

Appendices for "Social Welfare Attitudes and
Immigrants as a Target Population: Experimental
Evidence"

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Appendix A Representativeness of Sample (Online)

Table A.1. Comparison of Sample Estimates to American National Election Study Estimates

Variable	Sample mean or proportion	ANES 95% CI
Anti-immigration scale (5 items)	.51	.51 – .53
Anti-immigration scale (3 items)	.52	.51 – .53
Symbolic racism scale	.57	.54 – .56
Ideology	.5	.51 – .54
Democrat (including leaners)	.41	.45 – .49
Republican (including leaners)	.37	.38 – .41
Black	.11	.10 – .12
Hispanic	.07	.11 – .13

All ANES CIs were generated using full sample weights.

The five-item immigration scale estimate is from the 2012 ANES Time Series Study.

All other estimates are from the 2016 study.

All continuous or ordinal variables are rescaled to range from 0–1.

Appendix B Full Descriptive Results for Assumption Question (Online)

Table B.1. Proportion of Respondents Making Assumptions about the Described Policy

Would benefit:	Proportion
Poor people	.76
The unemployed	.66
Neither immigrants nor Americans born in the US	.51
Blacks or African-Americans	.41
Working-class people	.38
Latino or Hispanic Americans	.37
Immigrants	.36
Women	.34
Americans born in the US	.27
Men	.26
Whites	.24
Immigrants, not Americans born in the US	.22
Asian Americans	.21
Middle-class people	.19
Small business	.17
Both immigrants and Americans born in the US	.15
Americans born in the US, not immigrants	.13
Wealthy people	.05
Big Business	.05
Labor unions	.05

Appendix C Survey Instrument (Online)

Randomization and Survey Flow

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Control, Cultural Threat, and Fiscal Threat.

- Respondents in all conditions were asked questions 1–4 and 9–29.
- Respondents in the Control condition were asked questions 5 and 6.
- Respondents in the Cultural Threat condition were asked questions 5 and 8.
- Respondents in the Fiscal Threat condition were asked questions 6 and 7.

Text of Questionnaire

You are being asked to participate in a research study. Your participation in this study is voluntary. The purpose of this study is to learn more about people's views on government and public policy. It should take no more than 10 minutes of your time. We ask that you answer the questions honestly. Your responses will be completely anonymous, and we will never require you to provide any identifying information that could link you to your responses or data. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the researcher: Jake Haselswerdt, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, haselswerdtj@missouri.edu. You may contact the Campus Institutional Review Board if you have questions about your rights, concerns, complaints or comments as a research participant. You can contact the Campus Institutional Review Board directly by telephone or email to voice or solicit any concerns, questions, input or complaints about the research study. Website: <http://www.research.missouri.edu/cirb/index.htm> 573-882-9585.

If you do NOT wish to participate in this study, please click select "no" to opt-out. If you select "yes," it means that you have read (or have had read to you) the information given in this consent form, and you would like to participate in this study.

Do you consent to this survey?

- Yes
- No

1. Are you a citizen of the United States?

- (a) Yes
- (b) No

2. What is your sex?

- (a) Male
- (b) Female

3. What is the highest level of school you have completed of the highest degree you have received?

- (a) Less than high school degree
- (b) High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
- (c) Some college but no degree
- (d) College graduate
- (e) Graduate school degree

4. What is your age?

- (a) Under 18
- (b) 18-24
- (c) 25-44
- (d) 45-64
- (e) 65 or older

5. **Control and Cultural Threat conditions only:** Many people do not pay their fair share in federal income taxes, but the IRS doesn't have the resources to pursue all of them, resulting in hundreds of billions of dollars in uncollected revenue. Do you agree or disagree with the idea that the IRS should have greater resources to improve tax enforcement?

- (a) Strongly agree
- (b) Agree
- (c) Somewhat agree
- (d) Neither agree nor disagree
- (e) Disagree
- (f) Strongly disagree

6. **Control and Fiscal Threat conditions only:** According to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, traffic accidents and fatalities would be greatly reduced if every state would adopt a minimum age of 17 for all driver's licenses and 16 for learner's permits. Do you agree or disagree with the idea that states should raise the minimum ages for driver's licenses and learner's permits?

- (a) Strongly agree
- (b) Agree
- (c) Somewhat agree
- (d) Neither agree nor disagree
- (e) Disagree
- (f) Strongly disagree

7. **Fiscal Threat condition only:** A recent report by a policy research organization found that unauthorized immigrants pay much less in taxes than the average taxpayer. Do you agree or disagree with the idea that the IRS should have greater resources to improve tax enforcement?

- (a) Strongly agree
- (b) Agree
- (c) Somewhat agree
- (d) Neither agree nor disagree
- (e) Somewhat disagree
- (f) Disagree
- (g) Strongly disagree

8. **Cultural Threat condition only:** According to the US Census, the number of people who speak a language other than English at home has increased by more than 158 percent since 1980. Because of these changes, some states have begun offering the written portion of the driver's license tests in languages other than English. Do you agree or disagree with the idea that states should offer driver's license tests in languages other than English?

- (a) Strongly agree
- (b) Agree
- (c) Somewhat agree
- (d) Neither agree nor disagree
- (e) Somewhat disagree
- (f) Disagree
- (g) Strongly disagree

9. We would like your opinion on a hypothetical federal government policy. Under this policy, people with lower incomes would receive government assistance in the form of extra money to help living expenses. The government estimates that this policy would cost the U.S. Treasury about \$73 billion per year. Would you approve or disapprove of this policy?

- (a) Strongly approve

- (b) Approve
- (c) Approve somewhat
- (d) Neither approve nor disapprove
- (e) Disapprove somewhat
- (f) Disapprove
- (g) Strongly disapprove

10. Here is a list of different groups in American society. Which of these groups do you think are most likely to benefit from the program discussed in the last question?

You may select multiple groups.

- Poor people
- The unemployed
- Working-class people
- Middle-class people
- Wealthy people
- Big business
- Small business
- Labor unions
- Whites
- Blacks or African-Americans
- Latino or Hispanic Americans
- Asian Americans
- Immigrants
- Americans born in the United States
- Men
- Women

11. Do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?

- (a) Democrat
- (b) Republican
- (c) Independent
- (d) Other
- (e) No preference

12. **If answered "Democrat" or "Republican" above:** Would you consider yourself a strong Democrat/Republican, or a not very strong Democrat/Republican?

- (a) Strong
- (b) Not very strong

13. **If answered "Independent," "Other," or "No preference" above:** Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

- (a) Closer to Republican
- (b) Closer to Democratic
- (c) Neither

14. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

- (a) Very liberal
- (b) Liberal
- (c) Slightly liberal
- (d) Moderate; middle of the road
- (e) Slightly conservative
- (f) Conservative
- (g) Very conservative

15. What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

- (a) White
- (b) Black
- (c) Hispanic
- (d) Asian
- (e) Native American
- (f) Mixed
- (g) Middle Eastern
- (h) Other

16. Were you born in the United States?

- (a) Yes
- (b) No

17. Were your parents born in the United States?

- (a) Yes, both parents were born in the United States
- (b) One parent was not born in the United States
- (c) Both parents were not born in the United States

18. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- (a) Less than \$10,000
- (b) \$10,000-\$19,999
- (c) \$20,000-\$29,999
- (d) \$30,000-\$39,999
- (e) \$40,000-\$49,999
- (f) \$50,000-\$59,999
- (g) \$60,000-\$69,999
- (h) \$70,000-\$79,999

- (i) \$80,000-\$89,999
- (j) \$90,000-\$99,999
- (k) \$100,000-\$149,999
- (l) More than \$150,000

19. Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States?

- (a) Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country.
- (b) Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain.
- (c) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, but only if they meet certain requirements like paying back taxes and fines, learning English, and passing background checks.
- (d) Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, without penalties.

20. There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents if they attend college or serve in the military. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal?

- (a) Favor
- (b) Oppose
- (c) Neither favor nor oppose

21. Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a reasonable suspicion

that he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these immigration laws?

- (a) Favor
- (b) Oppose
- (c) Neither favor nor oppose

22. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

- (a) Increased a lot
- (b) Increased a little
- (c) Left the same as it is now
- (d) Decreased a little
- (e) Decreased a lot

23. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be decreased a lot, decreased a little, left the same as it is now, increased a little, or increased a lot?

- (a) Decreased a lot
- (b) Decreased a little
- (c) Left the same as it is now
- (d) Increased a little
- (e) Increased a lot

24. Now we'd like to ask you about immigration in recent years. How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here – extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?

- (a) Extremely
- (b) Very
- (c) Somewhat
- (d) Not at all

25. Now we'd like to ask you about immigration in recent years. How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away from people already here – not at all likely, somewhat likely, very likely, or extremely likely?

- (a) Not at all
- (b) Somewhat
- (c) Very
- (d) Extremely

26. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve."

- (a) Strongly agree
- (b) Somewhat agree
- (c) Neither agree nor disagree
- (d) Somewhat disagree
- (e) Strongly disagree

27. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors."

- (a) Strongly agree
- (b) Somewhat agree
- (c) Neither agree nor disagree
- (d) Somewhat disagree

(e) Strongly disagree

28. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites."

(a) Strongly agree

(b) Somewhat agree

(c) Neither agree nor disagree

(d) Somewhat disagree

(e) Strongly disagree

29. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."

(a) Strongly agree

(b) Somewhat agree

(c) Neither agree nor disagree

(d) Somewhat disagree

(e) Strongly disagree

Thank you for participating in this survey!

Appendix D Full Results with Control Variables (Online)

Table D.1. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, with Interaction Terms and all Controls Displayed (Table 1 in main text)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	-0.04 (.33)	-.20 (.18)	-.20 (.20)
Fiscal threat	.42 (.32)	.58*** (.19)	.63*** (.21)
Anti-immigration scale	.24 (.50)	.25 (.31)	.35 (.32)
Cultural threat X Anti-immigration scale	.06 (.54)		
Fiscal threat X Anti-immigration scale	.00 (.64)		
% Hispanic population in ZIP code	-.06 (.05)	-.06 (.09)	-.10 (.07)
Cultural threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code		.25 (.17)	.24 (.17)
Fiscal threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code		-.20 (.12)	-.21 (.13)
Black	-.03 (.25)	-.04 (.25)	-.16 (.27)
Hispanic	.01 (.15)	.04 (.15)	.02 (.16)
Other nonwhite	-.41* (.21)	-.38* (.21)	-.43** (.21)
Male	.11 (.11)	.11 (.11)	.10 (.12)
Ideology	.68** (.30)	.71** (.31)	.71** (.30)
Party ID (7-point scale)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)
Age (categorical)	.12 (.07)	.12* (.07)	.09 (.07)
Income scale	.07*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)
Education	.16*** (.06)	.16*** (.06)	.17*** (.06)
Not born in US	.34 (.43)	.30 (.43)	.35 (.47)
At least one parent not born in US	.24 (.19)	.22 (.19)	.17 (.19)
Symbolic racism scale	.43 (.31)	.43 (.32)	.38 (.34)
Constant	-3.60*** (.31)	-3.61*** (.28)	-2.12*** (.36)
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	2028	2028	2006
Pseudo R squared	.0592	.0635	.0886

State-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Hispanic population percentage measured in standard deviations

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table D.2. Linear Regression Models of Policy Approval, with Interaction Terms and Robust Standard Errors (Table 2 in main text)

	(1)	(2)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US	.33* (.20)	
Anti-immigration scale	.64*** (.22)	.51** (.26)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US X Anti-immigration scale	-2.24*** (.35)	
Would benefit immigrants		.52*** (.18)
Would benefit immigrants X Anti-immigration scale		-2.12*** (.32)
Would benefit Americans born in US		.03 (.18)
Would benefit Americans born in US X Anti- immigration scale		1.26*** (.35)
Cultural threat	.08 (.09)	.11 (.09)
Fiscal threat	.06 (.09)	.07 (.09)
Ideology	-1.22*** (.18)	-1.19*** (.18)
Symbolic racism scale	-1.15*** (.19)	-1.14*** (.19)
Black	-.22* (.12)	-.24* (.12)
Hispanic	-.13 (.16)	-.13 (.16)
Other nonwhite	.09 (.16)	.10 (.16)
Male	.02 (.07)	.04 (.07)
Party ID (7-point scale)	-.11*** (.02)	-.11*** (.02)
Age (categorical)	-.14*** (.04)	-.15*** (.04)
Income scale	-.12*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)
Education	-.12*** (.04)	-.12*** (.04)
Not born in US	.40* (.21)	.46** (.21)
At least one parent not born in US	-.20* (.12)	-.20* (.11)
Constant	7.44*** (.19)	7.29*** (.20)
Observations	2106	2106
R squared	.273	.283

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix E Alternative Specifications (Online)

Table E.1. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants, with Interaction Terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	-.01 (.11)	-.17 (.21)	-.11 (.15)
Fiscal threat	.30*** (.10)	.10 (.26)	.48*** (.15)
Anti-immigration scale		-.46 (.45)	-.19 (.29)
Cultural threat X Anti-immigration scale		.23 (.48)	
Fiscal threat X Anti-immigration scale		.44 (.57)	
% Hispanic population in ZIP code		-.11*** (.04)	-.07 (.07)
Cultural threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code			.06 (.11)
Fiscal threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code			-.17* (.09)
Black		-.12 (.18)	-.19 (.19)
Hispanic		.16 (.20)	.21 (.20)
Other nonwhite		-.22 (.25)	-.21 (.25)
Male		.11 (.10)	.12 (.10)
Ideology		.19 (.30)	.19 (.30)
Party ID (7-point scale)		.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)
Age (categorical)		.12* (.06)	.10 (.06)
Income scale		.03* (.02)	.03* (.02)
Education		.13*** (.04)	.13*** (.04)
Not born in US		-.06 (.33)	-.02 (.34)
At least one parent not born in US		.38** (.15)	.33** (.16)
Symbolic racism scale		-.52** (.23)	-.51** (.24)
Constant	-.66*** (.07)	-1.19*** (.23)	-.13 (.28)
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	2208	2028	2025
Pseudo R squared	.00371	.0253	.0492

State-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Hispanic population percentage measured in standard deviations

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.2. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Native-Born Americans, with Interaction Terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	-.27** (.14)	-.37 (.29)	-.24 (.18)
Fiscal threat	-.11 (.11)	-.15 (.29)	-.19 (.18)
Anti-immigration scale		-.04 (.45)	-.06 (.31)
Cultural threat X Anti-immigration scale		.10 (.59)	
Fiscal threat X Anti-immigration scale		-.03 (.51)	
% Hispanic population in ZIP code		-.06 (.06)	.02 (.09)
Cultural threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code			-.10 (.15)
Fiscal threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code			.02 (.12)
Black		-.03 (.14)	.03 (.15)
Hispanic		.07 (.18)	.14 (.17)
Other nonwhite		.24 (.18)	.28 (.18)
Male		-.18** (.09)	-.17* (.10)
Ideology		-.54** (.25)	-.62** (.28)
Party ID (7-point scale)		-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
Age (categorical)		.03 (.05)	.03 (.06)
Income scale		-.08*** (.02)	-.08*** (.02)
Education		-.07 (.05)	-.08 (.05)
Not born in US		-.79* (.41)	-.72* (.42)
At least one parent not born in US		-.03 (.14)	-.04 (.15)
Symbolic racism scale		-.60** (.25)	-.56** (.25)
Constant	-.85*** (.09)	.61*** (.22)	1.35*** (.31)
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	2208	2028	2019
Pseudo R squared	.00214	.0367	.0541

State-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Hispanic population percentage measured in standard deviations

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.3. Experimental Effects on Beneficiary Assumptions, Multinomial Specification (Neither as Base Outcome)

	Assumption of Groups that Benefit		
	Immigrants only	Immigrants & born US	Born US only
Cultural threat	-0.07 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.16)	-0.47** (0.19)
Fiscal threat	0.41*** (0.14)	0.10 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.16)
Constant	-0.98*** (0.09)	-1.22*** (0.11)	-1.22*** (0.14)
Observations	2208		
Pseudo R-squared	0.00		

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table E.4. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, by Race, with State-Clustered Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	.06 (.26)	.24 (.69)	.03 (.67)
Fiscal threat	-.03 (.28)	.63 (.81)	.60 (.84)
White	.33 (.20)	-.38 (.64)	-.83 (.66)
Cultural threat X White	-.05 (.27)	-.24 (.90)	-.05 (.91)
Fiscal threat X White	.51* (.30)	-.11 (.99)	-.04 (.98)
Anti-immigration scale		-.38 (1.18)	-1.21 (1.25)
Cultural threat X Anti-immigration scale		-.45 (1.63)	-.17 (1.58)
Fiscal threat X Anti-immigration scale		-1.48 (1.76)	-1.40 (1.83)
White X Anti-immigration scale		1.44 (1.39)	1.82 (1.41)
Cultural threat X White X Anti-immigration scale		.42 (1.87)	.18 (1.86)
Fiscal threat X White X Anti-immigration scale		1.37 (2.00)	1.26 (2.00)
% Hispanic population in ZIP code			-.05 (.05)
Constant	-1.69*** (.18)	-1.55*** (.53)	-2.96*** (.58)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	2192	2125	2028
Pseudo R squared	.01	.02	.06

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.5. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, by Race, with State-Clustered Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	-.36 (.36)	-.34 (.37)	-.26 (.39)
Fiscal threat	.21 (.41)	.53 (.44)	.67 (.48)
White	.18 (.31)	-.06 (.31)	.08 (.34)
% Hispanic population in ZIP code	-.10 (.11)	-.08 (.12)	-.08 (.13)
Cultural threat X White	.18 (.33)	.17 (.35)	.08 (.36)
Fiscal threat X White	.35 (.37)	.04 (.39)	-.06 (.43)
Cultural threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code	.33*** (.13)	.26 (.18)	.22 (.18)
Fiscal threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code	-.22 (.21)	-.36 (.23)	-.43* (.25)
White X % Hispanic population in ZIP code	.07 (.16)	.03 (.18)	-.01 (.19)
Cultural threat X White X Hispanic population	-.07 (.20)	-.00 (.20)	.03 (.22)
Fiscal threat X White X Hispanic population	.10 (.23)	.25 (.27)	.33 (.29)
Anti-immigration scale		.21 (.31)	.32 (.33)
Constant	-1.50*** (.29)	-3.56*** (.38)	-2.21*** (.49)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	2110	2028	2006
Pseudo R squared	.02	.06	.09

Standard errors in parentheses

Hispanic population percentage measured in standard deviations

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.6. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, by National Origin, with State-Clustered Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	.06 (.16)	-.14 (.36)	-.15 (.37)
Fiscal threat	.36** (.15)	.08 (.31)	.12 (.34)
Self or parent not born in US	.09 (.22)	-.45 (.72)	.01 (.87)
Cultural threat X Self or parent not born in US	-.28 (.40)	1.45* (.88)	1.06 (.93)
Fiscal threat X Self or parent not born in US	.34 (.32)	1.50 (1.12)	1.41 (1.29)
Anti-immigration scale		.75* (.43)	.13 (.53)
Cultural threat X Anti-immigration scale		.32 (.53)	.29 (.59)
Fiscal threat X Anti-immigration scale		.47 (.53)	.41 (.60)
Self or parent not born in US X Anti-immigration		1.25 (1.30)	.42 (1.58)
Cultural threat X Self or parent not born in US X Anti-immigration		-3.79* (2.22)	-2.94 (2.39)
Fiscal threat X Self or parent not born in US X Anti-immigration		-2.29 (2.12)	-1.92 (2.38)
% Hispanic population in ZIP code			-.06 (.05)
Constant	-1.46*** (.10)	-1.84*** (.25)	-3.58*** (.33)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	2187	2125	2028
Pseudo R squared	.01	.02	.06

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.7. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, by National Origin, with State-Clustered Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	-.10 (.20)	-.17 (.17)	-.17 (.20)
Fiscal threat	.54*** (.17)	.55*** (.18)	.58*** (.20)
Self or parent not born in US	.21 (.29)	.07 (.34)	-.02 (.38)
% Hispanic population in ZIP code	-.08 (.08)	-.08 (.09)	-.14* (.08)
Cultural threat X Self or parent not born in US	-.80 (.64)	-.61 (.67)	-.58 (.70)
Fiscal threat X Self or parent not born in US	.17 (.38)	.48 (.49)	.56 (.54)
Cultural threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code	.22 (.16)	.25 (.16)	.24 (.17)
Fiscal threat X % Hispanic population in ZIP code	-.26* (.14)	-.27* (.16)	-.28* (.17)
Self or parent not born in US X Hispanic population	-.02 (.16)	.10 (.15)	.13 (.16)
Cultural threat X Self or parent not born in US X Hispanic population	.22 (.23)	.16 (.26)	.16 (.27)
Fiscal threat X Self or parent not born in US X Hispanic population	.25 (.31)	.16 (.36)	.13 (.38)
Anti-immigration scale		.25 (.31)	.36 (.33)
Constant	-1.37*** (.11)	-3.63*** (.27)	-2.18*** (.35)
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
State fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Observations	2105	2028	2006
Pseudo R squared	.01	.07	.09

Standard errors in parentheses

Hispanic population percentage measured in standard deviations

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.8. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, with Alternate ZIP Code Demographic Interaction Terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	-.39* (.20)	-.12 (.17)	-.07 (.16)
Fiscal threat	.56** (.22)	.55** (.22)	.43*** (.15)
% foreign-born population	-.00 (.07)		
Cultural threat X % foreign-born	.34*** (.11)		
Fiscal threat X % foreign-born	-.09 (.10)		
% foreign-born Hispanic population		-.10 (.08)	
Cultural threat X % foreign-born Hispanic		.17 (.13)	
Fiscal threat X % foreign-born Hispanic		-.16 (.17)	
Hispanic population growth			-.15 (.11)
Cultural threat X Hispanic growth			.21* (.12)
Fiscal threat X Hispanic growth			.09 (.13)
Anti-immigration scale	.37 (.33)	.37 (.32)	.37 (.32)
Black	-.19 (.27)	-.15 (.27)	-.16 (.27)
Hispanic	-.16 (.15)	-.02 (.15)	-.11 (.15)
Other nonwhite	-.46** (.21)	-.44** (.22)	-.49** (.21)
Male	.08 (.12)	.10 (.12)	.09 (.11)
Ideology	.70** (.30)	.69** (.31)	.71** (.31)
Party ID (7-point scale)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)
Age (categorical)	.09 (.07)	.09 (.07)	.09 (.07)
Income scale	.08*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)	.08*** (.02)
Education	.17*** (.06)	.17*** (.06)	.17*** (.06)
Not born in US	.32 (.42)	.35 (.46)	.39 (.46)
At least one parent not born in US	.18 (.19)	.19 (.19)	.19 (.19)
Symbolic racism scale	.39 (.34)	.38 (.34)	.40 (.33)
Constant	-2.07*** (.38)	-2.15*** (.36)	-2.19*** (.36)
State fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2006	2006	2006
Pseudo R squared	.0886	.0863	.0844

State-clustered standard errors in parentheses

Population statistics measured in standard deviations

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.9. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, with Economic Interaction Terms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cultural threat	.04	(.34)	-.44	(.38)
Fiscal threat	.93**	(.48)	.15	(.40)
ZIP code unemployment rate	.02	(.03)	-.01	(.02)
Cultural threat X ZIP code unemployment rate	-.00	(.04)		
Fiscal threat X ZIP code unemployment rate	-.08	(.06)		
ZIP code median income in 10ks	.09***	(.03)	.05	(.04)
Cultural threat X ZIP code median income in 10ks			.07	(.06)
Fiscal threat X ZIP code median income in 10ks			.04	(.07)
Income scale			.06	(.04)
Cultural threat X Income scale			.00	(.04)
Fiscal threat X Income scale			.09*	(.05)
Education				.28*** (.09)
Cultural threat X Education				-.15 (.12)
Fiscal threat X Education				-.03 (.10)
Anti-immigration scale	.13	(.29)	.16	(.30)
Constant	-3.42***	(.40)	-3.01***	(.48)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2025	2025	2025	2025
Pseudo R squared	.0511	.0500	.0623	.0585

State-clustered standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.10. Linear Regression Models of Policy Approval, with Categorical Assumption Interaction Terms and Robust Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)
Immigrants only	.5** (.22)	.43** (.21)
Immigrants & born US	.85*** (.22)	.55*** (.21)
Born US only	-.09 (.29)	-.13 (.28)
Anti-immigration	-.72*** (.27)	.53* (.27)
Immigrants only X Anti-immigration	-2.9*** (.41)	-2.2*** (.38)
Immigrants & born US X Anti-immigration	-.92* (.5)	-.64 (.46)
Born US only X Anti-immigration	1.4*** (.53)	1.2** (.52)
Cultural threat	.095 (.094)	.1 (.087)
Fiscal threat	.11 (.095)	.072 (.089)
Ideology		-1.2*** (.18)
Symbolic racism scale		-1.1*** (.19)
Constant	5*** (.14)	7.3*** (.21)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	2126	2106
R squared	.15	.28

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Figure E.1. Predicted Policy Approval by Categorical Target Group Assumption and Anti-Immigration Attitudes, with 90% Confidence Intervals




Table E.11. Linear Regression Models of Policy Approval, with Additional Interaction Terms and Robust Standard Errors

	(1)	(2)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US	.16 (.23)	.22 (.23)
Anti-immigration	.74*** (.23)	.68*** (.23)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US X Anti-immigration	-2.7*** (.51)	-2.5*** (.47)
Ideology	-1.6*** (.19)	-1.3*** (.19)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US X Ideology	.35 (.41)	.37 (.4)
Symbolic racism	-1.3*** (.21)	-1.2*** (.21)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US X Symbolic racism	-.00055 (.48)	.062 (.46)
Cultural threat	.051 (.091)	.083 (.088)
Fiscal threat	.071 (.093)	.067 (.089)
Constant	6*** (.12)	7.5*** (.19)
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	2106	2106
R squared	.2	.27

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix F Mechanical Turk Follow-Up Study (Online)

Follow-Up Study Motivation, Design, and Data

The primary motivation for the follow-up study was concern that the ordering of the questions and experimental treatments (see Appendix C) may have created the possibility of post-treatment bias (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres 2018). In particular, the measurement of the immigration opinion questions after the randomized treatment, the group assumption question, and the policy approval question makes the anti-immigration scale a potentially problematic conditioning variable both for the analysis of the beneficiary group assumptions (columns 2 and 3 in Table 1) and policy approval (Table 2, Figure 5). In the latter analyses, there is also the potential for endogeneity of the dependent variable and beneficiary group assumptions, since the former was measured first. Question ordering is not a concern for the main experimental effects shown in Figure 2, which do not involve conditioning on any variables, or for the interactions of the treatments with demographic (Figure 3) and geographic (Figure 4) variables that are exogenous to the survey questions and experimental treatments.

To address this issue of potential bias, the follow-up study included all of the elements of the original survey in a different order. The questions about immigration policy (and other politics and ideology questions) preceded the experimental manipulation, and the question about beneficiary groups was presented on the same page as the social welfare policy description, with the policy approval question on the following page. This new survey flow does remove the post-treatment bias concern, but introduces an important new concern. Whereas the original study was carefully designed to avoid any priming of immigration outside of the intended priming in the experimental prompts, respondents in the follow-up study were exposed to a great deal of immigration-related content before the experimental manipulation or question about beneficiary groups. If questions prior to the experiment raise the salience of immigration and immigrants for all respondents,

the effect of the randomized treatments may be biased towards zero.

I also took this opportunity in the follow-up study to check for the robustness of the main findings to different measures of anti-immigration sentiment, including a new question asking respondents, "Overall, would you say your feelings about immigrants are positive or negative?", with seven response options ranging from "extremely positive" to "extremely negative." Unlike the anti-immigration scale questions, which all deal with immigration policy, this question directly taps sentiment or affect about immigrants as a group.

Subjects for the follow-up study were recruited on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a more economical choice than Qualtrics. A total of 1733 US-located MTurk Workers completed the survey between March 9 and 15, 2020, in exchange for an incentive of 60 cents. The citizenship question remained on the follow-up survey, but I did not screen out non-citizens. While Mechanical Turk samples have been shown to replicate most experimental effects documented on nationally representative samples and vice versa (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012), the sample is less nationally representative than the Qualtrics sample used in the main study. In the aggregate, the MTurk sample was much younger, more highly educated, more heavily male, more aligned with the Democratic Party, and more liberal (both in general and on immigration policy in particular). In terms of race, ethnicity, and nationality, the MTurk sample did not differ appreciably from the Qualtrics sample. Table F.1 compares the two samples on these dimensions.

Quality and effort are also a concern with MTurk samples. To ensure quality of responses, I first recruited from the pool of Workers with an approval rate of 99 percent or greater, then relaxed the standard to 97 percent to recruit the final 620 respondents. I also recorded the time each respondent spent on the survey before being exposed to the experimental treatments. I follow the guidelines offered by Wise and Kong (2005), who find time spent on survey questions to be a good measure of respondent effort. Stratifying the analyses by response time and an indicator for the final "lower-quality" batch of respondents does not alter the conclusions reported in this appendix.

Table F.1. Comparison of Main Study Sample Estimates to Mechanical Turk Follow-Up Study Estimates

Variable	Main study sample mean or proportion	Mechanical Turk mean or proportion
Anti-immigration scale (5 items)	.51	.38
Symbolic racism scale	.57	.40
Ideology (conservative)	.50	.40
Democrat (including leaners)	.41	.58
Republican (including leaners)	.37	.31
Black	.11	.11
Hispanic	.07	.07
Born in US	.96	.94
Male	.47	.52
College grad./grad. school	.27	.62
Age 18–24	.14	.19
Age 25–44	.34	.62
Age 45–64	.34	.17
Age 65 or older	.17	.02

All continuous or ordinal variables are rescaled to range from 0–1.

Results

Table F.2 displays the results of logit models of the assumption that immigrants and not people born in the US would benefit. The main experimental effects evident in Figure 2 and Table 1 are not replicated here, perhaps because placing the immigration opinion questions before the experiment primed considerations of immigration and rendered the treatments ineffective, or perhaps because of the characteristics of the MTurk sample relative to the more representative Qualtrics sample. In any case, there is also no evidence that treatment effects are larger at higher levels of anti-immigration sentiment (in fact, the interaction term for the fiscal treatment is signed in the wrong direction), which is consistent with the results in the main study (Table 1). This offers some reassurance that the null findings for interaction effects in the main study were not simply an artifact of post-treatment bias, though this reassurance is only partial since the main effects are null in the follow-up as well. Table F.3 demonstrates that these conclusions do not change when a more direct measure of negative feelings about immigrants is substituted for the anti-immigration scale.

Table F.4 demonstrates that the main study results on the interaction of the "immi-

Table F.2. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans, with Interaction Terms and Controls (Mechanical Turk Follow-Up Study)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	.09 (.14)	.08 (.30)	.08 (.31)
Fiscal threat	-.06 (.15)	.29 (.30)	.35 (.31)
Anti-immigration scale		.51 (.47)	.23 (.54)
Cultural threat X Anti-immigration scale		.05 (.66)	.03 (.68)
Fiscal threat X Anti-immigration scale		-.90 (.68)	-1.03 (.71)
Black			-.56** (.24)
Hispanic			-.02 (.24)
Other nonwhite			.06 (.20)
Male			-.08 (.12)
Ideology			.14 (.26)
Party ID (7-point scale)			.01 (.03)
Age (categorical)			-.13 (.10)
Income scale			.06*** (.02)
Education			.01 (.07)
Not born in US			.31 (.26)
At least one parent not born in US			.24 (.18)
Symbolic racism scale			.39 (.31)
Constant	-1.36*** (.10)	-1.56*** (.22)	-1.88*** (.39)
Observations	1733	1726	1726
Pseudo R squared	.000598	.00274	.0217

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table F.3. Logit Models of the Assumption that the Described Policy will Benefit Immigrants and Not Native-Born Americans using Alternative Measure of Anti-Immigration Sentiment, with Interaction Terms and Controls (Mechanical Turk Follow-Up Study)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cultural threat	.09 (.14)	.21 (.32)	.18 (.33)
Fiscal threat	-.06 (.15)	.17 (.33)	.20 (.34)
Negativity to immigrants		.18*** (.07)	.20*** (.07)
Cultural threat X Negativity to immigrants		-.03 (.09)	-.03 (.10)
Fiscal threat X Negativity to immigrants		-.07 (.10)	-.08 (.10)
Black			-.57** (.24)
Hispanic			-.01 (.24)
Other nonwhite			.05 (.20)
Male			-.10 (.12)
Ideology			-.02 (.27)
Party ID (7-point scale)			-.00 (.03)
Age (categorical)			-.13 (.10)
Income scale			.06*** (.02)
Education			.03 (.07)
Not born in US			.35 (.26)
At least one parent not born in US			.27 (.18)
Symbolic racism scale			.08 (.29)
Constant	-1.36*** (.10)	-1.91*** (.24)	-2.18*** (.41)
Observations	1733	1731	1731
Pseudo R squared	.000598	.00931	.0270

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

grants only" assumption with anti-immigration attitudes are robust to different ordering of the survey items (recall that in this study, the relevant items are ordered: immigration policy questions, other covariates, randomized treatment, description of social welfare policy and assumptions about which groups would benefit, policy approval). Table F.5 establishes that these results are also robust to a different measurement of anti-immigration sentiment (the direct question about positive or negative feelings towards immigrants).

Table F.4. Linear Regression Models of Policy Approval, with Interaction Terms and Robust Standard Errors (Mechanical Turk Follow-Up Study)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US	.33** (.14)	.29** (.13)	.36*** (.13)		
Anti-immigration	-2*** (.2)	.014 (.23)	-.0047 (.23)	-1.3*** (.28)	.21 (.28)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US X Anti-immigration	-2.7*** (.34)	-2.5*** (.32)	-2.5*** (.31)		
Would benefit immigrants				.82*** (.14)	.59*** (.14)
Would benefit immigrants X Anti-immigration				-3.2*** (.34)	-2.5*** (.32)
Would benefit Americans born in US				.31** (.13)	.11 (.12)
Would benefit Americans born in US X Anti-immigration				.65* (.35)	.81*** (.31)
Cultural threat	.045 (.091)	.035 (.084)	.051 (.083)	.031 (.09)	.039 (.083)
Fiscal threat	-.093 (.091)	-.11 (.085)	-.092 (.083)	-.075 (.091)	-.081 (.084)
Ideology		-1.6*** (.16)	-1.3*** (.19)		-1.3*** (.19)
Symbolic racism scale		-1.4*** (.19)	-1.2*** (.19)		-1.1*** (.19)
Constant	5.9*** (.093)	6.3*** (.088)	6.9*** (.2)	5.4*** (.13)	6.6*** (.22)
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1721	1721	1721	1721	1721
R squared	.19	.3	.32	.2	.33

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

Table F.5. Linear Regression Models of Policy Approval using Alternative Measure of Anti-Immigration Sentiment, with Interaction Terms and Robust Standard Errors (Mechanical Turk Follow-Up Study)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US	.52*** (.18)	.26 (.16)	.32* (.17)		
Negative feelings towards immigrants	-.36*** (.031)	-.16*** (.033)	-.17*** (.033)	-.37*** (.041)	-.22*** (.041)
Would benefit immigrants, not those born in US X Negativity to immigrants	-.38*** (.056)	-.29*** (.052)	-.29*** (.052)		
Would benefit immigrants				.71*** (.16)	.31* (.17)
Would benefit immigrants X Negativity to immigrants				-.32*** (.052)	-.21*** (.051)
Would benefit Americans born in US				.004 (.16)	-.15 (.15)
Would benefit Americans born in US X Negativity to immigrants				.22*** (.053)	.21*** (.049)
Cultural threat	.038 (.09)	.028 (.083)	.045 (.082)	.032 (.089)	.038 (.082)
Fiscal threat	-.078 (.091)	-.097 (.084)	-.085 (.083)	-.069 (.09)	-.086 (.083)
Ideology		-1.4*** (.16)	-1.2*** (.18)		-1.2*** (.18)
Symbolic racism scale		-1.2*** (.17)	-1.1*** (.17)		-1*** (.18)
Constant	6.1*** (.1)	6.6*** (.1)	7.3*** (.2)	5.9*** (.13)	7.2*** (.22)
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1726	1726	1726	1726	1726
R squared	.21	.31	.34	.22	.34

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < .01$

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