# Appendices

## Appendix A. Tables

Table A.1

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Author | Year | Discriminating Factors | Types |
| Piattoni  | 2001 | 3X3 Classification Barriers to Universal Redistribution (low- medium high) Barriers to Citizenship (low-medium-high)  | 2 types of clientelism: ClientelismMachine PoliticsDifferent forms of patronageincludes also regime types (liberal democracy, patrimonialism, corporatism, etc)  |
| Hopkin  | 2006 | 3X2 typology: Scope of benefits: Selective, club, collective Proximity/ distance between patron and client: Durable relationship vs. market exchange | 2 types of clientelism:Old clientelismNew clientelism And other forms of exchanges (e.g. corporate/ethnic and lobby, class voting) |
| Kitschelt and Wilkinson  | 2007 | 5 factors: Contingency; nature of goods, compliance, elasticity, monitoring  | Clientelism vs. 2 forms of programmatic (policy and valence)  |
| Schaffer  | 2007 | 3 factors:ScopeTimingLegality | 3 types of clientelism:Vote-buyingPatronagePork Barrel 1 form of programmatic:Allocational policies  |
| Nichter  | 2008[[1]](#footnote-0) | 2X2 typology:Party preference of recipient Turnout inclination of recipient | 4 types of electoral clientelism: turnout buyingvote-buyingdouble persuasionrewarding loyalists |
| Stokes et al. | 2013 | Classification TreeFirst level: rules vs. non rulesSecond level: contingent vs. non-contingent on supportThird level: directed at members vs. directed at voters | 2 types of clientelism: patronage vote buying2 non-programmatic but non-cl types: porknon-conditional individual benefits |
| Hutchcroft  | 2014 | Four factors: Target, Character, key actors, source of benefits  | Continuum of three forms of politics:Micro-particularisticMeso-particularisticProgrammatic |
| Nichter  | 2014 | 2X2 typologyExcludability Contingency (but contingency more important as “root definition”) | 2 types of vote buying1) Clientelistic vote-buying 2) Legislative vote-buying  |
| Gherghina and Volintiru  | 2017 | Origin of resources | 2 types of clientelistic linkages:Vertical (with voters) Horizontal (with private contractors) |
| Gottlieb  | 2017 | 2X2 typology Economic autonomy from community Broker selection mechanism | 2 types of broker strategy: extractive brokerspersuasive brokers  |
| Nichter  | 2018 | Classification TreeFirst level: contingencySecond level: benefits beyond election campaigns  | 2 types of clientelismElectoral clientelism Relational clientelism v non-clientelism |
| Mares and Young  | 2019 | 2X2 typologyorigin of resources; coercion/ inducements  | 4 types of clientelismVote-Buying Policy FavorsEconomic CoercionPolicy Coercion |
| Berenschot and Aspinall  | 2020 | 3 factors:ControlNetworksResources | 2 types of patronage systemsParty-centeredCommunity-centered |
| Yildirim and Kitschelt  | 2020 | 4 attributes: external networks or POdyadic-decentralized, personalistic or hierarchical, centralized party machinestargeting individuals or groupspublic or private resources  | 2 types of clientelism:single-shot clientelism relational clientelism  |

Full References:

Berenschot, Ward, and Edward Aspinall. 2020. “How Clientelism Varies: Comparing Patronage Democracies.” *Democratization* 27(1): 1–19.

Gans-Morse, Jordan, Sebastian Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2014. “Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 415–432.

Gherghina, Sergiu, and Clara Volintiru. 2017. “A New Model of Clientelism: Political Parties, Public Resources, and Private Contributors.” *European Political Science Review* 9(1): 115–137.

Gottlieb, Jessica. 2017. “Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal.” *Comparative Political Studies* 50(11): 1556–1592.

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Hutchcroft, Paul D. 2014. “Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines.” In *Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy*, eds. Diego Abente Brun and Larry Diamond. Baltimore: JHU Press, 174–203.

Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction.” In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–49.

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Schaffer, Frederic Charles. 2007. “Why Study Vote Buying?” In *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, ed. Frederic Charles Schaffer. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1–16.

Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Yıldırım, Kerem, and Herbert Kitschelt. 2020. “Analytical Perspectives on Varieties of Clientelism.” *Democratization* 27(1): 20–43.

Table A.2

|  |
| --- |
| Intercoder reliability |
|  | **Kappa** | **Kalpha Interval** | **Kalpha Ordinal** |
| Client receives goods | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.19 |
| Alternatives | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Coercion Threats | 0.36 | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| Agency | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.46 |
| Affective relation | 0.44 | 0.45 | 0.45 |
| Client gets employment | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.48 |
| Agent gets a good deal | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.47 |
| Client gets money | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.53 |
| Client gets gov services | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.53 |
| Frequent interaction | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.54 |
| Client gets insurance/ protection | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.57 |
| Client gives labor | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.57 |
| Coercion Withdrawal | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.59 |
| Additional domains of interaction | 0.6 | 0.59 | 0.64 |
| Hierarchical | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.58 |
| Broker Important | 0.65 | 0.64 | 0.66 |
| Dyadic | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.64 |
| Client gives loyalty | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.69 |
| Individual exchange | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.64 |
| Broker interests aligned to client | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.66 |
| Client gets infrastructure | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.72 |
| Client gives vote | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.88 |

Kappa denotes Cohen's kappa. Kalpha denotes Krippendorff's alpha. We present Krippendorff's alpha separately treating our data as ordinal and as interval. In all three cases higher values of the statistic imply higher intercoder reliability. A value of zero implies a level of rater agreement that would be expected if the coding was done randomly. A value of one implies complete agreement between the raters.

|  |
| --- |
| Table A.3. Evaluation of clientelism types |
|  | **Vote buying** | **Relational** | **Collective** | **Traditional** | **Modern coercive** |
| Good deal | 2.31 | 2.53 | 2.75 | 2 | 1.83 |
| Agency | 2.36 | 1.93 | 2.54 | 2 | 2 |
| Alternatives | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.88 | 0.67 | 0.67 |

Note: “Good deal” refers to how good a deal the client gets; and “Agency” refers to the agency of the client. “Good Deal” and “Agency” are coded with a scale from 0 to 4; Alternatives is coded as 1 if the client has alternatives to the current clientelistic relation, and 0 if not.

## Appendix B. List of Coded Articles and Description of Selection Procedure

List of Coded Articles

Alvarez Rivadulla, María José. 2012. “Clientelism or Something Else? Squatter Politics in Montevideo.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 54 (01): 37–63.

Arghiros, Daniel. 2001. *Democracy, Development and Decentralization in Provincial Thailand*. Vol. 8. Democracy in Asia series. Curzon Press.

Arias, Enrique Desmond. 2006. “Trouble En Route: Drug Trafficking and Clientelism in Rio de Janeiro Shantytowns.” *Qualitative Sociology* 29 (4): 427–45.

Auyero, Javier. 2000. “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account.” *Latin American Research Review* 35 (3): 55–81.

Barnes, Sandra T. 1986. *Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos*. International African Library 1. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.

Barth, Fredrik. 1977. “Political Leadership among Swat Pathans.” In *Schmidt, Steffen W., L. Guasti, J. C. Scott, and C. Lande, Eds. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.*, 207–19.

Berenschot, Ward. Forthcoming. “Informal Democratization: Political Networks and Clientelistic Accountability in India and Indonesia.”

Berenschot, Ward. 2011. *Riot Politics: Hindu-Muslim Violence and the Indian State*. London: Hurst.

Bob-Milliar, George M. 2014. “Party Youth Activists and Low-Intensity Electoral Violence in Ghana: A Qualitative Study of Party Foot Soldiers’ Activism.” *African Studies Quarterly* 15 (1): 125.

Burgwall, G. 1995. *Struggle of the Poor: Neighborhood Organization and Clientelist Practice in a Quito Squatter Settlement.* Amsterdam: Centro de Estudios y DocumentationLatinoamericanos (CEDLA).

Campbell, J. K. 1977. “Honour, Family and Patronage. A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community.” In *Schmidt, Steffen W., L. Guasti, J. C. Scott, and C. Lande,* *Eds. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.*, 250–63.

Chauchard, Simon. 2018. “Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections The Cost of Political Competition.” *Asian Survey* 58 (2): 341–64.

Darwin, Rizkika Lhena. 2016. “Bireuen, Aceh: The Aftermath of Post-Conflict Politics and the Decline of Partai Aceh.” In *Aspinall, Edward, Mada Sukmajati, and NUS Press, Eds.*

*Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press, National University of Singapore.*, 39–53.

Dewi, Sita W., S.L. Harjanto, and Olivia D. Purba. 2016. “Central and South Jakarta: Social Welfare and Constituency Service in the Metropolis.Pdf.” In *Aspinall, Edward, Mada Sukmajati, and NUS Press, Eds. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press, National University of Singapore.*,167–83.

Fernández, Pablo D., Ignasi Martí, and Tomás Farchi. 2017. “Mundane and Everyday Politics for and from the Neighborhood.” *Organization Studies* 38 (2): 201–223.

Gay, Robert. 1999. “The Broker and the Thief: A Parable (Reflections on Popular Politics in Brazil).” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 36 (1): 49–70.

Graziano, Luigi. 1977. “Patron-Client Relationships in Southern Italy.” In *Schmidt, Steffen W., L. Guasti, J. C. Scott, and C. Lande, Eds. Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.*, 360–79.

Guțu, Dinu. 2018. “World Going One Way, People Another: Ultras Football Gangs’ Survival Networks and Clientelism in Post-Socialist Romania.” *Soccer & Society* 19 (3): 337–54.

Hagene, Turid, and Íñigo González-Fuente. 2016. “Deep Politics: Community Adaptations to Political Clientelism in Twenty-First-Century Mexico.” *Latin American Research Review* 51 (2): 3–23.

Hilgers, Tina. 2009. “‘Who Is Using Whom?’ Clientelism from the Client’s Perspective.” *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research* 15 (1): 51–75.

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Lazar, Sian. 2004. “Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Elections in El Alto, Bolivia.” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23 (2): 228–243.

Mahsun, Muhammad. 2016. “Palembang, South Sumatra: Aspiration Funds and Pork Barrel Politics.” In *Aspinall, Edward, Mada Sukmajati, Eds. Electoral Dynamics in* *Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS* *Press, National University of Singapore.*, 120–35.

Muñoz, Paula. 2014. “An Informational Theory of Campaign Clientelism: The Case of Peru.” *Comparative Politics* 47 (1): 79–98.

Owen, David A. 2013. “Conceptualizing Vote Buying as a Process: An Empirical Study in Thai Provinces.” *Asian Politics & Policy* 5 (2): 249–273.

Paller, Jeffrey W. 2014. “Informal Institutions and Personal Rule in Urban Ghana.” *African Studies Review* 57 (03): 123–42.

Ridwan. 2016. “North Jayapura, Papua: Buying the Voters and Buying the Administrators.” In *Aspinall, Edward, Mada Sukmajati, Eds. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia:* *Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press,* *National University of Singapore.*, 383–97.

Rohi, Rudi. 2016. “East Nusa Tenggara: Patronage Politics, Clientelism and the Hijacking Social Trust.” In *Aspinall, Edward, Mada Sukmajati, Eds. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press, National University of Singapore.*, 363–81.

Scott, James C. 2000. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*.. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.

Shefner, Jon. 2001. “Coalitions and Clientelism in Mexico.” *Theory and Society* 30 (5): 593 628.

Silverman, Sydel F. 1977. “Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy.” In *Schmidt, Steffen W., L. Guasti, J. C. Scott, and C. Lande, Eds. Friends, Followers, and* *Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.*, 293–304.

Sulaiman, Teuku Muhammad Jafar. 2016. “Bener Meriah, Aceh: Money Politics and Ethnicity in a New Electoral District.” In *Aspinall, Edward, Mada Sukmajati, Eds. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press, National University of Singapore.*, 54–69.

Triantini, Zuziana E. 2016. “Blora, Central Java: Local Brokers and Vote Buying.” In *Aspinall,Edward and Mada Sukmajati, Eds. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots. Singapore: NUS Press, National University of Singapore.*, 249–63.

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Identification and selection of ethnographic literature

*Identification*

Our main aim was to assemble a diverse body of ethnographic studies on clientelism featuring the client perspective. Thus, initially, we intended to find as many fitting books, journal articles, and chapters in edited volumes as possible. In order to achieve a degree of comprehensiveness, we ensured that the body of literature covered a) all regions and b) some historic variation. Since we regard clientelism as an exchange of political support for goods or services we had to limit our sample to political systems with at least a minimum of electoral competition, as political support would be meaningless as trading resource otherwise. While we had some success in finding older literature, effectively this condition means that most cases are post-1990.

To identify potential and to selected relevant ethnographic sources we followed the following procedure:

First, we conducted a literature search, using the online catalogue of the University of Duisburg-Essen[[2]](#footnote-1) and Google Scholar. Our search terms were “clientelism” plus our perspective, i.e. “ethnographic”, “client point of view”, “demand side” and “micro”. We also included terms alternative terms to clientelism, such as patronage, informal political exchange, caciquismo, and neopatrimonialism.

An important challenge in identifying scholarly works fitting our criteria was that authors of relevant work do not necessarily conceive of their research as work on clientelism and hence do not use this term anywhere in the text, let alone as keyword. Instead, much relevant work is conceptualized as studies on elections and democratic representation, or on socio-political relations.

To address this problem, we used the following additional approaches to identify relevant works.

* We systematically screened journals where the articles we found in the first step were published in, such as Political Geography, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, African Studies Quarterly, or Journal of Modern African Studies.
* Building on the identified literature, we used a 'snowballing' approach, following references of papers and books that met our criteria.
* We sought recommendations from colleagues in the field.
* We conducted an additional region-specific literature review to reach a more balanced sample (i.e. cases outside Latin America and Asia).

This search resulted in a body of literature of approximately 300 papers (peer-reviewed, working papers), books, theses and chapters in edited volumes.

*Screening for relevant papers (Selection)*

We screened this literature for works meeting our criteria in a three-fold process. First, we checked if the work fit with regards to the content. We understand clientelism as *political* clientelism, i.e. a particularistic exchange of political support (given by the client) for goods, services, or/and privileged treatment (given by the patron). Thus, we excluded the literature that uses the term clientelism, but addresses non-contingent politics, corruption (clients providing no political support), or non-electoral regimes.

Second, in line with our focus on the client perspective, we looked for everyday practices and experiences of common citizens. Thus, we excluded literature on political intra-elite exchanges (e.g. clientelistic networks linking a country's rulers to economic elites).

Finally, as we are particularly interested in the client point of view, we considered the level of detail about the client perspective provided in the paper. Ideally, the work contains explicit quotes by clients (or prospective clients), describing one or more clientelistic exchanges, the client’s attitudes towards the exchange and their rationales when (not) engaging in it. However, as this proved rare in the literature, we also coded the information on the client when provided by another source, such as the author or another informant. Thus, while many of the studies referenced above focus on the intermediary, we consider them when they disclose relevant information on the client’s perspective. Whenever we identified more than one paper on a case, we only considered one of those, namely the one giving most insight into the clients’ perspectives.

Because of the different availability of suitable work on different world regions, we applied the selection criterion regarding the client perspective most stringently in areas where there was more suitable ethnographic work and relaxed the criterion for regions where there was a dearth of suitable studies, such as Sub-Saharan Africa. In this case, we had to include studies with less detail on the client/ voter perspective.

Applying these criteria led to 40 suitable studies that we included in the meta-analysis.

## Appendix C. Coding ethnographic literature – Codebook

**Part I: Basic characteristics**

Check whether the paper fits our scope.

1. We define clientelism very broadly as a particularistic exchange of political support (given by the client) for goods, services, or/and privileged treatment (given by the patron). There may be multiple goods and/or kinds of support involved in one clientelistic relationship. We consider the terms of the exchange very broadly: the goods provided by the patron may be goods or assistance in case of need, or “symbolic” goods (such as being a padrino). The goods provided by the client can be a vote, but also labor for the campaign or signs of loyalty.
2. For our definition of clientelism, we don’t require the exchange to actually materialize. The mere fact that the each of the parts understands that there is an exchange where each part is supposed to provide its part is sufficient. In other words, if the patron gives goods expecting that the client will vote for him/ her this is considered a clientelistic exchange even if the client does not actually vote for him/ her. And similarly, if the client votes because she expects the patron to deliver goods personally to her or her community, this counts as clientelism, even the expectation is not fulfilled.
3. We include in our definition of clientelism exchanges at the group level. This means that clientelism includes exchanges where the patron delivers goods to a group of people with the expectation that this group will vote for her; and the group votes for the patron with the expectation that the patron will deliver the goods.
4. We are particularly interested in the client point of view. Ideally, this point of view emerges raw from quotations of the clients. But we also record the information on the client even when this information from another source such as the author or another informant.
5. Sometimes information about clients comes from non-clients; i.e. from people having been or having considered being clients but having at some point chosen not to be clients. Their perspective is to be recorded similarly to that of the clients. In that sense, what we really are interested in is the perspective of “potential clients” regardless of whether they actually become clients or not.

**Agent ID**

Authors may describe in a single paper more than one clientelistic exchange relationships (e.g. a broker has different kind of clients, or differences between area are discussed, or past and present). Our coding unit is the ‘typical exchange’; i.e. the specific clientelistic relationship the author(s) focus on. Not every exchange mentioned in the paper requires a new coding. We code only exchanges described with a certain level of detail (that permits coding). Examples or illustrations narrated ‘in passing’ are not coded separately, but may be included in the ‘typical exchange’, especially when the author mentions the example to highlight a certain aspect of the general type of clientelism (s)he is describing. If you submit several entries per paper, you will have to re-enter the information above and choose an agent ID here - from now on, all the questions relate to that particular "agent"/ or interaction type

* 1-5

**Agent ID label**

Label of the ID, just in \*one word\*. The purpose of this label is to differentiate the Agent IDs assigned above from each other. Labels are names/titles or descriptions given to the particular clients within the paper., for instance activist, militant, or voter.

* [free text]

**Level of detail about the client perspective**

How much detail is provided on the client perspective, either form the client herself or form another informant?

* 0 little
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 a lot

**Collective vs. individual exchange**

Does the exchange happen mainly at the individual level (an exchange where an individual gives political support in exchange for a good service for herself), or mainly at the collective level (an exchange where a group of citizens give support to the patron as a block in exchange for a good that benefits the whole group)? Notice the reverse coding.

* 0 fully collective
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 fully individual

**Patron's side: Is delivery of goods conditional on client support?**

The patron that gives something to a particular voter may or may not expect this voter to reciprocate. We say that the patron gives with *conditionality* when she gives the good *because* she expects that the client will reciprocate. If the patron gives the good without expecting support in exchange then there is little conditionality. Again whether the voter actually reciprocates or not is not of interest to us; what counts is that the patron is giving the goods believing or hoping that this will be the case.

* 0 not at all
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 absolutely

**Client's side: Is support/ vote conditional on receiving goods from patron?**

Idem regarding the client. To what extent does the client support the patron *because* the client expects that the patron will give her a particularistic good? Again whether the expectaion materializes or not does not matter. What is crucial here is that the expectation of the voter is about a particularistic good: i.e. a good given to her or her group specifically.

* 0 not at all
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 absolutely

**Part II: Characteristics of the relation**

This section focuses on the characteristics of the clientelistic exchange and the broader relationship between the patron and the client is this relation exists beyond the immediate clientelistic exchange. Sometimes the relation between patrons and clients is not direct, but rather mediated by an intermediary: a broker. The patron provides the resources to the broker and the broker exchanges with the client. We are mostly interested in the perspective of the client.

**Broker/ Patron political interests aligned with clients'?**

The broker or patron may try to pursue the political interests of the clients to a greater or lesser extent. In one extreme, the broker may be an elected representative of the clients, chosen to represent their interests and obtain for them the best possible deal. This would be coded as their political interests being aligned. In the other extreme, the broker may just pursue his individual interests regardless of the interests of the clients. For instance, the broker maybe a party operative gathering votes from clients being totally unconcerned about the client’s political preferences. This would imply that their political interests are unrelated.

* 0 Interests unrelated
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 interests aligned

**Broker/ patron importance in the community**

Is the broker/ patron an important member of the community? At one extreme, the broker/ patron is totally external to the community (code as 0). At the other extreme, the broker/ patron totally dominates the community in the sense that the everyone in the community is totally dependent of her (code as 4). An intermediate level corresponds to a situation where the broker is simply a regular member of the community.

* 0 broker is totally external to the community
* 1
* 2 regular member of the community
* 3
* 4 the patron dominates the community

**Client/ patron domains of interaction**

Because clientelism implies an exchange of political support, we assume that the broker/ patron and the client interact in the political domain. The question here is whether they also interact in other relevant domains. They may interact in the economic domain if, for instance, the client is a employee of the broker/ patron or does business regularly with her. They may interact in the social domain if they have frequent and meaningful social interaction in the community. Code economic and social interactions only if they are substantial (an interaction between neighboors that say high to each other is not a substantial social interaction; a situation where the client very ocasionally works for the broker/ patron is also not a substantial economic interaction)

1. only political
2. economic
3. social
4. no info
5. [free text]

**Goods promised by patron/ broker**

Clientelistic exchanges often include several types of goods. Please try to be rather inclusive in the sense of including also less important goods. Money/ gifts implies small individual benefits. Employment can be promises. Access to individual government services typically implies that the broker is the gate-keeper of government services and provides them selectively to individuals that become clients; examples of services are unemployment or other government benefits. Infrastructure includes roads, schools, etc. Insurance is to be interpreted broadly; it implies that the patron is there to provide assistance or help when needed, including but not restricted to cases when something bad happens. Security/ protection refers to protecting from potential violence. Symbolic/ affective goods involves positive emotional/ psychological “goods” such as caring or giving a sense of recognition to the client; an example of this is the patron being a “padrino”.

* money/ gifts
* employment
* access to individual government services
* infrastructure
* insurance
* security/ protection
* symbolic/ affective goods

**How much of the promised goods do clients actually receive?**

As clientelism could also be based on mere promises, here we code how much of the goods promised to the client are actually delivered.

* 0 nothing
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 all of it

**“Goods” given by Client**

The client may also give/ promise a variety of goods to the patron. These include voting, or time/ labor put for instance in campaigns or rallies. Displays of loyalty can be “cheap” like wearing a badge of the patron or her party. Or they can be substantial, such as showing subservience explicitly.

1. Vote
2. Labor/ time
3. Displays of loyalty, cheap
4. Displays of loyalty, subservience
5. [free text]

**Frequency of Interaction between client and broker/ patron**

* once-off
* infrequent general
* infrequent around elections
* frequent

**How dyadic is the clientelistic relation?**

A dyadic relationship is based on “personal attachment” (Landé, 1977, p.xiii). In one extreme, the specific person(ality) of the broker/patron, and the relation one has with her/him, is the key of the clientelistic relationship. At the other extreme, the relation is fully impersonal, and the broker/patron acts by virtue of his position only. An indicator of how dyadic the relation is is the thought experiment of what happens to the relation if the current patron/ broker gets substituted by another person with the same position.

* 0 not dyadic at all
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 Completely dyadic

**How hierarchical is the relation?**

There can be more or less inequality in the clientelistic relation. They key here is that we care about the inequality in the relation. The patron maybe much of much higher status than the client but the relation could nevertheless be a transaction between equals. For example, a buyer and a seller of a Ferrari are probably of very different socioeconomic status but in their transaction, they are more or less equal.

* 0 A transaction between equals.
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 Client is clearly and explicitly subordinate

**Attitude of client towards relation**

How do clients interpret the overall nature of the relationship? Do they rather see it in pragmatic/opportunistic terms or in affective terms? We interpret affective in a broad way, as implying a behavior that shows signs of some positive emotional bond; it can inlcude signs of respect for instance.

* Pragmatic/ opportunistic
* Affective

**Coercion**

Does the patron/ broker use coercion towards the client. We distinguish between passive and active coercion. Active coercion involves threat of violence. Passive coercion involves the threat of the withdrawal of benefits.

* no
* passive
* active

**Alternatives to Clientelism - According to Client**

\*In the mind of the client\*, what else could he/ she be choosing (realistically) other than the specific clientelistic relationship? The main alternatives are the following. A “horizontal” group that pursues redistribution/ rights without conditionality. This can be a social group such as grassroots organizations, or a political party with a redistributive agenda. Another political party that is for whatever non-clientelistic reason attractive (for instance it could be that the program is attractive or that the candidate is considered very competent). Another clientelistic party. The possibility of exiting clientelism without choosing any alternative (this is relevant only when above options do not apply, i.e. “exit” is the only alternative to the clientelistic relation described).

* horizontal group (may be political or social; gives redistribution/ rights without conditionality)
* other political party (with attractive policy or people)
* other clientelistic party
* exit clientelism
* no alternatives at all (exit seen as too costly)

**Targeting**

A potential client may become a client because she is targeted by the patron/ broker, or may become one out ot own initiative (for instance by sign up for a party, approaching a broker, or showing up at rallies). An alternative is that there is no targeting, that simply patrons distribute or promise goods in a non-selective way.

* client explicitly targeted by party/ brokers
* client own initiative
* no targeting

**Part III: Client Characteristics**

**Agency**

Code from the perspective of \*potential\* clients (i.e. not only actual clients, but also their peers who do not engage in clientelism, if described). Low agency means that, in practice, clients do not have a choice but to engage in the type of clientelism offered by the patron; or that the costs of giving up the existing clientelistic relation are prohibitive. High agency means that clients can exit the relation and choose other alternatives without cost, or shape an existing clientelistic relation without a cost.

* 0 no agency
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 high agency

**How good a deal does the client get?**

As before, code from the perspective of \*potential\* clients. Use as indicator of whether clients get a good deal how satisfied they are. At one extreme they are totally unsatisfied possibly because they get nothing at all. At the other extreme, they are totally satified.

* 0 nothing
* 1
* 2
* 3
* 4 a lot

## Appendix D. Descriptive statistics

We group the variables in four types. First context variables, such as the decade during which the fieldwork took place, or whether the setting is urban or not. Second, variables that describe the clientelistic relation, such as the goods exchanged, how hierarchical (vertical) the relation is, and whether the client is an individual or a group. Third, variables that help to evaluate the relation from the client perspective, such as the degree to which the client has agency or gets a good deal. Finally we also present some other variables of interest, such as if there are alternatives to the current clientelistic relation for the client, if the client is targeted by the broker (a prominent assumption in much quantitative political science literature on the topic), the extent to which the exchange is conditional, and the degree to which the paper has detail on the client perspective.

Some variables are coded as zero/ one dummy variables whereas others are coded as scales ranging from 0 to 4. Some of the variables were categorical in the questionnaire and have been transformed into quantitative variables. For instance, the questionnaire asked about domains of interaction between the client and the patron/broker, which could be only political or also social (such as if the patron/broker is the chief), or also economic (if the client is employed by the patron/broker). This variable is quantified by recording the number of domains of interaction, either 1, 2, or 3, coded as 0-2. Free-text responses have been added when possible to existing categories. For instance, the category: Client gets employment includes also exchanges where the client receives income generation opportunities or housing opportunities. The variable capturing alternatives for the client originally included five categories (see codebook in Appendix C). From these we construct the variable Alternatives equals one if there is either a horizontal group that gives redistribution/ rights without conditionality, another political party (with attractive policy or people), another clientelistic party; if the only alternative is exit or if there is no alternative at all because exit is seen as too costly the variable is coded as zero.

The table shows some variation in context, with some rural cases and some urban ones. There is also variation in the variables describing and evaluating the exchange. Variables always span the whole range of permitted values (0-4, or 0-1, or 0-2) and have an average often close to the middle of their range. This suggests that we get a spread but not overly skewed distribution of types of exchange.

There are also interesting patterns in the data. Most of the exchanges are conditional, as standard definitions of clientelism require. At the same time, most clients are *not* explicitly targeted. This contrasts with much of the standard political science literature dealing with clients, which tends to assume that they become clients because they are targeted by brokers/ patrons.

The table also shows a relatively low level of detail on the clients' perspective provided in the papers. Despite our best efforts, a majority of ethnographic papers focuses on brokers and patrons more than on clients. This implies that our coding exercise requires frequent judgment calls from the coder.

|  |
| --- |
| Table D.1 Descriptive statistics |
|  | **Mean** | **Min** | **Max** | **N** |
| **Context** |
|   Decade fieldwork | 1997 | 1950 | 2010 | 60 |
|   Economic development area | 0.85 | 0 | 2 | 57 |
|   Urban | 0.62 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Africa | 0.2 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Asia | 0.37 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Latin America | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
| **Characteristics relation** |
|   Individual exchange | 2.91 | 0 | 4 | 59 |
|   Additional domains of interaction | 0.72 | 0 | 2 | 59 |
|   Frequent interaction | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 58 |
|   Dyadic | 2.42 | 0 | 4 | 60 |
|   Hierarchical | 1.93 | 0 | 4 | 59 |
|   Broker Important | 2.33 | 0 | 4 | 60 |
|   Broker interests aligned to client | 1.49 | 0 | 4 | 58 |
|   Affective relation | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 57 |
|   Client gets money | 0.56 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gets infrastructure | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gets gov services | 0.38 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gets insurance/ protection | 0.32 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gets employment | 0.19 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gives vote | 0.91 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gives labor | 0.35 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Client gives loyalty | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Coercion Threats | 0.18 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
|   Coercion Withdrawal | 0.2 | 0 | 1 | 60 |
| **Evaluation relation** |
|   Agency | 2.14 | 0 | 4 | 59 |
|   Agent gets a good deal | 2.4 | 0 | 4 | 59 |
| **Others** |
|   Alternatives | 0.82 | 0 | 1 | 48 |
|   Patron gives conditionally | 3.25 | 0 | 4 | 59 |
|   Client gives conditionally | 3.23 | 0 | 4 | 60 |
|   Client targeted | 0.43 | 0 | 1 | 51 |
|   Detail on client perspective | 1.77 | 0 | 4 | 60 |

## Appendix E. Data interpretation challenges

A potentially important concern with the data we produce has to do with our own biases and pre-conceptions. In particular, the coding may reflect a pre-conceived framework of clientelism in our minds: We might believe that some characteristics of clientelism should be associated with another one. For instance, we may believe a priori that hierarchical clientelistic relations should include affection. We may then have a tendency to code these two features together in a paper even if it is not warranted by the information given in the text. Of course, we seek to avoid making this mistake consciously, but it may still occur to a certain degree unconsciously.

It is difficult to gauge the extent of this problem, but several considerations alleviate the concern in our case. First, most of the coding was done before the details of this paper were conceived. In particular, the type of analysis that would be undertaken with the data was not known while most of the coding took place. It was always clear that the data from coding would be summarized in some way, but the decision to undertake a cluster analysis and a PCA was taken after most of the coding was done. Similarly, most coding was done prior to the development of the framework that emerges from the analysis. Concerns about a pre-conceived framework would be more severe if the framework had been developed first, and the coding done after. Second, the fact that there are four separate coders implies that idiosyncratic associations in the minds of a coder are diluted in the final data. To the extent that coders have different unconscious associations in mind, they should not affect greatly the end result.

In order to check if the team of co-authors held some pre-conceived framework that affected the coding, we asked a master student who was unfamiliar with the topic to also code some of the papers. We counted the instances where our codes disagree substantially, in the sense that the codes of dummy variables were opposed (for instance, she chose zero and we chose one), or differ by more than one unit for variables with more than two values, which usually have 5 values (for instance, she chose 2 and we chose 4). Comparing her codes to ours, we found that only in 14% of the cases there were substantial disagreements between hers and ours.

A final relevant interpretational issue that needs to be borne in mind when considering our data is that they are not “objective” data from clients or prospective clients. It is data already filtered through the author of the papers we code. This has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that the author has already selected the most meaningful and representative instances of all her ethnographic exploration; the disadvantage is that our data include, not only our biases and preconceptions, but also those of the authors of the papers.

## Appendix F. Choosing the number of clusters

Hierarchical clustering works as a bottom-up procedure. We start with a dataset of our 60 ID observations reflecting 60 different instances of exchange in the literature. We consider only the variables reflecting the characteristics of the relation, such as the frequency of interaction, whether the exchange is at the individual or group level, and so on, because we aim to use the evaluative variables for an analysis of the welfare implications of different types of clientelism later on. As mentioned above, we perform the analysis twice, first with all characteristics and second restricted to those characteristics with highest inter-coder agreement. We compute the distance between the different observations: instances of clientelistic exchange that have similar characteristics will be close to each other. The hierarchical clustering algorithm then joins the two that are closest to form a first cluster. It then computes an average of the characteristics of the cluster, recomputes the distance of this cluster to all other observations, and again chooses the observations/ clusters that are closest together.(We use the default method of “complete” linkage in the R function hclust.) The next closest observations could be two “new” observations so that we would now have two different clusters, or it could be the original cluster with a new observation, so that we would have a three-observation cluster. We continue this procedure getting less and less clusters until we only have one big cluster including all observations.

The result of hierarchical clustering can be represented in a dendrogram, which helps choosing a sensible number of clusters. A dendrogram displays the bottom-up approach of clustering more and more observations into fewer clusters. Figure F.1 shows the dendrograms. The horizontal axis shows all observations. The observations get increasingly clustered as we move up the figure. The vertical axis displays the distance between clusters. We can choose how many clusters we want to consider, and the procedure tells us which ones make most sense. This is done by slicing the figure horizontally at a chosen distance level and collecting the clusters that hang from the lines crossed. Starting from top to bottom, it makes sense to choose an amount of clusters so that the clustered papers “hang” as low as possible. The lower the clustered papers “hang”, the farther they are from the next cluster. Visually, it appears that two, four, or five clusters could all be a sensible number to choose. When considering five, two of the clusters are small, with only three exchanges, while the three others are larger. We decide to choose five but emphasize particularly the three largest. This allows us to explore a large variety of subtypes, while focusing particularly on the types that are more prevalent.



Figure F.1: Hierarchical clusters

## Appendix G. Clusters

Table G.1 shows the average characteristics of the five clusters. The rows correspond to different exchange characteristics and the columns correspond to the different clusters. The variables capturing exchange characteristics have been standardized (i.e. demeaned and divided by the respective standard deviation). Thus, the numbers in the cells can be interpreted as the average of the characteristic in the cluster relative to the overall average in standard deviations. Going row by row, one can pinpoint the attributes that characterize each of the clusters by comparing the value of one cluster to those of the others. For instance, the last characteristic is whether there is Coercion in the form of the threat of withdrawal of benefits. Clusters 1 and 3 have negative values implying that they tend to display no coercion relative to the average. Clusters 2, 4 and 5 display positive values so they display more coercion than average. The higher the absolute value of the characteristic in the cluster, the more the cluster is distinguished by such characteristic. Cluster 5 displays the highest value, quite larger than all the rest. In our analysis we consider characteristics with absolute values higher than 1/3 (an arbitrary value). Thus, we say that Cluster 5 (and to a lesser extent Cluster 4) are characterized by coercion in the form of withdrawal of benefits. Table 1 in the text lists all the characteristics with absolute value higher than 1/3, in decreasing order and with a “No” preceding characteristics with a negative value.

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| Table G.1. Characteristics of clusters |
|  | **Cluster 1** | **Cluster 2** | **Cluster 3** | **Cluster 4** | **Cluster 5** |
| Individual exchange | 0.49 | 0.35 | -1.26 | 0.86 | 0.21 |
| Additional domains of interaction | -0.9 | 0.78 | 0.03 | 1.84 | -0.74 |
| Frequent interaction | -0.8 | 1.05 | -0.34 | 1.11 | -0.32 |
| Dyadic | -0.91 | 0.84 | 0.16 | 1.19 | -0.91 |
| Hierarchical | -0.49 | 0.86 | -0.42 | 1.16 | -0.84 |
| Broker Important | -0.92 | 0.5 | 0.34 | 1.42 | -0.08 |
| Broker interests aligned to client | -0.74 | 0.19 | 0.66 | 0.1 | 0.23 |
| Affective relation | -0.58 | 0.92 | -0.29 | 0.73 | -0.77 |
| Client gets money | 0.69 | 0.17 | -1.04 | -0.1 | -0.1 |
| Client gets infrastructure | -0.31 | -0.16 | 0.92 | -0.95 | -0.6 |
| Client gets gov services | -0.14 | 0.09 | 0.23 | -0.89 | 0.23 |
| Client gets insurance/ protection | -0.69 | 0.91 | -0.44 | 1.25 | 0.09 |
| Client gets employment | -0.11 | 0.57 | -0.5 | 0.45 | -0.5 |
| Client gives vote | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.34 | -3.02 | -2.46 |
| Client gives labor | 0.17 | 0.15 | -0.75 | 1.41 | 0.29 |
| Client gives loyalty | -0.48 | 0.32 | -0.25 | 1.51 | 0.77 |
| Coercion Threats | 0.08 | -0.14 | -0.1 | 1.1 | -0.42 |
| Coercion Withdrawal | -0.21 | 0.09 | -0.12 | 0.42 | 0.89 |

|  |
| --- |
| Table G.2. Contexts of clusters |
|  | **Vote buying** | **Relational** | **Collective** | **Traditional** | **Modern coercive** |
| Decade fieldwork | 2002.5 | 1993.44 | 1998.93 | 1970 | 2005 |
| Urban | 0.68 | 0.53 | 0.71 | 0.33 | 0.5 |

## Appendix H. PCA results

PCA computes as many components as original variables and orders them by importance. The first components explain a lot of the variation of the original data and the following components explain the less and less. Figure H1 plots the percent of the variance explained by decreasingly important components. The first and second components explain a large amount of total variation (more than 25% and 15%, respectively). The third and following components explain much less in addition, less than 10%.



Figure H.1: Percent of the total variance explained by principal components

|  |
| --- |
| Table H.1: PCA. Loadings of three first components. |
|  |  | **PC 1** | **PC 2** | **PC 3** |
|  | Individual exchange | 0.02 | -0.5 | -0.13 |
|  | Additional domains of interaction | 0.38 | 0.1 | -0.12 |
|  | Frequent interaction | 0.39 | -0.03 | -0.05 |
|  | Dyadic | 0.38 | 0.14 | -0.05 |
|  | Hierarchical | 0.31 | -0.1 | 0.08 |
|  | Broker Important | 0.32 | 0.17 | 0.24 |
|  | Broker interests aligned to client | 0.16 | 0.39 | -0.02 |
|  | Affective relation | 0.31 | 0.05 | -0.33 |
|  | Client gets money | -0.1 | -0.29 | -0.27 |
|  | Client gets infrastructure | -0.02 | 0.42 | 0.04 |
|  | Client gets gov services | 0.01 | -0.07 | 0.37 |
|  | Client gets insurance/ protection | 0.34 | -0.14 | -0.09 |
|  | Client gets employment | 0.15 | -0.18 | -0.2 |
|  | Client gives vote | -0.15 | 0.17 | -0.23 |
|  | Client gives labor | 0.1 | -0.33 | -0.12 |
|  | Client gives loyalty | 0.24 | -0.22 | 0.27 |
|  | Coercion Threats | 0.04 | 0.04 | -0.04 |
|  | Coercion Withdrawal | 0.06 | -0.18 | 0.62 |

## Appendix I. Cluster Analysis without Indonesia chapters

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| --- |
| Table 1: Characteristics of Clusters |
| **Cluster** | **(1) Vote buying** | **(2) Relational** | **(3) Collective** |
| **Goods exchanged** | Client gets moneyClient gives voteNo Client gets insurance/ protectionNo Client gives loyaltyNo Client gets infrastructure | Client gets employment**Client gets insurance/ protection** Client gives vote | **Client gets infrastructure**Client gives vote**No Client gets money**No Client gets employmentNo Client gets insurance/ protectionNo Client gives laborNo Client gives loyalty |
| **Level of exchange** | Individual exchange |  | **No Individual exchange** |
| **Characteristics relation** | **No Additional domains of interaction**No Affective relation**No Dyadic****No Frequent interaction**No Hierarchical | Additional domains of interaction **Affective relation**Dyadic**Frequent interaction****Hierarchical** | No Frequent interaction No HierarchicalNo Affective relation |
| **Characteristics broker** | **No Broker Important****No Broker interests aligned to client** | Broker Important | Broker ImportantBroker interests aligned to client |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Cluster** | **(4) Traditional** | **(5) Modern coercive** |  |
| **Goods exchanged** | Client gets employment**Client gets insurance/ protection****Client gives labor****Client gives loyalty****No Client gets gov services****No Client gets infrastructure****No Client gives vote** | Client gives loyaltyNo Client gets employmentNo Client gets infrastructure**No Client gives vote** |  |
| **Level of exchange** | **Individual exchange** |  |  |
| **Characteristics relation** | **Additional domains of interaction**Affective relation**Coercion Threats****Dyadic****Frequent interaction****Hierarchical** | Coercion WithdrawalNo Additional domains of interactionNo Frequent Interaction**No Affective relation**No Coercion Threats**No Dyadic****No Hierarchical** |  |
| **Characteristics broker** | **Broker Important** |  |  |

1. Further developed and tested in Gans‐Morse, Mazzuca, Nichter (AJPS 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. <https://primo.ub.uni-due.de/> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)