

Online Appendix for:  
Economic Inequality and Political Responsiveness: A Systematic  
Review

Mads Andreas Elkjær & Michael Baggesen Klitgaard

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## A Information on Literature Search and Included Studies

### A.1 Search Strategy

The literature search was conducted on Google Scholar and Web of Science on May 30, 2020. We restricted the time period to 2004-2020, since the literature started emerging following the work of the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (APSA, 2004).

### Google Scholar

Literature search on Google Scholar, restricting the period 2004 to 2020 and excluding patents and citations. We used the following search strings:

- “unequal responsiveness”
  - 237 hits
- “differential responsiveness” “income” “unequal” “policy”
  - 192 hits
- “income” “representation” “policy” “inequality” “responsiveness”
  - 18.500 hits
  - Reviewed the 400 most relevant studies according to Google’s search engine algorithm
- “income” “representation” “policy” “inequality”
  - 327.000 hits
  - Reviewed the 100 most relevant studies according to Google’s search engine algorithm

### Web of Science

Literature search on Web of Science (using the following indexes: SCI-EXPANDED, SSCI, A&HCI, CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH, ESCI), restricting the search to English publications of the types: article, book, book chapter, letter, and note, published between 2004 and 2020 in Political Science, Economics or Sociology journals. We used the following search string:

- “TS=((equal\* OR unequal\* OR inequalit\* OR disparit\* OR differential\*) AND (responsiveness OR representation\* OR influence\*) AND (income OR economic elite\* OR affluen\* OR wealth\*) AND (politic\* OR democrac\* OR policy\* OR policies\*))”
  - 632 hits

## A.2 Information on Included Studies

**Table A1.** Information on Included Studies

Study	Country(ies)	Time period(s)	Political preferences	Political outcome	# ML <sup>a</sup>	# MH <sup>b</sup>
Bartels (2008)	USA	1989-1994	General political ideology (liberal-conservative scale); abortion attitudes (data source: Senate Election Study (ANES) 1988/1990/1992)	W-NOMINATE scores; roll-call votes on minimum wage; civil rights; budget waiver; budget cloture; roll-call votes on abortion (parental notification; counseling ban; public funding; clinic access)	29	29
Bartels (2017)	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States	1985-2012	Preferences for changes in government spending; budget-cutting preferences; welfare state support (data source: ISSP and WVS/EVS)	Two-year changes in social spending per capita	16	0

Table A1 – continued from previous page

Study	Country(ies)	Time period(s)	Political preferences	Political outcome	# ML <sup>a</sup>	# MH <sup>b</sup>
Bhatti and Erikson (2011)	USA	1989-1994; 1999-2004	General political ideology (liberal-conservative scale) (data source: Senate Election Study (ANES) 1988/1990/1992; NAES 2000/2004; and Exit Poll Data from 2004)	W-NOMINATE and DW-NOMINATE scores	11	11
Brunner, Ross, and Washington (2013)	USA (California)	1991-2008	Ballot voting on a range of issues	Vote of state legislator	22	19
Elkjær (2020)	Denmark	1985-2015	Preferences for changes in government spending (data source: multiple surveys)	Two-year changes in government spending	5	5
Elkjær and Iversen (2020)	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States	1985-2016	Support for redistribution; preferences for changes in government spending (data source: ISSP)	Two-year changes in and levels of social spending as percentage of GDP	12	12
Elsässer, Hense, and Schäfer (2018)	Germany	1998-2013	Support for policy change (data source: DeutschlandTrend)	Policy change (within four years of survey question)	2	1

Table A1 – continued from previous page

Study	Country(ies)	Time period(s)	Political preferences	Political outcome	# ML <sup>a</sup>	# MH <sup>b</sup>
Flavin (2012a)	USA	1999-2004	Composite measure of ideology (based on two questions about federal spending on i) social security and ii) health care and iii) one on whether poverty is a serious national problem) (data source: NAES 2000)	W-NOMINATE scores	12	12
Flavin (2012b)	USA	1988-1992; 2000-2004	General political ideology (liberal-conservative scale); favor or oppose death penalty, banning all abortions, and restricting the kinds of guns people can buy (data source: NAES 2000/2004 and Senate Election Study (ANES) 1988/1990/1992)	Different measures of state policy liberalism; state policies on death penalty, abortion, and gun control	10	0
Gilens (2012)	USA	1964-1968; 1981-2002; 2005-2006	Support for policy change (data source: multiple surveys)	Policy change (within four years of survey question)	52	52
Gilens and Page (2014)	USA	1981-2002	Support for policy change (data source: multiple surveys)	Policy change (within four years of survey question)	0	3
Hayes (2012)	USA	2001-2011	General political ideology (liberal-conservative scale) (data source: NAES 2004)	W-NOMINATE and DW-NOMINATE scores	14	14
Lax, Phillips, and Zelizer (2019)	USA	2001-2015	Support for policy change (data source: multiple surveys)	Roll-call votes of U.S. Senators	24	0

Table A1 – continued from previous page

Study	Country(ies)	Time period(s)	Political preferences	Political outcome	# ML <sup>a</sup>	# MH <sup>b</sup>
Peters and Ensink (2015)	Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom	2002-2010	Support for redistribution (data source: ESS)	Social spending as percentage of GDP	2	0
Rhodes and Schaffner (2017)	USA	2012	General political ideology; support for salient proposals: i) the Ryan budget bill, ii) the Simpson–Bowles budget plan, iii) the “Middle Class Tax Cut” Act, iv) the “Tax Hike Prevention” Act, v) the U.S.–Korea free trade agreement, vi) a proposal to repeal the Affordable Care Act, vii) a bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline, viii) and a proposal to end the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy (data source: Catalist and CCES 2012)	NOMINATE-scores and roll-call voting of members of the House of Representatives	6	6

**Table A1 – continued from previous page**

<b>Study</b>	<b>Country(ies)</b>	<b>Time period(s)</b>	<b>Political preferences</b>	<b>Political outcome</b>	<b># ML<sup>a</sup></b>	<b># MH<sup>b</sup></b>
Rigby and Wright (2011)	USA	2000-2004	Composite measures of economic and social policy liberalism (NAES 2000/2004)	Measures of state policy liberalism on economic and social issues	16	16
Rigby and Wright (2013)	USA	2000	Economic and social policy preferences (data source: NAES 2000)	Measures of the policy liberalism of state parties on economic and social issues	12	12
Schakel (in press)	Netherlands	1979-2012	Support for policy change (data source: multiple surveys)	Policy change (within four years of survey question)	5	5
Schakel, Burgoon, and Hakhverdian (2020)	Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States	1985-2006	Preferences for changes in government spending on unemployment, pension, and healthcare (ISSP)	Average yearly change (over four years) in the generosity of a policy	20	0
Soroka and Wlezien (2010)	USA	1973-2005	Preferences for changes in government spending on defense, health, education, and welfare (GSS and Environics)	One-year changes in government spending	6	6
Stadelmann, Portmann, and Eichenberger (2015)	Switzerland	1996-2012	Votes in referenda on specific policies	Legislator votes on policy	2	2

**Table A1 – continued from previous page**

<b>Study</b>	<b>Country(ies)</b>	<b>Time period(s)</b>	<b>Political preferences</b>	<b>Political outcome</b>	<b># ML<sup>a</sup></b>	<b># MH<sup>b</sup></b>
Tausanovitch (2016)	USA	2000-2012	Composite measure of ideology based on many specific policy questions (data source: NAES 2000/2004 and CCES 2006/2008/2010/2012)	DW-NOMINATE scores	6	3
Ura and Ellis (2008)	USA	1974-1996	Policy liberalism (10-item index based on government spending preferences from the GSS)	Measures of the policy liberalism of the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate	4	4
Wlezien and Soroka (2011)	USA	1973-2008	Preferences for changes in government spending on defense, welfare, health, education, environment, and crime (GSS)	One-year changes in government spending	12	12
Wright and Rigby (2020)	USA	2000-2004	Economic and social policy preferences (data source: NAES 2000/2004)	Measures of the policy liberalism of state parties on economic and social issues	8	8

*Note:* <sup>a</sup>Number of direct comparisons between high and low-income groups included in the quantitative review. <sup>b</sup>Number of direct comparisons between high and middle-income groups included in the quantitative review. ANES= American National Election Studies. CCES: Cooperative Congressional Election Studies. ESS=European Social Surveys. GSS= General Social Survey. ISSP: International Social Survey Program. NAES=National Annenberg Election Surveys. WVS/EVS=World Values Survey/European Values Study.



## **B Robustness Checks: Different Cut-Off Values**

In this appendix, we assess the robustness of the results to using a wide range of different cut-off values on the two categorical variables that measure the degree of differential political responsiveness; we refer to the variables as `High_Low` and `High_Middle`. In section B1, we present the baseline results from the main text to enable an easy comparison of results when using different cut-off values. In sections B2-B6, we then experiment with different cut-off values: we widen the ‘equal representation’ category and use different values to indicate severe forms of differential responsiveness. In order to ease comparison across different operationalizations of the dependent variables (`High_Low` and `High_Middle`), we illustrate the results first for the high-low income comparison and then for the high-middle income comparison. Overall, this appendix shows that the results of the quantitative review are robust to using a variety of different cut-off values.

### **B.1 Baseline Results from the Main Text**


In this subsection, we present the results from the analysis of the main text. These results serve as a baseline when assessing the robustness of the results to using different cut-off points in sections B2-B6.

**Table B1.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Full Set of Results from Table 1 of the Main Text

	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle		Ambiguous Cases	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.	H-L	H-M
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Study/Model Characteristics</b>						
N of groups > 1	3.62*	3.24*	1.69*	1.74*	1.14*	0.63
	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.61)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.78		0.21	0.64	1.02
		(0.46)		(0.43)	(0.59)	(0.77)
Partisanship: Republican		0.84		-0.22	0.87	-0.06
		(0.43)		(0.39)	(0.54)	(0.80)
General political ideology	0.03	0.41	-0.01	0.01	-1.53*	-2.07*
	(0.72)	(0.76)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.67)	(0.97)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.23	-0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.09	-0.99
	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.42)	(0.46)	(0.64)	(0.73)
Domain: Economic	0.50	0.61	-0.67	-0.41	0.33	-0.72
	(0.67)	(0.73)	(0.51)	(0.61)	(0.68)	(0.82)
<b>Region of the World</b>						
United States	-2.46*		-0.37		0.25	2.09
	(0.97)		(0.54)		(0.71)	(1.20)
<b>Controls</b>						
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.00	-0.03	0.07	0.04	-0.00	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.09)
Observations (ln)	-0.05	0.14	-0.14	-0.06	-0.58*	-1.53*
	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.41)
Preference divergence	1.71*	2.03*	1.91*	1.73*	1.06	-0.75
	(0.65)	(0.71)	(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.81)	(1.04)
<b>Constant</b>						
					0.61	0.74
					(2.31)	(3.57)
Cutpoint 1	-6.60*	-5.09	-1.59	-1.76		
	(3.01)	(3.03)	(1.43)	(1.64)		
Cutpoint 2	-4.93	-3.24	-1.07	-1.19		
	(2.95)	(2.97)	(1.41)	(1.60)		
Cutpoint 3	-3.49	-1.70	-0.05	0.04		
	(2.92)	(2.94)	(1.39)	(1.58)		
Cutpoint 4	-2.75	-0.98	1.18	1.29		
	(2.90)	(2.93)	(1.38)	(1.58)		
Cutpoint 5	-1.04	0.82	3.03*	3.22*		
	(2.90)	(2.94)	(1.40)	(1.60)		
Cutpoint 6	1.20	3.09	4.56*	4.78*		
	(2.91)	(2.95)	(1.42)	(1.62)		
<b>Random Effects</b>						
Study-level variance	4.55*	5.81*	0.15	0.31	0.27	0.66
	(1.94)	(2.72)	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.90)
<b>Summary Statistics</b>						
N	254	206	200	176	308	232
N of Studies	24	16	20	15	24	20
Log Likelihood	-296.6	-258.7	-308.3	-266.7	-125.4	-75.76


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific. Baseline for region is not the U.S.

**Figure B1.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table B1 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure B2.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table B1 (model 4 for partisanship).


## B.2 Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category

In this subsection, we analyze the results with a broader middle category: Instead of using a 15 percent cut-off value for cases of relatively equal representation as in the main text, we use a 25 percent cut-off value, as shown in equation 1.

$$\text{High\_Low [High\_Middle]} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \beta_H < 0 < \beta_{L[M]} \\ 2 & \text{if } \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 1/2 \\ 3 & \text{if } 1/2 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 0.75 \\ 4 & \text{if } 0.75 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 1.25 \\ 5 & \text{if } 1.25 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 2 \\ 6 & \text{if } 2 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \\ 7 & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 < \beta_H \\ \text{Amb} & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 \cap \beta_H < 0 \cup .1 < P_{\beta_{L[M]}} \cap .1 < P_{\beta_H} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Figure B3 shows the distribution of this alternative coding of the variable. Table B2 and Figures B4 and B5 show that the regression results do not change when using a broader ‘equal representation’ category.

**Figure B3.** Comparing Coefficients of Low, Middle, and High-Income Groups, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category




Note:  $N_{(a)}=308$ .  $N_{(b)}=232$ .  $\beta_L$ ,  $\beta_M$ , and  $\beta_H$  denote low, middle, and high-income coefficients.

**Table B2.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category

	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>				
N of groups > 1	3.61*	3.21*	1.45*	1.41*
	(0.50)	(0.54)	(0.37)	(0.44)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.78		0.11
		(0.46)		(0.42)
Partisanship: Republican		0.76		-0.32
		(0.43)		(0.38)
General political ideology	0.01	0.49	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.71)	(0.75)	(0.40)	(0.45)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.21	0.05	-0.10	-0.07
	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.41)	(0.45)
Domain: Economic	0.49	0.62	-0.74	-0.57
	(0.68)	(0.74)	(0.50)	(0.59)
<b>Region of the World</b>				
United States	-2.08*		-0.40	
	(0.95)		(0.54)	
<b>Controls</b>				
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.01	-0.04	0.06	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N of observations (ln)	-0.04	0.16	-0.18	-0.11
	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Preference divergence	1.71*	2.03*	1.85*	1.68*
	(0.64)	(0.70)	(0.61)	(0.63)
<hr/>				
Cutpoint 1	-6.31*	-5.53	-2.16	-2.47
	(2.94)	(3.00)	(1.42)	(1.59)
Cutpoint 2	-4.64	-3.68	-1.64	-1.90
	(2.89)	(2.94)	(1.39)	(1.55)
Cutpoint 3	-3.58	-2.58	-0.83	-0.95
	(2.87)	(2.91)	(1.37)	(1.53)
Cutpoint 4	-2.32	-1.24	0.88	0.88
	(2.85)	(2.88)	(1.36)	(1.51)
Cutpoint 5	-0.87	0.24	2.35	2.38
	(2.84)	(2.89)	(1.37)	(1.52)
Cutpoint 6	1.36	2.50	3.87*	3.91*
	(2.85)	(2.91)	(1.39)	(1.54)
<hr/>				
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Study-level variance	4.25*	5.38*	0.13	0.23
	(1.84)	(2.52)	(0.17)	(0.25)
<hr/>				
Observations	254	206	200	176
Number of studies	24	16	20	15
Log Likelihood	-302.3	-264.8	-311.5	-270.4


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Each observation is a model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a high-income coefficient to either a low or middle-income coefficient. The models are random-effects ordered logistic regressions with models nested within studies. Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific. Baseline for region is not the U.S.

**Figure B4.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table B2 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure B5.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table B2 (model 4 for partisanship).




### B.3 Severe Differentials in Political Responsiveness: Factor 3 Instead of 2

In this subsection, we analyze the results using a factor of three instead of two to describe cases of severe differentials in political responsiveness, as shown in equation 2.

$$\text{High\_Low [High\_Middle]} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \beta_H < 0 < \beta_{L[M]} \\ 2 & \text{if } \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 1/3 \\ 3 & \text{if } 1/3 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 0.85 \\ 4 & \text{if } 0.85 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 1.15 \\ 5 & \text{if } 1.15 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 3 \\ 6 & \text{if } 3 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \\ 7 & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 < \beta_H \\ \text{Amb} & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 \cap \beta_H < 0 \cup .1 < P_{\beta_{L[M]}} \cap .1 < P_{\beta_H} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Figure B6 shows the distribution of this alternative coding of the variable. Table B3 and Figures B7 and B8 show that the regression results are robust to using this alternative model specification.

**Figure B6.** Comparing Coefficients of Low, Middle, and High-Income Groups, Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation



(a) High Income vs. Low Income

(b) High Income vs. Middle Income


Note:  $N_{(a)}=308$ .  $N_{(b)}=232$ .  $\beta_L$ ,  $\beta_M$ , and  $\beta_H$  denote low, middle, and high-income coefficients.

**Table B3.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation

	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>				
N of groups > 1	3.71*	3.31*	1.50*	1.61*
	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.40)	(0.48)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.79		0.17
		(0.46)		(0.44)
Partisanship: Republican		0.89		-0.43
		(0.45)		(0.40)
General political ideology	0.28	0.78	-0.01	0.09
	(0.74)	(0.79)	(0.44)	(0.51)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.20	0.12	0.11	0.25
	(0.58)	(0.61)	(0.44)	(0.49)
Domain: Economic	0.96	1.14	-0.37	0.02
	(0.71)	(0.76)	(0.54)	(0.63)
<b>Region of the World</b>				
United States	-2.85*		-0.43	
	(1.05)		(0.59)	
<b>Controls</b>				
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.02	-0.05	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N of observations (ln)	0.00	0.26	-0.04	0.09
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.20)
Preference divergence	2.05*	2.40*	1.85*	1.73*
	(0.66)	(0.74)	(0.62)	(0.66)
<hr/>				
Cutpoint 1	-7.73*	-6.08*	-1.90	-1.81
	(3.16)	(3.08)	(1.55)	(1.78)
Cutpoint 2	-6.42*	-4.64	-1.49	-1.24
	(3.10)	(3.02)	(1.53)	(1.75)
Cutpoint 3	-4.49	-2.52	-0.35	0.02
	(3.05)	(2.96)	(1.51)	(1.73)
Cutpoint 4	-3.74	-1.80	0.89	1.30
	(3.03)	(2.96)	(1.51)	(1.73)
Cutpoint 5	-1.16	0.93	3.13*	3.67*
	(3.02)	(2.97)	(1.53)	(1.75)
Cutpoint 6	0.48	2.59	4.18*	4.77*
	(3.03)	(2.98)	(1.54)	(1.77)
<hr/>				
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Study-level variance	5.38*	6.65*	0.28	0.53
	(2.26)	(3.03)	(0.23)	(0.38)
<hr/>				
Observations	254	206	200	176
Number of studies	24	16	20	15
Log Likelihood	-283.2	-246	-297.5	-255.9


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Each observation is a model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a high-income coefficient to either a low or middle-income coefficient. The models are random-effects ordered logistic regressions with models nested within studies. Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific. Baseline for region is not the U.S.

**Figure B7.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table B3 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure B8.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table B3 (model 4 for partisanship).


## B.4 Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category and Factor 3 Instead of 2

In this subsection, we analyze the results with a broader middle category: Instead of using a 15 percent cut-off value for cases of relatively equal representation as in the main text, we use a 25 percent cut-off value. In addition, we use a factor of three instead of two to describe cases of severe differentials in political responsiveness. The coding of the variable is shown in equation 3.

$$\text{High\_Low [High\_Middle]} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \beta_H < 0 < \beta_{L[M]} \\ 2 & \text{if } \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 1/3 \\ 3 & \text{if } 1/3 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 0.75 \\ 4 & \text{if } 0.75 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 1.25 \\ 5 & \text{if } 1.25 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 3 \\ 6 & \text{if } 3 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \\ 7 & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 < \beta_H \\ \text{Amb} & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 \cap \beta_H < 0 \cup .1 < P_{\beta_{L[M]}} \cap .1 < P_{\beta_H} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Figure B9 shows the distribution of this alternative coding of the variable. Table B4 and Figures B10 and B11 show that the regression results are also robust to using this alternative model specification, which combines the two previous ones (shown above).

**Figure B9.** Comparing Coefficients of Low, Middle, and High-Income Groups, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category and Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation



(a) High Income vs. Low Income

(b) High Income vs. Middle Income


Note:  $N_{(a)}=308$ .  $N_{(b)}=232$ .  $\beta_L$ ,  $\beta_M$ , and  $\beta_H$  denote low, middle, and high-income coefficients.

**Table B4.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category and Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation

Study/Model Characteristic	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>				
N of groups > 1	3.67*	3.24*	1.27*	1.30*
	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.39)	(0.46)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.83		0.04
		(0.46)		(0.43)
Partisanship: Republican		0.79		-0.52
		(0.45)		(0.39)
General political ideology	0.24	0.82	-0.09	-0.04
	(0.72)	(0.76)	(0.44)	(0.49)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.18	0.15	0.03	0.13
	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.43)	(0.47)
Domain: Economic	0.88	1.06	-0.49	-0.21
	(0.70)	(0.76)	(0.52)	(0.60)
<b>Region of the World</b>				
United States	-2.35*		-0.45	
	(0.99)		(0.57)	
<b>Controls</b>				
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.02	-0.06	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N of observations (ln)	0.02	0.27	-0.09	0.02
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Preference divergence	2.02*	2.33*	1.81*	1.70*
	(0.65)	(0.72)	(0.61)	(0.64)
Cutpoint 1	-7.17*	-6.40*	-2.55	-2.63
	(3.04)	(3.03)	(1.52)	(1.72)
Cutpoint 2	-5.88*	-4.96	-2.13	-2.05
	(2.99)	(2.97)	(1.50)	(1.69)
Cutpoint 3	-4.35	-3.32	-1.21	-1.09
	(2.95)	(2.91)	(1.48)	(1.66)
Cutpoint 4	-3.08	-1.96	0.51	0.77
	(2.93)	(2.90)	(1.47)	(1.65)
Cutpoint 5	-0.82	0.37	2.39	2.71
	(2.92)	(2.91)	(1.48)	(1.67)
Cutpoint 6	0.81	2.02	3.43*	3.81*
	(2.93)	(2.92)	(1.49)	(1.68)
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Study-level variance	4.81*	5.96*	0.24	0.41
	(2.05)	(2.73)	(0.21)	(0.33)
Observations	254	206	200	176
Number of studies	24	16	20	15
Log Likelihood	-293.2	-256.4	-303.1	-261.8


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Each observation is a model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a high-income coefficient to either a low or middle-income coefficient. The models are random-effects ordered logistic regressions with models nested within studies. Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific. Baseline for region is not the U.S. B14

**Figure B10.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category and Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table B4 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure B11.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category and Using a Factor of Three instead of Two to Describe Cases of Severe Unequal Representation



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table B4 (model 4 for partisanship).




## B.5 Five-Category Dependent Variable

In this subsection, we analyze the results using a simpler five-category dependent variable combining categories two and three, and five and six, as shown in equation 4.

$$\text{High\_Low [High\_Middle]} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \beta_H < 0 < \beta_{L[M]} \\ 2 & \text{if } \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 0.85 \\ 3 & \text{if } 0.85 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 1.15 \\ 4 & \text{if } 1.15 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \\ 5 & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 < \beta_H \\ \text{Amb} & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 \cap \beta_H < 0 \cup .1 < P_{\beta_{L[M]}} \cap .1 < P_{\beta_H} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Figure B12 shows the distribution of this alternative coding of the variable. Table B5 and Figures B13 and B14 show that the regression results are robust to using this alternative model specification.

**Figure B12.** Comparing Coefficients of Low, Middle, and High-Income Groups, Five-Category DV



(a) High Income vs. Low Income

(b) High Income vs. Middle Income


Note:  $N_{(a)}=308$ .  $N_{(b)}=232$ .  $\beta_L$ ,  $\beta_M$ , and  $\beta_H$  denote low, middle, and high-income coefficients.

**Table B5.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Five-Category DV

	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>				
N of groups > 1	3.88*	3.49*	1.17*	1.27*
	(0.58)	(0.62)	(0.39)	(0.49)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.51		-0.03
		(0.49)		(0.47)
Partisanship: Republican		0.86		-0.39
		(0.49)		(0.42)
General political ideology	0.02	0.48	0.18	0.44
	(0.80)	(0.85)	(0.44)	(0.54)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.43	-0.10	0.07	0.27
	(0.66)	(0.69)	(0.46)	(0.51)
Domain: Economic	0.83	1.10	-0.42	0.05
	(0.82)	(0.87)	(0.56)	(0.66)
<b>Region of the World</b>				
United States	-2.99*		-0.33	
	(1.14)		(0.59)	
<b>Controls</b>				
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.02	-0.05	0.04	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
N of observations (ln)	-0.03	0.24	-0.05	0.18
	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.21)
Preference divergence	1.19	1.55	1.62*	1.45*
	(0.80)	(0.86)	(0.67)	(0.72)
<hr/>				
Cutpoint 1	-8.43*	-6.62	-1.90	-2.09
	(3.39)	(3.44)	(1.51)	(1.81)
Cutpoint 2	-4.68	-2.64	-0.34	-0.23
	(3.22)	(3.28)	(1.47)	(1.76)
Cutpoint 3	-3.92	-1.90	0.86	1.03
	(3.20)	(3.28)	(1.46)	(1.76)
Cutpoint 4	0.20	2.31	3.98*	4.32*
	(3.20)	(3.30)	(1.49)	(1.79)
<hr/>				
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Study-level variance	6.12*	7.26*	0.14	0.44
	(2.61)	(3.40)	(0.19)	(0.38)
<hr/>				
Observations	254	206	200	176
Number of studies	24	16	20	15
Log Likelihood	-208.3	-179.1	-231.8	-197.1


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Each observation is a model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a high-income coefficient to either a low or middle-income coefficient. The models are random-effects ordered logistic regressions with models nested within studies. Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific. Baseline for region is not the U.S.

**Figure B13.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, Five-Category DV



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table B5 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure B14.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, Five-Category DV



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table B5 (model 4 for partisanship).


## B.6 Five-Category Dependent Variable and Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category

In this subsection, we analyze the results using a simpler five-category dependent variable combining categories two and three, and five and six. In addition, we use a broader middle category: Instead of using a 15 percent cut-off value for cases of relatively equal representation as in the main text, we use a 25 percent cut-off value. The coding of the variable is shown in equation 5.

$$\text{High\_Low [High\_Middle]} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \beta_H < 0 < \beta_{L[M]} \\ 2 & \text{if } \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \leq 0.75 \\ 3 & \text{if } 0.75 < \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} < 1.25 \\ 4 & \text{if } 1.25 \leq \beta_H/\beta_{L[M]} \\ 5 & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 < \beta_H \\ \text{Amb} & \text{if } \beta_{L[M]} < 0 \cap \beta_H < 0 \cup .1 < P_{\beta_{L[M]}} \cap .1 < P_{\beta_H} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

Figure B15 shows the distribution of this alternative coding of the variable. Table B6 and Figures B16 and B17 show that the regression results are also robust to using this alternative model specification.

**Figure B15.** Comparing Coefficients of Low, Middle, and High-Income Groups, Five-Category DV plus Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category




Note:  $N_{(a)}=308$ .  $N_{(b)}=232$ .  $\beta_L$ ,  $\beta_M$ , and  $\beta_H$  denote low, middle, and high-income coefficients.

**Table B6.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Five-Category DV plus Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category

	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>				
N of groups > 1	3.72*	3.30*	0.95*	0.97*
	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.37)	(0.45)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.67		-0.14
		(0.48)		(0.44)
Partisanship: Republican		0.73		-0.49
		(0.47)		(0.40)
General political ideology	-0.03	0.56	0.08	0.22
	(0.76)	(0.80)	(0.41)	(0.48)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.38	-0.04	-0.00	0.13
	(0.63)	(0.66)	(0.43)	(0.48)
Domain: Economic	0.71	0.91	-0.57	-0.27
	(0.78)	(0.85)	(0.52)	(0.62)
<b>Region of the World</b>				
United States	-2.21*		-0.37	
	(1.04)		(0.55)	
<b>Controls</b>				
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.02	-0.06	0.04	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N of observations (ln)	-0.01	0.25	-0.11	0.06
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Preference divergence	1.25	1.59*	1.66*	1.51*
	(0.76)	(0.80)	(0.65)	(0.69)
<hr/>				
Cutpoint 1	-7.52*	-7.15*	-2.57	-2.90
	(3.17)	(3.31)	(1.43)	(1.66)
Cutpoint 2	-4.35	-3.78	-1.23	-1.35
	(3.05)	(3.15)	(1.39)	(1.60)
Cutpoint 3	-3.07	-2.42	0.45	0.48
	(3.03)	(3.13)	(1.37)	(1.59)
Cutpoint 4	0.64	1.33	3.21*	3.34*
	(3.03)	(3.15)	(1.39)	(1.61)
<hr/>				
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Study-level variance	5.12*	6.13*	0.08	0.26
	(2.20)	(2.85)	(0.16)	(0.28)
<hr/>				
Observations	254	206	200	176
Number of groups	24	16	20	15
Log Likelihood	-223.5	-193.9	-241.1	-206.9


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Each observation is a model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a high-income coefficient to either a low or middle-income coefficient. The models are random-effects ordered logistic regressions with models nested within studies. Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific. Baseline for region is not the U.S.

**Figure B16.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, Five-Category DV plus Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table B6 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure B17.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, Five-Category DV plus Broader ‘Equal Representation’ Category



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table B6 (model 4 for partisanship).



## C Robustness Check: Fixed Effects Models


In this section, we test the robustness of the results to using fixed effects models. We do not include the region identifier (U.S. or not U.S.) in these models because of lack of within-study variation on this variable. As can be seen from Table C1 and figures C1 and C2, the results are highly robust to including study fixed effects.

**Table C1.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, Study Fixed Effects Models

Study/Model Characteristic	High vs. Low		High vs. Middle		Ambiguous Cases	
	All	U.S.	All	U.S.	H-L	H-M
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>						
N of groups > 1	3.74*	3.32*	1.49*	1.52*	1.48*	0.57
	(0.55)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.60)	(0.71)
Partisanship: Democrat		-0.91		0.41	0.61	1.94*
		(0.48)		(0.48)	(0.73)	(0.94)
Partisanship: Republican		0.82		-0.09	0.82	0.59
		(0.46)		(0.43)	(0.69)	(0.95)
General political ideology	-0.17	0.06	-0.07	-0.00	-3.08*	-18.07
	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.71)	(0.73)	(1.39)	(1,554.84)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.44	-0.28	0.06	0.12	-1.11	-1.00
	(0.61)	(0.64)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.90)	(0.95)
Domain: Economic	0.45	0.43	-0.05	0.05	-0.78	-0.21
	(0.75)	(0.78)	(0.70)	(0.71)	(1.02)	(1.08)
<b>Controls</b>						
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.18)
N of observations (ln)	-0.09	0.11	-0.08	0.08	-0.60	-1.92*
	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.57)
Preference divergence	1.71*	1.97*	1.93*	1.72*	0.30	-0.96
	(0.67)	(0.72)	(0.66)	(0.69)	(0.86)	(1.13)
Cutpoint 1	-9.00*	-8.35*	-4.27	-3.72		
	(3.74)	(3.65)	(3.24)	(3.28)		
Cutpoint 2	-6.97	-6.17	-3.73	-3.11		
	(3.68)	(3.57)	(3.23)	(3.26)		
Cutpoint 3	-5.45	-4.50	-2.61	-1.75		
	(3.64)	(3.53)	(3.22)	(3.24)		
Cutpoint 4	-4.67	-3.74	-1.26	-0.37		
	(3.62)	(3.52)	(3.21)	(3.24)		
Cutpoint 5	-2.89	-1.87	0.70	1.66		
	(3.62)	(3.52)	(3.21)	(3.24)		
Cutpoint 6	-0.48	0.52	2.33	3.30		
	(3.63)	(3.53)	(3.22)	(3.25)		
Study FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	254	206	200	176	228	160
Log Likelihood	-259.2	-228.1	-293	-252.5	-106.2	-60.23


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . All models include a full set of study dummies (not shown). N is smaller in models 5 and 6, compared to the models in the main text, because some studies do not report any ambiguous findings and therefore drop out when including study fixed effects.

**Figure C1.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, Study Fixed Effects Models



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table C1 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure C2.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, Study Fixed Effects Models



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table C1 (model 4 for partisanship).

## D Descriptive Statistics of Study and Model Characteristics

Table D1 presents descriptive statistics of reported statistical models in the literature on differential political responsiveness: It shows the number of empirical models with different characteristics, separately for models that compare high and low-income groups and high and middle-income groups, as well as the combined total. For instance, 126 of 308 (or 41%) reported empirical models that compare the representation of high and low-income groups do so using an empirical model that includes the preferences of three income groups. Similarly, 15 of 232 (or 6.5%) reported empirical models that compare the representation of high and middle-income groups examine policies on which the preferences of the high and middle-income groups diverge. And of a total of 308 reported models that compare the representation of high-income individuals to that of low and/or middle-income individuals, 98 empirical models examine economic issues.

In the main text, we show how statistical models that include the preferences of more than one income group tend to produce greater differentials in political responsiveness. Table D1 shows that 40 percent of comparisons of political responsiveness are made on the basis of statistical models that include preferences separately, while 60 percent are based on models that include preferences simultaneously, with a three-class setup being most common. Table D1 also shows that only a small part of published models study specific instances on which the preferences of two income groups diverge: only 17 (or 5.5%) empirical models that compare the representation of high and low-income groups examine policies on which preferences diverge; this number is 15 (or 6.5%) for models that compare high and middle-income groups. Most tests of differential responsiveness are made without reference to the partisanship of the government or representative: Only about 30 percent of models disaggregate the analysis by party and all of these are from the U.S. (e.g. Brunner et al., 2013; Rhodes & Schaffner, 2017). 32 percent of models rely on measures of general political ideology, which refers to either general ideology measured on a liberal to conservative scale (e.g. Bartels, 2008) or aggregate measures of policy liberalism (e.g. Rigby & Wright, 2011, 2013), whereas 68 percent rely on measures of specific policies and preferences (e.g. Gilens, 2012). About 56 percent of statistical models investigate differential responsiveness on non-specific issues, such as general ideology or across a whole range of different issues (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012; Lax et al., 2019), whereas about 30 percent examine economic issues (e.g. Rigby & Wright, 2011, 2013). Only 14 percent of models examine non-economic issues, which is an amalgam that contains abortion, social issues, foreign affairs, gun control, moral and religious issues (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Flavin, 2012b). Finally, the table shows that although the comparative literature has been growing fast in recent years, it is clear that it is still far from catching up to that from the U.S., which presents 79 percent of all models.

**Table D1.** Descriptive Statistics of Reported Statistical Models in the Literature

	High vs. Low	High vs. Middle	Combined Total
Number of income-group preferences included in statistical model:			
One	114 (37%)	99 (43%)	130 (40%)
Two	63 (20%)	2 (1%)	65 (20%)
Three	126 (41%)	126 (54%)	126 (38.5%)
Four	5 (2%)	5 (2%)	5 (1.5%)
Preference divergence:			
Yes	17 (5.5%)	15 (6.5%)	31 (9.5%)
Overall/unspecified	291 (94.5%)	216 (93.5%)	295 (90.5%)
Partisanship:			
Overall/not party-specific	217 (70.4%)	159 (69%)	229 (70%)
Democrat	44 (14.3%)	35 (15%)	47 (14.5%)
Republican	47 (15.3%)	38 (16%)	50 (15.5%)
Level of aggregation:			
General political ideology	103 (33.5%)	90 (39%)	103 (32%)
Issue-specific	205 (66.5%)	142 (61%)	223 (68%)
Policy domain:			
Overall/not issue-specific	164 (53%)	126 (54%)	182 (56%)
Non-economic issues	46 (15%)	46 (20%)	46 (14%)
Economic issues	98 (32%)	60 (26%)	98 (30%)
Region:			
U.S.	241 (78%)	204 (88%)	258 (79%)
Not U.S.	67 (22%)	28 (12%)	68 (21%)


*Note:* For high vs. low income, N=308. For high vs. middle income, N=232. The combined total of models estimated, N=326. The unit of analysis is a statistical model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a regression coefficient of a high-income group to one of either a low or middle-income group.

## E Analyzing the U.S. Studies Separately

### E.1 Test Statistics

Figure E1 displays the test statistics of the low, middle, and high-income coefficients from the U.S. studies.<sup>1</sup> The figure shows that high-income coefficients more often have positive and larger test statistics than do lower-income coefficients. The median test statistic of high-income coefficients is 3.3, whereas it is 2.1 and 0.65 for middle and low-income coefficients. For all groups, the figure shows an uptick in coefficients with test statistics around 1.96, which could suggest some publication bias in the U.S. literature. The most striking feature of figure E1, however, is that only 37 percent of low-income coefficients are positive with test statistics above 1.96 and that 35 percent are negative. In contrast, 52 percent of middle-income coefficient and 79 percent of high-income coefficients are positive with test statistics above 1.96. And only fourteen and four percent of middle and high-income coefficients are negatively signed.

**Figure E1.** Low, Middle, and High-Income Test Statistics, U.S. Studies Only



*Note:* N=666. The x-axis is truncated at 10, since a few coefficients have very large test statistics.

<sup>1</sup>If a study reports the coefficients of more than three income groups, we include the test statistics of the groups with the lowest, median, highest income.

## E.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table E1 shows that 43 percent of statistical models in the U.S. literature include preferences separately, while 57 percent include them simultaneously with a three-class setup being most common. The table further shows that only a small part of published models (11 percent) study specific instances in which the preferences of two income groups diverge. Most tests of differential responsiveness are made without reference to the partisanship of the government or representative (62.4 percent); 37.6 percent of models disaggregate the analysis by party. 40 percent of models rely on measures of general political ideology, which refers to either general ideology measured on a liberal to conservative scale (e.g. Bartels, 2008) or aggregate measures of policy liberalism (e.g. Rigby & Wright, 2011, 2013), whereas 60 percent rely on measures of specific policies and prefer-

**Table E1.** Descriptive Statistics of Reported Statistical Models in the U.S. Literature

	High vs. Low	High vs. Middle	Combined Total
Number of income-group preferences included in statistical model:			
One	96 (40%)	82 (40%)	111 (43%)
Two	25 (10%)	2 (1%)	27 (10.5%)
Three	115 (48%)	115 (56.5%)	115 (44.5%)
Four	5 (2%)	5 (2%)	5 (2.5%)
Preference divergence:			
Yes	15 (6%)	14 (7%)	28 (11%)
Overall/unspecified	226 (94%)	190 (93%)	230 (88.4%)
Region:			
U.S.	241 (78%)	204 (88%)	258 (79%)
Not U.S.	67 (22%)	28 (12%)	68 (21%)
Partisanship:			
Overall/not party-specific	150 (62%)	131 (64%)	161 (62.4%)
Democrat	44 (18%)	35 (17%)	47 (18.2%)
Republican	47 (20%)	38 (19%)	50 (19.4%)
Level of aggregation:			
General political ideology	103 (43%)	90 (44%)	103 (40%)
Issue-specific	138 (57%)	114 (56%)	155 (60%)
Policy domain:			
Overall/not issue-specific	155 (64%)	118 (58%)	172 (67%)
Non-economic issues	46 (19%)	46 (22%)	46 (18%)
Economic issues	40 (17%)	40 (20%)	40 (15%)


*Note:* For high vs. low income, N=241. For high vs. middle income, N=204. The combined total of models estimated, N=258. The unit of analysis is a statistical model (or set of models for bivariate regressions) that compares a regression coefficient of a high-income group to one of either a low or middle-income group.

ences (e.g. Gilens, 2012). About 67 percent of statistical models from the U.S. literature investigate differential responsiveness on non-specific issues, such as general ideology or across a whole range of different issues (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Gilens, 2012; Lax et al., 2019), whereas about 15 percent examine economic issues (e.g. Rigby & Wright, 2011, 2013). 18 percent of models examine non-economic issues, which is an amalgam that contains abortion, social issues, foreign affairs, gun control, moral and religious issues (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Flavin, 2012b).

Figure E2 displays the variation of findings when comparing the representation of high-income groups to those of low and middle-income groups. The high-low income comparison in figure E2a shows that whereas the rich appear better represented than the poor in two of three cases, the poor appear better represented than the rich in just 14 percent of cases. In a mere five percent of cases, the representation of the two groups is roughly equal, while ambiguous results account for the remaining 14.5 percent. Figure E2a further shows that the most frequent finding in the literature is that the coefficient of the high-income group is positive, while that of the low-income group is negative (27 percent of comparisons).

Figure E2b shows that, compared to high and low-income groups, differentials in political responsiveness between high and middle-income groups are both less commonly observed and less severe: About 61 percent of published empirical models find that high-income preferences are better represented than middle-income preferences, most often with a factor less than two (32 percent of models), whereas about 10 percent find that the middle class are better represented than the rich. Representation is roughly equal between high and middle-income groups in 15 percent of cases; ambiguous results make out the last 14 percent. And similarly to the comparative literature, the published

**Figure E2.** Comparing Coefficients of Low, Middle, and High-Income Groups, U.S Studies Only



Note:  $N_{(a)}=241$ .  $N_{(b)}=204$ .  $\beta_L$ ,  $\beta_M$ , and  $\beta_H$  denote low, middle, and high-income coefficients.



literature from the U.S. includes more high-low income comparisons (241) than high-middle income comparisons (204).

### **E.3 The Drivers of Published Results**

Table E2 shows the results when regressing the two variables shown in figure E2 on the study and model characteristics displayed in table E1.

The results of models (1) and (2) of table E2 are identical to those presented in the main text. The results of Models (3) and (4) are highly similar to those of the models that are estimated on the full sample (the sample that includes the comparative studies, as reported in the main text): the models show that for the high-low income comparison, the likelihood of obtaining ambiguous results increases when more than one set of preferences are included in a statistical model. One is less likely to get ambiguous results as the sample size increases and when studying general ideology, rather than specific policies.

#### ***Predicted Probabilities***

For each study and model characteristic, we display the predicted probability of observing a certain form of differential responsiveness in figures E3 and E4.

For the high-low income comparison (shown in figure E3), the results are highly similar to the results estimated on the full sample of published studies (that which also includes the findings of the comparative studies) for all predictors, except policy domain. The pooled results in the main text show that observed differentials in responsiveness are slightly more severe on economic issues. The results in figure E3 demonstrate that this finding is driven solely by the comparative studies: In the U.S. literature, there is little variation in findings of differential responsiveness across policy domains. If anything, responsiveness appears slightly less unequal on economic issues compared to non-economic issues.


The results of the high and middle-income comparison (shown in figure E4) are largely identical to those from models estimated on the full sample of published studies. Observed differentials in responsiveness are more severe when including the preferences of more than one income group in a statistical model. There is little difference in findings across partisanship or the level of aggregation of policies and preferences. And although observed differentials in responsiveness appear less severe between the high and middle-income groups on economic issues, the differences in published findings across policy domains are not statistically significant.

**Table E2.** Determinants of Differential Political Responsiveness, U.S. studies only

	High vs. Low	High vs. Middle	Ambiguous Cases	
	U.S.	U.S.	H-L	H-M
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Study/Model Characteristic</b>				
N of groups > 1	3.24* (0.54)	1.74* (0.46)	1.56* (0.72)	1.27 (0.81)
Partisanship: Democrat	-0.78 (0.46)	0.21 (0.43)	0.82 (0.60)	1.10 (0.80)
Partisanship: Republican	0.84 (0.43)	-0.22 (0.39)	1.00 (0.55)	-0.01 (0.82)
General political ideology	0.41 (0.76)	0.01 (0.47)	-2.05* (0.85)	-2.39* (1.08)
Domain: Non-economic	-0.01 (0.60)	0.01 (0.46)	-0.34 (0.71)	-1.09 (0.76)
Domain: Economic	0.61 (0.73)	-0.41 (0.61)	0.01 (0.78)	-0.85 (0.87)
<b>Controls</b>				
Distance: H-L[M]	-0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.11 (0.10)
N of observations (ln)	0.14 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.90* (0.31)	-1.62* (0.45)
Preference divergence	2.03* (0.71)	1.73* (0.65)	0.56 (0.94)	-0.73 (1.06)
Constant			-0.10 (3.05)	2.39 (3.69)
Cutpoint 1	-5.09 (3.03)	-1.76 (1.64)		
Cutpoint 2	-3.24 (2.97)	-1.19 (1.60)		
Cutpoint 3	-1.70 (2.94)	0.04 (1.58)		
Cutpoint 4	-0.98 (2.93)	1.29 (1.58)		
Cutpoint 5	0.82 (2.94)	3.22* (1.60)		
Cutpoint 6	3.09 (2.95)	4.78* (1.62)		
<b>Random Effects</b>				
Study-level variance	5.81* (2.72)	0.31 (0.29)	0.21 (0.52)	0.80 (1.09)
N	206	176	241	204
N of studies	16	15	16	15
Log Likelihood	-258.7	-266.7	-84.84	-65.74


*Note:* \*  $p < 0.05$ . Models 1-2 are random-effects ordered logistic regressions, in which the dependent variables are the categorical variables shown Figure E2 (with ambiguous cases separated out). Models 3-4 are random-effects logistic regressions, in which the dependent variables are dummies for whether results are ambiguous (1) or not (0). Baseline for number of groups is one. Baseline for partisanship is overall/not party-specific. Baseline for policy domains is unspecified/not issue-specific.

**Figure E3.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Low-Income Comparison, U.S. Studies Only



*Note:*  $\beta_L$  and  $\beta_H$  denote low and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (1) of table E2 (model 2 for partisanship).

**Figure E4.** Predicted Probabilities for the High and Middle-Income Comparison, U.S. Studies Only



*Note:*  $\beta_M$  and  $\beta_H$  denote middle and high-income coefficients. The predicted probabilities are calculated from in-sample predictions based on the estimates of model (3) of table E2 (model 4 for partisanship).

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