

Supplementary Materials

These Supplementary Materials contain tables to accompany the article ‘The Power and Limits of Russia’s Strategic Narrative in Ukraine: The Role of Linkage’, accepted for publication in *Perspectives on Politics* in 2017.

The dataset and R-script used in the analysis can be requested from the author, Dr Joanna Szostek, at joanna.szostek@rhul.ac.uk.

Table 1: Explanatory variables studied in previous research on Ukrainian public opinion about Russia and related foreign policy issues

Study	Response variable(s), data	Language (native/convenience)	Identity/ ethnic identification	Region of residence	Settlement type (urban/rural)	Income/living standards	Religion/church attendance	Age	Gender	Level of education	Level of parental education	Occupation/employment status	Views on other political issues	English language ability	Personal travel/family abroad	Satisfaction with life	Media use
Kubicek (2000)	Binary variables ('Russia'/'other' and 'USA and EU'/'other') based on question asking with which county Ukraine's future was 'most closely tied'. Nationally representative surveys from 1992 & 1996.	-	Y	Y	-	Y	-	Y	N	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
O'Loughlin (2001)	Binary variable ('Russia'/'other') based on question asking with which county Ukraine's future was 'most closely tied'. Nationally representative surveys from 1992 & 1996.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-	-
McAllister & White (2002)	Scale of inclination to view NATO as a threat. Nationally representative survey from 2000.	-	-	-	Y	-	-	Y	Y	Y	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-
White et al (2002)	Scale of support for the EU based on positive/negative impression of EU and desire to join. Nationally representative survey from 2000.	-	Y	-	N	Y	-	Y	Y	N	-	-	-	-	Y	-	-
Barrington & Herron (2004)	Scale of positive/negative stereotyping of 'ethnic' Russians and Ukrainians. Nationally representative survey from 1998.	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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White et al (2006)	Scale of support for NATO membership. Nationally representative survey from 2004.	-	-	Y	N	Y	-	Y	Y	N	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-
Munro (2007)	Scale of support for CIS vs. Western Europe based on question asking 'with which countries Ukraine's future lies'. Nationally representative survey from 2005.	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-
Barrington and Farranda (2009)	Scale of attitude towards Russia based on six questions. Nationally representative survey from 2005.	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
White et al. (2010)	Scale combining support for NATO and EU membership and scale combining regret for USSR's demise and support for CIS integration. Nationally representative survey from 2006	Y	Y	-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	N	-	-	-	-	-
Kulyk (2011)	Binary variable (yes/no) based on question asking whether Ukraine's future lay in union with Russia and Belarus. Nationally representative survey from 2006	Y	N	Y	Y	N	-	N	N	N	-	-	Y	-	-	-	-
Gentile (2015)	Categorical variable ('West-leaning', 'Russia-leaning' and 'neither') based on support for joining the EU and/or NATO. Survey representative of Luhansk city population from 2013.	-	Y	-	-	-	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	-	Y	-

Y = effect found in at least one model; N = no effect found; - = not investigated. Operationalisation of explanatory variables differed from study to study.

For full References to these studies, see the article in *Perspectives on Politics* to which these Supplementary Materials belong.

Table 2: Frequency distributions of categorical predictor and control variables

Variables and response categories		<i>n</i>
Gender	Male	458
	Female	542
Education	Incomplete secondary	67
	Secondary	609
	Higher	321
	NA	3
Income	Lowest	171
	Low	383
	Middle	352
	Higher	77
	NA	17
Settlement type	Odesa	441
	Other urban settlement	242
	Village	317
Birthplace	Ukraine	890
	Russia	62
	Other	43
	NA	5
Lived in Russia (for at least 6 months in past 25 years)	Yes	43
	No	948
	NA	9
Friends or relatives in Russia (with whom in regular contact)	Yes	246
	No	746
	NA	8
Travels regularly to Russia (at least twice per year)	Yes	34
	No	955
	NA	11
Lived in 'West' (for at least 6 months in past 25 years)	Yes	29
	No	962
	NA	9
Friends or relatives in 'West' (with whom in regular contact)	Yes	152
	No	840
	NA	8
Travels to 'West' (at least twice per year)	Yes	36
	No	953
	NA	11

Religious attendance (at least once per month)	None	644
	ROCOMP	189
	Other	125
	NA	42
Discusses foreign affairs	Never/rarely	406
	Sometimes	290
	Often	277
	NA	27
Prefers Russian-language broadcasts (over Ukrainian-language or both)	Yes	390
	No	602
	NA	8
Time spent following news via television	None	141
	< 1 hour	474
	> 1 hour	374
	NA	11
Time spent following news via internet	None	596
	< 1 hour daily	213
	> 1 hour daily	184
	NA	7

Table 3: Proportion of Russian news sources (RNS), both narrowly and broadly defined, in news media repertoire

	0	0 < RNS < 0.1	0.1 ≤ RNS < 0.2	0.2 ≤ RNS < 0.3	0.3 ≤ RNS < 0.4	0.4 ≤ RNS	NA
#respondents (narrow definition)	788	12	49	40	18	21	72
#respondents (broad definition)	587	16	97	99	59	70	72

Table 4: 'Problem definition' questions used to assess narrative reception, with frequency distribution of responses

Question	Response	n
The USA violates the sovereignty of other countries	It is not a real problem	139
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	313
	It is a real and worrying problem	300
	NA/DK	248

Russia is showing imperialist tendencies	It is not a real problem	149
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	264
	It is a real and worrying problem	298
	NA/DK	289
Western countries try to change regimes they dislike, using democracy promotion as an excuse	It is not a real problem	176
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	312
	It is a real and worrying problem	200
	NA/DK	312
Russia is trying to destabilise Ukraine	It is not a real problem	139
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	217
	It is a real and worrying problem	396
	NA/DK	248
The USA is seeking domination in international affairs	It is not a real problem	95
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	303
	It is a real and worrying problem	358
	NA/DK	244
Russia is spreading false information about Ukraine	It is not a real problem	113
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	260
	It is a real and worrying problem	380
	NA/DK	247
Countries of the West and Europe are losing interest in solving Ukraine's problems	It is not a real problem	170
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	322
	It is a real and worrying problem	221
	NA/DK	287
Russia is trying to stop Ukraine getting closer to Western countries and EU	It is not a real problem	116
	There is some truth in it, but the problem is relatively not worrying	260
	It is a real and worrying problem	326
	NA/DK	298

The interviewer introduced the questions as follows: 'I will now read you eight claims taken from various news media and politicians' statements. Each statement is considered disputable to some degree and some of them may sound provocative... Now please tell me, in your opinion, which of the claims constitute real, worrying problems?'

Table 5: 'Causal' and 'solution' questions used to assess narrative reception, with frequency distribution of responses

Question	Response	n
The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Which is a bigger obstacle to solving the problem?	Continuing Russian support for the separatists	233
	The unwillingness of the Ukrainian authorities to grant Donbas special status	210
	Neither factor is important OR Both factors matter equally	351
	NA/DK	206
Strained relations between the European Union and Russia. Which is a bigger obstacle to solving the problem?	Antidemocratic tendencies in Russia which contradict European values	188
	The influence of the USA, which wants to prevent partnership between Russia and European countries	245
	Neither factor is important OR Both factors matter equally	279
	NA/DK	288
Unsatisfactory reform results in Ukraine since President Yanukovich left power. Which is a bigger obstacle to solving the problem?	Russia's attempts to destabilise Ukraine	120
	Inadequate actions by the Ukrainian leadership	475
	Neither factor is important OR Both factors matter equally	246
	NA/DK	159
Which proposal seems better to you?	Countries like Russia and China should balance the power of Western countries in a more multi-polar world	138
	Countries like Russia and China should democratise their political systems according to the model of Western countries	176
	Neither proposal seems good to me	179
	NA/DK	507
Which proposal seems better to you?	The USA and countries of Europe should continue their sanctions policy against Russia, so that the Russian authorities change their foreign policy	295
	The USA and countries of Europe should cooperate more closely with Russia to solve global problems	302

	Neither proposal seems good to me	127
	NA/DK	276
Which proposal seems better to you?	Ukraine should strive to integrate with the EU for the sake of economic and political reforms	281
	Ukraine should be wary of integration with the EU due to possible risks to the Ukrainian economy and traditional values	333
	Neither proposal seems good to me	124
	NA/DK	262
Which proposal seems better to you?	Ukraine should recognise the right of Donbas to strive for the closest relations with Russia	132
	Ukraine should do everything to return Donbas under Kyiv's control	412
	Neither proposal seems good to me	168
	NA/DK	288

Interviewers introduced the first three questions by saying: 'I will now mention three political problems, and for each problem, two possible obstacles to solving the problem. In each case, please say which obstacle, in your opinion, is more important in preventing the problem being solved. At the same time, it is recognised that the problems are complicated and have various causes not mentioned here.'

Interviewers introduced the latter four questions by saying: 'The last block of questions concerns possible paths to improving the situation in the world and in Ukraine. I will now read you four pairs of suggestions, again taken from the mass media and politicians' statements. Of each pair, please choose the suggestion which seems better to you.'

Table 6: Two-factor model of support for problem definitions from Ukrainian and Russian strategic narratives (pattern matrix)

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Communality
Russia is showing imperialist tendencies	0.91	0.07	0.80
Russia is trying to destabilise Ukraine	0.91	-0.06	0.85
Russia is spreading false information about Ukraine	0.91	-0.02	0.83
Russia is trying to stop Ukraine getting closer to Western countries and EU	0.89	0.00	0.79
The USA violates the sovereignty of other countries	-0.04	0.97	0.97
The USA is seeking domination in international affairs	0.02	0.78	0.60
Western countries try to change regimes they dislike using democracy promotion as an excuse	0.08	0.62	0.37
Sum of squared loadings	3.27	1.94	
Cumulative variance explained	0.47	0.74	

Table 7: Single-factor model of support for causal attributions and solutions from the Ukrainian strategic narrative rather than the Russian strategic narrative (pattern matrix)

Item	Factor 1	Communality
The USA and EU should continue sanctions against Russia (rather than cooperating more closely with Russia)	0.81	0.65
Russian support for separatists is a greater obstacle to peace in Donbas (rather than Kyiv's unwillingness to grant the region special status)	0.80	0.64
Antidemocratic trends in Russia are a greater obstacle to EU-Russia relations (rather than American influence on Europe)	0.77	0.60
Ukraine should strive for integration with the EU (rather than beware of integration with the EU)	0.69	0.48
Russian efforts to destabilise Ukraine are greater obstacle to reform results (rather than shortcomings of Ukraine's leadership)	0.64	0.41
Ukraine should do everything to regain control of Donbas (rather than allow Donbas to strive for close relations with Russia)	0.62	0.39
Countries like Russia and China should democratise in line with the Western model (rather than balancing power of Western countries)	0.42	0.18
Sum of squared loadings	3.35	
Variance explained	0.48	

Table 8: Summary statistics for factor-based measures of narrative support (response variables)

	Min.	1 st Qu.	Median	Mean	3 rd Qu.	Max	NA
RV1: Agreement with Ukrainian problem definitions	-1.86	-0.45	0.25	-0.01	0.92	1.03	162
RV2: Agreement with Russian problem definitions	-1.95	-0.40	-0.17	0.00	0.66	1.31	179
RV3: Agreement with Ukrainian (rather than Russian) causal attributions and solutions	-1.40	-0.52	0.02	-0.01	0.47	1.44	42

Table 9: OLS regression models of support for Russian and Ukrainian strategic narratives

	RV1: Agreement with Ukrainian ('anti-Russian') problem definitions		RV2: Agreement with Russian ('anti-Western') problem definitions		RV3: Agreement with Ukrainian (over Russian) causal claims and solutions	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Age (years)	-0.006** [0.002] (-0.009, -0.002)	-0.005** [0.002] (-0.009, -0.002)	0.005** [0.002] (0.001, 0.009)	0.005** [0.002] (0.001, 0.009)	-0.003* [0.001] (-0.006, -0.001)	-0.004** [0.001] (-0.006, -0.001)
Income (ref: lowest)						
Low	-	-	0.202* [0.088] (0.008, 0.394)	0.197* [0.088] (0.018, 0.380)	0.151* [0.061] (0.024, 0.263)	0.154* [0.061] (0.038, 0.265)
Middle	-	-	0.218* [0.092] (0.016, 0.427)	0.204* [0.092] (0.013, 0.406)	0.156* [0.065] (0.026, 0.283)	0.159* [0.065] (0.040, 0.278)
Higher	-	-	0.067 [0.135] (-0.185, 0.371)	0.041 [0.135] (-0.240, 0.346)	0.333** [0.096] (0.152, 0.533)	0.351** [0.095] (0.167, 0.540)
Birthplace (ref: Ukraine)						
Russia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
Regular communication with friends or relatives in Russia	-	-	0.167* [0.071] (0.030, 0.302)	0.164* [0.071] (0.018, 0.294)	-0.152** [0.051] (-0.243, -0.054)	-0.155** [0.050] (-0.262, -0.036)
Lived in Russia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Regular travel to Russia	-0.721** [0.172] (-1.092, -0.408)	-0.740** [0.173] (-1.130, -0.359)	0.357* [0.025] (0.034, 0.666)	0.353* [0.158] (0.044, 0.677)	-0.453** [0.117] (-0.644, -0.271)	-0.466** [0.117] (-0.677, -0.275)
Regular communication with friends or relatives in West	-	-	-0.216** [0.086] (-0.390, -0.033)	-0.227** [0.086] (-0.411, -0.068)	-	-
Lived in West	0.399* [0.190] (0.076, 0.716)	0.343 [0.189] (0.030, 0.685)	-	-	0.333** [0.127] (0.026, 0.637)	0.301* [0.127] (-0.005, 0.580)
Regular travel to West	0.514* [0.207] (0.059, 0.997)	0.529* [0.208] (0.072, 0.913)	-	-	-	-

Religious attendance (ref: none)						
ROCMP	-0.271** [0.077] (-0.420, -0.128)	-0.276** [0.077] (-0.435, -0.108)	0.156* [0.076] (0.019, 0.295)	0.153* [0.076] (0.008, 0.286)	-	-
Other	-0.002 [0.097] (-0.191, 0.198)	-0.008 [0.097] (-0.185, 0.177)	-0.161 [0.096] (-0.347, 0.028)	-0.162 [0.096] (-0.338, 0.012)	-	-
Prefers TV in Russian language	-0.409** [0.063] (-0.538, -0.282)	-0.409** [0.063] (-0.544, -0.283)	0.340** [0.063] (0.221, 0.464)	0.340** [0.062] (0.210, 0.467)	-0.427** [0.044] (-0.519, -0.339)	-0.424** [0.044] (-0.519, -0.345)
Reliance on Russian news sources (narrowly defined)	-0.955** [0.301] (-1.557, -0.315)	-	0.447 [0.262] (-0.020, 0.886)	-	-0.630** [0.186] (-0.963, -0.331)	-
Reliance on Russian news sources (broadly defined)	-	-0.575** [0.196] (-0.984, -0.136)	-	0.310 [0.171] (0.015, 0.606)	-	-0.423** [0.126] (-0.648, -0.185)
Discusses international politics (ref: rarely or never)						
Sometimes	0.305** [0.074] (0.160, 0.454)	0.297** [0.073] (0.160, 0.449)	-	-	0.144** [0.051] (0.049, 0.248)	0.136** [0.051] (0.024, 0.230)
Often	0.350** [0.077] (0.204, 0.499)	0.340** [0.077] (0.181, 0.490)	-	-	0.175** [0.054] (0.070, 0.281)	0.164** [0.053] (0.052, 0.289)
Time spent following news online (ref: none)						
Less than one hour daily	-0.221** [0.083] (-0.391, -0.050)	-0.137 [0.087] (-0.327, 0.058)	-	-	-0.091 [0.059] (-0.202, 0.033)	-0.028 [0.062] (-0.145, 0.095)
More than one hour daily	-0.286** [0.090] (-0.461, -0.090)	-0.190* [0.094] (-0.388, -0.021)	-	-	-0.191** [0.063] (-0.322, -0.069)	-0.123 [0.066] (0.038, 0.265)
<i>Intercept</i>	0.371	0.367	-0.582	-0.601	0.202	0.203
<i>Multiple R²</i>	0.164	0.162	0.102	0.103	0.208	0.207
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.150	0.149	0.088	0.089	0.195	0.195

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$. Each cell shows OLS regression coefficient followed by [standard error] and (basic non-parametric bootstrapped confidence interval at 95% level)