**Appendix A: List of V-Dem variables and/or indices used**

*A1. Dual vs. unitary executives and their relative powers*

v2exhoshog – **HOS = HOG (A\*):** Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)? (0=no, 1=yes)

v2exdfcbhs/v2exdjcbhg – **HOS/HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C):** In practice, does the head of state/government have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state/government necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers? (HOS: 0=No; 1= Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature, or Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature; 3= Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, or Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature; HOG: 0 = No; 1 = Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature; 2 = Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.)

v2exdfdmhs/v2exdfdshg **–** **HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C)**: If the head of state/government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed? **(**0 = No; 1 = Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events; 2 = Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions; 3 = Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions)

*A2. The appointment of the executive*

v2expathhs/hg – **HOS/HOG appointment in practice (B/A):** How did the head of state/government reach office? (HOS: 0=through coup/rebellion; appointed by 1=foreign power, 2=ruling party [in one-party system], 3=royal council; through 4=hereditary succession; appointed by 5=the military, 6=legislature; 7=directly elected; 8=other; HOG: 0=through coup/rebellion; appointed by 1=foreign power, 2=ruling party [in one-party system], 3=royal council; through 4=hereditary succession; appointed by 5=the military, 6=head of state, 7=legislature; 8=directly elected; 9=other)

v2exaphos/hog – **HOS/HOG selection by legislature in practice (A+B):** Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state/government? (0=no, 1=yes)

*A3. The confidence requirement*

v2exremhsp/hog – **HOS/HOG removal by legislature in practice (C):** If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state/government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency? (0=no, under no circumstances, 1=no, unlikely, 2=yes, probably, 3=yes, most likely)

*A4. Dismissal of the executive*

## v2exrmhsol/hgnp – HOS/HOG removal by other in practice (C): Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state/government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so? (HOS: 0=none, 1=a foreign power, 2=the ruling party or party leadership body, 3=a royal council, 4=the military, 5=a religious body, =a tribal or ethnic council, 7=other; HOG: 0=none, 1=a foreign power, 2=the ruling party or party leadership body, 3=a royal council, 4=the military, 5=the head of state, 6=a religious body, 7=a tribal or ethnic council, 8=other)

*A5. Repression*

v2cseeorgs – **CSO entry and exit (C):** To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? (0=monopolistic control/only government-sponsored orgs allowed to engage in political activity, repression of those who defy, 1=substantial control/government licenses all CSOs, active repression of those who defy, 2=moderate control/at least some orgs play an active political role, government does not or cannot repress them, 3=minimal control/constitutional provisions to ban anti-democratic movements, 4=unconstrained/government does not impede formation and operation)

v2csreprss – **CSO repression (C):** Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)? (0=no/free to organize, 1=weakly/government uses material sanctions, 2=moderately/material sanctions and minor legal harassment, 3=substantially/material sanctions, minor legal harassments, and arrests of oppositional CSO participants acting lawfully, 4=severely/violently and actively pursues all members of CSOs)

v2cltort **–****Freedom from torture** **(C):** Is there freedom from torture? (0=not respected; 1=weakly respected; 2=somewhat; 3=mostly respected; 4=fully respected)

v2clkill **–Freedom from political killings** **(C):** Is there freedom from political killings? (0=not respected; 1=weakly respected; 2=somewhat; 3=mostly respected; 4=fully respected)

*A6. Corruption*

## v2exbribe – Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (C): How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? (0=it is routine and expected; 1=it happens more often than not; 2=it happens but is unpredictable; 3=it happens occasionally but is not expected; 4=it never, or hardly ever, happens)

## v2exembez – Executive embezzlement and theft (C): How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? (0=constantly; 1=often; 2=about half the time; 3=occasionally; 4=never, or hardly ever)

## v2excrptps – Public sector corrupt exchanges (C): How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements? (0: It is routine and expected; 1: It happens more often than not; 2= It happens but is unpredictable; 3= It happens occasionally but is not expected; 4= It never, or hardly ever, happens)

## v2exthftps – Public sector theft (C): How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? (0=constantly; 1=often; 2=about half the time; 3= Occasionally; 4= never, or hardly ever)

## v2lgcrrpt – Legislature corrupt activities (C): Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain? (0=commonly, 1=often, 2=sometimes, 3=very occasionally, 4=never, or hardly ever)

## v2jucorrdc – Judicial corruption decision (C): How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision? (0=always, 1=usually, 2=about half the time, 3=not usually, 4=never)

**APPENDIX B: List of countries**

*Countries and time-periods covered:*

Afghanistan, 1789-2016

Albania, 1912-2016

Algeria, 1900-2016

Angola, 1900-2016

Argentina, 1789-2016

Armenia, 1990-2016

Australia, 1789-2016

Austria, 1789-1938, 1945-2016

Azerbaijan, 1990-2016

Baden, 1789-1871

Bangladesh, 1971-2016

Bavaria, 1789-1871

Belarus, 1990-2016

Belgium, 1789-1795, 1830-2016

Benin, 1900-2016

Bhutan, 1900-2016

Bolivia, 1825-2016

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-2016

Botswana, 1900-2016

Brazil, 1900-2016

Brunswick, 1789-1807, 1813-1867

Bulgaria, 1878-2016

Burkina Faso, 1919-1932, 1947-2016

Burma/Myanmar, 1789-2016

Burundi, 1916-2016

Cambodia, 1900-2016

Cameroon, 1961-2016

Canada, 1841-2016

Cape Verde, 1900-2016

Central African Republic, 1920-2016

Chad, 1920-2016

Chile, 1789-2016

China, 1789-2016

Colombia, 1789-2016

Comoros, 1900-1945, 1991-2016

Congo, Democratic Republic, 1900-2016

Congo, Republic, 1903-2016

Costa Rica, 1838-2016

Croatia, 1941-1945, 1991-2016

Cuba, 1789-2016

Cyprus, 1900-2016

Czech Republic, 1918-2016

Denmark, 1789-2016

Djibouti, 1900-2016

Dominican Republic, 1789-1822, 1844-2016

Ecuador, 1830-2016

Egypt, 1789-2016

El Salvador, 1838-2016

Eritrea, 1900-2016

Estonia, 1918-1940, 1990-2016

Ethiopia, 1789-2016

Fiji, 1900-2016

Finland, 1809-2016

France, 1789-2016

Gabon, 1910-2016

Gambia, 1900-2016

Georgia, 1990-2016

German Democratic Republic, 1945-1990

Prussia/Germany, 1789-1945, 1949-2016

Ghana, 1902-2016

Greece, 1822-2016

Guatemala, 1789-2016

Guinea, 1900-2016

Guinea-Bissau, 1900-2016

Guyana, 1900-2016

Haiti, 1789-2016

Hamburg, 1789-1810, 1813-1867

Hanover, 1789-1810, 1813-1866

Hesse-Darmstadt, 1789-1871

Hesse-Kassel, 1789-1871

Honduras, 1838-2016

Hungary, 1789-2016

Iceland, 1900-2016

India, 1789-2016

Indonesia, 1800-2016

Iran, 1789-2016

Iraq, 1920-2016

Ireland, 1919-2016

Israel, 1948-2016

Italy, 1861-2016

Ivory Coast, 1900-2016

Jamaica, 1900-2016

Japan, 1789-2016

Jordan, 1922-2016

Kazakhstan, 1990-2016

Kenya, 1900-2016

Korea, North, 1945-2016

Korea, South, 1789-2016

Kosovo, 1999-2016

Kuwait, 1900-2016

Kyrgyzstan, 1990-2016

Laos, 1900-2016

Latvia, 1920-1940, 1990-2016

Lebanon, 1918-2016

Lesotho, 1900-2016

Liberia, 1821-2016

Libya, 1789-1834, 1911-2016

Lithuania, 1918-1940, 1990-2016

Macedonia, 1991-2016

Madagascar, 1817-2016

Malawi, 1900-2016

Malaysia, 1900-2016

Maldives, 1900-2016

Mali, 1900-2016

Mauritania, 1904-2016

Mauritius, 1900-2016

Mecklenburg Schwerin, 1789-1867

Mexico, 1789-2016

Modena, 1789-1797, 1814-1859

Moldova, 1990-2016

Mongolia, 1911-2016

Montenegro, 1789-1918, 1998-2016

Morocco, 1789-2016

Mozambique, 1900-2016

Namibia, 1900-2016

Nassau, 1806-1866

Nepal, 1789-2016

Netherlands, 1789-1810, 1813-2016

New Zealand, 1841-2016

Nicaragua, 1838-2016

Niger, 1922-2016

Nigeria, 1914-2016

Norway, 1789-2016

Oldenburg, 1789-1810, 1813-1867

Oman, 1900-2016

Pakistan, 1947-2016

Palestine/British Mandate, 1918-1948

Palestine/Gaza, 1948-1967, 2007-2016

Palestine/West Bank, 1948-1950, 1967-   2016

Panama, 1903-2016

Papal States 1789-1809, 1814-1870

Papua New Guinea, 1900-2016

Paraguay, 1811-2016

Parma, 1789-1802, 1814-1859

Peru, 1789-2016

Philippines, 1900-2016

Piedmont-Sardinia, 1789-1861

Poland, 1789-1795, 1807-1867, 1918-1939, 1944-2016

Portugal, 1789-2016

Qatar, 1900-2016

Romania, 1789-2016

Russia, 1789-2016

Rwanda, 1916-2016

Sao Tome and Principe, 1900-2016

Saudi Arabia, 1789-1818, 1822-2016

Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, 1809-1867

Saxony, 1789-1867

Senegal, 1904-2016

Serbia, 1804-1813, 1815-2016

Seychelles, 1903-2016

Sierra Leone, 1900-2016

Singapore, 1867-2016

Slovakia, 1939-1945, 1993-2016

Slovenia, 1989-2016

Solomon Islands, 1900-2016

Somalia, 1900-2016

Somaliland, 1900-1960, 1991-2016

South Africa, 1900-2016

South Sudan, 2011-2016

South Yemen, 1900-1990

Spain, 1789-2016

Sri Lanka, 1900-2016

Sudan, 1900-2016

Suriname, 1900-2016

Swaziland, 1900-2016

Sweden, 1789-2016

Switzerland, 1798-2016

Syria, 1918-1920, 1922-2016

Taiwan, 1900-2016

Tajikistan, 1990-2016

Tanzania, 1900-2016

Thailand, 1789-2016

Timor-Leste, 1900-2016

Togo, 1916-2016

Trinidad and Tobago, 1900-2016

Tunisia, 1789-2016

Turkey, 1789-2016

Turkmenistan, 1990-2016

Tuscany, 1789-1807, 1814-1861

Two Sicilies, 1789-1860

Uganda, 1900-2016

Ukraine, 1990-2016

United Kingdom, 1789-2016

United States, 1789-2016

Uruguay, 1825-2016

Uzbekistan, 1789-1920, 1990-2016

Vanuatu, 1906-2016

Venezuela, 1900-2016

Vietnam, Democratic Republic, 1945-2016

Vietnam, Republic of, 1802-1975

Wurtemberg, 1789-1871

Yemen, 1789-1850, 1918-2016

Zambia, 1911-2016

Zanzibar, 1900-2016

Zimbabwe, 1900-2016

*Current UN Member States Not Covered:*

Andorra

Antigua and Barbuda

Bahamas

Bahrain

Barbados

Belize

Brunei

Dominica

Equatorial Guinea

Grenada

Kiribati

Liechtenstein

Luxembourg

Malta

Marshall Islands

Micronesia (Federated States of)

Monaco

Nauru

Palau

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

San Marino

Tonga

Tuvalu

United Arab Emirates

**APPENDIX C: Country examples**

To provide some feel for how the two measurement strategies (based on appointment and dismissal) play out in individual country cases, we here provide three country examples. Figure C1 displays how the measures maps onto more than two centuries of executives in Russia. The grey vertical spikes portray the appointment mechanism used and the red lines show the measures of dismissal. The lower-most panel provides additional descriptive evidence, indicating with gray spikes periods when there was a nominally dual executive in Russia (meaning that the head of state was a different person from the head of government). The red line overlaid on top of that measures the relative power of the head of government vs. the head of state to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers (higher values equaling primacy of the HOS over the HOG).

**FIGURE C1. Executive appointment and dismissal in Russia, 1789-2016**



*Note:* In the graphs for each dimension, vertical grey bars indicate when it applies (1=present, 0=absent) according to the appointment measure, whereas red lines indicate the presence of the dimension according to the dismissal measure, also scaled from 0-1. In the lower-most graph, vertical grey bars indicate a dual executive (1=dual, 0=unified), the red line the relative power of the HOS vis-à-vis the HOG.

From the perspective of distinguishing democratic vs. authoritarian regime types, Russia is by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) classified as a dictatorship until the fall of communism in 1992, when a transition to democracy occurred that however in 1999 slid back to authoritarianism. According to Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland (2010), Russia has been a “civilian dictatorship” since 1946, and according to Geddes, Wright and Frank (2014) a “party” dictatorship from 1946-1994 when it turned into a “personal” one. Finally, according to Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), all leaders of Russia since 1881 have entered office regularly except Lenin, who entered irregularly in 1917.

Concealed under these classifications, however, are facts like that Russia had an executive appointed through hereditary succession until 1917, although the first ruler entering our sample period in 1789 (Catherine the Great) came to power through a military coup; that under the old regime, executive powers were shared between the tsar and a chairman of a committee minister, whereas under single-party rule, the role of the *de facto* head of state held by the General/First Secretary of the Communist Party was shared with a subordinate head of government (the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars/Ministers) from Lenin’s death in 1924 until 1941, then again under Khrushchev after Stalin’s death until 1958, and after 1964 under Brezhnev; that much as under the old tsarist regime, executive power has since 1993 been shared between a directly elected president and a prime minister, but with the latter independent of the legislature to such a degree that very little of the confidence dimension can be said to apply. As the lower-most red line shows, moreover, despite its numerous periods of having a nominally dual executive, the executive in Russia has always been dominated by the head of state in the sense that both the tsar under the ancient regime and the president in present-day Russia exercised more power than their prime ministers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Figure C1 also illustrates how the two measurements (appointment vs. dismissal powers) largely co-vary in Russia. With an interesting exception during the personalization of power in the hands of Stalin during the 1930s and 1940s, the ruling party dimensions is most clearly present during the Soviet regime and disappears with the introduction of multiparty elections in the 1990s. Similarly, with the brief exception of the Russian revolution that brought Lenin to power, and the already mentioned case of Catherine the Great, the military is portrayed as a consistently weak political force throughout Russian history by both measures. The largest discrepancy occurs in the case of the hereditary dimension, where appointment through hereditary succession in Russia was never backed up by dismissal powers of for example a royal council.

Figure C2 depicts another prominent historical case: Germany (Prussia up until the unification in 1871, West Germany in 1948-1990). According to Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012), Germany was a democracy between 1919 and 1932, and again since 1949. Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland (2010) puts it down as a parliamentary democracy from the same year and Archigos codes all German leaders since 1858 as having entered office regularly except Ebert, who entered irregularly in 1918 (since Germany was not a dictatorship in the post-WWII period, it is not included in the dataset of Geddes, Wright and Frank 2014).

According to our regime dimensions, Germany starts out strong on the hereditary dimension in 1789, but then pursues distinctly different trajectories along our five regime dimensions after the end of WWI, first with a combination of a directly elected president and a relatively strong confidence requirement during Weimar republic in the 1920s, then with the Nazi takeover and interlude in the 1930s, a break where there is no sovereign regime during the allied occupation in 1945-1948, followed by West and later reunified Germany which both only score on the confidence dimension. As the grey spikes in the lower-most graph shows, Germany has always had a nominally dual executive, with the exception of Hitler’s rule after 1934. Indicated by the overlaid red line in that graph, the system was also dual in practice in Prussia and in Imperial Germany, with the King/Kaiser and the Chancellor sharing equal power over the appointment and dismissal of the cabinet (hence the red line is at 0.5), whereas in Weimar Germany (1919-1933) these powers were entirely transferred to the Reich Chancellor (the line hence drops to 0). From the installation of the parliamentary republic in 1948, the president of Germany has played an equally ceremonial role.

**FIGURE C2. Executive appointment and dismissal in Prussia/Germany, 1789-2016**



*Note:* Same as for Fig. C1 above.

Interesting to note about Figure 2 is that the Nazi regime (1933-1945) has a close to “residual” executive following our theoretical framework, since all regime dimensions are close to zero. Neither controlled by a strong ruling party, nor by the military (or at least only to a minor extent), Hitler’s appointment to Reich Chancellor in 1933 and then to Führer in 1934, merging the powers of head of state and head of government, is not captured by the five dimensions.[[2]](#footnote-2) Given that most countries in the world from 1789 to 2016 can be ordered by the five dimensions, this provides evidence that the Nazi regime had a sui generis character.

As a final example, Egypt is depicted in Figure C3. It highlights another distinct feature of our measures: they also cover semi-sovereign territories such as colonies prior to independence. We have therefore in this figure replaced the lower-most row with a simple binary indicator for whether the executive was appointed by a foreign power. This illustrates the extent to which colonial rule affected the appointment of the executive in Egypt. There are two notable such instances of foreign rule: the French occupation that in 1798 wrested power from the military-based Mamluks until direct Ottoman rule was installed in 1804, and British colonial rule from 1882 to 1922. The latter is most evidently present through the appointment of the Consul-General/High Commissioner, *de facto* head of government of Egypt, alongside the hereditary Sultan/King who served as *de facto* head of state. This foreign presence was in reality not fundamentally altered until 14 years after formal independence, when the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed in 1936 and power was transferred to the Egyptian prime minister, according to the confidence dimension relatively accountable to parliament. With the revolution of 1952 and later the military coup of Nasser, Egypt transitioned to (directly elected) presidential rule under strong military influence primarily on the side of dismissal/control powers. The brief spike in the confidence requirement toward the end of the coding period is the consequence of the Arab spring in 2011, which was then again thwarted by direct military intervention under al-Sisi.

This description can be compared to what extant classifications offer. According to Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012), Egypt has always been a dictatorship. Both Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland (2010) and Geddes, Wright and Frank (2014) classifies it as a monarchy from 1946, Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland (2010) then as a “military dictatorship” since 1952, Geddes, Wright and Frank (2014) as a “triple threat” (“Party-Personal-Military”) dictatorship since 1953. According Archigos, Naguib in 1952, Nasser in 1954 and Mansour in 2013 entered office irregularly, whereas all other leaders since 1922 have entered regularly.

**FIGURE C3. Executive appointment and dismissal in Egypt, 1789-2016**



*Note:* Same as for Fig. C1 above.

**APPENDIX D: Pairwise comparisons of regime dimensions**



*Note:* The scatter graphs have been jittered by 2 % to enhance readability; numerical entries are correlation coefficients­­.

**APPENDIX E: Regime dimensions across four global regions**



**APPENDIX F: Comparison to Geddes, Wright & Franz, 1946-2010**



*Note:* These comparisons are based on the collapsed version of the Geddes, Wright and Franz typology as suggested in their footnote 19 (2014, 329).

**APPENDIX G: Comparison to Archigos, 1840-2015**

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**Appendix H: Full Regression Tables**

*Table H1. Regression Models of Repression and Corruption*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|  | *Repression* | *Repression* | *Corruption* | *Corruption* |
| Hereditary | -0.022 | -0.012 | 0.020 | -0.002 |
|  | (0.156) | (0.124) | (0.068) | (0.034) |
| Military | 0.445\*\*\* | 0.165 | 0.266\*\*\* | 0.071\*\*\* |
|  | (0.164) | (0.120) | (0.052) | (0.026) |
| Ruling party | 0.675\*\*\* | 0.554\*\*\* | -0.099\* | -0.132\*\*\* |
|  | (0.193) | (0.166) | (0.053) | (0.047) |
| Direct election | -0.209\*\* | -0.195\*\* | 0.168\*\*\* | 0.081\*\*\* |
|  | (0.089) | (0.078) | (0.031) | (0.019) |
| Confidence | -0.840\*\*\* | -0.717\*\*\* | -0.050 | 0.021 |
|  | (0.139) | (0.106) | (0.045) | (0.028) |
| Appointed by foreign | 0.103 | -0.040 | -0.067\* | -0.106\*\*\* |
| power | (0.117) | (0.086) | (0.041) | (0.024) |
| Appointed by legislature | -0.069 | -0.047 | 0.051\* | 0.023 |
|  | (0.098) | (0.062) | (0.030) | (0.015) |
| Dual executive | -0.004 | -0.150\*\* | -0.002 | 0.049\*\*\* |
|  | (0.080) | (0.064) | (0.034) | (0.015) |
| HOS vs. HOG power | 0.087 | -0.077 | 0.052 | 0.049\*\* |
|  | (0.129) | (0.099) | (0.051) | (0.024) |
| Suffrage | 0.073 | 0.029 | 0.106\*\*\* | 0.025 |
|  | (0.100) | (0.088) | (0.029) | (0.020) |
| Free and fair elections | -1.480\*\*\* | -1.017\*\*\* | -0.343\*\*\* | -0.169\*\*\* |
|  | (0.115) | (0.100) | (0.037) | (0.028) |
| Country-fixed effects | N | Y | N | Y |
| Year-fixed effects | N | Y | N | Y |
| R-squared (within) | .555 | .578 | .385 | .330 |
| No. of countries | 192 | 192 | 192 | 192 |
| No. of observations | 22 782 | 22 782 | 22 549 | 22 549 |

*Note*: Standard errors, cluster on countries, in parentheses. \* *p* < 0.10, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01

*Table H2. Cox proportional hazards models of executive survival*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|  | *All executives* | *Influential executives* | *1900< sample* |
| Hereditary | 0.402\*\*\* | 0.430\*\*\* | 0.290\*\*\* |
|  | (0.046) | (0.052) | (0.046) |
| Military | 1.359\*\*\* | 1.356\*\*\* | 1.265\*\* |
|  | (0.112) | (0.120) | (0.128) |
| Ruling party | 0.902 | 0.936 | 0.751\*\* |
|  | (0.092) | (0.107) | (0.094) |
| Direct election | 1.005 | 0.999 | 0.906 |
|  | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.061) |
| Confidence | 1.418\*\*\* | 1.508\*\*\* | 1.440\*\*\* |
|  | (0.083) | (0.098) | (0.093) |
| Appointed by foreign | 1.739\*\*\* | 1.817\*\*\* | 1.443\*\*\* |
| power | (0.098) | (0.121) | (0.088) |
| Appointed by legislature | 1.109\*\* | 1.128\* | 0.976 |
|  | (0.055) | (0.070) | (0.049) |
| Head of state | 0.679\*\*\* | 0.735\*\*\* | 0.691\*\*\* |
|  | (0.031) | (0.044) | (0.035) |
| HOS vs. HOG power | 0.980 |  | 0.929\*\* |
|  | (0.034) |  | (0.033) |
| Suffrage | 0.886\*\* | 0.860\*\* | 0.746\*\*\* |
|  | (0.044) | (0.051) | (0.042) |
| Free and fair elections | 0.792\*\*\* | 0.837\*\* | 0.760\*\*\* |
|  | (0.047) | (0.058) | (0.053) |
| No. of countries | 191 | 191 | 177 |
| No. of subjects | 6 423 | 4 966 | 5 074 |
| No. of failures | 7 151 | 5 432 | 5 539 |
| No. of observations | 28 218 | 20 701 | 20 942 |

*Note:* Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses.

\* *p* < 0.10, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \*\*\* *p* < 0.01

1. We are however a little surprised ourselves by the fact that our country experts did not think this situation changed during the time period (2008-2012) in which Medveded was president (HOS), and Putin prime minister (HOG), of Russia. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. One could argue that the German referendum in 1934 was functionally equivalent to a “direct election” of Hitler as Fuhrer. However, the proposal put to voters in the referendum in 1934 was to unify the offices of the president and the chancellor (“kansler”) to the effect of abolishing the presidency and transfer all powers and duties of the president to the chancellor. The text mentioned that the chancellor was Hitler, but there was nothing in the referendum to the effect of whether Hitler should stay in power or not, or extend his term. Thus, it was not, even in an indirect way, an election of Hitler.

   [↑](#footnote-ref-2)