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| Appendix 1: Roll Call Votes on Sentencing for Non-Violent Offenses in New York, California & Washington, 2001-2010 | | | |
| Bill | | Summary | Notes |
| NEW YORK, 2009-10  AB06085 | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Passed 98-56; Almost party-line vote, Democrats 97-7, GOP 1-49 |
|  | |  |  |
| NEW YORK 2007-08 | |  |  |
| A06663 | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | **Failed 82-117 (appendix 2)** |
| S1777 | | Increases penalties for selling drugs in a park | Near-unanimous support, 59-1 |
| S3145 | | Increases the number of objects that count as drug paraphernalia | Near-unanimous support, 59-1 |
| A00341 | | Creates crime of criminal trespass on field of play of sporting event | Passed 162-16 (app 2) |
| S4269 | | Increases severity of criminal trespass offense on subway or rail track | Strong support, 171-14 |
| S5927 | | Establishes crime of refusing to ID oneself to police officer | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| S2877 | | Criminalizes street gang activity | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| S4381 | | Creates felony of street gang recruitment on school grounds | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| NEW YORK, 2005-06 | |  |  |
| A08098 | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | **Failed 92-108 (app 2)** |
| A0809a | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Almost party-line vote |
| S084445 | | Makes it crime to flee police officer | Near-unanimous support, 137-1 |
| S5171 | | Expands number items that constitute drug paraphernalia | Unanimous support |
| S02440 | | Extends crime of inciting a riot to those in detention | Passed 128-30 |
| NEW YORK, 2003-04 | |  |  |
| A07078 | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | **Failed 86-114 (app 2)** |
| A07078a | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Failed 86-118 (model similar to above, not included in appendix) |
| S99 | | Makes it easier to be convicted for sale of marijuana | Near-unanimous support, 59-2 |
| S050414 | | Allows criminal fees to be paid by credit card | Near-unanimous support, 215-11 |
| S01437 | | Criminalizes intentional damage to vehicle | Near-unanimous support, 204-5 |
| S665 | | Increases penalties for jumping bail | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| S1034 | | Prisoners who commit crimes on release must serve maximum sentence | Near-unanimous support, 58-4 |
| S5561 | | Criminalizes possession of hidden knife | Near-unanimous support, 59-3 |
| NEW YORK, 2001-02 | |  |  |
| A0888b | | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Passed 78-62; Democrats 77-9, GOP 1-53 (app 2) |
| S3408 | | Makes it easier to be convicted for sale of marijuana | Near-unanimous support, 55-3 |
| S1133 | | Requires 5 additional years for crime involving firearm | Near-unanimous support, 58-3 |
| S1759 | | Prisoners who commit crimes on release must serve maximum sentence | Near-unanimous support, 51-5 |
| S1990 | | Requires additional sentence for possessing firearm during drug sale | Near-unanimous support, 55-2 |
| S7767 | | Reduces penalties for crimes related to controlled substance | Party-line vote |
|  | |  |  |
| CALIFORNIA 2009-10  AB358 | | Returns discretion to judges in eligibility for deferral in drug-related cases | **Passed 67-50 (app 4)** |
| ABX18 | | Softens penalties for theft | Passed 69-43, party-line vote |
| SBX318 | | Softens penalties for theft | **Failed 53-62; Democrats, 52-10, Independents 2-1, GOP 0-51 (app 4)** |
| AB640 | | Increases penalties for methamphetamine | Near-unanimous support, 104-4 |
| SB24 | | Reclassifies grand theft auto (less punitive) | Near-unanimous support, 113-1 |
| SB484 | | Criminalizes buying ephedrine without prescription | Strong support, 21-9 |
| CALIFORNIA, 2007-08  AB1705 | | Reclassifies theft (less punitive) | Unanimous support |
| AB1141 | | Expands definition of controlled substances | Near-unanimous support, 111-2 |
| SB40 | | Returns sentencing discretion to judges | Near-unanimous support, 59-5 |
| SB391 | | Expands use of parole/probation | Almost party-line vote |
|  | |  |  |
| CALIFORNIA, 2005-06 | |  |  |
| SB556 | | Expends parole/drug treatment options for offenders with a psychiatric disorder | Almost party-line vote |
| AB336 | | Increases number of items defined as a controlled substance | Unanimous support |
| AB454 | | Increases penalty for providing alcohol to minor if results in felony | Near-unanimous support, 72-1 |
| SB444 | | Expands who can be convicted in gang-related activity | Near-unanimous support, 116-1 |
| Sb797 | | Reduces penalties for marijuana possession | Failed 53-54 (app 4) |
| CALIFORNIA, 2003-04 | |  |  |
| AB1530 | | Gives mothers of children guilt of non-violent offenses access to community supervision rather than imprisonment (less punitive) | Unanimous support |
| AB2037 | | Increases penalty of giving alcohol to minor | Unanimous support |
| SB131 | | Reduces penalty for marijuana possession | **Passed 61-49 (app 4)** |
| SB1223 | | Increases judicial discretion in sentencing for minors charged as adults | Party-line vote |
|  | |  |  |
| CALIFORNIA, 2001-02 | |  |  |
| SB1449 | | Allows parole in drug treatment program to be revoked under certain circumstances | Almost party-line vote |
| SB1517 | | Limits offenses that trigger 3-strikes laws (less punitive) | Almost party-line vote |
| SB1680 | | Reduces penalties for property crimes (fine) | Democrats 60-1, Independents 4-0, GOP 20-15 |
| SB791 | | Draws down penalties for marijuana possession | Failed 36-79 (app 4) |
| WASHINGTON, 2009-10 | |  |  |
| SB6167 | | Softens prosecution of property crimes by raising threshold | Passed 78-69; Democrats 69-14, GOP 0-55 (model in app 6) |
| SB5798 | | Softens medical marijuana requirements | **Passed 90-54 (app 6)** |
| HB131 | | Provides community service instead of incarceration options for non-violent offenders (less punitive) | Unanimous support |
|  | |  |  |
| WASHINGTON, 2007-08 | |  |  |
| HB2117 | | Increases penalties for gang activities | Near-unanimous support, 141-7 |
| HB5711 | | Expands offender score to include offenses under influence under liquor & any drug | Unanimous support |
| HB1001 | | Combatting auto theft | Almost party-line vote |
| SB5987 | | Softens prosecution of theft by raising monetary threshold | Almost party-line vote |
| HB1001a | | Increases penalties for auto theft | Passed 131-16 (model in app 6) |
| WASHINGTON, 2005-06 | |  |  |
| HB2467 | | Criminalizes possession of iodine (component of meth) | Near-unanimous support, 139-3 |
|  | |  |  |
| WASHINGTON, 2003-04 | |  |  |
| HB 1619 | | Increases penalties for driving under the influence with children in the vehicle | Unanimous support |
| SB5990 | | Limits parole to 10% of sentence (less punitive) | Strong support, 126-21 |
| SB5903 | | Provides alternative sentencing for juvenile offenders (less punitive) | Strong support, 129-15 |
| WASHINGTON, 2001-02 | |  |  |
| HB2605 | | Separate third-degree thefts may be combined if they were part of a criminal episode | Unanimous support |
| HB2338 | | Reduces sentences for heroin, cocaine | **Passed 103-41 (app 6)** |
| SB6490 | | Increases penalties for motor vehicle theft | **Passed 114-30, Democrats 76-9, GOP 47-21 (app 6)** |
| Entries in bold indicate votes supporting the theory rural reliance on a prison economy promotes greater legislative support for punitive sanctions. See Appendix 2-6. | | | |

Appendix 2. Negative binomial regression analysis of effect of economic need on locations of prison sites in New York, California, and Washington, 2010

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Coefficients | | | |
| Independent Variables | New York | California | Washington | |
| **Population Densitya** | -.0012 (.0061) | -0.3 (.06)\*\*\* | -1.5 (.27)\*\*\* | |
| **Percent Unemployment** | .25 (.05)\*\*\* | .26 (.09)\*\* | .29 (.20) | |
|  |  |  |  | |
| Percent less than high school | 10001.7 (1357.4) | -4721.0 (8337.8) | 19255.6 (5091.9)\*\*\* | |
| Percent high school graduate | 313.7 (892.9) | 12876.6 (6141.4)\* | -4460.8 (2006.7)\* | |
| Percent some college | -283.8 (684.1) | -10204.2 (3529.4)\*\* | 2601.5 (1558.3)† | |
| Percent black | .0016 (.004) | .05 (.02)\* | .58 (.09)\*\*\* | |
| Percent Asian | -.004 (.01) | -.01 (.01) | -.32 (.11)\*\* | |
| Percent Latino | -.016 (.007)\* | .004 (.008) | -.14 (.03)\*\*\* | |
| Percent Democratic vote share, 2008 presidential election | -4.27 (.17)\*\*\* | -2.96 (1.37)† | 2.97 (2.30) | |
| Party (Republican) | .68 (.17)\*\*\* | -.98 (1.05) | -.20 (.30) | |
|  | N=591  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .10 | N=294  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .18 | N=261  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .33 | |
|  |  |  |  | |
|  | | | | |

Note: All entries are negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of state, federal, or private prisons in a state legislative district.

a In thousands

\*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Appendix 3. Negative binomial regression analysis of effect of economic need on locations of prison sites in New York, California, and Washington, by Partisanship, 2010 | | | | | | |
| Coefficients | | | | | | |
| Independent Variables | New York  Republican districts | New York  Democratic districts | California  Republican  districts | California  Democratic  districts | Washington  Republican districts | Washington Democratic districts |
| **Population Densitya** | -.62 (.11)\*\*\* | .01 (.0007)† | -.93 (.21)\*\*\* | -.21 (.06)\*\* | -2.63 (.95)\*\* | - .1.0 (.37)\*\* |
| **Percent Unemployed** | .15 (.06)\* | .19 (.07)\*\* | .47 (.17)\*\* | .21 (.09)\* | -- | -- |
| **Percent Poverty** | -- | -- | -- | -- | .21 (.08)\* | -.33 (.14)\* |
| Percent less than high school | 2887 (1355)\* | -4094 (2316)\*† | -6370 (13633) | -16299 (10834) | 43654 (18188)\*\* | 50820 (13669)\*\*\* |
| Percent high school graduate | -933 (788.8) | 1254 (1845) | 2286 (8848) | 16688 (10217)† | -649 (3908) | -11281 (4361)\* |
| Percent some college | 86 (686.8) | -57.1 (1225) | 5418 (6500) | -17718 (5388)\*\* | 10802 (5507)\* | -6482 (2929)\* |
| Percent black | .01 (.005)\* | .0002 (.006) | -.009 (.04) | .06 (.02)\*\* | .69 (.23)\*\* | .96 (.19)\*\*\* |
| Percent Asian | .02 (.02) | -.009 (.02) | -.02 (.02) | -.01 (.02) | -.42 (.31) | -1.11 (.24)\*\*\* |
| Percent Latino | -.02 (.01)\* | .01 (.009) | .017 (.014) | .02 (.01) | -.32 (.11)\*\* | -.21 (.08)\* |
| Percent Democratic vote share, 2008 | -.08 (1.64) | -5.90 (1.44)\*\*\* | .71 (2.45) | -6.11 (1.82)\*\*\* | 17.52 (5.91)\*\* | 12.78 (7.21)† |
|  | N=247  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .19 | N=344  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .07 | N=107  Prob>χ²= .000  Pseudo R²= .17 | N=177  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .26 | N=120  Prob>χ²=.000  PseudoR²= .39 | N=141  Prob>χ²= .000  PseudoR²= .50 |
| Note: All entries are negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of state, federal, or private prisons in a state legislative district.  a In thousands  \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test) | | | | | | |

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| Appendix 4. Logistic regression analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in New York State Legislature | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Coefficients | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Independent  Variables | ab0663 – Drug law reform, 2007-08 | ab0663 – Democrats only | | S4269- criminal trespass,  2007-08 | | | A08098 – drug law reform, 2005-06 | | A08098 – Democrats only 2005-06 | | A07078 – drug law reform, 2003-04 | | A07078 – Democrats only | | A0888b- drug law reform,  2001-02 |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .91 (.42)\*  [.30] | .81 (.43)\*  [.12] | | -.04 (.15)  [-.02] | | | .86 (.29)\*\*  [.30] | | .88 (.29)\*\*  [.08] | | .79 (.34)\*  [.27] | | .74 (.37)\*  [.13] | | .24 (.54)  [.04] |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.014 (.015)  [-.07] | -.017 (.016)  [-.10] | | -.19 (.08)\*  [-.80] | | | -.022 (.020)  [-.12] | | -.022 (.019)  [-.06] | | -.0004 (.02)  [-.002] | | -.009 (.016)  [.05] | | -.001 (.07)  [-.005] |
| Prisons\*Population  Density (urban) a | -.0003 (.01)  [-.01] | -.005 (.012)  [-.03] | | .0006 (.025)  [.03] | | | -.003 (.01)  [-.01] | | -.0016 (.015)  [-.004] | | .0007 (.009)  [.003] | | -.002 (.013)  [.009] | | .003 (.18)  [.008] |
| Percent Poverty | -.03 (.02)  [-.07] | -.03 (.03)  [-.08] | | .03 (.05)  [.08] | | | -.0.03 (.03)  [-.06] | | -.058 (.032)  [-.05] | | .005 (.027)  [.01] | | .003 (.028)  [.006] | | -.03 (.07)  [-.05] |
| Total Arrest Ratea | .  .054 (.064)  [.07] | .086 (.067)  [.12] | | .52 (.21)\*  [.81] | | | -.06 (.07)  [-.09] | | .044 (.07)  [.03] | | .038 (.07)  [.05] | | .04 (.07)  [.05] | | .03 (.23)  [.03] |
| Percent High School | 449 (1045)  [.02] | 624 (1186)  [.03] | | -1315 (2013)  [-.06] | | | -3812 (1327)  [-.16] | | -3229 (1314)\*  [-.06] | | -766 (1214)  [-.03] | | 288 (1350)  [.01] | | -3299 (3176)  [-.10] |
| Percent White | .001 (.008)  [.007] | .002 (.009)  [.02] | | .005 (.015)  [.03] | | | .006 (.01)  [.16] | | .009 (.010)  [.03] | | .003 (.009)  [.02] | | .04 (.07)  [.04] | | .03 (.03)  [.13] |
|  |  |  | |  | | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  |
| Ideology (conservative) | 2.17 (.47)\*\*\*  [.28] | .91 (.64)  [.19] | | 2.68 (.92)\*\*  [.44] | | | 5.66 (.71)  [.66] | | 3.97 (.85)\*\*\*  [.17] | | 3.51 (.62)\*\*\*  [.43] | | 1.21 (.79)  [.09] | | 9.25 (2.26)\*\*\*  [.77] |
|  | N=198  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .33 | N=129  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .19 | | N=59  Prob>χ²= .0006  Pseudo R²= .34 | | | N=200  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .68 | | N=242  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .40 | | N=201  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .43 | | N=121  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .11 | | N=205  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .79 |
| Note: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted probabilities are in brackets (indicating a one standard deviation change). The dependent variable is a roll call vote on penal policies taken in the New York state legislature. Votes opposing sentencing reform are coded “1”; votes supporting sentencing reform are coded “0.”  a In thousands, \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Appendix 5. Ordinary least squares analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in New York State Legislature, Pooled (by Legislative Term) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Coefficients | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Independent  Variables | 2007-2008 | | 2005-2006 | |  | 05-06, Democrats only | | 2003-2004 | | 03-04, Democrats only | | 2001-2002 | | 01-02,  Democrats only | |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | -.008 (.007) | | .015 (.009)† | |  | .07 (.02)\*\* | | .019 (.011)† | | .12 (.04)\*\* | | .04 (.02)† | | .16 (.05)\*\* | |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.0042 (.0016)\* | | -.0017 (.001)† | |  | -.0006 (.001) | | -.0014 (.0015) | | -.002 (.002) | | -.0001 (.002) | | -.0003 (.003) | |
| Prisons\*Population  Density (urban) a | -.0017 (.0007)\* | | -.0005 (.0007) | |  | -.0011 (.0008) | | .0007 (.001) | | -.001 (.001) | | .0020 (.0014) | | -.0004 (.002) | |
| Percent Poverty | .001 (.002) | | -.0007 (.002) | |  | -.0021 (.0018) | | .0002 (.002) | | -.001 (.003) | | -.007 (.003)\* | | -.008 (.004)\* | |
| Total Arrest Ratea | .011 (.006)† | | -.01 (.002)\* | |  | -.00012 (.0048) | | .007 (.006) | | .0001 (.008) | | .0006 (.001) | | .006 (.01) | |
| Percent High School | -5.59 (74) | | -- | |  | -- | | -- | | -- | | -- | | -- | |
| Percent White | .0007 (.0006) | | .001 (.0005)\* | |  | .001 (.0006) | | -.0002 (.008) | | .0002 (.001) | | -.0002 (.001) | | -.001 (.001) | |
|  |  | |  | |  |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |
| Party (Republican) | .066 (.039)\*† | | .18 (.03)\*\*\* | |  | -- | | .28 (.04)\*\*\* | | -- | | -- | | -- | |
| Ideology (conservative) | -- | | -- | |  | .30 (.05)\*\*\* | | -- | | .59 (.09)\*\*\* | | .44 (.05)\*\*\* | | .34 (.13)\*\* | |
|  | N=62  Prob>F= .0002  Adjusted R²= .42 | | N=435  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .41 | |  | N=264  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .35 | | N=214  Prob>F= .0000  AdjustedR²= .31 | | N=230  Prob>F= .0000  AdjustedR²=.09 | | N=212  Prob>F= .0000  AdjustedR²=.45 | | N=125  Prob>F= .0004  AdjustedR²=.14 | |
| Note: All entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average roll call vote on penal policies for non-violent offenses taken in the New York state legislature pooled by legislative term. Votes favoring punitive sentencing policies are coded “1”; votes opposing punitive sentencing policies are coded “0.”  a In thousands \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

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| Appendix 6. Logistic regression analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in California State Legislature | | | | | | |
|  | Coefficients | | | | | |
| Independent  Variables | ab358- restores judicial discretion in drug cases, 09-10 | sbx318- softens penalties for theft, 09-10 | sbx318- Democrats only | sb797- reduces penalties for marijuana, 05-06 | sb131- reduces penalties for marijuana, 03-04 | sb791- reduces penalties for marijuana, 01-02 |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .30 (.21)\*†  [.17] | .67 (.32)\*\*  [.27] | .55 (.41)\*†  [.03] | .28 (.26)  [.13] | .19 (.12)\*†  [.11] | -.08 (.11)  [-.03] |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.057 (.17)  [-.06] | .08 (11)  [.09] | .18 (.12)\*†  [03] | -.52 (.21)\*\*  [-.50] | .06 (.09)  [.07] | -.11 (.08)\*†  [-.09] |
| Prisons\*Population  Density (urban) a | -.28 (.36)  [-.17] | -.50 (.39)  [.31] | -1.3 (2.5)  [-.17] | -.38 (.26)\*†  [-.22] | -.27 (.20)\*†  [-.17] | -.11 (.10)  [-.05] |
| Percent Poverty | .014 (.080)  [.02] | -.12 (.08)\*†  [-.20] | -.10 (.08)  [-.02] | .11 (.07)\*†  [.16] | -.04 (.06)  [-.07] | -.02 (.05)  [-.03] |
| Total Arrest Ratea | -.009 (.034)  [-.05] | -.034 (.028)  [-.17] | .06 (.03)\*  [.04] | .09 (.03)\*\*  [.41] | -.009 (.02)  [-.05] | .01 (.01)  [.05] |
| Percent High School | 5603 (11130)  [.07] | 12525 (9982)  [.15] | 16961 (12034)  [.03] | -9659 (10744)  [-.10] | -4421 (8328)  [-.06] | 817 (5751)  [-.01] |
| Percent White | -.004 (.040)  [-.02] | -.03 (.04)  [-.11] | -.03 (.04)  [-.01] | -.07 (.04)\*  [-.26] | -.04 (.03)  [-.13] | -.07 (.02)\*\*  [-.18] |
| Party (Republican) | 6.78 (1.50)\*\*\*  [.66] | 6.62 (1.51)\*\*\*  [.65] | -- | 6.97 (1.62)\*\*\*  [.66] | 4.93 (.888)\*\*\*  [.53] | 3.01 (.77)\*\*\*  [.26] |
| Percent Democratic Voteshare, 2008 | -- | -- | -8.61 (5.38)\*  [-.02] | -- | -- | -- |
|  | N=116  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .73 | N=113  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .67 | N=70  Prob>χ²= .0187  Pseudo R²= .32 | N=107  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .66 | N=109  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .53 | N=115  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .24 |
| Note: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted probabilities are in brackets (indicating a one standard deviation change). The dependent variable is a roll call vote on penal policies taken in the California state legislature. Votes opposing sentencing reform are coded “1”; votes supporting sentencing reform are coded “0.”  a In thousands, \*\*\*p<.01; \*\*p<.05; \*p<.10 (two-tailed test), †(one-tailed test) | | | | | | |

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| Appendix 7. Ordinary least squares analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Penal Policies in California, Pooled (by Legislative Term) | | | | | | |
|  | Coefficients | | | | | |
| Independent  Variables | 2009-2010 | 09-10, Democrats only | 2007-2008 | 2005-2006 | 2003-2004 | 2001-2002 |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .011 (.007)\*† | .021 (.011)\*\* | -.007 (.008) | .013 (.009)\*† | .014 (.008)\* | .007 (.01) |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.0024 (.0052) | -.003 (.007) | -.009 (.0054)\* | -.0097 (.0067)\*† | .0039 (.0055) | -.0086 (.0073) |
| Prisons\*Population  Density (urban) a | -.0087 (.0066)\*† | -.02 (.007)\*\* | -.0038 (.0078) | -.014 (.0078)\* | -.0079 (.0064) | -.01 (.01) |
| Percent Poverty | .20 (3.2) | .001 (.004) | .0003 (.003) | .001 (.004) | .002 (.003) | -.003 (.004) |
| Total Arrest Ratea | -.0004 (.001) | -.0007 (.001) | .001 (.0009) | .00075 (.0012) | -.0013 (.0010)\*† | -.0012 (.0012) |
| Percent High School | -23 (386) | -308 (514) | -535 (384)\*† | -398 (467) | -436 (390) | 259 (519) |
| Percent White | .0002 (.003) | .0001 (.002) | -.003 (.001)\* | -.0039 (.0017)\*\* | .0003 (.001) | -.004 (.002)\* |
| Party (Republican) | .55 (.04)\*\*\* | -- | .21 (.04)\*\*\* | .31 (.05)\*\*\* | .30 (.04)\*\*\* | .48 (.16)\*\*\* |
| Ideology (conservative) | -- | .114 (.036)\*\* | -- | -- | -- | -- |
|  | N=122  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .72 | N=55  Prob>F= .0210  Adjusted R²= .18 | N=118  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .22 | N=117  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .38 | N=120  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .56 | N=117  Prob>F= .0000  Adjusted R²= .59 |
| Note: All entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average roll call vote on penal policies for non-violent offenses taken in the California legislature pooled by term. Votes favoring punitive sentencing policies are coded “1”; votes opposing punitive policies are coded “0.”  a In thousands  \*\*\*p<.01; \*\*p<.05; \*p<.10 (two-tailed test), †(one-tailed test) | | | | | | |

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| Appendix 8. Logistic regression analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in Washington State Legislature | | | | | | |
|  | Coefficients | | | | | |
| Independent  Variables | sb5798- softens medical marijuana requirements, 09-10 | sb6167-soften prosecution for property crimes, 09-10 | hb1001- increases penalties for auto theft, 08-07 | hb2338- reduces penalties for heroin, cocaine, 01-02 | sb6490- increases penalties for motor vehicle theft, 01-02 | Sb6490-Republicans only |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .81 (.49)\*  [.10] | .15 (.56)  [.02] | .30 (1.35)  [.004] | -.13 (.47)  [-.01] | .61 (.51)  [.02] | 1.63 (.75)\*\*  [.16] |
| Population Densitya (urban) | .02 (.25)  [.01] | .13 (.24)  [.08] | -.65 (.30)\*\*  [-.04] | -.28 (.29)  [-.10] | -.02 (.15)  [-.002] | -.0035 (.46)  [-.001] |
| Prisons\*Population  Density (urban) a | -.31 (.34)  [-.08] | -.14 (.37)  [-.05] | -.37 (.43)  [-.01] | .36 (.25)\*†  [.08] | -4.4 (5.3)  [-.55] | -2.4 (2.7)  [-.35] |
| Percent Poverty | -.13 (.10)\*†  [-.12] | -.20 (.11)\*  [-.23] | .24 (.14)\*  [.02] | .009 (.09)  [.01] | -.02 (.08)  [-.004] | -.10 (.16)  [-.08] |
| Total Arrest Ratea | -.18 (.16)  [-.909] | -.34 (.18)\*  [-.21] | .25 (.24)  [.01] | .07 (.14)  [.02] | -.04 (.15)  [-.01] | .17 (.21)  [.06] |
| Percent High School | 2215 (2802)  [.06] | 5018 (3156)\*†  [.17] | -7762 (4716)\*†  [-.02] | -520 (2372)  [-.01] | -1645 (2171)  [-.01] | -1858 (3100)  [-.03] |
| Percent White | -.05 (.05)  [-.10] | -.03 (1.0)  [-.07] | -.01 (.05)  [-.002] | -.04 (.04)  [-.06] | -.02 (.04)  [-.01] | -.01 (.06)  [-.02] |
| Party (Republican) | 3.66 (.66)\*\*\*  [.33] | 5.26 (1.00)\*\*\*  [.56] | -- | -- | 1.03 (.51)\*\*  [.03] | -- |
| Ideology (conservative) | -- | -- | 1.74 (.86)\*\*  [.04] | -- | -- | 3.56 (1.48)\*\*  [.19] |
| Percent Democratic Voteshare, 2008 | -- | -- | -- | -14.29 (4.2)\*\*\*  [-.27] | -- | -- |
|  | N=147  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .46 | N=141  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .56 | N=147  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .30 | N=145  Prob>χ²= .0000  Pseudo R²= .26 | N=144  Prob>χ²= .0498  Pseudo R²= .10 | N=68  Prob>χ²= .0487  Pseudo R²= .19 |

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted probabilities are in brackets (indicating a one standard deviation change). The dependent variable is a roll call vote on penal policies taken in the Washington state legislature. Votes opposing sentencing reform are coded “1”; votes supporting sentencing reform are coded “0.”

a In thousands, \*\*\*p<.01; \*\*p<.05; \*p<.10 (two-tailed test), †(one-tailed test)