**Appendix**

Table A1: Effect of political conditions on difference between internal and public data

|  |
| --- |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Per Capita Difference |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  |
| Share of opposition councilors | -3,424.930\*\* |  |
|  | (1,374.553) |  |
|  |  |  |
| CCM majority |  | 1,868.956\*\* |
|  |  | (918.290) |
|  |  |  |
|  |
| Observations | 173 | 179 |
| R2 | 0.258 | 0.232 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.236 | 0.209 |
| Residual Std. Error | 4,206.238) | 4,242.385 |
| F Statistic | 11.620\*\*\*  | 10.433\*\*\*  |
|  |
|  | \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 |
| *Note:* *Models include controls for population, administrative status.* |

Table A2: Effect of political conditions on difference between internal and public data

|  |
| --- |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Log(Per Capita Difference) |
|  | (1) | (2) |
|  |
| Share of opposition councilors | -1.158 |  |
|  | (0.735) |  |
|  |  |  |
| CCM majority |  | 0.885\* |
|  |  | (0.478) |
|  |  |  |
|  |
| Observations | 173 | 179 |
| R2 | 0.044 | 0.048 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.015 | 0.020 |
| Residual Std. Error | 2.250  | 2.210  |
| F Statistic | 1.526  | 1.736  |
|  |
|  | \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.0 |

*Note:* *Models include controls for population, administrative status.*

*Coefficient in model 1 has a p-value of 0.11*

Table A3: Effect of political conditions on negative underestimates

|  |
| --- |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | Significant per capita underestimates |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| Share of opposition councilors | 1.632\*\* |  | 1.893\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.640) |  | (0.672) |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| CCM majority |  | -0.793\*\* |  | -1.030\*\* |
|  |  | (0.401) |  | (0.432) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |
| Controls | N | N | Y | Y |
| Observations | 173 | 179 | 173 | 179 |
| Log Likelihood | -114.393 | -119.728 | -107.939 | -112.670 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 232.786 | 243.456 | 221.878 | 231.339 |
|  |
|  | \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.0 |
| *Note:* Models include controls for population as indicated. Models 1-3 are also robust to controlling for administrative type. Significant underestimates are those greater than a standard deviation of the per capita differences. I do not estimate the effect of these variables on underestimates of total tax because all underestimates greater than a standard deviation are LGAs under opposition control.  |

Table A4: Effect of administrative type on revenue raising

|  |
| --- |
|  |
|  | *Dependent variable:* |
|  |  |
|  | *Internal Data*  | *Public Data* |
| *log(Local Tax Revenue)*  |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  |
| Rural council | -1.445\*\*\* | -1.173\*\*\* | -1.816\*\*\* | -1.538\*\* |
|  | (0.277) | (0.285) | (0.567) | (0.597) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Municipal council | -0.792\*\*\* | -0.617\*\* | -1.179\* | -1.000 |
|  | (0.303) | (0.301) | (0.622) | (0.632) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Town council | -1.156\*\*\* | -0.904\*\*\* | -1.570\*\* | -1.313\*\* |
|  | (0.302) | (0.306) | (0.619) | (0.642) |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  |
| Region fixed effects | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| LGA majority controls | N | Y | N | Y |
| Observations | 179 | 179 | 179 | 179 |
| R2 | 0.656 | 0.675 | 0.402 | 0.410 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.588 | 0.609 | 0.285 | 0.291 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.440  | 0.429  | 0.902  | 0.899  |
| F Statistic | 9.777\*\*\*  | 10.241\*\*\*  | 3.452\*\*\*  | 3.431\*\*\*  |
|  |
|  | \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01 |

*Note:* Models include controls for population, region and CCM control of the LGAas indicated



Figure A1: Difference between total revenue reported in internal and public data by LGA including Kinondoni

(a) Benford’s Law analysis of internal data

(b) Benford’s Law analysis of public data

Figure A2: Digit analysis of first digits of tax data. Benford’s law states that the distribution of first digits should conform to the red line show



1. Internal data (b) Public data

Figure A3: Digit analysis of last digits of tax data. If the data reported is the true data, we would expect broadly consistent frequencies across all digits.



Figure A4: Selection of newspaper headlines reporting on local tax performance