

Lost in translation?

Class cleavage roots and left electoral mobilization in Western Europe

ONLINE APPENDIX

Parties in the Class bloc

For the classification of political parties in the class bloc, we have included “those parties which are the historical product of the structuring of the working-class movement” (Bartolini and Mair 1990 [2007], 46). Moreover, as the class cleavage is not only a historical product but a dynamic concept, we have also carefully assessed the potential inclusion of all those parties that are: 1) direct successors of traditional working-class parties or 2) new parties emphasizing traditional left issues.

As regards direct successors of traditional working-class parties, issues related to party continuity and change across time arise. Class bloc parties changing name or symbol, merging or forming joint lists with other class bloc parties are obviously included in the Class Bloc. Conversely, in the case of splits or in the case of mergers between a class bloc party and a non-class bloc party, choices become less straightforward. Generally speaking, we looked at the splinter party and included it in the Class bloc whenever it still maintained a clear communist, socialist, or social democratic programmatic profile (e.g., the case of Communist Refoundation Party in Italy in 1992). Conversely, “right-wing” splits from Social democratic parties (e.g., the Centre Democrats from the Social Democratic Party in Denmark in 1973) that have explicitly abandoned their former ideological references to social democracy, shifting their programmatic focus away from economic left issues and embracing liberal, radical, green, or “new politics” ideological profiles, have been generally excluded from the Class Bloc. In the case of merge between a class bloc party and a non-class bloc party, the general rule we have followed is to consider the new party as part of the Class Bloc only when the class bloc party was the largest predecessor at the time of the merge (as in the case of the merge of Democrats of the

Left and The Daisy into the Olive Tree List in Italy in 2006 and later into the Democratic Party in 2007).

TABLE A1. Party composition of the class bloc by country

Country	N	Parties in the Class bloc
Austria	2	Social Democratic Party of Austria; Communist Party of Austria
Belgium	5	Belgian Socialist Party*; Francophone Socialist Party; Flemish Socialist Party; Communist Party; Workers' Party of Belgium
Cyprus	3	Progressive Party of Working People; Movement for Social Democracy; Democratic Socialist Renewal Movement
Denmark	6	Social Democrats; Communist Party of Denmark; Socialist People's Party; Left Socialists; Common Course; Red-Green Alliance
Finland	3	Left Alliance; Social Democratic Party of Finland; Democratic Alternative
France	8	Socialist Party; Unified Socialist Party; French Communist Party/Front de Gauche; Unbowed France; Workers' Struggle; Revolutionary Communist League; Extreme gauche; Other gauche
Germany	3	Social Democratic Party of Germany; Communist Party of Germany; Party of Democratic Socialism-LINKE
Greece	9	Panhellenic Socialist Movement; Communist Party of Greece; Communist Party of Greece-Interior; Coalition of the Left/Syriza; Democratic Social Movement; Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left; Democratic Left; Movement of Democratic Socialists; Popular Unity
Iceland	6	People's Alliance; Social Democratic Party; Alliance of Social Democrats; National Awakening-People's Movement; Social Democratic Alliance; People's Party
Ireland	7	Labour Party; National Labour Party; National Progressive Democrats; Workers' Party; Socialist Party; People Before Profit Alliance; Democratic Left
Italy	12	Italian Communist Party/Democratic Party of the Left/Democrats of the Left/Democratic Party; Italian Socialist Party/Italian Democratic Socialists; Italian Democratic Socialist Party; Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity; Proletarian Democracy; Proletarian Unity Party; Communist Refoundation Party; Party of the Italian Communists; Left, Ecology and Freedom; Civil Revolution; Free and Equal; Power to the People
Luxembourg	4	Socialist Workers' Party; Communist Party of Luxembourg; Independent Socialists; The Left
Netherlands	4	Labour Party; Communist Party of the Netherlands; Pacifist Socialist Party; Socialist Party
Norway	4	Norwegian Labour Party; Communist Party of Norway; Socialist People's Party/Socialist Left Party; Red Electoral Alliance/Red Party
Portugal	10	Socialist Party; Unified Democratic Coalition; People's Socialist Front; Movement of Socialist Left; Communist Party of Portuguese Workers; Workers Party of Socialist Unity; Revolutionary Socialist Party; Popular Democratic Union; Portuguese Democratic Movement; Bloc of the Left;
Spain	6	Spanish Socialist Workers Party; Communist Party of Spain-United Left; People's Socialist Party-Socialist Unity; Party of Labour of Spain; Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity Board; <i>Podemos</i>
Sweden	2	Social Democratic Party; Communist Party of Sweden/Left Party
Switzerland	3	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Swiss Party of Labour; Progressive Organizations of Switzerland
UK	1	Labour Party
Total	98	


*It includes Liberal-Socialist Cartels in 1950, 1954, and 1958.

Table A1 shows a very different degree of “organizational cohesion” (Bartolini 2000), or in other words, of internal fragmentation of the class bloc. On average, five class bloc parties have appeared in each Western European country after 1945¹. The United Kingdom shows the highest level of organizational cohesion with only the Labour Party representing the interest of the working-class since World War II, followed by Austria and Sweden with two parties in the classification. Other countries are instead highly fragmented, such as France, Greece, Portugal, and especially Italy, where 12 parties fit the substantive and methodological criteria, thus entering the classification.

¹ Notice that the exact number of parties considered also depends upon the rules for considering party continuity/change. As shown in Table A1, we have counted as different organizations all splits and all brand-new parties, while aesthetic changes or small organizational ones like name changes or joint lists have been not considered. Moreover, also in case of mergers the new party has been put in continuity with the largest predecessor (all such cases are indicated by slashes between the old and the new party name in the Table).

Supplementary Figures and Tables

FIGURE A1. Boxplot of Class bloc electoral support by country



The boxplots reported in Figure A1 have to be interpreted as follows: for each country, the respective box includes 50% of values (the first quartile represents the bottom side of the box, the third quartile the top side, and the line within the box identifies the median). The two whiskers at the top and the bottom of the box include all remaining values that are not outliers, while these latter (defined as those observations that are at least 1.5 times lower than the first quartile or 1.5 times higher than the third quartile) are reported with dots. Finally, the length of the box represents the interquartile range and gives an idea of the within-country variation of the observations. As a result, we can compare countries based on Class bloc electoral support and variability over time. In terms of the former, besides the well-known strong Scandinavian lefts (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), we find remarkably high support for the class bloc in Southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Conversely, data shows that the class left is comparatively weak in the Netherlands, Switzerland and especially Ireland (where the only two cases above 20% are outliers in the

distribution). This result is consistent with Bartolini's findings in the 1860-1980 period (2000, p. 56). Moreover, Figure A1 also shows that the class bloc is also weaker than the average in Belgium, Iceland and Luxemburg. Regardless of the overall electoral support, the analysis of Figure A1 let us to observe the presence of countries with a very stable class bloc, namely with a limited variation in the class bloc electoral performance over time, such as Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Sweden. On the other side, in Finland, France, Italy, Luxemburg, and Portugal, the class bloc has experienced a comparatively larger variation, with a wide range of performance over time.

Temporal trends in the class bloc electoral support can be better assessed by looking at Figure A2, which plots the evolution of the class bloc over time in the 20 countries under study. A general pattern of declining support over time is the rule, but deviations from this trend can be found in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In all such cases, the electoral decline over time – measured through Pearson's r – is not statistically significant, and a pattern of stability or even of (not yet significant) increase can be detected.

FIGURE A2. Electoral support of the class bloc over time, national variations




TABLE A2. Regressions of Emphasis on traditional economic left goals on time

DV: Emphasis on traditional economic left goals	All class parties		Party models Comm. and left soc.		Social democrats		Bloc model	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Time (Election date)	0.0013***	0.0002	0.0007***	0.0001	0.0002**	0.0001	0.0003***	0.0001
Party fixed effects	☑		☑		☑			
Country fixed effects							☑	
Constant	31.4937***	1.9289	28.5463***	1.9384	29.5820***	1.9728	16.4722***	2.5154
R ²	0.408		0.563		0.271		0.311	
Adj. R ²	0.320		0.463		0.203		0.271	
Observations	702		313		389		345	

Note. Party fixed effects (Party models) and country fixed effects (Bloc model) not shown. Standard errors are reported.

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

We have measured the emphasis on traditional economic left goals as follows. For each class bloc party (those listed in Table A1), we have built an index that is nothing but the sum of the following items in the CMP (Volkens et al. 2019): market regulation (per403), economic planning (per404), control of the economy (per412), Marxist analysis (per415), equality (per503), welfare state (per504), and labor groups (per701).² A vast literature has attempted to create left-right indexes for measuring parties' positions through the CMP, from more inductive to more deductive approaches (for a review, see Jahn 2011). Here, we simply select a group of items that are consistently referred to as traditional economic left goals. In addition, we also get a systemic, class bloc measure by weighting, within each bloc, the individual party emphasis for the respective party's electoral support.

Table A2 reports the results of the regressions of the previously created index on time, measured as the exact election date. Quite surprisingly given our expectations, both the party models and the bloc models return the same result, namely a significant increase of the emphasis on traditional economic left goals. This result holds even by disaggregating the pool of class parties between the communist

² With reference to the welfare state and labor variables, we have calculated the difference between the item “welfare expansion” (per504) and the item “welfare limitation” (per505), and “labor group positive” (per701) and “labor group negative” (per702), respectively. All the other selected items refer to positive references and have not a corresponding negative item.

and left socialist family, and the social-democratic family.³ On the one hand, this finding clearly rejects the assumption that left-wing parties have moderated their ideological orientation, thus favoring a substantial convergence with the mainstream right (Mair 2008; Dalton 2013; Evans and Tilley 2012; 2017). Such conventional wisdom relies on studies focusing on a specific period, the social democratic “third way” of the 1980s-1990s (Mair 2008), or from some paradigmatic party cases, especially the Labour Party (Evans and Tilley 2012; 2017). Conversely, by adopting a comparative and longitudinal perspective (15 countries in the 1960-2005 period) Jansen, Evans, and De Graaf (2013) rejects the hypothesis of a generalized right-wing trend of social-democratic parties’ positions. Working on CMP data, they state that, from the 1980s to the beginning of the 2000s, “we see for Britain the clearest and perhaps most well-known example of a right-wing shift by a left party and as consequent ideological depolarization.” (Evans, and De Graaf 2013, 380). However, by considering all countries and the entire time period, they also concludes that “there is no clear sign of a universal movement of left-wing parties since the 1960s and where such movement is observed it does not follow a linear trend in most cases” (Evans, and De Graaf 2013, 380). In a similar vein, in a comparison between the social democratic parties of Austria and Switzerland, Rennwald and Evans (2014) find that both parties do not show a convergence towards the center as far as economic issues are concerned. To a certain extent, our result is consistent with the argument that left parties are less ideologically flexible than their conservative counterparts and, therefore, less responsive to the so-called “neoliberal convergence” as a consequence of the globalization process (Adams, Haupt, and

³ The result holds as well by excluding third-wave countries (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, and Spain), where the class cleavage emerged in different contextual conditions compared to the other Western European countries. Moreover, the substantive result is the same (class bloc parties have not moderated their ideological orientation) if we opt for a different combination of the index, by removing one item at a time or by adding nationalisation (per413) which often considered as another economic left indicator (e.g., Jahn 2011).

Stoll 2009; Haupt 2010). Indeed, in a recent comparative analysis on 18 Western European countries between 1970 and 2015 based on CMP data, Adam and Ftergioti (2019) find that parties in Western Europe are converging towards the left due to right-wing party moderation, while left-wing parties have not altered their positions.

Therefore, the alleged decline of class cleavage roots of left parties seems not to be driven by a shift in the ideological and programmatic supply away from traditional class interests.

FIGURE A3. Boxplot of Industrial working-class size by country




FIGURE A4. Boxplot of Working-class homogeneity by country




FIGURE A5. Boxplot of Total working-class size by country




FIGURE A6. Boxplot of Social group strength by country




FIGURE A7. Boxplot of Trade union density by country




FIGURE A8. Boxplot of Class partisan density by country




FIGURE A9. Boxplot of Organizational density by country




TABLE A3. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Class bloc vote share	38.02	11.23	9.10	71.20	349
Industrial working-class size	15.06	4.68	4.27	30.60	349
Working-class homogeneity	31.75	8.36	11.98	50.77	349
Total working-class size	47.78	9.70	23.71	80.03	349
Social group strength (size+homogeneity)	0.00	0.95	-2.14	2.74	349
Trade union density	35.51	17.83	5.35	76.04	349
Class partisan density	3.98	4.22	0.17	20.34	349
Organizational density (TUD+CPD)	0.00	0.85	-1.21	2.91	349
Fractionalization index	0.21	0.15	0.01	0.59	349
Economic left emphasis index	4.03	1.66	0.53	14.42	349
N. parties in the Class bloc	2.60	1.20	1	7	349
Polarization index	0.18	0.08	0.02	0.41	349
Average district magnitude	18.53	42.91	1	309	349
Third-wave democracies	0.15	0.35	0	1	349
Time since 1945	38.76	20.39	1	73	349

TABLE A4. Determinants of Class bloc vote share in Western Europe after 1945, preliminary models

	Social group strength models						Organizational density models							
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Industrial working-class size	0.121**	0.045												
Working-class homogeneity			0.078*	0.039										
Total working class					0.044	0.039								
Social group strength							0.110*	0.044						
Trade union density									0.062*	0.031				
Class partisan density											0.199***	0.029		
Organizational density													0.172***	0.034
Economic left emphasis index	-0.067†	0.037	-0.068†	0.038	-0.071†	0.038	-0.067†	0.0373	-0.071†	0.038	-0.073*	0.037	-0.071†	0.037
N. parties in the Class bloc	1.158*	0.563	1.08†	0.561	1.227*	0.566	1.104*	0.562	1.209*	0.568	1.374*	0.538	1.319*	0.562
Polarization index	3.333	4.328	3.414	4.365	3.267	4.492	3.39	4.322	2.703	4.497	2.905	4.418	2.287	4.454
Average district magnitude (ln)	0.877†	0.491	0.916†	0.504	0.701	0.498	0.928†	0.497	0.672	0.502	0.338	0.484	0.456	0.498
Third-wave democracies	14.78***	2.547	13.07***	2.421	14.57***	2.586	13.88***	2.479	14.82***	2.558	14.09***	2.198	15.57***	2.48
Time since 1945	-0.136***	0.039	-0.137**	0.042	-0.191***	0.033	-0.127**	0.042	-0.191***	0.033	-0.122***	0.033	-0.159***	0.033
Constant	32.33***	3.795	33.77***	3.97	37.78***	2.949	32.28***	3.967	37.25***	2.603	33.85***	2.511	33.75***	2.671
R ²	0.447		0.441		0.435		0.446		0.440		0.483		0.467	
Wald χ^2	72.36***		70.78***		70.98***		71.50***		72.73***		139.88***		102.15***	
N of elections	345		345		345		345		345		345		345	
N of countries	19		19		19		19		19		19		19	

Note. Prais-Winsten AR1 regressions; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Preliminary regression models, reported in Table A4, have separately tested the effects of the different socio-structural and organizational variables on left electoral mobilization.

Some important preliminary findings emerge from Table A4. Among the socio-structural variables, data show that it is precisely the size of the industrial working class, rather than that of the working class as a whole (including agriculture and service workers) that matter for left electoral mobilization. The former is significant at the 0.01 level, while the latter is not significant as a predictor of class bloc electoral support. Moreover, industrial working-class size has a more significant effect than working-class homogeneity ($p < .01$ vs $p < .05$).⁴ This finding is quite unexpected as Bartolini (2000, 173-174) found that the effect of homogeneity was stronger than that of size in predicting the support for the class bloc. It must be specified that Bartolini dealt with a smaller set of countries (Southern Europe was excluded) and a different time frame (1860-1980). Therefore, we can argue that in the golden age of the class cleavage and industry-based production (Bartolini's time frame), the fact of having an industry-based working class (at the expense of agriculture and services) was more important than the overall size of the industrial working class itself. Conversely, in the period 1946-2018, characterized, especially in recent decades, by de-industrialization and industrial working class reduction, the size itself of the industrial working class seems to be slightly more important than the ratio between industry and other sectors among the dependent workers. Given these results, we have excluded total working-class size from the analyses in Table 2 of the manuscript and, given that industrial working-class size and working-class homogeneity are highly collinear (Pearson's $r = .796$), we have created a standardized index combining them, namely *Social group strength*.⁵ As regards the organizational element, both the corporate and the partisan factors are significantly associated with class bloc electoral support, but a relevant difference emerges. Indeed, class partisan density

⁴ All class cleavage-related variables in Table 1 and A4 have been standardized and rescaled to a 0-100 range, so the respective coefficients can be compared.

⁵ The Cronbach's alpha test between the two variables equals .81.

(significant at $p < .001$) has by far a stronger impact on class bloc vote share than trade union density (significant at $p < .05$).⁶ Indeed, for a unitary increase in class partisan density, class bloc electoral support increases by 0.2%, while the effect of trade union density is about three times lower. In other words, the corporate encapsulation into trade unions plays a positive function on the electoral success of the class left, but the latter is much more dependent upon the fact that class bloc parties develop strong organizations with a large number of party members. More generally, the organizational encapsulation into class bloc parties is the most important factor driving the success of the class bloc in the electoral arena. As in the case of socio-structural factors, also trade union density and class partisan density are tested separately and then combined into a standardized index of *Organizational density*.⁷

⁶ The positive – albeit relatively weak – effect of trade unions seems in contrast with Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco (2020) that find an apparently surprising negative effect of trade union density on the electoral support for social democratic parties since 1975. However, by replicating the result on the same timeframe (1975-2018) we find a non-significant association between trade union density and class bloc electoral support. Therefore, the role of trade unions on electoral mobilization has eroded in recent decades (see also Gallego 2010 on this point).

⁷ The correlation between the two variables is lower than in the case of industrial working-class size and working-class homogeneity but significant as well ($r = .43$; $p < .001$). However, notice that the results in Table 2 remain almost identical if the combined index is replaced by class partisan density.

TABLE A5. Robustness checks

	FGLS		PCSE		GLM	
	b	se	b	pcse	b	se
Social group strength	0.081*	0.037	0.136***	0.035	0.006***	0.002
Organizational density	0.135***	0.033	0.142***	0.027	0.006***	0.001
Fractionalization index	-23.78***	4.737	-8.101†	4.292	-0.365*	0.183
Economic left emphasis index	-0.020	0.031	-0.215***	0.060	-0.010***	0.003
N. parties in the Class bloc	0.621	0.499	1.300**	0.446	0.054**	0.020
Polarization index	0.857	3.516	12.94†	7.210	0.561†	0.318
Average district magnitude (ln)	1.285**	0.440	-0.052	0.330	-0.002	0.015
Third-wave democracies	13.77***	2.384	14.67***	1.398	0.619***	0.060
Time since 1945	-0.070†	0.037	-0.032	0.036	-0.001	0.002
Constant	33.51***	3.550	28.92***	3.831	-0.875***	0.172
R^2			0.439			
Wald χ^2	176.00***		274.79***			
BIC					359.21	
χ^2					2765.639	
N of elections	345		345		345	
N of countries	19		19		19	

Note. The Table replicates the results of Model 1 of Table 3 through three different estimating techniques: 1) Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression with a specification for panel heteroscedasticity and an autoregressive parameter (AR1); 2) Panel-corrected standard error regression (PCSE) ; and 3) Generalized linear model (GLM) estimator with logit link function and robust standard errors; †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

TABLE A6. Separate regressions for two time periods with 1989 as cutoff point

	1946-1989		1990-2018	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Social group strength	0.165***	0.045	0.145*	0.060
Organizational density	0.192***	0.028	0.022	0.053
Fractionalization index	-13.21*	5.463	-7.431	6.635
Economic left emphasis index	-0.180*	0.081	-0.255*	0.104
N. parties in the Class bloc	1.521*	0.68	0.793	0.633
Polarization index	3.652	9.307	26.58*	10.38
Average district magnitude (ln)	0.404	0.479	-0.369	0.543
Third-wave democracies	12.94***	3.021	15.32***	1.564
Time since 1945	-0.091	0.059	-0.004	0.122
Constant	27.25***	4.417	30.76**	9.653
R^2	0.403		0.528	
Wald χ^2	152.06***		263.35***	
N of elections	202		143	
N of countries	18		19	

Note. Panel-corrected standard error regression (PCSE); panel-corrected standard errors are reported. The model ‘1946-1989’ reports 18 countries as data about Economic left emphasis and Polarization are not available for Cyprus before 1996. Results are the same if Cyprus is excluded from the model ‘1990-2018’. Models are run without the AR1 correction as the Wooldridge test shows no concerns of autocorrelation (Drukker 2003). †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

TABLE A7. Replication of Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 by replacing the linear time variable with a categorical variable for decades

	Model 3		Model 4	
	b	pcse	b	pcse
Social group strength	0.133	0.074	0.118**	0.044
Organizational density	0.132***	0.039	0.206**	0.064
Decade: 1950s (reference)				
1960s	0.077	5.195	-0.093	2.839
1970s	-9.003	6.134	-3.344	3.24
1980s	0.468	6.228	1.692	3.378
1990s	2.425	6.162	2.588	3.619
2000s	1.993	6.091	0.967	3.703
2010s	-2.311	5.626	1.145	3.929
Social group str.* Decade: 1950s (reference)				
1960s	0.003	0.078		
1970s	0.112	0.096		
1980s	-0.042	0.108		
1990s	-0.107	0.12		
2000s	-0.143	0.139		
2010s	-0.105	0.139		
Org. density* Decade: 1950s (reference)				
1960s			0.01	0.065
1970s			0.026	0.073
1980s			-0.09	0.075
1990s			-0.145	0.089
2000s			-0.124	0.093
2010s			-0.253*	0.101
Fractionalization index	-12.458*	5.724	-10.790*	5.493
Economic left emphasis index	-0.046	0.038	-0.053	0.038
N. parties in the Class bloc	1.023†	0.583	0.985†	0.574
Polarization index	2.064	4.349	2.114	4.305
Average district magnitude (ln)	0.818†	0.483	0.862†	0.482
Third-wave democracies	15.010***	2.511	14.732***	2.322
Constant	27.001***	5.133	25.194***	4.645
R ²	0.495		0.505	
Wald χ^2	126.80***		142.69***	
N of elections	345		345	
N of countries	19		19	

Note. Prais-Winsten AR1 regressions; panel-corrected standard errors are reported. †p < .10; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

FIGURE A10. Marginal effect of organizational density across decades




TABLE A8. Replication of Table 1 on the same set of countries of Bartolini's analysis (2000)

	Plain model				Interactions models											
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6		Model 7		Model 8	
	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse	b	pcse
Social group strength	0.214***	0.063	0.360**	0.113	0.203*	0.098	0.215***	0.063	0.414***	0.099	0.212**	0.066	0.241**	0.091	0.201**	0.063
Organizational density	0.196***	0.041	0.527**	0.187	0.196***	0.042	0.203**	0.072	0.170***	0.039	0.210***	0.064	0.198***	0.041	0.162**	0.053
Social group str.*Org. density			0.006†	0.003												
Social group str.*Time since 1945					0.001	0.005										
Org. density*Time since 1945							0.000	0.003								
Social group str.*Fract. index									-0.964**	0.308						
Org. density*Fract. index											-0.118	0.342				
Social group str.*Economic left emphasis index													-0.001	0.003		
Org. density*Economic left emphasis index															0.001	0.001
Fractionalization index	-28.163***	6.704	-30.523***	6.988	-28.080***	6.743	-28.250***	6.684	33.038	21.69	-25.042*	12.27	-27.982***	6.705	-26.866***	6.921
Economic left emphasis index	-0.014	0.04	-0.009	0.039	-0.014	0.04	-0.014	0.04	-0.015	0.041	-0.015	0.04	0.054	0.203	-0.055	0.065
N. parties in the Class bloc	1.469	0.911	1.344	0.885	1.486	0.948	1.465	0.928	1.448†	0.872	1.441	0.938	1.477	0.915	1.44	0.907
Polarization index	1.956	5.442	3.027	5.259	1.955	5.407	1.926	5.499	1.182	5.548	1.994	5.481	1.774	5.484	1.664	5.264
Average district magnitude (ln)	0.746	0.71	0.845	0.733	0.75	0.713	0.749	0.71	0.454	0.666	0.711	0.711	0.744	0.709	0.783	0.734
Time since 1945	-0.064	0.075	-0.054	0.075	-0.101	0.298	-0.051	0.138	-0.109	0.075	-0.06	0.078	-0.066	0.077	-0.063	0.075
Constant	22.156***	5.797	13.854†	8.255	22.668***	6.769	21.865***	6.156	13.566*	6.764	21.902***	5.796	20.349**	7.508	23.776***	5.956
R ²	0.682		0.691		0.682		0.682		0.69		0.682		0.683		0.686	
Wald χ^2	81.92***		83.50***		81.15***		83.90***		118.44***		83.22***		82.72***		77.59***	
N of elections	127		127		127		127		127		127		127		127	
N of countries	13		13		13		13		13		13		13		13	

Note. Prais-Winsten AR1 regressions in the period 1946-1980 and the same 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom) included in Bartolini's analysis (2000); panel-corrected standard errors are reported. †p < 0.10; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

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