

On-Line Appendix for:

Hybrid Regimes for Local Public Goods Provision: A Framework for Analysis

Table A.1.

Empirical studies* of Local Public Goods Provision in the Developing World**

Author/Date	Country Focus	Sector/service	Focus on/assumes state delivery?	If NSP*** described, what type?
Agostini, Brown, Zhang (2016)	China	Spending in infrastructure, land projects	Yes	
Ahlborg, Boran, Jagers, and Soderholm (2015)	Cross-country (Africa)	Electricity consumption	Yes	
Akin, Hutchinson, and Strumpf (2005)	Uganda	Spending on health services	Yes	
Alesina, Devleeshauwer, Easterly, Kulat, and Wacziarg (2003)	Cross-country	Infrastructure quality, infant mortality, educational attainment	Yes	
Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register (2009)	Cross-Country	Access to water and sanitation	Yes	
Arvate (2013)	Brazil	Social services (health, education)	Yes	
Auerbach (2016)	India	Access to trash service, health care, quality roads, street lighting	No	Considers community self-provision
Baldwin (2013)	Zambia	Classroom construction	No	Examines coproduction between traditional authorities (chiefs) and

				politicians
Baldwin and Huber (2010)	Cross-country	Contract enforcement, infrastructure spending and access, etc.	Yes	
Bandiera and Levy (2011)	Indonesia	Spending on Infrastructure, social services	Yes	
Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan (2005)	India	Infrastructure (access)	Yes	
Banerjee and Somanathan (2007)	India	Infrastructure (facilities built)	Yes (with caveat about water sector)	
Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels (2009)*	Ethiopia	Health services	Yes	
Beekman, Bulte, Nillesen (2014)*	Liberia	Public investment	No	Examine private willingness to contribute to efforts of chief/government
Bell (2011)	Cross-country	Expenditures on health, education, welfare, as well as educational attainment, literacy, human capital stock, death rates, etc.	Yes	
Bernauer and Koubi (2009)	Cross-country (by city)	Air pollution	Yes	
Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao (2004)	India	Infrastructure access	Yes	
Besley, Pande, and Rao (2007)	India	Spending on infrastructure, targeting of ration cards, social services	Yes	
Burgess, Gedwab, Miguel,	Kenya	Spending on, construction of roads	Yes	

Morjaria, Padro I Miquel (2015)				
Caldeira, Foucault, Rota-Graziosi (2015)	Benin	Expenditures	Yes	
Cammett and Issar (2010)	Lebanon	Location of welfare agencies	No	Examines services offered by sectarian organizations
Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, Khanh Nam (2015)*	Vietnam	Financial contributions toward bridge construction	No	Field experiment involves community contributions
Carpenter, Danieri and Takahashi (2004)*	Thailand, Vietnam	Financial contributions towards services	No	Lab in field experiment examining differences in contribution rates in absence or in tandem with government
Caselli and Michaels (2013)	Brazil	Expenditures on local services, access to services	Yes	
Casey, Glennersten, and Miguel (2012)	Sierra Leone	Stock and quality of local public services infrastructure	No	Co-production between government-sponsored CDD program and local communities
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)	India	Infrastructure quality and access	Yes	
Chauvet, Gubert, Mercier, Mesple-Soms (2015)	Mali	Access to infrastructure, education	No	Examines impact of Home Town Associations (migrant associations)
Chen, Huhe (2013)	China	Public expenditures (various)	Yes	
Chhibber and Nooruddin	India	Spending, voter	Yes	

(2004)		perceptions of electricity, water		
Chu and Zheng (2013)	China	Expenditures on infrastructure and education	Yes	
Cooray (2014)	Sri Lanka	Infrastructure access	Yes	
Deacon (2009)	Cross-country	Secondary school enrollment, water and sanitation access, road infrastructure	Yes	
Deininger and Mpuga (2005)	Uganda	Infrastructure, social services	Yes	
Dell (2010)	Peru	Roads construction, literacy and schooling	No	Public goods provided both by state and hacienda owners
Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin, Wacziarg (2012)	Cross-country	Variety of measures of access to and quality of services and infrastructure	Yes (implicit)	
Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Euler (2014)	Mexico	Infrastructure access	No	Traditional institutions (usos y costumbres)
Duan and Zhan (2011)	China	Local public spending	Yes	
Duquette-Rury (2014)	Mexico	Water and sanitation, drainage, electricity access	No	Examines coproduction between government and migrant associations
Egel (2013)	Yemen	Education	No	Examines allocation of donor-funded teachers and classrooms
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya	Cross-country	Immunization rates, infant	Yes	

(2007)		mortality, illiteracy, teacher/student ratio		
Faguet (2004)	Bolivia	Government expenditure	Yes	
Franck and Rainer (2012)	Cross-country (Africa)	Education, health	Yes	
Gajwani and Zhang (2015)	India	Infrastructure access	Yes	
Gennaioli, N. & Rainer, I. (2007)	Cross-country (Africa)	Paved roads, immunizations, school attainment	No	Examines efficacy of co- production of local chiefs and central government
Gibson and Hoffman (2013)	Zambia	Public expenditure	Yes	
Gisselquist, Leiderer, Nin- Zarazua (2016)	Zambia	Spending on, enrollment in health and education services	Yes	
Glennersten, Miguel, and Rotherberg (2013)	Sierra Leone	Infrastructure (facilities built, etc.)	No	Community participation in efforts to improve local infrastructure and services; traditional authorities (chiefs)
Golooba- Mutebi (2012)	Rwanda and Uganda	Access to water	No	Compares public with private sector and community provision
Gonzalez (2002)	Mexico	Spending on infrastructure	Yes	
Grossman (2014)	Uganda	Agricultural community services	No	Studies farmer associations
Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and	Uganda	Variety of services provided	No	Focus on community- level,

Weinstein (2009)*		cooperatively		cooperative initiatives related to security, drainage, etc.
Hoop, van Kempen and Fort (2011)	Peru	Community sanitation education	No	Individual contributions to NGO training for community
Huhe, Chen, Tang (2015)	China	Access to water, expenditure on social welfare and agricultural infrastructure	Yes	
Jack and Recalde (2015)	Bolivia	Environmental education	No	Community contributions
Jackson (2013)	Cross-country, Africa	Access to drinking water, electricity, education	No	Considers possibility of community self-provision (but not private providers)
Javaid and Falk (2015)*	Pakistan	Cooperation with community irrigation systems	No	Examine how existence of traditional authorities, legal pluralism affect contributions, sanctioning
Joshi and Mason (2011)	Nepal	Access to sanitation, primary education	Yes	
Kochar (2008)	India	Education expenditures	Yes	
Kochar, Singh and Singh (2009)	India	Spending on infrastructure and social services	Yes	
Kramon and Posner (2016)	Kenya	Educational attainment	Yes	
Kung, Cai, Sun (2009)	China	Expenditures on infrastructure, education	Yes	
Khwaja (2009)	Pakistan	Infrastructure	No	Examines

		maintenance		community maintenance of government and NGO-sponsored projects
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1999)	Cross-country	Quality of infrastructure and social services	Yes	
Lee, Walter-Drop, Wiesel (2014)	Cross-country	Access to health, education, water, electricity, health outcomes	No	Show that state capacity doesn't predict local public goods provision
Li (2014)	China	Access, expenditures on education, health	Yes	
Lu (2015)	China	Education spending	Yes	
Luo, Zhang, Huang, Rozelle (2007)	China	Spending on infrastructure and social services	Yes	
Luo, Zhang, Huang, Rozelle (2010)	China	Spending on infrastructure and social services	Yes	
MacLean (2011)	Cross-Country (Africa)	Access to social services	No	Measures consumption of public and private services
Meng and Zhang (2011)	China	Local public spending	Yes	
Meseguer and Aparicio (2012)	Mexico	Spending on local infrastructure	No	Co-production between government and migrant hometown associations
Miguel (2004)	Kenya, Tanzania	Spending on education, water	No	School committee contributions to

				state schools (co-production)
Miguel and Gugerty (2005)	Kenya	Infrastructure, social services	No	Parental contributions to state schools
Mu and Zhang (2014)	China	Public spending (various)	Yes	
Mussacchio, Fritscher, Viarengo (2014)	Brazil	Education expenditures	Yes	
Nooruddin and Simmons (2015)	India	Spending in development, education	Yes	
Okten and Osili (2004)	Indonesia	Broad set of services	No	Community organizations
Olken (2007)	Indonesia	Infrastructure expenditures, quality	Yes	
Olken (2010)	Indonesia	Infrastructure access	Yes	
Olken and Singhal (2009)	Cross-country	Informal taxation for public goods	No	Examining community contributions of finances and labor
Pesqué-Cela, V., Tao, R., Liu, Y., & Sun, L. (2009)	China	Various	No	Self-governing, rural social organizations
Rosas, Johnston, and Hawkins (2014)	Venezuela	Access to education, social programs	Yes	
Sacks and Levi (2010)	Cross-Country (Africa)	Access to food	Yes	
Sarkhel (2015)	India	River bank preservation	No	Examine conditions under which households would contribute to private efforts
Sato (2008)	China	Various	Yes	
Silva-Ochoa	Mexico	Infrastructure	Yes	

(2009)		access, quality of social services		
Rosenzweig (2015)	Tanzania	Access to electricity, piped water	Yes	
Thachil and Teitelbaum (2015)	India	Public expenditures on development projects	Yes	
Tsai (2007)	China	Infrastructure access, social services	Yes	
Tsai (2011)	China	Infrastructure	No	Examines variety of “coproduction” arrangements
Tu, Mol, Zhang, Ruben (2011)	China	Land conservation	No	Examine citizen contributions to public program
Uchimura, Jutting (2009)	China	Health outcomes	Yes	
Visser and Burns (2015)*	South Africa	Cooperation and sanctioning related to fishing quotas	No	Focus on fishing communities
Waring (2011)	India	Community irrigation	No	Examines voluntary contributions to local irrigation institutions
Xu and Yao (2015)	China	Spending on schools, infrastructure, forestation	Yes	
Yi, Hare, Zhang (2011)	China	Spending on, access to infrastructure, social services	Yes	
Zhan, Huan, Zeng (2015)	China	Spending on education, health	Yes	
Zhang, Fan, Zhang, Huang (2004)	China	Spending on infrastructure, social services	Yes	

Zhang, Luo, Lui, Rozell (2006)	China	Public projects	Yes	
Zheng, Kahn (2013)	China	Transit, green space	Yes	

*Table only includes laboratory or “laboratory in the field” experiments if they were tailored to specific institutional or organizational contexts. Such experiments are noted with an asterisk.

**Contains results of article searches using the term “public good” and “local public goods,” using major academic search engines.

***Non-state provider.

Figure A.1 Example Hybrid Regimes for Local Public Goods Provision




Figure 3 notes: ^aKramon and Posner (2013); ^bThe Economist (2015); ^cCaldeira (2000) ; ^dLeBas (2013); ^eBurt and Ray (2014), McKenzie & Ray (2009); ^fKeener et al. (2010); ^gBloom et al. (2011), Sudhinaraset et al. (2013); ^hWolff et al. (2005); ⁱZhong & Grabosky (2009); ^jPost (2014); ^kHerrera (2017); ^lMazengia (2005); ^mAtun et al. (2015); ⁿNjoroge et al. (2014); ^oAlemu (2017); ^pEzeah et al. (2013); ^qMacLean and Brass (2015); ^rKlopp et al. (2014); ^sGoodfellow (2015); ^tBartone et al. (1991); ^uBesant-Jones (2006); ^vMuñoz & Gschwender (2008)

Prevalence of the four system types:

The tables below illustrate and indicate the prevalence of the four types of “hybrid systems” introduced in the paper. To assemble these tables, we surveyed the policy literatures on water and sanitation and urban transport. Our engagement with these literatures helped us develop sector-specific metrics appropriate for placing systems in a particular cell. Note that because the strength and mode of state involvement in each sector can vary within a given country, some of our examples constitute particular urban systems rather than country systems.

- For water and sanitation systems, we place in the **state dominant** category systems where state-managed water and sanitation utilities deliver potable water close to 24 hours a day. In such contexts, households on the network will have less need to turn to alternative providers. Systems where more than 50% of the urban population does not have access to household connections are excluded from this category, as the majority of the population will need to turn to alternative providers, regardless of the quality of state services.
- The **supplemented state** category includes cases where state-managed water and sanitation services are intermittent and/or water quality is poor, so that households on the network face incentives to supplement state services. Relatedly, systems where less than 50% of the population possesses household connections to state-managed utility services fall in this category.
- The **regulated provision** category for urban transit includes cases in which the public sector explicitly delegates the provision of mass transit to non-state providers through concession contracts or franchise agreements, and then actively regulates fares, schedules, routes, and safety. These state-sanctioned providers service the majority of those reliance on mass transit.
- The **independent provision** category for urban transit includes cases in which the majority of the population reliant on mass transit turns to non-state providers without explicit contracts to operate services. Rather, loosely regulated or completely unregulated providers service the bulk of the population.

Table A.2. Examples of “State-Dominant” Water and Sanitation Systems

<i>Coun try/Ci ties, or regio</i>	<i>GNI per capita (2013)*</i>	<i>System Characteristics</i>	<i>Studies describing this example</i>
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Mexico	9,770	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 100% of the population has access to utility water (Berg & Danilenko, 2011) - Services are provided 24hrs/day, but some regions have service intermittency and receive water only a few hours a week and based on unpredictable schedules - 2,571 state-owned, legally autonomous water utilities provide services in Mexico (the majority are municipal operators, 10 are inter-municipal and 5 are state-level operators) 	Herrera (Unpublished Manuscript)
Brazil	12,310	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 84% of the population has access to utility water (Berg & Danilenko, 2011)¹ - 98% of the urban population has piped water on premises - Services are provided 24hrs/day in 2015 (WHO-UNICEF, 2015) - In 3,706 municipalities out of 5,507 (67%), services are provided by state water companies; in 1,676 (30%) services are provided by a mix of municipal water providers, private concessionaires, private and social organizations; and in the remaining 2% water was supplied through standpipes and water tankers 	Marin (2009) Gamper-Rabindran, Khan & Timmins (2010)
Uruguay	15,640	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Publicly owned and operated Obras Sanitarias del Estado is the main water provider - Approximately 98% of the population has access to piped utility water - Services are provided 24hrs/day - Water quality is generally excellent (less so in informal settlements) - High income households consume bottled water 	Spronk, Crespo, & Olivera (2014) Borraz, Pampillón, & Olarreaga (2013)
Costa Rica	9,780	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 100% of the urban population has access to water piped on premises (WHO-UNICEF, 2015) - In 2004, services provided 24hrs/day, 7days/week (Berg & Danilenko, 2011) - In 2007, most urban areas serviced by autonomous state agency, The Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA) 	de Albuquerque (2009)

¹ Note that this estimate most likely overstates access, because utilities typically calculate coverage ratios only for “authorized” urban areas (see Gamper-Rabindran, Khan, & Timmins, 2010; Marin, 2009 for alternative measures).

South Africa	7,410	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In 2015, 92% of the urban population had access to piped water on premises (WHO-UNICEF, 2015) - In 2006, services provided 24hrs/day (Berg & Danilenko, 2011) - Water service provision is shared by various entities including: municipalities who can create water companies and subcontract provision, and government water boards -South Africa enshrines the right to the water in its constitution and has established the basic right to free water for poor South African citizens 	von Schnitzler (2008) (n.d.)
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*GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$), Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank
Last updated: 11/15/15

Table A.3. Examples of “Supplemented State” Water and Sanitation Systems

<i>Country/ Cities, or region</i>	<i>GNI per capita (2013)*</i>	<i>System Characteristics</i>	<i>Studies describing this example</i>
Ghana (Accra)	\$1,750	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State provides services directly via the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) - GWCL only services about 60% of urban/peri-urban residents - Water services intermittent (ranging from not at all to once a week to seven days a week) - Urban poor rely heavily on informal vendors, community standpipes and surface water sources, and small-scale storage to cope with intermittency 	Gerlach & Franceys (2010); Peloso and Morinville (2014)
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam)	\$840	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In early 2000, 22% of urban households had access to piped water, 45% had access to standposts and 19% to wells and boreholes - Roughly as many illegal as legal connections - Low rates of billing and collection efficiency, tariffs dry far below operating costs and a host of other problems make the urban water authority unable to meet demand for water - Many areas go for several days without supply; water rationing is common - Vendors common in areas where public supply is lacking or of poor quality, especially in informal settlements 	Banerjee & Morella (2011); Kjellén (2000); Kyessi (2005); Solo (1999); Water Aid Tanzania (2003)
Nepal (Kathmandu)	\$720	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Water provided by the Kathmandu Valley Water Supply Management Board, an autonomous government body - 70% of Kathmandu’s population possesses a household connection - Services intermittent (<4 hours a day in most of city) - Households cope with deficient state services by collecting water from public taps or purchasing from vendors and neighbors, investing in tube wells, storage tanks, and filtration systems, and boiling water before drinking or cooking 	Pattanayak, Yang, Whittington, & Bal Kumar (2005)

			Asian Development Bank (2012)
Nigeria (Lagos)	\$2,700	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Service provision by state water corporations - In early 2000s, approximately 15% of the urban population had access to piped water, 17% had access to standposts, and 48% had access to boreholes and wells; by 2015 access to piped urban water decreased to 3% - Lagos state water corporation sells water to small-scale providers at 500+ public standpipes, who in turn sell water to households outside network - Public perceives utility employees to benefit financially from water sales to private tankers 	Acey (2011); Banerjee & Morella (2011); Larbi et al. (2004); WHO-UNICEF (2015)
Yemen (San'a City)	\$1,300	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Urban water provided by the National Water and Sanitation Authority, non-urban water provided by 15 local corporations and autonomous public utilities - 71% of the urban population had access to piped water in 2010 - Supply intermittent (service every other day) - Low water pressure leads to shortages even on service days for some households with official connections, who turn to private suppliers - Within and outside of the public network, households rely on private vendors (e.g. costly water kiosks and tanker trucks) 	Al-Hamdi & Alaerts (2000); WHO-UNICEF (2015); Lichtenthaler (2010)
Ethiopia	\$470	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 48% of the urban population possess household connections to piped utility water, and 41% have access to standposts - Services provided approximately 23 hrs/day - A number of water utilities provide piped water including Addis Ababa Water Services Authority (AWSA), Nazareth Water Company (ADAMA), and Dire Dawa - In Addis Ababa, 100% of standposts are community-managed with oversight from utilities - 26% of households resell water; water resale is legal and not licensed by utilities 	Banerjee & Morella (2011); Keener, Luengo, & Banerjee (2010)

		- Water vending also exists	
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Note: Many urban systems in Sub-Saharan Africa would fall in this category as well. See Collignon, B., & Vézina, M. (2000).

*GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$), Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank.

Last updated 11/15/15

Table A. 4. Examples of “Regulated Provision” Hybrid Transport Systems

<i>Country/Cities, or region</i>	<i>GNI per capita (2013)*</i>	<i>System Characteristics</i>	<i>Studies describing case</i>
Chile (Santiago)	\$15,270	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State out-sources provision to private companies via concession contracts (trunk lines), and licensing and tendering (for feeder services) - State-regulated providers service most of urban population in major metro areas 	Barter (2008); Ferro, Munoz, & Behrens (2012); Finn & Walters (2010)
Brazil (Curitiba, Recife, Porto Alegre)	\$12,310	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal sector bus transport is usually delivered by private firms with long-term service concessions from public agencies (municipalities regulate city routes, and state governments inter-city routes) - Regulation governs fares, routes, schedules, labor rules, curbside operations, market entry standards, as well as maintenance and equipment specifications - Informal carriers are mainly absent in Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Goiânia, Curitiba, Florianópolis, Belém, and Porto Velho; in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Fortaleza, Salvador, and Brasilia informal providers also provide services (to a minority of riders) 	Cervero (2000); Ferreira & Golub (2004)
Argentina (Buenos Aires Metro Area)	\$14,220	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bus services for Metropolitan Buenos Aires out-sourced to private companies via franchises since the 1990s - The national government regulates fares, routes, etc. and subsidizes urban transport to restrain price increases - Shared taxis (“remises”) carried approximately 8% of ridership (relative to 43% for public transit) in the metropolitan area in 2000 	Bril-Mascarenhas & Post (2015); Kralich (2005)
South	\$7,410	- The South African government contracts with private bus operators for commuter services	Ahmed

Africa		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The government subsidizes fares on a per ticket basis, but is attempting to amend all contracts so payments are linked to the kilometers operated (Walters, 2010) - A large fraction (21%) of trips made via public transit involve full-size buses operated by private companies, while 14% involve publicly-managed rail transport - In Capetown, 74% of trips are provided by institutional, rather than informal, providers (Godard 2005; data from 1998); informal operators provided 26% of the trips 	(2004); Barrett (2003); Finn & Mulley (2011); Finn & Walters (2010); Godard (2005); Lomme (2008); Schalekamp & Behrens (2010); Venter (2013); Walters (2010)
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**GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$), Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Last updated: 14/10/15

Table A. 5. Examples of “Independent” Hybrid Transport Systems

<i>Country/Cities, or region</i>	<i>GNI per capita (2013)**</i>	<i>System Characteristics</i>	<i>Studies describing case</i>
Georgia (Tibilis)	\$3,560	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Paratransit providers called “marshrukta” provided 75% of mass transit by 2001 - Owned by individual entrepreneurs and loosely allocated to routes – granted the rights to operate on a specified line on a month-to-month basis - The municipally-owned Tibilisi Bus Company (TBS), successor to the Soviet-era bus enterprise, services roughly 30% of the surface transport market 	Finn (2008); Finn (2012)
Philippines (Manila) ²	\$3,300	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Paratransit comprised by “jeepneys,” jeeps refurbished for small passenger loads, which both compete with and complement Manila’s official bus and lightrail services - Informal transport represented approx. 76% of total public transport in 1998 	Cervero (2000); Finn (2012); Godard (2005)
Thailand (Bangkok)	\$5320	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Paratransit includes 14-18 passenger minibuses, 6-11 person minibuses, three wheelers, and motorcycles and pedicabs - The number of informal vehicles operating in Metro Bangkok on a weekday is 50,000 	Cervero & Golub (2011)
Ghana (Accra)	\$1,750	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Paratransit operators called “trotros” serviced 71.4% of the market in metropolitan areas in 2008 - Legal buses serviced roughly 9% of the market by 2008 - These legal bus services are provided by a government bus company, Metro Mass Transit, in major cities 	Abane (2011); Finn (2012)

² Georgia, Philippines, Thailand, and to a lesser extent Ghana, exhibit “free market” hybrid transport systems despite reasonably high state capacity scores. (In the case of Georgia, its percentile ranking rose from 35 in 2003 to 69 in 2013.) While the Philippines and Georgia clearly fall in the lower-middle income category, Thailand does not. Clearly, state capacity in particular sectors can deviate from state capacity in other areas of government.

Senegal (Dakar)	\$1,050	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Paratransit in form of “Car Rapids” (converted vans for 23-32 passengers) dominates mass transport -roughly 95% of marked serviced by paratransit -A small fraction of the market is serviced by a privatized bus operator with large vehicles 	World Bank (2005)
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa)	\$470	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Roughly 73% market share for informal providers in 1986 -Conventional bus services also provided by the publicly owned Anbessa City Bus Enterprise, which has had trouble expanding services in line with urban growth 	Gebeyehu & Takano (2007); Takano & Mintesnot (2006); Transportation Research Laboratory (2002)
Uganda (Kampala)	\$620	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Public transport in Kampala almost completely dominated by matatus (informal minibuses) and boda-bodas (motorcycle taxis) -The number of <i>boda-boda</i> operators in Uganda reportedly grew by 58.7% per annum in the 2000s. 	Goodfellow (2015)

**GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$), Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
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