

Appendix

Diasporic Foreign Policy Interest Groups in the US:
Democracy, Conflict, and Political Entrepreneurship

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1 Foreign Policy Interest Groups

In this section, we present a comprehensive list of all the diasporic foreign policy interest groups that we identified through our data collection conducted in 2018-2020 (Table A1-1). We also discuss the data collection process and its relationship to Paul and Paul’s study.¹

Coding Decisions on “Diasporas”

As discussed in the paper, we used data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) regarding all foreign-born groups in the US to identify the entire universe of diasporas which could in theory mobilize to influence US foreign policy. It is important to acknowledge that foreign-born populations are only a sub-set of the broader concept of diasporas. Political diasporas have been defined as “a people with common national origin who reside outside a claimed or an independent home territory... ...[and] who regard themselves or are regarded by others as members or potential members of their country of origin (claimed or already existing), a status held regardless of their geographical location and citizen status outside their home country.”² Such a definition clearly encompasses individuals who are foreign-born, but may also include second or later generations of individuals who are still identified (or identify) with their country of origin. According to the US Census Bureau, foreign-born individuals include naturalized US citizens, legal permanent residents, temporary migrants, humanitarian migrants, and unauthorized migrants.³ Although limiting, we contend that these populations make up a large percentage of potential diasporic individuals in the US. The fact that most immigrants in the US today arrived after 1965 reinforces this assumption and minimizes the limitation this narrow definition imposes on this study. The foreign-born groups in the census thus constitute our universe of cases.

Paul and Paul (2009) Data

Our original data collection is inspired in part by the work conducted by Paul and Paul, whose data we use in our paper to verify the robustness of our results. Paul and Paul indicate in their study that they searched the *Washington Representatives* to identify all organizations that employed a federal lobbyist, the Federal Election Commission archives to find all reports filed by ethnic-based Political Action Committees (PACs) since 1998, and the Center for Responsive Politics to find any additional PAC campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures associated with diaspora groups.⁴ Through their search, they discounted business organizations, trade groups, or foreign groups which do not cater to American members. In the end, they identify 85 groups representing 37 ethnicities. Of these, 7 constitute regional ethnicities (Asian, Arab, African, Caribbean, Central and Eastern European, Baltic, and Hispanic), while the remaining 30 were associated with a specific nationality.

¹Paul, David M., and Rachel A. Paul. *Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2009.

²Shain, Yossi. “Ethnic diasporas and US foreign policy.” *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 5 (1994): 811-841, p. 814.

³Grieco, Elizabeth M., et al. *The foreign born population in the US: 2010*. American Community Survey Reports. United States Census Bureau. 2012.

⁴Paul, David M., and Rachel A. Paul. *Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2009, p. 24.

The Kurdish lobby group identified by Paul and Paul does not feature in our data since there is no independent Kurdish state, limiting our ability to collect measures for our covariates. In particular, the Census Bureau does not identify a foreign-born Kurdish community, as data are collected only by independent countries recognized by the US.

Authors' Data Collection

Given our definition of diasporic foreign policy interest groups, we identified two specific types of organizations which have a legal status allowing them to primarily engage in political activities as relates to foreign policy - Social Welfare Organizations (501(c)4) and Political Action Committees (PACs). We exclude organizations that are not tied to diaspora communities, namely broader American groups or those established by embassies, foreign governments, or their surrogates. Of all organizations that are established by diaspora communities, we exclude those whose primary missions are cultural, educational, humanitarian, economic (business and trade), or otherwise unrelated to foreign policy. While these organizations may have political stances, they do not engage in activities that primarily aim to influence US foreign policy and most are legally forbidden from engaging in electoral activities or lobbying. Of all organizations that are legally permitted to engage in politics, we do not consider those which are not primarily concerned with foreign policy issues.

In particular, we include 501(c)4 organizations because they can “rate candidates, promote legislation, sponsor PACs, broadcast issue advocacy (including electioneering communications), and make independent expenditures as long as partisan activities are not their primary purpose.”⁵ Although these groups are prohibited from making campaign contributions and should not spend more than 50% of their resources on partisan electioneering, they primarily serve to engage in political activism. Given the political nature of 501(c)4 organizations, their donors cannot deduct their contributions from their federal tax returns, in contrast to 501(c)3 non-profits.⁶

All other non-profit organizations under 501(c) of the US tax code are not relevant as they are not dedicated to political activism as relates to foreign policy, and most cannot be tied to diaspora communities. A complete list of definitions of all 501(c) organizations is available on the IRS website.⁷ Importantly, 501(c)3 organizations, the most prominent and common type of non-profit, are classified as charitable organizations. As indicated by the IRS, “no organization may qualify for section 501(c)(3) status if a substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence legislation (commonly known as lobbying).”⁸ Although 501(c)3 organizations are able to conduct research and educational activities, voter registration drives, and organize events with candidates for elections, these are not their primary activities, and they are forbidden from being directly involved in federal campaigns, including endorsing or contributing to candidates for election or to PACs.⁹ Ultimately, while 501(c)3 organizations may have political stances which they publicize to their members, they do not primarily engage in any electoral activities or lobbying, and there-

⁵Herrnson, Paul S., Christopher J. Deering, and Clyde Wilcox. *Interest Groups Unleashed*. Sage Publications Inc. 2013, p. 16.

⁶Ibid.: p. 17.

⁷IRS. (2020). “Other Tax-Exempt Organizations.” Accessible here: <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-tax-exempt-organizations>.

⁸IRS. (2020). “Lobbying.” Accessible here: <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/lobbying>.

⁹Herrnson, Paul S., Christopher J. Deering, and Clyde Wilcox. *Interest Groups Unleashed*. Sage Publications Inc. 2013, p. 16.

fore take no significant action to shape US foreign policy. For these reasons, we exclude these organization from our analyses.

For our paper, we replicated and expanded upon Paul and Paul’s process for identifying the relevant diasporic interest groups. We began by searching through the *Washington Representatives* database as well as Federal Election Commission filings and reports. In addition, we conducted an extensive online search for relevant organizations, one community at a time. In turn, again for each potential diaspora community, we searched the US Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) online Tax Exempt Organization Search database for all diasporic 501(c)4 organizations engaged in foreign policy lobbying.¹⁰ Lastly, we reviewed the political activities of all PACs and 501(c)4 organizations on the online “OpenSecrets” platform of the Center for Responsive Politics.¹¹

Table A1-1 below delineates the organizations that we were able to identify as well as their related diaspora community. Through our searches we were not able to identify an organization engaged in foreign policy lobbying corresponding to the Czechian-American, Salvadoran-American, Serbian-American, and Somali-American communities, as identified by Paul and Paul. It is possible that the relevant organizations which existed in the mid-2000s are no longer active. In turn, unlike Paul and Paul, we identified organizations associated with the Azerbaijani, Bosnian, Cambodian, Chinese, Cypriot, Egyptian, Libyan, Macedonian, Moroccan, Sri Lankan, South Sudanese, Syrian, and Yemeni diasporas. It is likely that these organizations were established after Paul and Paul conducted their study. As a result of these discrepancies we used both Paul and Paul’s data as well as our new data as dependent variables in the analyses presented in the paper.

¹⁰IRS. (2020). “Tax Exempt Organization Search.” Accessible here: <https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/>.

¹¹For reference, the platform is accessible here: [OpenSecrets.org](https://www.opensecrets.org).

Table A1-1: Diasporic Foreign Policy Interest Groups

Country of Origin	Name	Status
Albania	Albanian American Civic League	501(c)4
Albania	Albanian American Public Affairs Committee	PAC
Armenia	Armenian National Committee of America	501(c)4
Armenia	Armenian National Committee PAC	PAC
Azerbaijan	Azeri Democracy Initiative Foundation	501(c)4
Azerbaijan	US Azeris Network	501(c)4
Bosnia	Bosnia and Herzegovina Democracy Initiative	501(c)4*
Bosnia	Bosnian American PAC	PAC
Cambodia	Cambodian-Americans PAC	PAC
China	Chinese American Leadership PAC	PAC
Colombia	Colombian Alliance in the USA (CAUSA)	501(c)4
Croatia	National Federation of Croatian Americans	501(c)4
Cuba	Cuban American National Foundation (CANF)	501(c)4
Cuba	New Cuba PAC	PAC
Cuba	United States Cuba Now PAC	PAC
Cuba	US-Cuba Democracy PAC	PAC
Cyprus	National Coordinated Effort of Hellenes	501(c)4
Egypt	American Egyptian Strategic Alliance	501(c)4
Eritrea	Eritrean American PAC	PAC
Ethiopia	Ethiopian American PAC	PAC
Greece	Greek American PAC 2016	PAC
India	India-US PAC (INDIAPAC)	PAC
India	US India PAC (USINPAC)	PAC
Iran	Iranian American PAC	PAC
Ireland	The Irish Breakfast Club Leaders PAC	PAC
Israel	American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)	501(c)4
Israel	American Pro-Israel PAC	PAC
Israel	Friends of Israel PAC (FIPAC)	PAC
Israel	US Israel Friendship PAC	PAC
Israel	World Alliance for Israel PAC	PAC
Italy	National Italian American PAC	PAC
Japan	National Japanese American PAC (JAAMPAC)	PAC
Lebanon	American Task Force for Lebanon Policy PAC**	PAC
Lebanon	The Lebanese American Council for Democracy***	501(c)4
Lebanon	US Lebanon Policy Council	501(c)4
Libya	Libyan American Public Affairs Council Inc.	501(c)4

Lithuania	Lithuanian American Council	501(c)4
Macedonia	Macedonia PAC	PAC
Mexico	Mexican American Political Association	501(c)4*
Mexico	Mexicans and Americans Thinking Together (MATT) Foundation Inc.	501c4
Morocco	Moroccan American Center for Policy Inc.	PAC
Pakistan	American Pakistani Public Affairs Committee	501(c)4
Pakistan	Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee (PAK-PAC)	PAC
Philippines	Filipino American Community Council	501(c)4
Poland	Polish American Congress	501(c)4
Poland	Polish American Leadership PAC	PAC
South Korea	NAKASEC Action Fund	501(c)4
South Korea	NAKASEC Action Fund PAC	PAC
South Sudan	Alliance for South Sudanese in Diaspora	501(c)4
Sri Lanka	Americans for Peace in Sri Lanka	501(c)4
Syria	Americans for a Free Syria	501(c)4
Syria	Free Syria PAC	PAC
Taiwan	Taiwanese American Action Council PAC	PAC
Taiwan	Taiwanese American Victory Fund PAC (TAVF PAC)	PAC
Turkey	Turkish American Heritage PAC (TURKISH PAC)	PAC
Turkey	Turkish Coalition California PAC (TC-CAL PAC)	PAC
Turkey	Turkish Coalition Midwest PAC (TC-MIDWEST PAC)	PAC
Turkey	Turkish Coalition Northeast PAC (TC-NE PAC)	PAC
Turkey	Turkish Coalition USA PAC (TC-USA PAC)	PAC
Ukraine	American Center for a European Ukraine	501(c)4
Vietnam	Human Rights For Vietnam PAC	PAC
Vietnam	Vietnamese American PAC	PAC
Yemen	Yemeni American Public Affairs Council PAC	PAC

*We were unable to identify direct evidence of the 501(c)4 status of these organizations.

**Also called the “American Task Force for Lebanon Legislative Council PAC.”

***Also called “The Lebanese American Commission for Democracy.”

2 Rationales and Data Sources for Control Variables

Population

Unless there is a sufficient number of immigrants from a certain country, it is unlikely that they will band together to advance their interests. More populous diaspora communities are thus more likely to have motivated individuals who are willing to establish an interest group and influence US foreign policy. Even if relatively less wealthy on a per-capita basis, larger groups will have greater absolute resources that they can draw upon to fund interest group activities. To measure diaspora community populations we use data from the US Census Bureau (2017) American Community Survey (ACS) Tables S0201 and B05006. S0201 contains detailed information regarding foreign-born communities greater than 65,000 people. B05006 contains aggregate population levels for each foreign-born group, as well as the number of individuals living in 32 US states by country of birth when the total population exceeds 20,000. We combine the population data available in these two tables and create a single aggregate population variables. Given the skewed distribution of these populations - most communities are very small while a few, such as those of individuals born in Mexico or China, are very large - we use the natural log transformation of the data in our models.

Geographic Concentration

The greater the geographic concentration of a diasporic community in a given area in the US, the lower the costs of mobilizing individuals and offering solidarity or expressive benefits as an inducement for engaging with an interest group. Thus, diasporas that are more geographically concentrated will be more likely to form interest groups. As with population, Table B05006 from the ACS is also used to construct a variable that indicates the relative geographic concentration of different communities. We calculate the ratio of the percentage of a diaspora which lives in a state to the percentage of the territory of the United States covered by that state. For example, in 2010, roughly 19% of all individuals born in India living in the US resided in California, while California represents 4.31% of US territory. The value of the geographic concentration variable for India in 2010 would thus be $0.19/0.0431 = 4.41$. In this way we take into account the relative size of a diaspora's presence across states and the size of those states in order to assess the relative concentration of a diaspora population. A large proportion of a diaspora in a small state indicates that that population is more likely to be geographically proximate than the same proportion in a large state. Unfortunately, B05006 does not provide details for 18 of the 50 states which represent 41.84% of the US's territory. For these 18 states we calculate the aggregate percentage of each diaspora living in all those states and divide by the aggregate territory. In addition, this data is only available starting in 2010, so our variable is not deployed for the 2007 models in the primary results. We use the natural log transformation of this measure in our models.

Wealth

If the average income level of a diaspora community is high, then there is a greater chance its members will be able to contribute to lobbying activities and provide campaign contributions with the aim of influencing policy-makers. Greater numbers of wealthy individuals who feel part of a community makes it more likely that that community will have individuals willing to engage in or support foreign policy lobbying. Ultimately, the perceived value of the probability of success

has a positive impact on overcoming the collective action problem.¹² Thus, we expect to see an association between the income levels of a community and the existence of an interest group. We adopt a measure of the relative wealth of every foreign-born community in the US using data from the ACS Table S0201. Specifically, the S0201 data contains a measure of per capita income in dollars of every foreign-born community with a population greater than 65,000. We use this as a measure of community wealth and employ the natural log transformation in our models.

Education

The relative level of education of diaspora communities will likely play a role in their ability to overcome the collective action problem, in addition to making it more likely that they have individuals with the know-how to establish a new lobby organization. Communities whose members have higher overall levels of educational achievement are more likely to be associated with a foreign policy interest group. Educated individuals are more likely to have the capacity to engage in the entrepreneurship necessary to establish and manage a group, as well as to mobilize other members of their community. We create an education variable for our models using ACS Table S0201, which indicates the number of individuals age 25 or above who have attained different levels of education defined as (1) less than a high school degree, (2) a high school degree, (3) some college or associate degree, (4) a bachelor's degree, or (5) a graduate degree. For the primary models presented in our paper, we construct a variable that indicates the percentage of individuals of a foreign-born community who have a bachelor's degree or higher. We posit that communities with many individuals who have a high level of education are more likely to have an associated foreign policy lobby group. We use the natural log transformation of this measure in our models.

Level of Integration

The degree to which diaspora communities are integrated into US society will also influence their willingness to form a foreign policy interest group. In particular, we expect that the greater the level of integration, the weaker the connection that a diaspora feels towards its country of origin, and the less likely it is associated with a foreign policy interest group. In turn, communities which retain their individual culture or language, even while being a part of US society, are more likely to seek to influence US foreign policy, given that they likely care more about US relations with their country of origin. We use one final variable from the ACS Table S0201 as a proxy measure for the degree to which a certain community is integrated into US society. Table S0201 contains a measure of the percentage of individuals from each foreign-born community that speak English less than "very well." Given that language ability is a marker for integration, if a large percentage of a community cannot speak English that can be interpreted as a sign that it is not highly integrated into US society and potentially maintains strong links to its country of origin. This implies that English speaking diasporas are more likely to integrate and less likely to form interest groups. We employ the natural log transformation of this variable in our models.

¹²Lubell, Mark, Arnold Vedlitz, Sammy Zahran, and Letitia T. Alston. "Collective action, environmental activism, and air quality policy." *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2006): 149-160.

Remittances

The extensiveness of ties between the US and the countries of origin of different diaspora communities will also affect the likelihood those communities establish foreign policy interest groups. In particular, we posit that remittance ties between the US and a particular country of origin will make it more likely that individuals from that country’s diaspora mobilize in an attempt to influence US foreign policy. In our models, we adopt a measure of the importance of remittances for country of origin economies from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2018), indicating the quantity of remittances countries receive as a percentage of their GDP. The higher the value of this indicator, the greater the extent to which a country and its people are reliant on remittances to sustain economic activity and well-being. In our main models presented in the paper, we calculate the average number of remittances received by countries of origin as a percentage of GDP for the period 1996-2005. In Appendix 4, we use alternative measures to assess the robustness of our results. In particular, we use the value for the given year represented in our models. We also calculate the averages for the decades 1991-2000 and 2001-2010. We employ the natural log transformation of these variables in our models. Although this variable represents remittances from all countries, it is likely that a substantial percentage comes from US diasporas, making this a valid proxy measure of ties between those diasporas and their countries of origin.

Trade

In addition to remittances, we include a measure of the average amount of trade flows between the US and all relevant countries of origin. This data is collected from the Correlates of War database. The measure constitutes the sum of the total value of imports in millions of current US dollars from the US to relevant countries of origin and vice-versa. Trade represents the economic linkages between the US and different countries of origin and its scale is influenced in part by the presence of diasporas within the US. High levels of trade should make it more likely that communities mobilize in attempts to influence US foreign policy toward their country of origin, perhaps with a focus on its international economic policies. In particular, for our main models we calculate the average annual value of total trade in the period 1996-2005. In Appendix 4, we deploy data for the given year represented in our models, as well as averages for 1991-2000 and 2001-2010. We employ the natural log transformation of these variables in our models.

Diaspora Institutions

Additionally, if a country of origin has a government institution dedicated to diaspora affairs, it would indicate an institutionalized desire to maintain a stronger connection with its diaspora populations abroad. The presence of such institutions could make it more likely for diasporas to mobilize. As demonstrated by Daniel Naujoks in the Indian case specifically, initiatives by countries of origin to engage with their diasporas can change the behavior of the latter by shifting their incentives to become naturalized Americans and to send remittances or invest in India.¹³ A primary way that governments seek to engage their diasporas is by creating a formal agency or other public body for this purpose. Thus, we collect data on whether any of the countries of origin in our sample have any formal public institution dedicated to diaspora relations. We obtain our measure from Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland who conducted a survey

¹³Naujoks, Daniel. *Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States*. 2013. Oxford University Press.

of states which participated in the Global Forum on Migration and Development, identifying all those which have formal institutions dedicated to diaspora relations. Specifically, they identify six types of institutions “depending on whether they function at a ministry, sub-ministry, national, or local level; are part of a consular network; or are a quasi-governmental institution.”¹⁴ For the purposes of our analysis, we code a simple dichotomous variable equal to one if a country of origin contains any type of diaspora institution. Ultimately, all those states whose governments seek any formal ties with their diasporas are more likely to galvanize their mobilization in the US than those with no institutions whatsoever.

Alliances

Security ties between the US and countries of origin may also affect the incentives for individuals in a diaspora community to mobilize to influence US foreign policy. In particular, defense alliances between the US and various countries around the world may influence diaspora mobilization in two ways: (1) On the one hand, they may deflate the perceived need for diasporas to mobilize, as they may feel that the interests of their country of origin are secure within the alliance. (2) On the other hand, alliances may spur mobilization as diasporas feel that they may have a greater chance of successfully influencing US foreign policy and/or that they are compelled to attempt to do so in order to ensure continued US support for the existing security arrangements. Although these two countervailing effects may neutralize each other, we posit it is important to include a measure in our models. We use data from the Correlates of War (COW 2018) project to identify all those states which have a formal defense pact with the US. The measure is a simple dichotomous variable of whether a state was covered by a defense pact for the entire period from 1996-2005, or entered into a defense pact in that decade. In Appendix 4, we conduct sensitivity analyses using data for the given year represented in our models as well as for the decades 1991-2000 and 2001-2010.

¹⁴Agunias, Dovelyn Rannveig, and Kathleen Newland. *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries*. International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute. 2012, p. 72.

3 Summary Statistics

Table A3-1: Summary Statistics for Main Variables (2010)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	110	1.863636	4.751585	0	31
Liberal Dem. (1996-2005)	104	.4445237	.2757615	.0200271	.8762133
Population*	110	11.7481	1.228895	10.01691	16.27605
Poor English*	72	3.430961	.9416625	.5877866	4.320151
Income*	72	10.33358	.3436437	9.506957	11.10892
Bachelor's Degree or More*	72	3.45684	.5758615	1.84055	4.32148
Remittances (1996-2005)*	100	1.077793	.8996386	.0148052	3.366247
Trade (1996-2005)*	106	7.646543	2.340879	1.99606	12.83131
Diaspora Institutions	110	.3909091	.4901873	0	1
Alliance (1996-2005)	110	.4727273	.5015406	0	1
Geographic Concentration*	109	3.319756	.5949161	2.25633	5.378391

*Natural log versions of these measures.

Table A3-2: Summary Statistics for Sensitivity Analysis Variables (2010)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Violent Conflict (Given Year)	110	.2	.5211138	0	3
Liberal Dem. (Given Year)	104	.4653386	.2768095	.0151628	.8886045
Remittances (Given Year)*	102	1.186158	.9708213	.0041571	3.263096
Trade (Given Year)*	106	8.160326	2.467763	.9282193	13.1484
Alliance (Given Year)	110	.4818182	.5019561	0	1
Violent Conflict (1991-2000)	110	2.136364	5.107069	0	35
Liberal Dem. (1991-2000)	104	.419392	.2797312	.0195294	.8753144
Remittances (1991-2000)*	95	.9290015	.8367781	.0091915	3.687852
Trade (1991-2000)*	107	7.264581	2.357728	1.734307	12.53146
Alliance (1991-2000)	110	.4363636	.4982036	0	1
Violent Conflict (2001-2010)	110	1.881818	4.788618	0	27
Liberal Dem. (2001-2010)	104	.4607581	.2759907	.0151167	.8848179
Remittances (2001-2010)*	103	1.187068	.9545609	.0041571	3.322793
Trade (2001-2010)*	106	8.020516	2.312112	2.86716	13.03843
Alliance (2001-2010)	110	.4818182	.5019561	0	1
MIDs (1996-2005)	110	.3818182	.7896326	0	3
Electoral Dem. (1996-2005)	104	.5626279	.2652501	.0214092	.9113757
Deliberative Dem. (1996-2005)	104	.4615525	.2613854	.028702	.8794953
Participatory Dem. (1996-2005)	104	.3615348	.2140295	.0175057	.8004006
Egalitarian Dem. (1996-2005)	104	.43606	.2502649	.0509541	.8696345
Polity (1996-2005)	102	4.171569	6.06082	-10	10
Dem. Change (1996-2005)	104	.0043228	.0130013	-.0456058	.0520645

*Natural log versions of these measures.

4 Sensitivity Analyses

In this section, we present 12 sensitivity analyses we conducted to assess the robustness of the results discussed in the paper. These analyses are presented in four subsections. In section 4.1, we provide results for all possible years for which we have data using the same variables from our primary models. In section 4.2, we test whether our results hold when our variables represent data from the given year considered by our models, or from two alternative decades (1991-2000 or 2001-2010). In section 4.3, we use an alternative measure of violent conflict in our models. Finally, in section 4.4, we use alternative measures of democratic governance. Altogether these analyses confirm the robustness of our results, particularly with respect to our two primary independent variables of interest - conflict and democratic experience.

4.1 Models Across All Years

Tables A4-1 and A4-2 present independent models of all of the years (2007-2015) for which we have data for all of our variables. In the paper, we only present data for 2007, 2010, and 2015. We selected these years as they represent the first and last years for which we have data from the American Community Survey Tables S0201 (2007 and 2015) and B05006 (2010 and 2015). Our results should not differ across years since many of the variables we use are invariant across time (such as the historic averages), while changes in the characteristics of foreign-born communities do not change dramatically on an annual basis. Indeed, the two Tables below demonstrate that our results are not substantively different across the different years.

4.2 Different Time-Periods

In Tables A4-3, A4-4, and A4-5 we present three sets of results using data covering different time periods instead of 1996-2005 for five variables: violent conflict, democracy, remittances, trade, and alliances. In A4-3, we replace the decade averages with contemporaneous data for the given years represented by our models. Due to data limitations we present a model using data from the year 2012 instead of 2015. We then calculate averages for the decades 2001-2010 and 1991-2000 and use these variables in our models. The three Tables demonstrate that our results do not change substantively when using these alternative measures.

Table A4-1: Models Across All Years (DV: New Data on Lobbies)

	(2007)	(2008)	(2009)	(2010)	(2011)	(2012)	(2013)	(2014)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.568** (0.231)	0.369** (0.149)	0.340** (0.135)	0.398** (0.167)	0.372** (0.171)	0.295** (0.128)	0.286** (0.114)	0.385** (0.155)	0.290** (0.117)
Liberal Dem. (1996-2005)	13.585*** (5.259)	8.188** (3.438)	9.334** (4.086)	11.375** (4.812)	9.653** (4.675)	5.228 (3.398)	5.424* (3.056)	6.114 (4.061)	5.335* (3.122)
Population	3.616*** (1.369)	2.730*** (0.962)	2.856*** (1.042)	3.064*** (1.107)	3.402*** (1.210)	2.531*** (0.972)	2.376*** (0.858)	2.779*** (1.053)	2.054** (0.805)
Poor English	3.834*** (1.288)	3.234*** (1.057)	2.957*** (0.900)	3.207*** (1.021)	3.260*** (1.054)	3.423*** (1.107)	2.919*** (0.963)	4.684*** (1.403)	3.383*** (1.043)
Income	12.152*** (4.536)	10.699*** (3.463)	11.127*** (4.009)	9.933*** (3.475)	12.060*** (4.028)	13.112*** (3.966)	11.780*** (3.971)	17.526*** (5.104)	11.808*** (3.485)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.642 (1.162)	-0.073 (1.039)	0.093 (1.043)	0.794 (1.182)	-0.017 (1.162)	-0.830 (1.123)	-0.755 (1.084)	-1.270 (1.365)	-1.163 (1.163)
Remittances (1996-2005)	2.327** (0.916)	1.483** (0.648)	2.554** (1.063)	2.868** (1.295)	2.022** (1.004)	2.022** (0.944)	1.297** (0.639)	2.331** (1.029)	1.261* (0.661)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.690 (0.461)	-0.511 (0.348)	-0.299 (0.417)	-0.172 (0.483)	-0.410 (0.485)	-0.048 (0.389)	-0.307 (0.311)	-0.098 (0.419)	-0.134 (0.330)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.827 (1.091)	-0.053 (0.898)	-0.979 (1.006)	-1.062 (1.028)	-0.330 (1.098)	-0.150 (0.952)	0.537 (0.887)	0.236 (1.075)	0.220 (0.876)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-7.264*** (2.450)	-5.409*** (1.775)	-5.812*** (1.996)	-6.126*** (2.225)	-6.378*** (2.207)	-6.152*** (2.094)	-4.849*** (1.594)	-6.389*** (2.133)	-4.966*** (1.664)
Geographic Concentration				0.541 (0.790)	1.023 (0.790)	0.936 (0.830)	0.741 (0.724)	0.711 (0.859)	0.910 (0.746)
Constant	-186.005*** (62.749)	-155.403*** (46.675)	-163.210*** (51.685)	-160.801*** (48.927)	-182.985*** (54.397)	-181.766*** (51.601)	-162.424*** (49.559)	-234.507*** (64.380)	-161.588*** (43.796)
Observations	65	66	65	67	68	70	72	72	72

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-2: Models Across All Years (DV: Paul and Paul 2009 Data)

	(2007)	(2008)	(2009)	(2010)	(2011)	(2012)	(2013)	(2014)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.603*** (0.229)	0.531*** (0.202)	0.434*** (0.152)	0.468*** (0.166)	0.486*** (0.183)	0.459*** (0.162)	0.497*** (0.172)	0.519*** (0.179)	0.477*** (0.165)
Liberal Dem. (1996-2005)	17.323*** (5.997)	15.194*** (5.180)	13.829*** (4.840)	15.733*** (5.419)	15.503*** (5.697)	13.897*** (5.118)	15.269*** (5.497)	14.139*** (5.385)	14.486*** (5.257)
Population	3.193*** (1.076)	3.034*** (0.980)	2.550*** (0.848)	2.926*** (1.006)	3.346*** (1.089)	3.011*** (1.038)	3.005*** (0.997)	3.073*** (1.074)	2.825*** (0.953)
Poor English	2.720*** (0.931)	2.602*** (0.867)	2.270*** (0.746)	2.489*** (0.807)	2.737*** (0.873)	2.637*** (0.845)	2.726*** (0.865)	3.200*** (0.968)	2.880*** (0.895)
Income	6.364*** (3.180)	6.267*** (2.959)	5.880*** (2.937)	5.800*** (2.613)	7.806*** (3.166)	7.906*** (2.964)	7.710*** (3.078)	10.077*** (3.615)	8.312*** (2.980)
Bachelor's Degree or More	1.572 (1.312)	1.154 (1.276)	0.933 (1.161)	1.502 (1.257)	1.098 (1.286)	0.680 (1.281)	0.754 (1.262)	0.140 (1.341)	0.186 (1.270)
Remittances (1996-2005)	2.428** (1.124)	2.040** (0.936)	2.316** (0.984)	2.443** (1.076)	2.416** (1.104)	2.182** (1.048)	2.326** (1.043)	2.349** (1.110)	2.145** (0.979)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.782 (0.494)	-0.783* (0.464)	-0.460 (0.426)	-0.571 (0.494)	-0.654 (0.487)	-0.582 (0.516)	-0.568 (0.446)	-0.599 (0.518)	-0.547 (0.459)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.999 (0.999)	-0.964 (0.977)	-0.944 (0.898)	-0.927 (0.909)	-0.805 (0.954)	-0.848 (0.967)	-0.793 (0.921)	-0.918 (1.059)	-0.844 (0.944)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-4.333** (1.731)	-3.868** (1.602)	-3.740** (1.615)	-3.621** (1.735)	-4.242** (1.840)	-3.792** (1.736)	-3.988** (1.702)	-3.801** (1.700)	-3.774** (1.686)
Geographic Concentration				-0.047 (0.773)	0.455 (0.749)	0.050 (0.844)	0.113 (0.762)	-0.010 (0.821)	0.111 (0.778)
Constant	-123.457*** (43.694)	-117.799*** (39.317)	-107.867*** (36.470)	-114.584*** (37.168)	-140.987*** (43.426)	-134.767*** (38.804)	-134.586*** (40.637)	-158.849*** (45.587)	-137.536*** (38.450)
Observations	65	66	65	67	68	70	72	72	72

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-3: All Data from Given Year

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2012)	(2007)	(2010)	(2012)
Violent Conflict	4.751** (1.892)	3.286*** (1.229)	3.814*** (1.278)	2.953** (1.248)	1.727* (0.938)	1.693* (0.943)
Liberal Dem.	15.695*** (5.623)	10.290*** (3.689)	9.635** (3.982)	9.495** (3.759)	5.531* (2.946)	2.932 (3.152)
Population	2.496*** (0.913)	1.591** (0.660)	2.332*** (0.824)	2.667*** (0.922)	1.773** (0.741)	1.601** (0.709)
Poor English	2.914*** (0.949)	2.484*** (0.770)	3.148*** (0.951)	3.504*** (1.154)	2.584*** (0.906)	2.965*** (1.074)
Income	7.848** (3.368)	6.809*** (2.465)	10.151*** (3.255)	10.448*** (3.872)	7.775*** (2.695)	9.860*** (3.037)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.712 (1.148)	0.101 (0.925)	0.063 (1.095)	0.328 (1.057)	0.103 (0.902)	-0.488 (0.979)
Remittances	2.400** (1.178)	2.111** (0.837)	2.295** (0.894)	1.568** (0.693)	1.459** (0.694)	1.280* (0.667)
Trade	-0.501 (0.468)	-0.182 (0.290)	-0.371 (0.249)	-0.514 (0.340)	-0.205 (0.287)	-0.074 (0.244)
Diaspora Institutions	-1.378 (1.063)	-0.762 (0.817)	-1.051 (1.002)	-1.253 (1.033)	-0.487 (0.814)	-0.125 (0.878)
Alliance	-4.819** (1.894)	-2.107 (1.303)	-1.845 (1.451)	-5.994*** (1.997)	-3.080** (1.367)	-3.093** (1.459)
Geographic Concentration		-0.184 (0.714)	0.077 (0.866)		0.237 (0.668)	0.726 (0.767)
Constant	-129.239*** (44.376)	-104.417*** (31.224)	-150.203*** (41.876)	-153.400*** (49.029)	-114.015*** (34.418)	-134.895*** (37.123)
Observations	64	67	70	64	67	70

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-4: Alternative Decade (1991-2000)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1991-2000)	0.439*** (0.161)	0.304*** (0.113)	0.329*** (0.115)	0.845** (0.360)	0.348*** (0.134)	0.291** (0.116)
Liberal Dem. (1991-2000)	13.374*** (4.353)	12.509*** (4.222)	12.036*** (4.433)	15.960** (6.612)	10.085** (3.988)	4.642* (2.773)
Population	3.136*** (1.066)	3.024*** (1.048)	3.249*** (1.125)	3.785** (1.522)	3.248*** (1.172)	1.936** (0.759)
Poor English	1.890** (0.799)	1.687** (0.710)	2.210*** (0.847)	3.248*** (1.147)	2.430*** (0.840)	2.704*** (0.908)
Income	2.418 (2.886)	2.402 (2.697)	5.293* (2.924)	7.561** (3.651)	6.971** (3.535)	9.232*** (3.246)
Bachelor's Degree or More	2.224* (1.192)	2.080* (1.254)	1.259 (1.299)	1.498 (1.329)	1.420 (1.210)	-0.531 (1.110)
Remittances (1991-2000)	1.410* (0.739)	1.273* (0.663)	1.292* (0.680)	2.880** (1.257)	2.382** (0.943)	1.483** (0.703)
Trade (1991-2000)	-0.878* (0.473)	-0.833* (0.462)	-0.864* (0.459)	-0.318 (0.489)	-0.307 (0.444)	0.060 (0.360)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.971 (0.940)	-0.740 (0.874)	-0.978 (0.907)	-0.708 (1.175)	-1.060 (1.066)	0.087 (0.875)
Alliance (1991-2000)	-2.396* (1.363)	-2.058 (1.365)	-2.000 (1.438)	-7.687*** (2.845)	-5.198*** (1.850)	-4.286** (1.677)
Geographic Concentration		0.003 (0.720)	0.252 (0.772)		0.452 (0.845)	0.888 (0.759)
Constant	-78.454** (37.262)	-75.710** (34.601)	-109.106*** (38.465)	-146.594*** (54.724)	-129.514*** (47.332)	-134.554*** (40.798)
Observations	62	64	68	62	64	68

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-5: Alternative Decade (2001-2010)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violenc Conflict (2001-2010)	0.601*** (0.212)	0.474*** (0.173)	0.526*** (0.183)	0.309** (0.129)	0.219** (0.103)	0.233** (0.100)
Liberal Dem. (2001-2010)	18.819*** (6.664)	15.631*** (5.585)	15.537*** (5.646)	7.827** (3.578)	7.116** (3.415)	4.864 (3.161)
Population	2.731*** (0.944)	2.406*** (0.889)	2.458*** (0.883)	2.205*** (0.796)	2.224** (0.871)	1.697** (0.720)
Poor English	2.947*** (0.933)	2.876*** (0.912)	3.231*** (0.946)	2.779*** (0.952)	2.723*** (0.938)	3.019*** (0.997)
Income	6.491** (3.069)	7.840*** (2.988)	10.432*** (3.259)	8.469** (3.332)	8.373*** (2.927)	10.528*** (3.013)
Bachelor's Degree or More	1.292 (1.300)	0.634 (1.088)	-0.490 (1.191)	0.372 (1.042)	0.403 (1.009)	-1.010 (1.092)
Remittances (2001-2010)	2.867** (1.222)	2.765** (1.186)	2.747** (1.121)	1.434** (0.666)	1.646** (0.777)	1.170* (0.623)
Trade (2001-2010)	-0.755 (0.483)	-0.448 (0.443)	-0.418 (0.445)	-0.503 (0.334)	-0.369 (0.363)	-0.215 (0.327)
Diaspora Institutions	-1.608 (1.047)	-1.062 (0.870)	-1.068 (0.936)	-0.759 (0.888)	-0.715 (0.862)	0.259 (0.776)
Alliance (2001-2010)	-4.265** (1.859)	-3.217* (1.685)	-3.616** (1.719)	-4.138** (1.626)	-3.668** (1.555)	-3.728** (1.476)
Geographic Concentration		-0.161 (0.746)	0.343 (0.780)		0.273 (0.660)	0.813 (0.666)
Constant	-120.407*** (40.043)	-129.121*** (41.376)	-157.562*** (42.447)	-125.165*** (40.627)	-126.579*** (38.796)	-142.300*** (37.022)
Observations	65	67	74	65	67	74

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

4.3 Alternative Measure of Conflict

In the paper, we measure violent conflict as the number of ongoing conflicts whose violence cumulatively exceeded 1000 deaths each year, aggregated for the period 1996-2005. This measure is constructed using data derived from the UCDP-PRIO database on armed conflict. Given the focus of this data on intra-state conflict, we develop an alternative measure reflecting the existence of violent international disputes from the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) database. The measure constitutes the total number of years that a country of origin experienced level 4 or 5 MIDs which led to human fatalities between 1996-2005. The use of this measure does not substantively change any of our results, as shown in Table A4-6 below.

Table A4-6: Alternative Measure of Conflict (Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs))

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
MIDs (1996-2005)	2.070*** (0.719)	1.887*** (0.678)	1.459** (0.591)	1.953*** (0.715)	1.784** (0.700)	1.238** (0.580)
Liberal Dem. (1996-2005)	13.051*** (4.359)	11.646*** (4.074)	11.380*** (4.064)	9.224** (3.802)	8.313** (3.775)	4.761 (3.276)
Population	3.228*** (1.041)	2.968*** (0.977)	2.819*** (0.900)	2.993*** (0.975)	3.204*** (1.148)	2.154*** (0.788)
Poor English	2.735*** (0.949)	2.292*** (0.776)	2.436*** (0.816)	3.235*** (1.006)	2.858*** (0.922)	2.851*** (0.914)
Income	6.996** (2.730)	6.232** (2.517)	6.679*** (2.481)	10.355*** (3.434)	9.457*** (3.278)	9.276*** (2.893)
Bachelor's Degree or More	1.019 (1.125)	0.553 (1.161)	0.161 (1.073)	0.215 (1.065)	0.159 (1.211)	-0.783 (1.101)
Remittances (1996-2005)	1.063* (0.558)	1.126** (0.573)	1.052* (0.559)	1.319** (0.635)	1.507** (0.685)	0.792 (0.517)
Trade (1996-2005)	-1.057** (0.438)	-0.841** (0.410)	-0.772** (0.384)	-0.684* (0.370)	-0.567 (0.404)	-0.264 (0.309)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.933 (0.895)	-1.194 (0.893)	-1.169 (0.876)	-0.706 (0.953)	-1.386 (1.065)	-0.356 (0.894)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-3.151** (1.359)	-3.030** (1.390)	-3.078** (1.380)	-4.970*** (1.684)	-4.890*** (1.711)	-4.223*** (1.483)
Geographic Concentration		0.452 (0.724)	0.465 (0.735)		0.894 (0.749)	1.116 (0.736)
Constant	-123.336*** (38.179)	-111.714*** (34.375)	-115.185*** (33.638)	-154.522*** (45.238)	-149.874*** (45.193)	-134.685*** (36.347)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses
 * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

4.4 Alternative Measure of Democracy

In Tables A4-7 through A4-12 below, we use several alternative measures of democracy. In the paper, our measure is derived from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) database, and constitutes the average “liberal democracy” score of each country of origin from 1996-2005. In Table A4-7 through Table A4-11 we use the VDEM “electoral democracy” score, “deliberative democracy” score, “participatory democracy” score, and “egalitarian democracy” score, respectively. In all cases the results are not substantively different from those presented in the paper. In Table A4-11 we use the average POLITY IV score, which is significant in all models except for the years 2010 and 2015 when we use our originally collected data. Finally, in Table A4-12 we use a measure of the average change in the VDEM “liberal democracy” score for the period 1996-2005. This measure is not significant, indicating that shifts towards autocratic or democratic governance are not associated with diaspora mobilization.

Table A4-7: Alternative Measure of Democracy (VDEM Electoral Democracy)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.520*** (0.197)	0.466*** (0.172)	0.466*** (0.168)	0.415** (0.163)	0.305** (0.133)	0.257** (0.111)
Electoral Dem. (1996-2005)	17.111** (6.924)	16.722** (6.496)	14.649** (5.983)	9.999** (4.302)	8.083** (3.993)	3.220 (2.991)
Population	3.187*** (1.168)	2.969*** (1.020)	2.733*** (0.923)	3.115*** (1.130)	2.834*** (1.033)	1.913** (0.770)
Poor English	2.673*** (0.990)	2.486*** (0.844)	2.780*** (0.889)	3.430*** (1.154)	2.949*** (1.007)	3.154*** (1.017)
Income	8.805** (3.701)	7.404** (2.945)	9.545*** (3.058)	12.623*** (4.297)	10.775*** (3.664)	12.128*** (3.467)
Bachelor’s Degree or More	1.291 (1.219)	1.195 (1.152)	-0.136 (1.178)	0.352 (1.091)	0.457 (1.079)	-1.332 (1.133)
Remittances (1996-2005)	2.101** (1.072)	2.000** (0.944)	1.821** (0.901)	1.806** (0.801)	2.034** (0.956)	1.060* (0.623)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.867* (0.513)	-0.802 (0.506)	-0.673 (0.475)	-0.612 (0.429)	-0.341 (0.426)	-0.136 (0.316)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.689 (0.942)	-0.826 (0.871)	-0.806 (0.924)	-0.634 (1.000)	-0.840 (0.961)	0.178 (0.856)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-4.606** (1.859)	-3.540** (1.627)	-3.772** (1.617)	-6.105*** (2.036)	-4.883*** (1.846)	-4.321*** (1.584)
Geographic Concentration		-0.629 (0.836)	-0.212 (0.836)		0.266 (0.718)	0.966 (0.740)
Constant	-148.359*** (53.723)	-129.019*** (41.845)	-147.316*** (40.055)	-182.462*** (57.339)	-161.440*** (49.672)	-161.470*** (43.356)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-8: Alternative Measure of Democracy (VDEM Deliberative Democracy)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.447*** (0.167)	0.362*** (0.134)	0.391*** (0.138)	0.460** (0.190)	0.327** (0.150)	0.248** (0.108)
Deliberative Dem. (1996-2005)	12.743** (5.013)	11.630** (4.630)	10.937** (4.759)	10.941** (5.105)	9.114* (4.789)	2.908 (3.028)
Population	2.569*** (0.888)	2.397*** (0.859)	2.402*** (0.851)	3.113*** (1.160)	2.846*** (1.047)	1.901** (0.773)
Poor English	2.164*** (0.784)	2.093*** (0.746)	2.475*** (0.824)	3.171*** (1.063)	2.892*** (0.970)	3.080*** (1.002)
Income	6.241** (2.824)	5.987** (2.547)	8.616*** (2.890)	11.089*** (3.909)	9.779*** (3.322)	11.773*** (3.403)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.870 (1.067)	0.882 (1.061)	-0.347 (1.139)	0.335 (1.080)	0.592 (1.104)	-1.293 (1.138)
Remittances (1996-2005)	1.638* (0.856)	1.734** (0.866)	1.567* (0.801)	1.896** (0.834)	2.325** (1.127)	1.028* (0.611)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.728* (0.417)	-0.563 (0.428)	-0.574 (0.420)	-0.659 (0.430)	-0.294 (0.434)	-0.133 (0.310)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.863 (0.883)	-0.780 (0.846)	-0.787 (0.877)	-0.761 (0.987)	-1.063 (1.003)	0.176 (0.854)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-3.226** (1.545)	-2.531* (1.485)	-2.749* (1.503)	-5.900*** (2.110)	-5.060** (2.044)	-4.133*** (1.548)
Geographic Concentration		-0.016 (0.711)	0.201 (0.738)		0.549 (0.759)	1.019 (0.736)
Constant	-108.182*** (36.923)	-104.584*** (34.001)	-130.571*** (36.028)	-164.841*** (52.606)	-152.705*** (46.075)	-157.202*** (42.396)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-9: Alternative Measure of Democracy (VDEM Participatory Democracy)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.484*** (0.181)	0.387*** (0.148)	0.414*** (0.147)	0.466** (0.193)	0.275** (0.121)	0.256** (0.111)
Participatory Dem. (1996-2005)	16.704*** (6.147)	15.939** (6.383)	14.678** (6.185)	13.253** (5.481)	8.668* (4.627)	3.970 (4.012)
Population	2.331*** (0.834)	2.226*** (0.815)	2.127*** (0.787)	2.863*** (1.044)	2.455*** (0.901)	1.844** (0.753)
Poor English	2.193*** (0.791)	2.033*** (0.713)	2.564*** (0.869)	3.416*** (1.156)	2.671*** (0.925)	3.137*** (1.029)
Income	6.446** (2.694)	5.798** (2.385)	8.737*** (2.905)	11.423*** (3.984)	9.368*** (3.308)	11.919*** (3.470)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.863 (1.060)	0.958 (1.060)	-0.247 (1.133)	0.256 (1.046)	0.352 (1.028)	-1.350 (1.136)
Remittances (1996-2005)	1.778* (0.912)	1.831** (0.892)	1.782** (0.893)	1.873** (0.802)	1.865** (0.874)	1.067* (0.629)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.617 (0.440)	-0.518 (0.423)	-0.446 (0.418)	-0.538 (0.401)	-0.272 (0.391)	-0.118 (0.310)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.796 (0.927)	-0.669 (0.839)	-0.570 (0.872)	-0.771 (1.032)	-0.817 (0.945)	0.206 (0.855)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-3.684** (1.523)	-2.825** (1.416)	-3.061** (1.459)	-6.327*** (2.147)	-4.404*** (1.669)	-4.281*** (1.616)
Geographic Concentration		-0.371 (0.742)	-0.161 (0.780)		0.255 (0.713)	0.954 (0.746)
Constant	-108.523*** (35.212)	-100.268*** (32.197)	-129.425*** (36.543)	-166.288*** (52.146)	-139.972*** (42.979)	-158.065*** (43.001)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-10: Alternative Measure of Democracy (VDEM Egalitarian Democracy)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.567*** (0.220)	0.403*** (0.141)	0.435*** (0.147)	0.566** (0.227)	0.384** (0.163)	0.284** (0.117)
Egalitarian Dem. (1996-2005)	14.064*** (4.745)	12.646*** (4.316)	12.371*** (4.588)	12.021** (4.695)	10.262** (4.186)	4.796 (3.084)
Population	2.752*** (0.954)	2.556*** (0.928)	2.664*** (0.965)	3.315*** (1.192)	3.025*** (1.085)	2.032** (0.808)
Poor English	2.069*** (0.766)	1.965*** (0.708)	2.377*** (0.803)	3.194*** (1.069)	2.943*** (0.966)	3.115*** (0.977)
Income	4.676 (2.907)	5.048* (2.720)	7.511** (2.964)	10.608*** (4.022)	10.131*** (3.752)	11.341*** (3.468)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.940 (1.125)	0.925 (1.154)	-0.097 (1.234)	0.332 (1.070)	0.442 (1.111)	-1.207 (1.155)
Remittances (1996-2005)	1.895** (0.877)	2.026** (0.926)	1.882** (0.868)	2.169** (0.869)	2.821** (1.308)	1.220* (0.664)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.653 (0.440)	-0.447 (0.447)	-0.479 (0.440)	-0.583 (0.409)	-0.125 (0.480)	-0.096 (0.324)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.909 (0.992)	-0.756 (0.901)	-0.734 (0.932)	-0.724 (1.008)	-1.072 (1.034)	0.221 (0.873)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-3.095** (1.442)	-2.572* (1.415)	-2.759** (1.394)	-6.213*** (2.089)	-5.654*** (2.034)	-4.631*** (1.572)
Geographic Concentration		0.155 (0.746)	0.415 (0.768)		0.650 (0.775)	1.027 (0.735)
Constant	-95.389*** (36.500)	-98.466*** (35.392)	-124.981*** (37.568)	-163.355*** (54.017)	-160.402*** (51.327)	-155.777*** (43.230)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-11: Alternative Measure of Democracy (POLITY)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.358** (0.148)	0.296** (0.119)	0.348** (0.136)	0.317** (0.140)	0.214** (0.103)	0.216** (0.101)
Polity (1996-2005)	0.506*** (0.190)	0.394*** (0.148)	0.384** (0.150)	0.287** (0.145)	0.181 (0.129)	0.017 (0.108)
Population	2.651*** (0.928)	2.335*** (0.824)	2.248*** (0.823)	2.581*** (0.926)	2.444*** (0.916)	1.756** (0.722)
Poor English	2.571*** (0.928)	2.182*** (0.765)	2.639*** (0.880)	3.158*** (1.056)	2.590*** (0.941)	2.880*** (0.984)
Income	10.615*** (3.752)	8.273*** (2.807)	10.722*** (3.058)	12.936*** (4.108)	10.430*** (3.465)	11.993*** (3.455)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.705 (1.040)	0.641 (1.008)	-0.609 (1.137)	0.012 (0.998)	0.229 (1.011)	-1.450 (1.124)
Remittances (1996-2005)	1.456* (0.876)	1.268 (0.771)	1.252* (0.756)	1.338** (0.669)	1.469** (0.727)	0.857 (0.556)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.665 (0.440)	-0.550 (0.403)	-0.441 (0.406)	-0.466 (0.369)	-0.330 (0.364)	-0.083 (0.289)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.317 (0.897)	-0.516 (0.823)	-0.573 (0.897)	-0.169 (0.929)	-0.592 (0.927)	0.245 (0.845)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-3.118** (1.431)	-1.809 (1.173)	-2.378* (1.283)	-4.657*** (1.614)	-3.328** (1.373)	-3.437** (1.381)
Geographic Concentration		-0.242 (0.732)	0.214 (0.772)		0.343 (0.696)	1.108 (0.739)
Constant	-152.142*** (48.986)	-122.507*** (36.804)	-148.077*** (38.958)	-174.165*** (52.014)	-147.697*** (45.269)	-156.078*** (42.466)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table A4-12: Alternative Measure of Democracy (VDEM Average Change Democracy)

	DV: Paul and Paul Data			DV: New Data		
	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)	(2007)	(2010)	(2015)
Violent Conflict (1996-2005)	0.229** (0.102)	0.169** (0.081)	0.243*** (0.093)	0.217** (0.105)	0.157* (0.086)	0.215** (0.098)
Dem. Change (1996-2005)	1.544 (27.522)	0.862 (27.492)	1.084 (30.733)	0.863 (30.240)	3.524 (30.347)	-9.500 (32.884)
Population	1.345** (0.564)	1.359** (0.595)	1.540** (0.653)	1.869*** (0.716)	2.017*** (0.771)	1.719** (0.727)
Poor English	1.375** (0.611)	1.365** (0.598)	1.809** (0.708)	2.353*** (0.886)	2.199*** (0.837)	2.823*** (0.957)
Income	6.275** (2.443)	6.329*** (2.401)	9.454*** (2.822)	10.061*** (3.602)	9.506*** (3.254)	11.897*** (3.455)
Bachelor's Degree or More	0.025 (0.850)	-0.090 (0.860)	-1.164 (1.023)	-0.112 (0.923)	-0.036 (0.942)	-1.496 (1.132)
Remittances (1996-2005)	0.647 (0.480)	0.797 (0.536)	0.807 (0.508)	1.018* (0.564)	1.348** (0.660)	0.831 (0.551)
Trade (1996-2005)	-0.303 (0.272)	-0.244 (0.280)	-0.285 (0.308)	-0.209 (0.292)	-0.176 (0.305)	-0.049 (0.299)
Diaspora Institutions	-0.573 (0.789)	-0.470 (0.776)	-0.579 (0.806)	-0.380 (0.888)	-0.579 (0.930)	0.349 (0.927)
Alliance (1996-2005)	-0.078 (0.825)	-0.029 (0.888)	-0.184 (0.903)	-2.561** (1.132)	-2.416** (1.140)	-3.376*** (1.258)
Geographic Concentration		0.161 (0.613)	0.475 (0.686)		0.553 (0.688)	1.109 (0.734)
Constant	-85.471*** (29.179)	-86.989*** (29.575)	-121.833*** (34.168)	-133.647*** (44.069)	-131.876*** (41.556)	-154.437*** (42.503)
Observations	65	67	72	65	67	72

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

5 Predicted Probabilities

In this section, we present the average marginal effects of our primary independent variables of interest - violent conflict and democratic experience. The results illustrated in the three figures shown below correspond to the second model in Table 1 presented in the paper. In this model we use our newly collected data on interest group existence as the dependent variable and we use data for 2010 for several of our control variables. Figure A5-1 reveals the predicted probabilities of interest group existence with 95% confidence intervals given variable levels of violent conflict during the period 1996-2005. The number of conflicts considered are 0 to 31, the minimum and maximum number of conflicts recorded across all countries of origin in our data. In short, the probability of interest group existence rises from approximately 30% to 100% as the number of conflicts rises from 0 to 31. As we argue in the paper, the greater the number of intense conflicts in a country of origin, the higher the likelihood that diaspora communities mobilize to influence US foreign policy.

Figure A5-2 reveals the predicted probabilities of interest group existence with 95% confidence intervals given variable levels of liberal democracy across countries of origin for the period 1996-2005. In this case, when the average VDEM liberal democracy score is low, the probability of interest group existence is approximately 20%. When the average VDEM liberal democracy score is high, the probability of interest group existence rises substantially, to approximately 75-80%. Again, diaspora communities are more likely to attempt to influence US foreign policy if their countries of origin were liberal democracies in 1996-2005. This is evidence that past experience with democratic governance increases the likelihood of diaspora mobilization in the US.

Finally, Figure A5-3 illustrates the average marginal effects of violent conflict on interest group existence when the values for liberal democracy are low or high, respectively. The dotted-line and dark shaded area indicates the predicted probabilities of interest group existence and 95% confidence intervals at different levels of violent conflict in those cases when the average VDEM liberal democracy score is held at 0.2, indicating highly autocratic governance. The solid-line and lightly shaded area indicates the predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals at different levels of violent conflict in those cases when the average VDEM liberal democracy score is held at 0.8, indicating highly liberal governance. The figure demonstrates that in those cases where there is low conflict and illiberal governance, the likelihood of interest group existence is low (approximately 20%). It is substantially higher in the case of low conflict and liberal governance (approximately 60%). In situations of high conflict, the likelihood of interest group existence is high in cases of both illiberal and liberal governance (approximately 98% and 100%, respectively). Ultimately, this is further evidence that both conflict and democratic experience are factors which bolster the likelihood that diaspora communities in the US mobilize to influence US foreign policy.

Figure A5-1




Figure A5-2





Figure A5-3



6 Case Study: Discussion of Alternative Factors

In addition to experience with democracy and policy disturbances, other factors may increase the likelihood of diaspora mobilization. Based on the controls outlined in our paper and the appendices above, we discuss some of the alternative factors that might have played a role in the Indian-American case. With respect to population size, the ILA functioned at a time when there were very few Indians in the US due to strict immigration laws, and most Indians present in the US could not vote. Although the Indian-American population doubled between the 1930s and the 1960s, it remained politically insignificant.¹⁵ In fact, one of the ILA's main objectives was to reduce immigration restrictions for Indians. Members lobbied for the Luce-Celler Immigration Act (1946) to increase the number of quotas for Indians and then the Hart-Celler Immigration Act (1965), which finally abolished the national origins quota system. Thus, the ILA was created and effective without having the power of numbers on its side.

USINPAC operates in a very different environment where Indian-Americans number over three million. Certain counties and congressional districts thus have a significant Indian-American population, which might affect the voting decisions of their representatives. Of the ten largest districts in terms of Indian-American population (as per the 2000 US census), eight representatives voted for the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.¹⁶ As USINPAC founder Sanjay Puri points out, Indian-Americans are becoming a significant portion of the electorate in certain districts but have not been seen as electorally significant so far.¹⁷

Although the number of Indians in the US in the 1930s was small, many were wealthy businessmen who had the resources to engage in lobbying. For example, Singh owned a successful import business in Manhattan. While actual income data is unavailable, one can assume that the concentration of wealth amongst a few Indian-Americans allowed them to formally organize themselves. One can surmise that the reason the ILA was successful in building relations with key political figures in the US was because of the affluence of its leaders. One cannot assert, however, that the ILA's members influenced policy through their economic power wherein their capital was useful for American politicians.

Currently, Indian-Americans are, on average, economically well off with a per capita income of \$49,505 and only 6.8% living below the poverty line (ACS 2010). Indian-Americans are also one of the most highly educated groups in the US with around 70% holding a Bachelor's degree in 2010.¹⁸ The community's political campaign contributions are on the rise. For example, the founder and head of the Republican Hindu Coalition, Shalabh Kumar, emerged as one of Donald Trump's biggest financial backers for the 2016 presidential elections with a "double max" donation.¹⁹ However, their wealth alone did not motivate mobilization. While some of USINPAC's

¹⁵Shaffer, Robert. "JJ Singh and the India League of America, 1945-1959: Pressing at the Margins of the Cold War Consensus." *Journal of American Ethnic History* 31, no. 2 (2012): 68-103, p.70.

¹⁶Based on data available on the USINPAC site (accessible here: <http://usinpac.com/index.php/indian-american-demographics/by-congressional-district>) and govtrack.us on the nuclear deal (accessible here: <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr7081>).

¹⁷Gupta, Amit. "The Indian diaspora's political efforts in the United States." ORF Occasional Paper 18 (2004).

¹⁸Desilver, Drew. 5 facts about Indian Americans. Pew Research Center (2014). Available online at <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/30/5-facts-about-indian-americans/>.

¹⁹Swan, Jonathan. Hindu-American emerges as Trump mega-donor. *The Hill* (2016). Available online

founding members are wealthy business owners, one common complaint mentioned in the interviews we conducted was that raising money from Indian-Americans is difficult. Thus, while the wealth of a few individual entrepreneurs helped provide capital to start USINPAC, the wealth of the community itself does not directly translate into mobilization.

It is also important to examine the Indian state's changing attitude towards its diaspora. The Indian state's pre-independence, post-independence, and post-liberalization policies towards the diaspora can be characterized as a pendulum swing. Pre-independence, the Indian elite had close ties with the Indian diaspora abroad in order to bolster support for Indian independence in countries like the US and the UK. After independence from British colonial rule, India disengaged from its diaspora, which it thought should integrate into its various host societies. However, in the aftermath of economic liberalization in the early 1990s, India changed its attitude in order to attract more investments. As demonstrated by Naujoks, there was a spike in remittances and other economic linkages between Indians and their homeland beginning in the late 1990s and continuing until today.²⁰

Thus, the role of the Indian government in spurring diasporic engagement is likewise a factor that may have played a role in the development of the ILA and USINPAC. For instance, Singh's connection to Indian politics was critical. The Indian National Congress' recognition of the role Indians-Americans could play to help India's quest for independence could have made it easier for Indians in the US to overcome the collective action problem as they knew that they could forge ties and receive support from Indian leaders.²¹ Easy communication and trust between Indian leaders in India and the ILA's members gave the ILA a clear agenda for their lobbying efforts.

While the Indian independence movement was supportive of ILA's efforts prior to 1947, upon achieving independence, its leaders started to distance themselves from the ILA. The Indian government did not pay much attention to the Indian diaspora until the 1990s, when economic liberalization incentivized attracting foreign investments. The Indian government only started to rebuild bridges with its diaspora from the late 1990s. In 2003, the Indian government declared January 9 as Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas, a day to celebrate the achievements of people of Indian origin. An entire ministry for the Indian diaspora around the world called the Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs was set up in 2004.²² While India still refuses to allow dual citizenship, in 2005 it set up a new regime that gave Indians abroad the option of becoming Overseas Citizens of India (OCI). The OCI was the Indian government's response to "demands for 'dual citizenship' particularly from the diaspora in North America and other developed countries and keeping in view the Government's deep commitment towards fulfilling the aspirations and expectations of Overseas Indians" (MOIA 2015). The OCI card extends almost every citizen privilege to non-resident

at <http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/288377-hindu-american-emerges-as-trump-mega-donor>

²⁰Naujoks, Daniel. *Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States*. 2013. Oxford University Press.

²¹Gandhi himself wrote letters to Singh (48/1/1945/PolI(I): Issue by the India League of America of a monthly entitled India Today and Question of countering the propaganda contained therein - Dropped, Home Department Files, NAI, New Delhi) and Nehru's sister, Vijaylaxmi Pandit, met him in the US to discuss talking points with Americans about Indian independence. The ILA set up meetings between Celler and Ms. Pandit. JJ Singh also introduced Luce to Pandit and her daughters.

²²This Ministry has since been absorbed into the Ministry of External Affairs as one of its sub-divisions, but its functions remain the same.

Indians except the ability to vote in elections or stand for political office. Thus, the Indian government has been making a concerted effort to please the Indian diaspora and build stronger relations with it. However, in our interviews with USINPAC's founding members, it was made clear that they had no prior connection to the Indian government nor did the Indian government seek them out to establish the lobby group.

It was only after the establishment of USINPAC that the Prime Minister's Office in India approached the team to help present the case for the Indo-US nuclear deal to members of Congress. Sanjay Puri, the Chair and founder of USINPAC, also claimed that because the US State Department agreed on the benefits the deal would bring to Indo-US relations, USINPAC took up the cause of promoting the Indo-US Civil nuclear agreement.²³ USINPAC's activities have included working with leading Indian politicians, including the current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, the former Ministers of Defence, Manohar Parrikar, and Finance, Arun Jaitley (USINPAC 2015). Thus, in general, the Indian government's positive attitude towards the Indian diaspora correlates with the rise of an organized Indian-American lobby in the US. However, we found no direct link between the Indian government and the decision of the Indian-American diaspora to mobilize.

Altogether, there is some evidence that the attitude of the country of origin's government is relevant for diaspora mobilization. However, the other alternative explanations do not supersede the relative importance of democratic experience, conflict crises, and political entrepreneurship. While factors such as connections with the political elite in the country of origin may play a role in spurring mobilization, with both the ILA and USINPAC, experience with democracy and conflict as well as the actions of political entrepreneurs provide the best explanation for lobby creation.

²³Interview, August 28, 2018.