framework where proliferation only happens when a state has both the willingness and the opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons. Their core theory proposes two pathways to acquisition and is thus a multiple necessary-condition generalization: a high level of security threat combined with conventional force weakness; and a high level of security threat and an unreliable ally. The theory rests on strategic interaction between the state in question, its allies and adversaries and is supported with a formal model; it is thus an example of how LNQA can be used in that context to demonstrate causal processes. The scope is all countries that pursue nuclear development, whether successful or not. The case work is structured broadly in line with the two major pathways. The high-security threat proposition is tested against four cases, and made conditional; if the state was insufficiently strong to deter an attack on their program, they did not develop (Iran and Iraq). The alliance proposition is tested in two chapters through a discussion of eight "loose" alliance cases and four "close" alliance cases. All cases are considered to conform to the theoretical model advanced. Debs and Monteiro use qualitative appendices to provide case studies of all the countries pursuing nuclear weapons not discussed in the book itself as well four cases the literature has deemed "puzzling" for not pursuing nuclear weapons.

#### Downing, Brian M. 1992. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Downing is exemplary of the tradition of comparative historical analysis that was effectively using LNQA methods. The outcome to be explained is the emergence of constitutional government or military-bureaucratic absolutism (with a consideration of some other autocratic forms). The scope conditions are defined in geographical terms and limited to Europe, including England and Scandinavia in the North to the Spanish marshlands and Italian citystates, Burgundy the Swiss Confederation and the Holy Roman Empire (exclusive of Muscovite Russia). The argument involves two core sufficient conditions claims: all of these future democratic areas had a form of governance that Downing calls "medieval constitutional government." The second variable is that these consultative forms were conducive to subsequent democratic development only if the international context did not force domestic resource extraction and a "military revolution" in order to conduct warfare; in those settings, military-bureaucratic absolutism was more likely to emerge. Hence the claim is of the form  $X_1$ and  $X_2$  is sufficient for Y. Case selection restricted the initial scope conditions to states involved in at least some level of warfare and by omitting cases that matched others that were included (for example, the Dutch Republic is included in lieu of Venice). However, the book contains case studies of a number of the major European countries, each with detailed historical process tracing: Brandenburg-Prussia and France as examples of absolutism; England (in two periods), Sweden, and the Dutch Republic as constitutional cases, and Poland as losing sovereignty as a result of "state paralysis." Table 2 in chapter 10 provides a summary of the analysis. One chapter also devotes significant attention to three possible comparators that lacked the underlying institutions in question, i.e., X = 0: Russia, Japan and China.

Edelstein, David M. 2017. Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Edelstein is an example of several LNQA books on the rise and fall of major powers. Under what circumstances will rising powers generate conflict or cooperation, and of different sorts (for example, hegemonic war, preventive war or lower-level skirmishes)? The theory is that conflict depends on an interaction of the time horizons of the rising and incumbent powers, with time horizons of each coded as "long" or "short." A two-by-two table identifies four combinations between rising and incumbent powers (long-long, long-short, short-long, and short-short), each of which is associated with a different causal path; the design is thus exemplary of a complex generalization in which different Y outcomes are a function of the combination of two causal factors. Conflict is more likely, however, when the time horizons of the declining powers are long. The scope is defined as all cases of rising major powers since the late 19th century. Edelstein claims there are seven such cases, and he does five: late-19th century Germany and the United States, interwar-German, the post-war Soviet Union and current China (the omitted cases are early 20th century Japan and Russia). As each of the four main cases is exemplary of one of the four possible paths, the process-tracing in the chapters is devoted to playing out how interacting time horizons influence conflict, with China presented as a generalizing case in the conclusion.

### Fairfield, Tasha. 2015. Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America: Business Power and Tax Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fairfield's theory focuses on the effects of structural and instrumental business power on decisions about taxation/ Stripped of nuance, the claim is "more business power, less likelihood of taxation to provide public goods." Fairfield provides an example of an LNQA-like design that is nonetheless based on a complex sampling strategy. The basic scope is Latin American countries that need to increase government revenue; clearly the scope here should be all Latin American countries. The three countries chosen, however, are sampled to reflect three different levels of the core independent variables in order to mitigate potential bias: the strength and type of economic elites' sources of power such as elite cohesion and ties to right parties. Within these three countries, however, she looks at 60 different proposals to increase

revenues and does within-case causal inference for about two-thirds of them (43 of 60). Summary tables in the appendix give an overview of the results of her within-case analysis. Overall, 78 percent of the observations accord with her theory, with 3 percent marked as "extraordinary cases," 10 percent anomalous, and 8 percent with insufficient information. Although sampled, Fairfield gives particular attention to the nonconforming cases and their implications for introducing new factors into her theory.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

We include Fortna's book because she was the first scholar to our knowledge to use the term "large-N qualitative analysis" and she reports doing all of the cases in a dataset that is used for both quantitative and qualitative purposes. However, the book does not fully report on the process-tracing in the mini-case studies even though examples are drawn from that exercise at several points throughout the book.

Fortna seeks to explain the likelihood that cease-fire agreements will hold, and contrasts her work to theories that emphasize characteristics of the outcome of the war, such as the balance of forces and the extent of casualties. She proposes that the design of the cease fire can raise the cost of attack, reduce uncertainty about actions and intentions and prevent or control actions through a variety of quite precisely defined mechanisms: demilitarized zones, withdrawal of forces, third party monitors and other confidence-building measures. The scope conditions are clearly defined and are in line with optimal sample size for LNQA: the data set includes 48 bilateral cease fires in 25 wars. The book combines quantitative analysis to control for the baseline risks of war and to test a number of her propositions and in-depth case studies of the India-Pakistan and Israel-Syria ceasefires. The outcomes of the baseline difficulty of maintaining peace and the strength of the cease-fire agreement, and examples are used in describing the correlations. But the mini-cases are not used in the book for standard process-tracing purposes and arguably the book therefore does not fall under the rubric of LNQA *stricto sensu*.

### George, Alexander, and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American foreign policy: theory and practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

This classic book is an early example of LNQA-like research in international relations and is included here because it introduced the methodology of focused-case comparisons in the field. George and Smoke examine efforts by the US to successfully deter limited warfare conflicts. The authors identify eight causal factors that inform their case studies. They have a causal mechanism figure which determines the kinds of questions that they are posing to the cases. The authors conduct 11 in-depth case studies of American deterrence after World War II. There is little discussion of the universe from which cases are chosen, the principles for selecting them or even what constitutes a deterrence case, as opposed to, for example, a case of compellence. They are concerned with generalization and have an extensive discussion of it in an appendix, but they do not arrive at any strong regularities.

Goddard, Stacie E. 2018. When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Goddard's book is exemplary of new work in security studies on power transitions. Goddard considers the conditions under which extant great powers accommodate or contain and confront rising powers. The theory is that the propensity to accommodation is a function of two factors: how leaderships in rising powers justify their actions to domestic audiences; and whether incumbents believe that the existing order is under attack. A  $2 \times 2$  table of the two core causal variables suggests four alternative paths from less conflict to more; the design is thus a multiple generalizations causal claim. The scope conditions are clearly identified in tabular form, with seven rising powers and a shifting set of incumbents generating 17 rising power-extant power dyads. We consider the book LNQA because eight of the 17 dyads are addressed in a succession of process-tracing case study chapters. The case selection includes variation in both the independent and dependent variables. Case studies do not attempt to cover the entire period of the rising power's rise, but rather consider crises or turning points in order to focus the historical process-tracing. China is treated in the final chapter as a generalizing case study.

Gunitsky, Seva. 2017. *Aftershocks: Great Powers and Domestic Reforms in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gunitsky addresses the causes of an observed regularity: that regime changes both to and from democratic rule appear to spread in a wave-like pattern in which many countries move in the same direction at the same time. The unit of analysis is thus both changes in the scope of democracies and authoritarian regimes at any given time and the international mechanisms (coercion, inducement, emulation) through which those operate at the country level. Gunitsky advances an X-generalization claim that these waves are associated with "hegemonic shocks": the rapid rise of a new hegemonic power or powers is followed by changes in the scope of democracies and autocracies. This generalization is supported by descriptive quantitative analysis and presented in tabular form. The generalization pertains over four periods: following World War I, the Great Depression, World War II and the Soviet collapse. Case study chapters consider the four hegemonic shocks of the 20th century. The case study chapters provide process-tracing of the broad causal forces associated with each wave and their effects on the scope of democratic and authoritarian regimes. Very short treatments of the most significant country cases demonstrate the operation of the mechanisms at the country level, but generalizations at the country level for the operation of the mechanisms are not reported.

### Haggard, Stephan, and Robert Kaufman. 2021. *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haggard and Kaufman present a complex model of democratic backsliding that includes three clusters of causal factors: polarization; legislative support or acquiescence for a collapse in the balance of powers; and an incremental approach to derogations from democratic rule. The scope is clearly defined based on the outcome variable; the book proposes necessary conditions claims over 16 backsliding cases. The book chapters are structured around the

three core causal factors and their subcomponents, and report both generalizations using different measures and exemplary case studies. The book is supported by an extensive qualitative Appendix with detailed process-tracing cases of all countries in the sample. Those cases draw on both descriptive statistical information and qualitative analysis.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2012. Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule. *American Political Science Review* 106:1–22.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 2017. *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haggard and Kaufman provide an example of "disconfirmatory LNQA" that is multi-method in form. Their purpose is to address a cluster of theoretical and empirical work in which different levels of inequality are associated with regime change. They subject this claim to scrutiny by considering the entire scope of transitions to and from democratic rule drawn from two extant quantitative data sets; an Appendix provides brief process-tracing case studies of each transition (73/79 democratic transitions; 25/27 reversions depending on dataset). They find that the share of cases comporting with the target theoretical models— involving the inequality-democracy or reversion regularity—falls to as low as a third of the transitions and reversions depending on how they are coded and inequality is measured. They subsequently propose an alternative set of necessary conditions claims about why transitions and reversions might occur, focusing on prior regime type and the extent of social organization for democratic transitions and the weakness of democratic institutions for reversions. Those alternative causal pathways are subjected to both quantitative and process-tracing analysis. Distributions of conforming cases are reported and a large number of representative cases are outlined in short case studies in the book, drawing from the online qualitative appendix.

Hudson, Alexander. *The Veil of Participation: Citizens and Political Parties in Constitution Making Processes.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Alexander Hudson's study of public participation in constitution writing is an example of multi-method LNQA. Hudson argues that direct citizen participation in constitution writing does not typically have significant impact because of principal-agent constraints. However, the level of input varies inversely by the strength of parties: strong parties are able to screen out public participation while weaker parties are more likely to accommodate it. He does chapter-length case studies of three cases, arrayed by variation on the independent variable: South Africa (strong parties, weak input); Brazil (weak parties, more intermediate input) and Iceland (constitutions drafted without party involvement, and citizen input high). In a subsequent chapter, he conducts an econometric exercise and finds an interaction term between citizen participation and the strength of parties is significant. He then selects a sample of 16 cases for closer case scrutiny. These cases all reflect high levels of citizen participation and are thus a "going to the tail" scope setting strategy: he is seeking to assess the extent to which variance in party strength affects citizen input in all high-participation cases. As with his core cases, the generalizing case studies are arrayed with respect to variance on the independent variable of party strength, in this case running from countries with the strongest parties—and thus lowest expectations of citizen input—to those with the

weakest parties. with high participation to assess whether his favored causal factor—the strength or weakness of political parties—operates. The cases run to roughly two pages, and each concludes with an assessment of the causal process within the case. An interesting feature of the exercise is that Hudson identifies numerous examples of measurement error with respect to core causal variables, an additional function that cases may serve. Hudson does not provide tabular material on how the regression assessments and the cases line up exactly, nor on how his findings with respect to measurement error might influence our assessment of the statistical work. But he concludes that the LNQA consideration of the high-participation cases permits an overall generalization with respect to the difference between strong and weak party cases.

Kapiszewski, Diana. 2012. *High courts and economic governance in Argentina and Brazil.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kapiszewski is interested in patterns of inter-branch relations in new democracies in Latin America, and between high courts and executives in particular. She outlines four distinct types of inter-branch relations (confrontation, court submission, accommodation, and court domination), each of which is a function of both court and executive behavior. The core thesis is that variations in "court culture"-a multidimensional concept including stability, professionalization, legitimacy and institutional cohesion-accounts for these differences. As with Fairfield, the book is built around a complex case selection design that involves a large number of cases, but with sampling from the entire scope. At the country level, the book undertakes a standard comparative design, considering Argentina and Brazil as two countries representative of two paths. Yet within the country case studies, Kapiszewski undertakes an analysis of a what she deems to be the most substantively significant cases to come before each court with respect to economic policy during a roughly three-decade time span: 18 in Argentina and 26 in Brazil selected from a larger sample of 67 from Argentina and 55 in Brazil. The book includes detailed case studies of only a limited number of cases for each country, but provides detailed tabular material in both the text and in appendices summarizing the results of qualitative analyses of the cases based on a variety of primary and secondary sources.

Kaufman, Robert. 1980. "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model," in David Collier, ed. *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

As the title suggests, Kaufman's early example of regionally-focused LNQA sought to test a complex causal theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in Latin America advanced by Guillermo O'Donnell. The Introduction to the book introduces the theory with a well-done causal mechanism figure (28). Kaufman provides lengthy sketches of all four Southern Cone cases—Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay—provides his own causal mechanism figure and summary conclusions about the cases. He also undertakes some consideration of cognate cases from elsewhere in the region. Although supporting some of O'Donnell's claims, the article is critical of a number of core claims of the BA model. Other contributions to the volume also undertake comparative analysis of the BA cases.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Kalyvas provides a classic example of selection on the dependent variable, considering five countries where a successful confessional party formed and was frequently in power (Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy) and one where it didn't (France) despite its Catholic population. Kalyvas articulates a complex causal process in which party formation was the unintended consequence-a "contingent outcome" (18)--of Liberal anticlerical attacks, which in turn created a new political identity and organizational infrastructure among Catholics. This new context was then exploited by political elites; Kalyvas is intent on showing that the parties were not the outcome of either conservative or church strategies. He outlines a clear causal mechanism figure, (Figure 2, 109), has particularly strong tabular material showing exactly how his proposed mechanistic account maps onto his country cases (Table 1, 25) and makes explicit mention of the case study analysis in terms of mechanisms and process-tracing. Kalyvas claims his method is comparative. However, following his analysis of France's failure case, he presents case studies in Chapter Four on the historical formation of all of the Christian Democratic parties—emphasizing their similarities over their differences--and then extends the serial case analysis in his consideration of the aftermath of party formation in Chapter Five.

Kelanic, Rosemary A. 2020. *Black Gold and Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kelanic seeks to explain how great powers respond to a particular vulnerability: potential dependence on oil during a conflict, and is a methodologically self-conscious example of LNQA work. She argues that responses will depend on two factors: the extent of the potential petroleum deficit and the threat to imports. Using a standard  $2 \times 2$  table to capture the effect of the two variables, Kelanic collapses the outcomes into three: direct control (high deficit and high threat); self-sufficiency (low deficit and low threat) and indirect control (in the case of the off diagonals of high deficit and low threat and low deficit and high threat). The design is thus a two-variable generalization with three possible ordinal outcomes. The statement of scope conditions is particularly clear: while there are six great powers since the onset of the oil age (for military purposes roughly 1910), she chooses cases based on time periods when the combination of independent variables is constant and doesn't change. This allows the same country to constitute a different case at different times. She thus has a total of 12 potential cases reporting a regularity of 11/12. She also uses fuzzy-set QCA to strengthen inference. Kelanic is very explicit about her process-tracing strategy – played out mainly in chapters dealing with Britain, Germany and the US – and stipulates clearly the longitudinal and qualitative evidence that would be supportive of her claims.

Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation. *American Political Science Review* 104:369—92.

Kreuzer's article provides an example of "disconfirmatory LNQA": a multimethod challenge to an existing statistical result by looking at basically all the cases. Cusack, Iversen and Soskice – Kreuzer's main target – look at the origins of European party systems in the pre-

1920 period and contend that the choice of electoral systems was determined by the need of labor and capital to cooperate over certain social policies that assured the proper formation of employees' skills. Kreuzer also examines Boix's argument that the adoption of proportional representation (PR) was an attempt by divided conservative elites to contain the dual threat of democracy and socialism. According to Kreuzer, the relevant universe of cases is 32 pre-1920 developed democracies in Europe. He argues that Cusack, Iversen and Soskice did not include relevant cases which would have changed their empirical findings. He concludes from detailed examination of the cases that "the inability to eliminate CIS' sources of bias, replicate their results or find qualitative evidence supporting their causal claims allows us to reject the concern that the economic effects of electoral institutions are endogenous to antecedent economic structures." (Kreuzer 2010, 382). He provides summary tables of the within-case analyses which support his causal generalizations. Appendices provide justification for his coding of individual variables.

Lessing, Benjamin. 2018. *Making peace in drug wars: crackdowns and cartels in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lessing is interested in a rare phenomenon: sustained violence between states and drugtrafficking organizations (DTO) or cartels. The book differentiates this particular form of violence from cognate types and argues that three countries—Mexico, Brazil and Colombia are probably exhaustive of it (at least in the Americas). The book has two dependent variables. A first step involves explaining why cartels might be incentivized to anti-state violence, and considers both the level of repression and whether it is conditional on DTO violence or not. The cases are not the countries, but the different policies within them. He then has a similar process-oriented theory about why states might pursue more or less repressive or conditional approaches in the first place. That theory goes through a stylized sequence in which a peaceful status quo is disrupted by the growth of cartel power, setting in train violence which is only curtailed in the wake of failed police reform efforts. The countries are divided into periods when violence is higher or lower—with distinct phases within each case–and the method combines quantitative evidence with detailed process-tracing of core concepts.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky and Way seek to explain why "hybrid" regimes failed to consolidate into democracies and remained as what they call "competitive authoritarian regimes." The scope conditions for the book are 35 regimes that were or became competitive authoritarian in 1990–95, with cases from the Americas, Eastern Europe, Asia, the former Soviet Union and Africa. The design is comparative and can thus be seen as testing two *Y*-generalizations: why such regimes either remain competitive authoritarian or transition to democracy. The core causal mechanisms are two, and they are formulated in a contingent way: the extent and nature of ties to the advanced industrial democracies and the strength of governing-party and state organizations. Where linkage to the West was high, regimes democratized (generally, Eastern Europe and the Americas). Where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinged on organizational capabilities. If these were high, regimes remained stable and authoritarian; if governments and parties lacked cohesion, regimes were unstable but did not democratize

(post-Soviet, African and some Asian cases). Levitsky and Way outline in Appendices detailed measures of external ties (linkage and leverage) as well as organizational power; both are multidimensional concepts. A striking feature of the book is that they undertake highquality within-case causal inference of all cases.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2022. *Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

A very strong example of LNQA, with a subsidiary statistical component contained in an Appendix. The theory and causal mechanism rest on an X generalization: social revolution leads to authoritarian regime durability. The authors present a complex causal mechanism including early radicalism, serious counterrevolutionary threats, and the creation of a new army which in turn lead to the key proximate conditions for durable authoritarianism: a loyal coercive apparatus, a cohesive elite, and weak alternative power centers. In combination, these conditions permit the new regime to control the military as a tool against oppositions and thus significantly increase regime durability (see their figure 1.2). The scope of the analysis is defined by the presence of social revolution, which is defined in a relatively restrictive way to yield 20 cases. They present their findings in terms of a strong regularity: 18/20 cases conform to their theory. They present 13 within-case analyses in the core chapters of the book and the final seven generalizing case studies in the conclusion.

Loxton, James. 2021. *Conservative Party Building in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Loxton addresses the conditions under which successful conservative parties emerged in the new democracies of Latin America. He focuses on the puzzle of "authoritarian successor parties": why parties grounded in authoritarian regimes might nonetheless manage to compete effectively. He argues that inherited assets from the authoritarian regime and the organizational consequences of counter-revolutionary struggles combine to make them effective: through party-voter linkages, territorial organization and cohesion. The book pays most attention to a paired comparison of two cases of successful conservative party building (the UDI in Chile and ARENA in El Salvador) and two failures (UCEDE in Argentina and the PAN in Guatemala) to make this case. However, the study is framed in terms of the entire population of conservative parties, defined by membership in the Union of Latin American Parties, a center-right international for the region. Of 16 such parties, Loxton identifies four that succeeded, ten that failed and two that were coded as "incomplete" since not competing in an adequate number of elections. All of the successful cases were authoritarian successor parties, and he demonstrates this through shorter generalizing case studies of the two other success cases (the PFL/ DEM in Brazil and RN in Chile) as well as two other shadow cases of well-performing parties that fall short of his success criteria.

Luebbert, Gregory M. 1991. Liberalism, Fascism, Or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luebbert is an example of LNQA methods in the context of comparative historical analysis. His dependent variable is the emergence of three types of political-economic regimes in the interwar period—liberal democracy, social democracy and fascism—although he makes comparative reference to traditional dictatorships in Eastern Europe. The overall design is thus based on three generalizations, with the outcomes defined in terms of both political regime and economic policy. The theory is rooted in how classes, conceived in both politicalorganizational and economic terms, aligned. Liberal democracy (Britain, France and Switzerland) was sustained by what Luebbert calls Lib-Lab inter-class center-right coalitions, which reflected liberal hegemony and weak labor movements. In the absence of liberal hegemony, such coalitions fell apart and working class movements were stronger. Middle classes were subsequently more threatened by rising socialist challenges but rural forces became determinative of the path. Where left forces sought to organize agrarian workers, portions of the agrarian and middle classes aligned with the fascists against the working class. Where the peasantry sided with urban workers, social democracy was possible. The scope conditions are all of the major countries in Western Europe (a total of 11 cases). Historical process-tracing is brought to bear on the different stages of the causal argument: formation of Lib-Lab coalitions; failure of such coalitions to form; how working-class movements emerged and evolved; with three chapters on the outcomes devoted to the paths.

MacDonald, Paul K., and Joseph M. Parent. 2018. *Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

The book is one in the security field that is looking at the decline of great powers (see discussions of Allison, Edelstein and Goddard). Given decline, MacDonald identify several causal variables which—either operating alone or in combination—make a strategy of retrenchment more likely: relative rank to begin with, the availability of allies, the independence or interdependence of international commitments and the likelihood of outright conquest. Scope conditions are clearly defined as all cases of great power decline from 1870 to the present (16), with the precise magnitude of decline also measured. MacDonald and Parent offer a number of generalizations. Depending on how measured, they develop an X generalization: 10 to 13 of those 16 cases retrenched (a reasonably strong generalization of 63-81 percent) while only a small share failed to do so. Preventive war was also found to be relatively uncommon (38% of cases and only 4.5 percent of country years). MacDonald and Parent do six detailed case studies, but their selection is purposeful: they select to include cases of large, intermediate and low declines. Within-case causal inference is used to identify the presence or absence of the stipulated causal factors, some of which were found not to operate. The concluding chapter does a generalizing case study of US-China relations.≠ wline

Mahoney, James. 2010. Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The core puzzle addressed by the book is the fact that the relative rankings of countries in terms of economic development in Latin America have remained remarkably constant over the centuries except for a critical period when they flipped: those that were most advanced moved to the bottom of rankings on a number of indicators of development and those that were at the bottom to the top. Mahoney develops an explanation for this flip. The design sets scope conditions of 15 Latin American countries. He conducts a regularity analysis using

fuzzy logic QCA. He finds that levels of development during the early, mercantilist phase were driven by a threefold combination of causes: complexity of indigenous scope, extent of mineral wealth, and proximity to one of the two great indigenous empires. One causal factor he emphasizes is ethnic diversity measured by the presence of indigenous groups. He conducts case studies on all of the countries involved in the book to trace out the causal argument.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2010. Does War Influence Democratization? in Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs, eds. *In War's Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy* 

Mansfield and Snyder offer a particularly strong example of M-LNQA within the context of a single book chapter. They ask the question of whether war is associated with democratization and begin with a standard panel design. The statistical evidence is mixed, but a causal relationship cannot be ruled out. However, they subject their own statistical analysis to withincase causal inference, identifying 40 cases in which states fought wars prior do democratization, drawn directly from their own dataset. An Appendix outlines the cases clearly and shows how the sample shifts subtly depending on the indicator chosen for case selection. The purpose is explicitly mechanistic: to determine whether any of four possible causal mechanisms operated in the cases: that war swept autocrats from power; that it led to mass mobilization of new groups, that it induces bargaining between authoritarian incumbents and oppositions, or that it strengthens institutions that are important for liberal democracy such as the rule of law. All cases are sorted on the extent to which they comport with the proposed theory, and they conclude that only a limited number of cases do and that the relationship between war and democratization is in fact weak. A particularly interesting finding for the purpose of M-LNQA is that they show that the findings of a relationship between war and democratization are spurious, control variables in their models that were significant did have causal effect, including the level of economic development, living in a democratic neighborhood, and whether the country had previously been democratic.

Miller, Michael. 2021. Shock to the System: Coups, Elections, and War on the Road to Democratization. Princeton University Press.

The theoretical insight of the book centers on the observation that regime changes may not result in the fundamental shifts in power often assumed. If authoritarian incumbents are strong, then democracy is possible because they believe they can compete; the presence of politically competitive authoritarian incumbents thus defines one causal path to democracy, However, the bulk of the book is taken up the claim "no disruption, no democracy," a classic necessary conditions claim. The concept of "shock" is defined expansively to include no fewer than five sub-paths, three domestic (coups, civil wars and assassinations) and two international (defeat in war and "hegemonic withdrawal"). Scope conditions are clearly defined and regularities are reported in a clear way, including anomalies. A striking feature of the book is the provision of an abbreviated causal process observation for each case in the sample. The appendix from the book provides thumbnails of each case but these abbreviated "qualitative codings" draw on a much deeper well of literally thousands of sources.

Narang, Vipin, and Rebecca M. Nelson. 2009. Who are these Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War. *International Organization* 63:357–79.

This example of disconfirmatory LNQA challenges a pre-existing statistical finding. Mansfield and Snyder make the provocative claim that recently democratized states which are weakly institutionalized are war prone. Narang and Nelson take the existing statistical analysis by Mansfield and Snyder and focus attention on the (1,1) cases. It turns out that these are few in number and none match well the causal mechanism proposed by Mansfield and Snyder. Moreover, although Narang and Nelson do not conduct extensive case studies, they do note one important feature of the (1,1) cases: all occur before World War I. As a result, Narang and Nelson challenge the relevance of the statistical finding to the post-Cold War world.

- Pape, R. 2003. The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 97(3) 343--61.
- Pape, R. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House.

Pape, R. and J. Feldman. 2010. *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ashworth, S., et al. 2008. Design, inference, and the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 102(2) 269-73, with Pape response.

Pape's work on suicide terrorism is an excellent example of multiple *Y* generalizations. He narrows the scope from terrorism in general to suicide terrorism which is a small subset of all terrorist acts. He reports three strong regularities: that this form of terrorism occurred overwhelmingly in organized campaigns with nationalist goals, directed at democracies, and targeting foreign states occupying some or all of the country. For example, Pape and Feldmanw write: ``[There is] strong confirmation for the hypothesis that military occupation is the main factor driving suicide terrorism. The stationing of foreign combat forces (ground and tactical air force units) on territory that terrorists prize accounts for 87 percent of the over 1,800 suicide terrorist attacks around the world since 2004" (Pape and Feldman 2010, 10). The research does not do all of the cases, but reports on important examples involving the US and Israel. We include the Ashworth symposium because it reflects an example of statistical researchers misunderstanding a regularity claim and seeking to turn it into a probabilistic or statistical one.

Power, Samantha. 2002. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books.

Power starts with a powerful descriptive generalization: that the US has consistently been slow to respond to genocide and that as a result the US has contributed to their deadliness. The explanation resides both at the political and psychological levels. Decision-makers do not respond because the public is not engaged on the issue and as a result there is no pressure to act. These constitute the two *X* generalization claims in the book. But in addition, psychological factors play a role: despite evidence, decision makers cannot comprehend that

such violence is possible and engage in arguments that justify inaction (the conflict is twosided, intervention will be futile, those supporting intervention are emotional, and so on). Scope conditions are not precisely defined, but the book covers the major genocides of the 20th century: Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Saddam Hussein's assault on the Kurds, Bosnia and Rwanda. Chapters engage in detailed process tracing based on primary, secondary and interview sources.

Reiter, Dan. 1995. Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen. *International Security* 20:5–34.

Reiter provides an example of disconfirmatory LNQA – if *Y* then not-*X*. Pre-emption is not a general theory of war, but is assumed by many existing theories (spiral models; offense-defense balance models) to be a possible path to war. War can occur if the attacker believes that they themselves will be attacked. Reiter clearly defines the scope conditions of his claim: all 67 wars in the Correlates of War database that exceed the 1000 casualty threshold. He reports on (but does not actually show) process-tracing of all cases and finds that only three are preemptive: World War I (and particularly Russo-German interactions); the Chinese intervention in the Korean war; and the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967. In order to probe the theoretical arguments for why preemption might occur, Reiter presents detailed case studies of the adversary nor belief in the military advantages of striking first played any significant role. The result of the exercise is a strong causal generalization: preventive war accounts for only 4.5 percent of all wars as defined, and none of those comport with dominant theoretical explanations of the phenomenon.

Ripsman, Norrin M. 2016. *Peacemaking from Above, Peace from Below: Ending Conflict between Regional Rivals.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ripsman provides an example of the use of generalizing cases in order to cover an entire scope. Ripsman seeks to explain how regional rivalries-defined as geographically proximate states with a history of war and protracted hostility-can make peace. The proposed hypothesis involves two causal steps occurring in a temporal sequence: during a transition phase, leaders take initiatives even over societal objections; in a post-transition phase publics either buy in or don't. Each of these arguments is considered against an array of alternatives. The claim is a necessary conditions one: transitions to peace require these two steps. The scope is established by starting with a list of 55 20th century enduring rivalries generated by other researchers and a narrowing of the scope conditions in several ways (removing geographically remote rivals, those with high power asymmetry, and those not belonging to the same region) and selecting those that ended in peace agreements. This definition of the scope yielded nine cases. The research design is based around intensive chapter-length process-tracing of three cases (France and Germany, Egypt and Israel, and Israel and Jordan) that achieved effective peace agreements. A separate chapter does shorter, generalizing case studies of the six other cases, some of which stabilize and some of which don't. Tabular material provides transparent summary information on how stabilizing cases conform with the model and those that fail to stabilize don't.

Ross, Michael L. 2004. How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. *International Organization* 58:35–67.

Ross provides an example of an effort to generalize through serial case studies, but in which the scope conditions are not clearly defined. Ross seeks to distinguish among mechanisms that might explain an observed regularity in the quantitative literature: the relationship between natural resources and the onset of civil war. This is a type of multi-method LNOA in which an extant statistical finding is subjected to LNQA test, focusing on (1,1) cases. The scope is defined by an existing dataset (Collier and Hoeffler) of 36 civil wars, but are then narrowed by focusing on 13 cases in which Ross argues scholars have debated whether natural resources might have played a role in the conflict; thus the ambiguity in the scope conditions. The design involves multiple Y conditions claims: seven distinct hypotheses and the evidence required to support them is spelled out at length. Each of the 13 cases in then subjected to process-tracing in order to identify the presence or absence of the seven main proposed causal relationships. Tabular material summarizes the case findings. Short case examples are cited in the paper, but it does not have a qualitative appendix providing the underlying case studies. Ross does find some regularities among the cases identified including disconfirmatory ones. For example, "The third finding is that two of the most widely cited causal mechanisms, the looting and grievance mechanisms, do not appear to be valid. However given the lack of clarity about the selection criteria, it is hard to know whether the 13 cases chosen for treatment are representative of the larger population of 36 civil wars or not. (pp. 61–62)

Rotberg, Robert I. 2017. *The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders can Combat Graft.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

This theoretically eclectic book seeks to explain successful anti-corruption drives through reference to political will, defined as full political embrace of anti-corruption measures by political elites. However, a series of ancillary hypotheses are also introduced throughout. The book adopts a variety of methods, and contains a total of 33 short case studies. Two chapters provide an example of one feature of the LNQA design: narrowing scope conditions and empirical focus by considering the tails of distributions. One chapter looks at the five most-improved cases on two corruption indices over 2004–2014;another considers the ten least corrupt countries in the world on one corruption measure. An effort is then made to test for the presence of those factors which appear 'necessary' for these outcomes by being present across cases.

Schenoni, Luis., et al. 2020. Settling resistant disputes: the territorial boundary peace in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly* 64:57–70.

Schenoni et. al. provide an example of how the tail of the distribution can be used to constitute a bounded universe of cases. The universe consists of hard-to-resolve territorial issues within Latin America. They discuss what constitutes a hard case and end up with five hard-to-resolve cases which are the focus of the article. The theory involves three necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient for the outcome of territorial settlement (Y = 1), which in effect yields four hypotheses. The three independent variables are agenda setting, regime change, and third

party mediation. Summary tables provide a regularity analysis showing that each of these is necessary for successful management and that they are jointly sufficient. They then conduct within-case counterfactual analyses for the three necessary conditions and the jointly sufficient one to show how the causal mechanism works in individual cases resulting in four process tracing case studies in the article itself. An online appendix conducts the rest of the within-case analyses for all the hypotheses for all the cases. In total, they article presents a total of 20 within-case analyses (5 cases and 4 hypotheses).

Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2017. *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The authors develop a theory of why compellence threats are not effective and are not complied with in interstate militarized disputes. Three factors make it extremely difficult to make effective compellence threats: military redundancy; low stakes for the coercer; and costs of engaging in nuclear coercion. They do a statistical analysis of compellence using standard COW data sets. They then provide two long chapters of case studies which look at both the conforming and nonconforming cases, demonstrating that several of the non-conforming cases have been misdiagnosed in extant work. They conclude with the *X*-generalization that compellence essentially never works; they could find no cases that clearly supported the compellence idea (this example is discussed at length in the text).

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol provides an example of how a "large-N" qualitative study may involve a small number of cases depending on how scope conditions are defined. Skocpol is interested in social revolutions in agrarian, bureaucratic states with no colonial history. Within this scope limit she has three positive cases of social revolution – France, Russia and China—and six non–social revolution cases. Her theory is that state breakdown and peasant revolt are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for social revolution; she thus provides two necessary condition generalizations and one sufficient conditions generalization. In terms of the latter, presumably there were no other cases in her universe which had this particular combination of factors and so there are no nonconforming cases. The book provides highly detailed case studies of each of the social revolutionary cases, demonstrating the complex mechanisms through which state breakdown coupled with peasant revolt produce revolutionary outcomes.

Slater, Dan and Joe Wong. 2022. From Development to Democracy: The Transformations of Modern Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Slater and Wong seek to explain a particular route to democracy: the conditions under which incumbent autocrats will democratize "through strength." The intuition is that if autocrats believe that social instability can be avoided and that they can prevail in elections, they are more likely to democratize. The claim can be made probabilistically as they do, or as a necessary conditions argument. The claim rests on a complex causal mechanism related to the ability of regime to read "signals" of strength and weakness accurately. Their book is a good

example of a regional bounding strategy, considering all East Asian states that were "developmental" and had periods of high growth. They identify 12 cases that break into different "clusters" or what we would call paths. Full chapters are devoted to the paradigmatic developmental state cases, particularly Taiwan but also Japan and Korea, which conform with the democracy through strength model. In the other clusters, countervailing factors work to make democratization episodes erratic (Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar) or to block them altogether (the "developmental Britannia" path of Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong and the communist party cluster of China, Vietnam and Cambodia). All cases receive significant treatment and early tabular material clearly identifies the core generalizations.

Soifer, Hillel D. 2015. State Building in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soifer provides an example of a comparative historical design within a particular region with generalizing case studies. Soifer identifies three state-building paths in Latin America: one in which state-building efforts fail to gel in the first place; one in which they are undertaken and fail; and one in which they are undertaken and succeed. The book thus provides necessary conditions arguments with respect to why state-building projects emerge (a strong urban core plus developmental-liberal ideas) and why they succeed (success is more likely when the central administrative apparatus is staffed by outsiders rather than local elites). The scope is all of South America (defined to include ten countries) and descriptive statistics provide the basis for coding all cases. Four cases are selected for more intensive treatment based on variation in the dependent variable: Colombia (no state-building project), Peru (failure) and Mexico and Chile (success), but the book organizes the case study treatment through the development of different dimensions of state capacity (education, infrastructure and taxes, and coercive capacity). The Conclusion provides clear tabular material detailing the conforming and non-conforming cases (Paraguay and Venezuela only partly conform to the model). Twoto-three page generalizing case studies validate the argument, provide more detail on Argentina, and attend to the anomalies.

Staniland, Paul. 2021. Leftist Insurgency in Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 54: 518–22.

Staniland is interested in a particular form of civil conflict: the onset of leftist insurgencies not against authoritarian regimes but in democratic settings. The paper explicitly adopts an LNQA framework and reflects most of its core components. The paper starts with an empirical observation that challenges existing theoretical expectations: contrary to the claim that democracy blunts insurgencies, Staniland provides evidence from a particular region – South Asia – that they are in fact quite common. The second task is to propose a theory under which they arise, which takes the form of a *Y*-generalization: leftist insurgenciesarise in full-suffrage democracies when redistribution does not occur and political participation is blocked. Using a case study from Sri Lanka, the theory is refined to propose a series of more specific *X*-generalizations about the conditions under which these insurgencies arise and turn to war. Two variables – the presence of incorporation window and whether the left is cohesive or divided – generate four possible paths. The scope conditions are all South and Southeast Asian countries since 1945. Staniland finds 18 left revolts, 12 of which occurred in a democratic period. Tabular material summarizes the cases, and shows the strength of the

generalization: for example that only three such insurgencies arose as a result of state repression alone, while the large majority comport with the left incorporation hypothesis. The paper includes four case studies, but a detailed qualitative appendix explains coding rules, provides detail on ambiguous cases and a detailed references on each case.

#### Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2019. *Defending Frenemies: Alliance Politics and Nuclear Nonproliferation in US Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The scope of the book is US relations with strategically vulnerable but potentially difficult allies around issues of nuclear proliferation. Four states fall into the category of "frenemies," which sets the scope conditions for the book: Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Successive governments in all four states displayed patterns of deception, evasion, and obstruction with respect to their clandestine nuclear weapons programs. The dependent variable that Taliaferro seeks to explain is US nonproliferation strategy, which can range from coercive to accommodative, in effect two *Y*-generalizations. The theory is that presidents and their administrations will pursue coercive nonproliferation strategies toward an ally, when they perceive (1) the United States as facing a favorable regional power distribution, (2) long time horizons for threats to US interests in that region and (3) the domestic mobilization hurdles to pursuing a coercive strategy are low. Each country is analyzed in a separate chapter arguing that all four are explained by the theoretical model.

Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis. Security Studies 21:3-42.

Trachtenberg provides an example of disconfirmatory LNQA. He focuses on Fearon's formal model of audience costs which has been used in a large number of statistical analyses by a wide range of authors. The scope is major powers. Trachtenberg focuses on crises involving at least one democracy in which the audience cost factors should operate (X = 1). The dependent variable is crises that do not end in war (Y = 1). This produces a scope of 11 cases. He does process tracing on all of these cases to see if audience costs theory explains the outcome. In none of the cases does he find any significant evidence for audience cost theory. Trachtenberg thus has a strong causal generalization: that in significant major power crises involving democracies audience cost theory never explains the outcome of non-war.

### Vasquez, John A. 2018. Contagion and War: Lessons from the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vasquez considers all of the major dyads that declared war on one another in World War I (43), with a few smaller exceptions such as the Latin American countries excluded. Vasquez is very clear that the larger scope of which World War I is a case is what he calls "general wars." He is interested in explaining contagion from the initial conflict: in the case of WWI, the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian war. He outlines a series of contagion "processes" and clusters cases under them (alliance contagion through a coercive game; alliance contagion through valence balancing; contiguity; territorial rivalry; opportunity through breakdown of political order; economic dependence and brute force). These processes are associated with 11 major hypotheses and 32 more open-ended "questions" for the cases. A distinctive feature of the book is the interrogation of all dyads, discussed in chapters corresponding with three "waves"

of contagion (1914, 1915–16 and 1917). Although cases are grouped by his overall characterization of each case he treats the enterprise as exploratory and considers competing hypotheses. The conclusion goes through the hypotheses but does not report the generalizations associated with them in a systematic way (Table 7.3 is a partial exception). He also adds in a number of "supplemental hypotheses" in the Conclusion. He does discuss the Y = 0 cases of countries that could have joined but which did not such as Sweden.

Wallensteen, Peter. 2015. *Quality Peace: Peacebuilding, Victory & World Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wallensteen's is another example of disconfirmatory LNQA, conducting a large-N qualitative test of Toft's hypothesis and statistical analysis claiming that outright victory in rebel civil war has a number of positive outcomes for the post-civil-war state. These include: reduced likelihood of recurrence of civil war, stronger economic growth, and democratization. Wallensteen explores all three of Toft's claims but focuses particular attention on the impact of rebel victory on democratization. Wallensteen shows that given her statistical research design only three cases fall in the (1,1) cell of victory in the civil war and democracy. These are Argentina, Cambodia, and Iran. He does detailed within-case causal inference and argues none of them support Toft's hypothesis of the impact of rebel victory on democracy.

Walt, Stephen M. 1996. Revolution and War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

As the title of Walt's book suggests, he seeks to address the relationship between two rare events: revolutions and wars. Walt argues that revolutions are likely to heighten security competition through a number of different mechanisms: not only by changing the balance of power, as realists would propose, but by bringing to power new regimes with universalist ideologies, by generating fears of contagion, and by increasing uncertainty. He groups these latter causal factors together under the rubric of changing the balance not of power but threats, and places particular weight on whether the setting in which the revolution occurs is one favoring offense (heightening risks of war) or defense (under which fears of contagion are mitigated). The study is based on an X-generalization claim. He focuses on extreme X cases of major revolutions that changed the political regime, as opposed to "elite revolutions," postulating the conditions under which revolution is more or less likely to lead to war. The scope conditions for the theory are purposely restrictive, excluding coups, national liberation movements and most civil wars, unless a new order is imposed by the victor. Although the scope conditions are not precisely defined, Walt's list includes major revolutions: the English, French, American, Russian, Turkish, Chinese, Cuban, Ethiopian, Nicaraguan and Iranian cases. Of these he does three primary case studies (France, Soviet Union and Iran) with two additional chapters providing generalizing case studies of the United States, Mexico, Turkey and China as well as the effects of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Walt explicitly adopts a process-tracing approach, with historical narrative used to test the core propositions and demonstrate the presence of the two alternative paths. The conclusion not only summarizes the overall outcome in each revolution but also offers generalizations about the effect of each postulated causal mechanism.

Wolf, Eric. 1969. Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. Prentice-Hall: New York.

This early example of comparative historical analysis by an anthropologist takes an LNQA form. Wolf seeks to understand the paradox that many successful revolutions in the 20th century rested not only – or even primarily – on the working class but on the peasantry. The book is constructed in a somewhat inductive fashion, with chapters on the successful peasant revolutions of the 20th century. Although the selection criteria are not entirely clear, the list encompasses six major revolutions and undertakes serial case studies of all of them in separate chapters: Mexico, Russia, China, Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba. A concluding chapter outlines a causal model that starts with increasing commodification, the declining power of traditional authorities, the emergence of brokers mediating the relationship between traditional landowners and the peasantry and increasing disintegration of peasant life. However, the main generalization Wolf seeks to advance is a Y generalization claim: if successful revolution, then a key role is played by "middle peasants" rather than poor peasants or landless laborers. Wolf entertains some conditioning factors. For example, the role of armed intellectuals, either in the form of parties or armies and militias, are crucial to the seizure of the cities and national power. While the case studies trace the causal process summarized in the conclusion, particular attention is paid to the middle peasant role.

### Yashar, Deborah. 2005. Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yashar's book is interested in the rise of indigenous politics in Latin America. She develops a complex causal argument that rests on three causal factors: changes in citizenship regimes that unwittingly challenged previous spaces of indigenous autonomy; the political associational space that made organizing possible; and the existence of networks that permitted mobilization across highly diverse spaces. The method combines both latitudinal and comparative designs, but we take note of it here for one particular choice: her strategy for case selection. In addition to focusing on a region, she also focuses on the tail of a distribution: the five countries in Latin America with indigenous populations that exceed 10 percent (and in toto account for over 90 percent of all indigenous people in the region): Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico.