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| Appendix 1: Roll Call Votes on Sentencing for Non-Violent Offenses in New York, California & Washington, 2001-2010 |
| Bill | Summary | Notes |
| NEW YORK, 2009-10AB06085 | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Passed 98-56; Almost party-line vote, Democrats 97-7, GOP 1-49  |
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| NEW YORK 2007-08 |  |  |
| A06663 | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | **Failed 82-117 (appendix 2)** |
| S1777 | Increases penalties for selling drugs in a park | Near-unanimous support, 59-1 |
| S3145 | Increases the number of objects that count as drug paraphernalia | Near-unanimous support, 59-1 |
| A00341 | Creates crime of criminal trespass on field of play of sporting event | Passed 162-16 (app 2) |
| S4269 | Increases severity of criminal trespass offense on subway or rail track | Strong support, 171-14 |
| S5927 | Establishes crime of refusing to ID oneself to police officer | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| S2877 | Criminalizes street gang activity | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| S4381 | Creates felony of street gang recruitment on school grounds | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| NEW YORK, 2005-06 |  |  |
| A08098 | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | **Failed 92-108 (app 2)** |
| A0809a | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Almost party-line vote |
| S084445 | Makes it crime to flee police officer | Near-unanimous support, 137-1 |
| S5171 | Expands number items that constitute drug paraphernalia | Unanimous support |
| S02440 | Extends crime of inciting a riot to those in detention | Passed 128-30 |
| NEW YORK, 2003-04 |  |  |
| A07078 | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | **Failed 86-114 (app 2)** |
| A07078a | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Failed 86-118 (model similar to above, not included in appendix) |
| S99 | Makes it easier to be convicted for sale of marijuana | Near-unanimous support, 59-2 |
| S050414 | Allows criminal fees to be paid by credit card | Near-unanimous support, 215-11 |
| S01437 | Criminalizes intentional damage to vehicle | Near-unanimous support, 204-5 |
| S665 | Increases penalties for jumping bail  | Near-unanimous support, 62-2 |
| S1034 | Prisoners who commit crimes on release must serve maximum sentence | Near-unanimous support, 58-4 |
| S5561 | Criminalizes possession of hidden knife | Near-unanimous support, 59-3 |
| NEW YORK, 2001-02 |  |  |
| A0888b | Drug law reform, drug treatment & crime reduction; reforms mandatory minimum sentencing | Passed 78-62; Democrats 77-9, GOP 1-53 (app 2)  |
| S3408 | Makes it easier to be convicted for sale of marijuana | Near-unanimous support, 55-3 |
| S1133 | Requires 5 additional years for crime involving firearm | Near-unanimous support, 58-3 |
| S1759 | Prisoners who commit crimes on release must serve maximum sentence | Near-unanimous support, 51-5 |
| S1990 | Requires additional sentence for possessing firearm during drug sale | Near-unanimous support, 55-2 |
| S7767 | Reduces penalties for crimes related to controlled substance | Party-line vote |
|  |  |  |
| CALIFORNIA 2009-10AB358 | Returns discretion to judges in eligibility for deferral in drug-related cases | **Passed 67-50 (app 4)** |
| ABX18 | Softens penalties for theft | Passed 69-43, party-line vote |
| SBX318 | Softens penalties for theft | **Failed 53-62; Democrats, 52-10, Independents 2-1, GOP 0-51 (app 4)** |
| AB640 | Increases penalties for methamphetamine | Near-unanimous support, 104-4 |
| SB24 | Reclassifies grand theft auto (less punitive) | Near-unanimous support, 113-1 |
| SB484 | Criminalizes buying ephedrine without prescription  | Strong support, 21-9 |
| CALIFORNIA, 2007-08AB1705 | Reclassifies theft (less punitive) | Unanimous support  |
| AB1141 | Expands definition of controlled substances | Near-unanimous support, 111-2 |
| SB40 | Returns sentencing discretion to judges | Near-unanimous support, 59-5 |
| SB391 | Expands use of parole/probation | Almost party-line vote |
|  |  |  |
| CALIFORNIA, 2005-06 |  |  |
| SB556 | Expends parole/drug treatment options for offenders with a psychiatric disorder | Almost party-line vote |
| AB336 | Increases number of items defined as a controlled substance | Unanimous support |
| AB454 | Increases penalty for providing alcohol to minor if results in felony | Near-unanimous support, 72-1 |
| SB444 | Expands who can be convicted in gang-related activity | Near-unanimous support, 116-1 |
| Sb797 | Reduces penalties for marijuana possession | Failed 53-54 (app 4) |
| CALIFORNIA, 2003-04 |  |  |
| AB1530 | Gives mothers of children guilt of non-violent offenses access to community supervision rather than imprisonment (less punitive) | Unanimous support |
| AB2037 | Increases penalty of giving alcohol to minor | Unanimous support |
| SB131 | Reduces penalty for marijuana possession | **Passed 61-49 (app 4)** |
| SB1223 | Increases judicial discretion in sentencing for minors charged as adults | Party-line vote |
|  |  |  |
| CALIFORNIA, 2001-02 |  |  |
| SB1449 | Allows parole in drug treatment program to be revoked under certain circumstances | Almost party-line vote |
| SB1517 | Limits offenses that trigger 3-strikes laws (less punitive) | Almost party-line vote |
| SB1680 | Reduces penalties for property crimes (fine) | Democrats 60-1, Independents 4-0, GOP 20-15 |
| SB791 | Draws down penalties for marijuana possession | Failed 36-79 (app 4)  |
| WASHINGTON, 2009-10 |  |  |
| SB6167 | Softens prosecution of property crimes by raising threshold | Passed 78-69; Democrats 69-14, GOP 0-55 (model in app 6) |
| SB5798 | Softens medical marijuana requirements | **Passed 90-54 (app 6)** |
| HB131 | Provides community service instead of incarceration options for non-violent offenders (less punitive) | Unanimous support |
|  |  |  |
| WASHINGTON, 2007-08 |  |  |
| HB2117 | Increases penalties for gang activities | Near-unanimous support, 141-7 |
| HB5711 | Expands offender score to include offenses under influence under liquor & any drug | Unanimous support |
| HB1001 | Combatting auto theft | Almost party-line vote |
| SB5987 | Softens prosecution of theft by raising monetary threshold | Almost party-line vote |
| HB1001a | Increases penalties for auto theft |  Passed 131-16 (model in app 6) |
| WASHINGTON, 2005-06 |  |  |
| HB2467 | Criminalizes possession of iodine (component of meth) | Near-unanimous support, 139-3  |
|  |  |  |
| WASHINGTON, 2003-04 |  |  |
| HB 1619 | Increases penalties for driving under the influence with children in the vehicle | Unanimous support |
| SB5990 | Limits parole to 10% of sentence (less punitive) | Strong support, 126-21 |
| SB5903 | Provides alternative sentencing for juvenile offenders (less punitive) | Strong support, 129-15 |
| WASHINGTON, 2001-02 |  |  |
| HB2605 | Separate third-degree thefts may be combined if they were part of a criminal episode | Unanimous support |
| HB2338 | Reduces sentences for heroin, cocaine | **Passed 103-41 (app 6)** |
| SB6490 | Increases penalties for motor vehicle theft | **Passed 114-30, Democrats 76-9, GOP 47-21 (app 6)** |
| Entries in bold indicate votes supporting the theory rural reliance on a prison economy promotes greater legislative support for punitive sanctions. See Appendix 2-6. |

Appendix 2. Negative binomial regression analysis of effect of economic need on locations of prison sites in New York, California, and Washington, 2010

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| --- | --- |
|  | Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | New York | California | Washington |
| **Population Densitya**  | -.0012 (.0061) | -0.3 (.06)\*\*\* | -1.5 (.27)\*\*\* |
| **Percent Unemployment** | .25 (.05)\*\*\*  | .26 (.09)\*\* | .29 (.20) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Percent less than high school | 10001.7 (1357.4)  | -4721.0 (8337.8) | 19255.6 (5091.9)\*\*\* |
| Percent high school graduate | 313.7 (892.9)  | 12876.6 (6141.4)\* | -4460.8 (2006.7)\*  |
| Percent some college | -283.8 (684.1)  | -10204.2 (3529.4)\*\* | 2601.5 (1558.3)†  |
| Percent black | .0016 (.004)  | .05 (.02)\* | .58 (.09)\*\*\* |
| Percent Asian | -.004 (.01)  | -.01 (.01) | -.32 (.11)\*\* |
| Percent Latino | -.016 (.007)\*  | .004 (.008) | -.14 (.03)\*\*\* |
| Percent Democratic vote share, 2008 presidential election | -4.27 (.17)\*\*\*  | -2.96 (1.37)† | 2.97 (2.30)  |
| Party (Republican) | .68 (.17)\*\*\* | -.98 (1.05) |  -.20 (.30)  |
|  | N=591Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .10 | N=294Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .18 | N=261Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .33 |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |

Note: All entries are negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of state, federal, or private prisons in a state legislative district.

a In thousands

\*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test)

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| Appendix 3. Negative binomial regression analysis of effect of economic need on locations of prison sites in New York, California, and Washington, by Partisanship, 2010 |
| Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | New YorkRepublican districts | New YorkDemocratic districts | CaliforniaRepublicandistricts | CaliforniaDemocraticdistricts | WashingtonRepublican districts | Washington Democratic districts |
| **Population Densitya** | -.62 (.11)\*\*\* | .01 (.0007)† | -.93 (.21)\*\*\* |  -.21 (.06)\*\* | -2.63 (.95)\*\* | - .1.0 (.37)\*\* |
| **Percent Unemployed** | .15 (.06)\* | .19 (.07)\*\* | .47 (.17)\*\* |  .21 (.09)\*  | -- | -- |
| **Percent Poverty**  | -- | -- | -- |  -- | .21 (.08)\* | -.33 (.14)\* |
| Percent less than high school | 2887 (1355)\*  | -4094 (2316)\*† | -6370 (13633) |  -16299 (10834)  | 43654 (18188)\*\*  | 50820 (13669)\*\*\* |
| Percent high school graduate | -933 (788.8) |  1254 (1845) | 2286 (8848) | 16688 (10217)†  | -649 (3908) | -11281 (4361)\*  |
| Percent some college | 86 (686.8) | -57.1 (1225) | 5418 (6500) |  -17718 (5388)\*\*  | 10802 (5507)\* | -6482 (2929)\* |
| Percent black | .01 (.005)\* | .0002 (.006) | -.009 (.04) |  .06 (.02)\*\*  | .69 (.23)\*\* | .96 (.19)\*\*\* |
| Percent Asian | .02 (.02) | -.009 (.02) | -.02 (.02) |  -.01 (.02) | -.42 (.31) | -1.11 (.24)\*\*\* |
| Percent Latino | -.02 (.01)\* | .01 (.009) | .017 (.014) |  .02 (.01)  | -.32 (.11)\*\* | -.21 (.08)\* |
| Percent Democratic vote share, 2008  | -.08 (1.64) | -5.90 (1.44)\*\*\* | .71 (2.45)  |  -6.11 (1.82)\*\*\* | 17.52 (5.91)\*\* | 12.78 (7.21)† |
|  | N=247Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .19 | N=344Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .07 | N=107Prob>χ²= .000Pseudo R²= .17 | N=177Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .26 | N=120Prob>χ²=.000PseudoR²= .39 | N=141Prob>χ²= .000PseudoR²= .50 |
| Note: All entries are negative binomial coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of state, federal, or private prisons in a state legislative district.a In thousands \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test) |

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| Appendix 4. Logistic regression analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in New York State Legislature  |
|  | Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | ab0663 – Drug law reform, 2007-08 | ab0663 – Democrats only | S4269- criminal trespass, 2007-08 | A08098 – drug law reform, 2005-06 | A08098 – Democrats only 2005-06 | A07078 – drug law reform, 2003-04 | A07078 – Democrats only | A0888b- drug law reform,2001-02 |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .91 (.42)\* [.30] | .81 (.43)\*[.12] | -.04 (.15)[-.02] | .86 (.29)\*\*[.30] | .88 (.29)\*\*[.08] | .79 (.34)\*[.27] | .74 (.37)\*[.13] | .24 (.54)[.04] |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.014 (.015) [-.07] | -.017 (.016)[-.10] | -.19 (.08)\*[-.80] | -.022 (.020)[-.12] | -.022 (.019)[-.06] | -.0004 (.02)[-.002] | -.009 (.016)[.05] | -.001 (.07)[-.005] |
| Prisons\*Population Density (urban) a | -.0003 (.01) [-.01] | -.005 (.012)[-.03] | .0006 (.025)[.03] | -.003 (.01)[-.01] | -.0016 (.015)[-.004] | .0007 (.009)[.003] | -.002 (.013)[.009] | .003 (.18)[.008] |
| Percent Poverty | -.03 (.02) [-.07] | -.03 (.03)[-.08] | .03 (.05)[.08] |  -.0.03 (.03)[-.06] | -.058 (.032)[-.05] | .005 (.027)[.01] | .003 (.028)[.006] | -.03 (.07)[-.05] |
| Total Arrest Ratea | ..054 (.064) [.07] | .086 (.067)[.12] | .52 (.21)\*[.81] | -.06 (.07)[-.09] | .044 (.07)[.03] | .038 (.07) [.05] | .04 (.07)[.05] | .03 (.23)[.03] |
| Percent High School  | 449 (1045) [.02] | 624 (1186)[.03] | -1315 (2013)[-.06] | -3812 (1327)[-.16] | -3229 (1314)\*[-.06] | -766 (1214)[-.03] | 288 (1350)[.01] | -3299 (3176)[-.10] |
| Percent White | .001 (.008)[.007] | .002 (.009)[.02] | .005 (.015)[.03] | .006 (.01)[.16] | .009 (.010)[.03] | .003 (.009)[.02] | .04 (.07)[.04] | .03 (.03)[.13] |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ideology (conservative) | 2.17 (.47)\*\*\*[.28] | .91 (.64)[.19] | 2.68 (.92)\*\*[.44] | 5.66 (.71)[.66] | 3.97 (.85)\*\*\*[.17] | 3.51 (.62)\*\*\*[.43] | 1.21 (.79)[.09] | 9.25 (2.26)\*\*\*[.77] |
|  | N=198Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .33 | N=129Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .19 | N=59Prob>χ²= .0006Pseudo R²= .34 | N=200Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .68 | N=242Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .40 | N=201Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .43 | N=121Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .11 | N=205Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .79 |
| Note: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted probabilities are in brackets (indicating a one standard deviation change). The dependent variable is a roll call vote on penal policies taken in the New York state legislature. Votes opposing sentencing reform are coded “1”; votes supporting sentencing reform are coded “0.” a In thousands, \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test)  |
| Appendix 5. Ordinary least squares analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in New York State Legislature, Pooled (by Legislative Term) |
|  | Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | 2007-2008 | 2005-2006 |  | 05-06, Democrats only | 2003-2004 | 03-04, Democrats only | 2001-2002 | 01-02, Democrats only |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | -.008 (.007) | .015 (.009)† |  | .07 (.02)\*\* | .019 (.011)† | .12 (.04)\*\* | .04 (.02)† | .16 (.05)\*\* |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.0042 (.0016)\* | -.0017 (.001)† |  | -.0006 (.001) | -.0014 (.0015) | -.002 (.002) | -.0001 (.002) | -.0003 (.003) |
| Prisons\*Population Density (urban) a | -.0017 (.0007)\* | -.0005 (.0007) |  | -.0011 (.0008) | .0007 (.001) | -.001 (.001) | .0020 (.0014) | -.0004 (.002) |
| Percent Poverty | .001 (.002) | -.0007 (.002) |  | -.0021 (.0018) | .0002 (.002) | -.001 (.003) | -.007 (.003)\* | -.008 (.004)\* |
| Total Arrest Ratea | .011 (.006)† | -.01 (.002)\* |  | -.00012 (.0048) | .007 (.006) | .0001 (.008) | .0006 (.001) | .006 (.01) |
| Percent High School | -5.59 (74) | -- |  | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Percent White | .0007 (.0006) | .001 (.0005)\* |  | .001 (.0006) | -.0002 (.008) | .0002 (.001) | -.0002 (.001) | -.001 (.001) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Party (Republican) | .066 (.039)\*† | .18 (.03)\*\*\* |  | -- | .28 (.04)\*\*\* | -- | -- | -- |
| Ideology (conservative) | -- | -- |  | .30 (.05)\*\*\* | -- | .59 (.09)\*\*\* | .44 (.05)\*\*\* | .34 (.13)\*\* |
|  | N=62Prob>F= .0002Adjusted R²= .42 | N=435Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .41 |  | N=264Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .35 | N=214Prob>F= .0000AdjustedR²= .31 | N=230Prob>F= .0000AdjustedR²=.09 | N=212Prob>F= .0000AdjustedR²=.45 | N=125Prob>F= .0004 AdjustedR²=.14 |
| Note: All entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average roll call vote on penal policies for non-violent offenses taken in the New York state legislature pooled by legislative term. Votes favoring punitive sentencing policies are coded “1”; votes opposing punitive sentencing policies are coded “0.” a In thousands \*\*\*p<.001; \*\*p<.01; \*p<.05; †p<.10 (two-tailed test)  |

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| Appendix 6. Logistic regression analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in California State Legislature  |
|  | Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | ab358- restores judicial discretion in drug cases, 09-10 | sbx318- softens penalties for theft, 09-10 | sbx318- Democrats only | sb797- reduces penalties for marijuana, 05-06 | sb131- reduces penalties for marijuana, 03-04 | sb791- reduces penalties for marijuana, 01-02 |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .30 (.21)\*†[.17] | .67 (.32)\*\*[.27] | .55 (.41)\*†[.03] | .28 (.26) [.13] | .19 (.12)\*†[.11] |  -.08 (.11)[-.03] |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.057 (.17)[-.06] | .08 (11)[.09] | .18 (.12)\*† [03] | -.52 (.21)\*\*[-.50] | .06 (.09)[.07] | -.11 (.08)\*†[-.09] |
| Prisons\*Population Density (urban) a | -.28 (.36)[-.17] | -.50 (.39)[.31] | -1.3 (2.5)[-.17] | -.38 (.26)\*† [-.22] | -.27 (.20)\*†[-.17] | -.11 (.10)[-.05] |
| Percent Poverty | .014 (.080)[.02] | -.12 (.08)\*†[-.20] | -.10 (.08)[-.02] | .11 (.07)\*†[.16] | -.04 (.06)[-.07] | -.02 (.05)[-.03] |
| Total Arrest Ratea | -.009 (.034)[-.05] | -.034 (.028)[-.17] | .06 (.03)\*[.04] | .09 (.03)\*\*[.41] | -.009 (.02)[-.05] | .01 (.01)[.05] |
| Percent High School  | 5603 (11130)[.07] | 12525 (9982)[.15] | 16961 (12034) [.03] | -9659 (10744)[-.10] | -4421 (8328)[-.06] | 817 (5751)[-.01] |
| Percent White | -.004 (.040)[-.02] | -.03 (.04)[-.11] | -.03 (.04) [-.01] | -.07 (.04)\*[-.26] | -.04 (.03)[-.13] | -.07 (.02)\*\*[-.18] |
| Party (Republican) | 6.78 (1.50)\*\*\*[.66] | 6.62 (1.51)\*\*\*[.65] | -- | 6.97 (1.62)\*\*\*[.66] | 4.93 (.888)\*\*\*[.53] | 3.01 (.77)\*\*\*[.26] |
| Percent Democratic Voteshare, 2008 | -- | -- | -8.61 (5.38)\*[-.02] | -- | -- | -- |
|  | N=116Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .73 | N=113Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .67 | N=70Prob>χ²= .0187Pseudo R²= .32 | N=107Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .66 | N=109Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .53 | N=115Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .24 |
| Note: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted probabilities are in brackets (indicating a one standard deviation change). The dependent variable is a roll call vote on penal policies taken in the California state legislature. Votes opposing sentencing reform are coded “1”; votes supporting sentencing reform are coded “0.”a In thousands, \*\*\*p<.01; \*\*p<.05; \*p<.10 (two-tailed test), †(one-tailed test) |

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| Appendix 7. Ordinary least squares analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Penal Policies in California, Pooled (by Legislative Term) |
|  | Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | 2009-2010 | 09-10, Democrats only | 2007-2008 | 2005-2006 | 2003-2004 | 2001-2002 |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .011 (.007)\*† | .021 (.011)\*\* | -.007 (.008) | .013 (.009)\*† | .014 (.008)\* | .007 (.01) |
| Population Densitya (urban) | -.0024 (.0052) | -.003 (.007) | -.009 (.0054)\* | -.0097 (.0067)\*† | .0039 (.0055) | -.0086 (.0073) |
| Prisons\*Population Density (urban) a | -.0087 (.0066)\*† | -.02 (.007)\*\* | -.0038 (.0078) | -.014 (.0078)\* | -.0079 (.0064) | -.01 (.01) |
| Percent Poverty | .20 (3.2) | .001 (.004) | .0003 (.003) | .001 (.004) | .002 (.003) | -.003 (.004) |
| Total Arrest Ratea | -.0004 (.001) | -.0007 (.001) | .001 (.0009) | .00075 (.0012) | -.0013 (.0010)\*† | -.0012 (.0012) |
| Percent High School | -23 (386) | -308 (514) | -535 (384)\*† | -398 (467) | -436 (390) | 259 (519) |
| Percent White | .0002 (.003) | .0001 (.002) | -.003 (.001)\* | -.0039 (.0017)\*\* | .0003 (.001) | -.004 (.002)\* |
| Party (Republican) | .55 (.04)\*\*\* | -- | .21 (.04)\*\*\* | .31 (.05)\*\*\* | .30 (.04)\*\*\* | .48 (.16)\*\*\* |
| Ideology (conservative) | -- | .114 (.036)\*\* | -- | -- | -- | -- |
|  | N=122Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .72 | N=55Prob>F= .0210Adjusted R²= .18 | N=118Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .22 | N=117Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .38 | N=120Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .56 | N=117Prob>F= .0000Adjusted R²= .59 |
| Note: All entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average roll call vote on penal policies for non-violent offenses taken in the California legislature pooled by term. Votes favoring punitive sentencing policies are coded “1”; votes opposing punitive policies are coded “0.” a In thousands\*\*\*p<.01; \*\*p<.05; \*p<.10 (two-tailed test), †(one-tailed test) |

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| Appendix 8. Logistic regression analysis of effect of Prison Economy on Support for Punitive Drug & Property Laws in Washington State Legislature  |
|  | Coefficients |
| Independent Variables | sb5798- softens medical marijuana requirements, 09-10 | sb6167-soften prosecution for property crimes, 09-10 | hb1001- increases penalties for auto theft, 08-07 | hb2338- reduces penalties for heroin, cocaine, 01-02 | sb6490- increases penalties for motor vehicle theft, 01-02 | Sb6490-Republicans only  |
| ***Prison Facilities*** | .81 (.49)\*[.10] | .15 (.56)[.02] | .30 (1.35)[.004] | -.13 (.47)[-.01] | .61 (.51)[.02] | 1.63 (.75)\*\*[.16] |
| Population Densitya (urban) | .02 (.25)[.01] | .13 (.24)[.08] | -.65 (.30)\*\*[-.04] | -.28 (.29)[-.10] | -.02 (.15)[-.002] | -.0035 (.46)[-.001] |
| Prisons\*Population Density (urban) a | -.31 (.34)[-.08] | -.14 (.37)[-.05] | -.37 (.43)[-.01] | .36 (.25)\*†[.08] | -4.4 (5.3)[-.55] | -2.4 (2.7)[-.35] |
| Percent Poverty | -.13 (.10)\*†[-.12] | -.20 (.11)\*[-.23] | .24 (.14)\*[.02] | .009 (.09)[.01] | -.02 (.08)[-.004] | -.10 (.16)[-.08] |
| Total Arrest Ratea  | -.18 (.16)[-.909] | -.34 (.18)\*[-.21] | .25 (.24)[.01] | .07 (.14)[.02] | -.04 (.15)[-.01] | .17 (.21)[.06] |
| Percent High School  | 2215 (2802)[.06] | 5018 (3156)\*†[.17] | -7762 (4716)\*†[-.02] | -520 (2372)[-.01] | -1645 (2171)[-.01] | -1858 (3100)[-.03] |
| Percent White | -.05 (.05)[-.10] | -.03 (1.0)[-.07] | -.01 (.05)[-.002] | -.04 (.04)[-.06] | -.02 (.04)[-.01] | -.01 (.06)[-.02] |
| Party (Republican) | 3.66 (.66)\*\*\*[.33] | 5.26 (1.00)\*\*\*[.56] | -- | -- | 1.03 (.51)\*\*[.03] | -- |
| Ideology (conservative) | -- | -- | 1.74 (.86)\*\*[.04] | -- | -- | 3.56 (1.48)\*\*[.19] |
| Percent Democratic Voteshare, 2008 | -- | -- | -- | -14.29 (4.2)\*\*\*[-.27] | -- | -- |
|  | N=147Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .46 | N=141Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .56 | N=147Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .30 | N=145Prob>χ²= .0000Pseudo R²= .26 | N=144Prob>χ²= .0498Pseudo R²= .10 | N=68Prob>χ²= .0487Pseudo R²= .19 |

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Predicted probabilities are in brackets (indicating a one standard deviation change). The dependent variable is a roll call vote on penal policies taken in the Washington state legislature. Votes opposing sentencing reform are coded “1”; votes supporting sentencing reform are coded “0.”

a In thousands, \*\*\*p<.01; \*\*p<.05; \*p<.10 (two-tailed test), †(one-tailed test)