"Gender Inequality in Deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of Interaction" Online Appendix

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A Supplementary Tables and Figures

Notes on additional results, summarized:

1. As noted in the paper, minority women under majority rule receive positive affirmations at less than half the rate enjoyed by men in their group (Figure 2). Here we note that the results are similar when we subtract women's from men's average instead of taking the ratio of women's to men's. In addition, the women/men ratio of the negatively interrupted proportion of the person's speaking turns does not change in a statistically discernible way (results not shown). Neither does the gender ratio of the interrupting proportion of the issuer's speaking turns, for either positive or negative interruptions (results not shown).
2. If we collapse mixed and enclave groups in Figure 4, Panel A, a similar pattern holds. The negative balance of interruptions received is influential for women and men ($B = -1.18$, $SE = 0.31$, $p < 0.001$ among women, versus $B = -0.64$, $SE = 0.32$, $p < 0.05$ for men). However, when we control for participants' proportion of talk time instead of speaking turns, the effect of the person's negative balance of interruptions received is very similar for women though smaller ($B = -0.682$, $SE = 0.245$, $p < 0.01$). The effect for men disappears ($B = -0.226$, $SE = 0.265$).

Table A1: Experimental Conditions and Sample Size

	# Unanimous Groups	# Majority Groups	Total # Groups	# of Individuals
0 Females	8	7	15	75
1 Female	10	9	19	95
2 Females	6	7	13	65
3 Females	9	7	16	80
4 Females	8	8	16	80
5 Females	7	8	15	75
Total # of Groups	48	46	94	
# of Individuals	240	230		470

Table A2: Negative Proportion of Negative or Positive Interruptions Received, for Men and for Women, Mixed Groups

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Majority Rule	0.30^	-0.05
	(0.18)	(0.11)
Number of Women	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.11*	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Egalitarianism	-0.10	-0.19
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Number of Egalitarians	0.08***	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Constant	0.18	0.37***
	(0.15)	(0.10)
Observations	128	141
R-squared	0.19	0.09
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table A3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive or Negative Interruptions, Mixed-Gender Groups Only

	Negative		Positive	
	(1) Women by Men and Women	(2) Men by Men and Women	(3) Women by Men and Women	(4) Men by Men and Women
Majority Rule	-0.205	0.017	0.156	0.007
	(0.224)	(0.115)	(0.226)	(0.124)
Number of Women	-0.046^	0.008	0.023	-0.078**
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.030)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.086^	-0.032	-0.060	-0.015
	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.052)
Egalitarianism	0.418^	0.349*	-0.082	0.041
	(0.301)	(0.177)	(0.269)	(0.173)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.019	0.005	-0.068*	0.014
	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Constant	0.746***	0.665***	0.526***	0.584***
	(0.195)	(0.110)	(0.179)	(0.111)
Observations	92	104	118	129
R-squared	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.07
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Individual-level analysis. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20, two-tailed test.

Table A4: Formal Test of Mediation

	Others' Ratings of Speaker's Influence	Self-Rating of Speaker's Influence
Average Causal Mediation Effect	0.29 [0.02 – 0.67]	0.08 [0.01 – 0.15]
Direct Effect	-0.08 [-1.26 – 1.11]	-0.22 [-0.42 – -0.03]
Total Effect	0.21 [-0.81 – 1.19]	-0.15 [-0.30 – -0.01]

90% confidence intervals in brackets below estimates. Estimates based on 1,000 simulations. Models include main effects for group gender composition and for decision rule as well as controls for total # of comments, egalitarianism, and experimental location. These are only partial estimates, as Imai et al. (2010) have not yet extended their method to include the interaction + main effect when the model includes an interaction between experimental conditions.

Table A5: Panel A: Effect of Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions and Confidence on Talk Time, Mixed Groups

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Confidence	0.042*	-0.012
	(0.021)	(0.024)
Proportion Speaking Turns w/ Positive Interruption	1.176*	0.667
	(0.630)	(0.679)
Confidence x Prop. Turns w/ Positive Interruption	-0.270	0.436
	(0.813)	(0.810)
Outlier Control	-0.134**	--
	(0.064)	--
Speaking Turns	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.055**	0.098***
	(0.021)	(0.019)
Observations	157	163
R-squared	0.40	0.31
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table A5: Panel B: Effect of Confidence and Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on Influence Votes, Mixed Groups

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Confidence	0.701*	0.140
	(0.401)	(0.297)
Proportion Speaking Turns w/ Positive Interruption	26.088**	16.297**
	(10.930)	(6.648)
Confidence x Prop. Turns w/ Positive Interruption	-20.119^	-7.317
	(13.951)	(8.523)
Outlier Control	-18.219***	--
	(1.433)	--
Speaking Turns	0.016***	0.011***
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Constant	-2.012***	-0.772***
	(0.508)	(0.222)
Alpha	0.833	0.208
	(0.355)	(0.145)
Observations	157	163
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Coefficients from a negative binomial model; Robust standard errors in parentheses
Models in Panels A and B include a control for an outlier that receives well over 2 SD more positive interruptions than anyone else in the sample; patterns of are similar if the outlier control is removed.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table A6: Effect of Confidence and Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on Self-efficacy, Mixed Groups

	(1) Women	(2) Men
Confidence	0.096*	0.018
	(0.051)	(0.039)
Proportion Speaking Turns w/ Positive Interruption	4.799***	0.283
	(1.330)	(1.256)
Confidence x Prop. Turns w/ Positive Interruption	-3.360*	0.499
	(1.933)	(1.637)
Outlier Control	-0.333***	--
	(0.120)	--
Constant	0.550***	0.685***
	(0.037)	(0.031)
Observations	157	163
R-squared	0.11	0.01
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Models include a control for an outlier that receives well over 2 SD more positive interruptions than anyone else in the sample; patterns are similar if the outlier control is removed.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.2

Table A7: Effect of the Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on the Percentage of Time Men Spoke in their Groups

	Men in Enclaves		Minority Female (1-2 women)				Majority Female (3-4 women)			
			Majority Rule		Unanimous Rule		Majority Rule		Unanimous Rule	
	(1) Majority Rule	(2) Unanimous Rule	(3) From Women	(4) From Men	(5) From Women	(6) From Men	(7) From Women	(8) From Men	(9) From Women	(10) From Men
Prop. w/ Positive	1.018	0.292	0.248	0.878^	-0.367	0.945	0.657^	1.074*	0.295	2.113***
	(1.063)	(0.364)	(1.240)	(0.527)	(0.909)	(1.335)	(0.440)	(0.546)	(0.320)	(0.471)
Constant	0.180***	0.194***	0.225***	0.235***	0.264***	0.229***	0.206***	0.194***	0.200***	0.165***
	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Observations	35	40	22	14	26	18	57	57	58	58
R-squared	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.16
Prop. w/ Positive	1.132	0.419	-0.002	1.012^	0.012	0.828	0.681^	1.109*	0.368	2.155***
	(1.187)	(0.352)	(1.140)	(0.657)	(0.867)	(1.514)	(0.443)	(0.611)	(0.319)	(0.529)
Egalitarianism	-0.018	0.161	-0.053	-0.043	-0.182	-0.095	-0.013	-0.032	0.064	0.041
	(0.182)	(0.140)	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.177)	(0.191)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.066)	(0.062)
Constant	0.178*	0.118*	0.272***	0.257***	0.305***	0.257*	0.208***	0.209***	0.186***	0.142***
	(0.074)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.096)	(0.112)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Observations	35	40	22	14	26	18	57	57	58	58
R-squared	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.17
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table A8: Proportion of Negatively Interrupted Turns that were Completed without Interrupter Completion, Mixed Groups

	(1) Women by Men and Women	(2) Men by Men and Women
Majority Rule	0.0720	0.1126
	(0.1381)	(0.1335)
Number of Women	0.0539*	0.0114
	(0.0269)	(0.0317)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.0446	-0.0131
	(0.0440)	(0.0666)
Egalitarianism	-0.3593	-0.0426
	(0.3174)	(0.1496)
Number of Egalitarians	0.0552*	-0.0292
	(0.0321)	(0.0407)
Constant	0.0946	0.2642***
	(0.1438)	(0.0986)
Observations	92	104
R-squared	0.12	0.05
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Figure A1: Disposition Summary Statistics (Raw)



Figure A2: Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received (Raw)

(a) Women



(b) Men



Figure A3: Proportion of Speaking Turns that Gave or Received Positively or Negative Interruptions (Raw)



Figure A4: Predicted Self-Efficacy among Women with Low and High Confidence, Mixed Groups



B Alternative Estimator Models

Table B1: Negative Proportion of Men's and Women's Interruptions Received, Separately by Male and Female Interrupters, Mixed Groups (compare to Table 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Women from Men		Women from Women		Men from Men		Men from Women	
	OLS	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**
Majority Rule	0.470**	1.004**	0.066	0.131	0.078	0.118	-0.041	0.038
	(0.205)	(0.490)	(0.373)	(0.666)	(0.159)	(0.271)	(0.124)	(0.236)
Number of Women	-0.018	-0.070	-0.109*	-0.190**	0.050	0.064	0.002	0.056
	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.060)	(0.103)	(0.036)	(0.071)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.185***	-0.404**	-0.038	-0.073	-0.118	-0.199	0.048	0.035
	(0.068)	(0.174)	(0.105)	(0.187)	(0.093)	(0.170)	(0.055)	(0.100)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.004***	0.010***	0.003**	0.005**	0.003**	0.005***	0.003***	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Egalitarianism	0.040	0.031	-0.556**	-0.857**	-0.277	-0.505^	0.021	-0.058
	(0.244)	(0.481)	(0.223)	(0.380)	(0.229)	(0.386)	(0.167)	(0.292)
Number of Egalitarians	0.089**	0.242**	0.106***	0.184***	0.008	-0.008	-0.078*	-0.148*
	(0.042)	(0.111)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.081)
Constant	-0.068	-0.728^	0.729**	0.822*	0.246*	0.166	0.277**	0.015
	(0.190)	(0.463)	(0.277)	(0.446)	(0.137)	(0.219)	(0.125)	(0.231)
Observations	102	102	94	94	107	107	111	111
R-squared	0.24	--	0.17	--	0.13	--	0.12	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table B2: Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive and Negative Interruptions, Mixed Groups (compare to Table 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Women Positive		**Women Negative**		**Men Positive**		**Men Negative**	
	OLS	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**
Majority Rule	-0.025**	-0.037**	0.003	-0.001	0.005	0.004	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Number of Women	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.007*	0.011**	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Egalitarianism	-0.020**	-0.030**	-0.011^	-0.017^	0.013^	0.016^	-0.000	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.001	-0.001	0.005***	0.008***	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	0.041***	0.045***	0.012*	0.010	0.018***	0.015**	0.014***	0.012**
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Observations	157	157	157	157	163	163	163	163
R-squared	0.07	--	0.11	--	0.04	--	0.03	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

**Table B3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions to Women from Men, Mi
Groups (compare to Table 3)**

	(1)	(2)
	OLS	**Tobit**
Majority Rule	0.545**	1.174**
	(0.239)	(0.556)
Number of Women	0.077^	0.120
	(0.058)	(0.113)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.225***	-0.496**
	(0.079)	(0.190)
Egalitarianism	0.022	0.015
	(0.284)	(0.630)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.003	0.023
	(0.047)	(0.113)
Constant	0.232	0.018
	(0.208)	(0.443)
Observations	83	83
R-squared	0.11	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table B4 – Panel A: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Others' Ratings of Speaker's Influence, All Groups (compare to Table 4 – Panel A)

Mixed Groups Only	(1)	(2) **Women**	(3)	(4)	(5) **Men**	(6)
	NB	**Tobit**	**Log**	**NB**	**Tobit**	**Log**
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-1.315***	-2.178***	-1.654***	-0.541*	-0.997*	-1.104*
	(0.388)	(0.737)	(0.561)	(0.318)	(0.574	(0.647)
Egalitarianism	-0.181	-1.036^	-1.514	-0.552	-1.171	-1.651^
	(0.300)	(1.547)	(1.509)	(0.488)	(0.984)	(1.241)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.019***	0.038***	0.036***	0.011***	0.023***	0.029
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.947**	-1.188^	-3.005***	0.035	0.535	-1.493
	(0.472)	(0.878)	(0.835)	(0.231)	(0.471)	(0.624)
Alpha	0.646	--	--	0.138	--	--
	(0.319)	--	--	(0.119)	--	--
Observations	128	128	128	141	141	141
R-squared	--	--	0.14	--	--	0.13
Pseudo R-squared	--	0.06	--	--	0.04	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Enclave Groups Only	(1)	(2) **Women**	(3)	(4)	(5) **Men**	(6)
	NB	**Tobit**	**Log**	**NB**	**Tobit**	**Log**
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-1.098**	-1.749*	-1.491*	-0.631	-1.258	-0.834
	(0.537)	(0.919)	(0.840)	(0.715)	(1.467)	(1.135)
Egalitarianism	-1.474*	-1.948	-1.141	-1.357*	-3.347^	-2.785^
	(0.820)	(1.694)	(2.008)	(0.754)	(2.084)	(1.725)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.011***	0.024***	0.025**	0.024***	0.055**	0.033**
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.015)
Constant	0.083	-0.187	-2.867*	-1.156**	-1.955	-3.144**
	(0.561)	(1.181)	(1.379)	(0.585)	(1.881)	(1.428)
Alpha	0.516	--	--	0.371	--	--
	(0.315)	--	--	(0.349)	--	--
Observations	65	65	65	59	59	59
R-squared	--	--	0.09	--	--	0.18
Pseudo R-squared	--	0.04	--	--	0.11	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: NB stands for negative binomial
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table B4 – Panel B: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Self-rating of Speaker's Influence, All Groups (compare to Table 4 – Panel B)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Women				**Men**			
	Mixed		**Enclave**		**Mixed**		**Enclave**	
	OLS	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**	**OLS**	**Tobit**
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-0.132**	-0.132**	0.084	0.110	-0.039	-0.041	-0.036	-0.051
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.156)	(0.197)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.001^	0.001^	0.002^	0.002^	0.001^	0.001*	0.003***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Egalitarianism	-0.018	-0.039	0.039	-0.029	-0.035	-0.040	0.006	-0.022
	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.170)	(0.205)	(0.112)	(0.130)	(0.109)	(0.134)
Constant	0.688***	0.697***	0.471***	0.476***	0.690***	0.687***	0.580***	0.576***
	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.060)
Observations	128	128	65	65	141	141	59	59
R-squared	0.07	--	0.05	--	0.02	--	0.27	--
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

C Fully-Saturated Control Models

Table C1: Negative Proportion of Men's and Women's Interruptions Received, Separately by Male and Female Interrupters, Mixed Groups, Saturated Model (compare to Table 1)

	(1) Women from Men	(2) Women from Women	(3) Men from Men	(4) Men from Women
Majority Rule	0.588**	0.111	0.232^	-0.055
	(0.229)	(0.368)	(0.166)	(0.124)
Number of Women	-0.030	-0.115*	0.033	0.004
	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.037)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.146*	-0.019	-0.076	0.044
	(0.080)	(0.116)	(0.097)	(0.069)
Number of Egalitarians	0.129**	0.125**	0.062^	-0.082**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.041)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians	-0.077	-0.036	-0.093*	0.009
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.005***	0.003*	0.003**	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Egalitarianism	0.015	-0.568**	-0.276	0.019
	(0.242)	(0.223)	(0.219)	(0.166)
Constant	-0.129	0.695**	0.146	0.286**
	(0.197)	(0.297)	(0.131)	(0.123)
Observations	102	94	107	111
R-squared	0.25	0.17	0.16	0.12
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table C2: Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive and Negative Interruptions, Mixed Groups, Saturated Model (compare to Table 2)

	Women		Men	
	(1) Positive	(2) Negative	(3) Positive	(4) Negative
Majority Rule	-0.024*	0.006	0.005	-0.001
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Number of Women	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.007*	-0.002	-0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Number of Egalitarians	-0.001	0.005***	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Egalitarianism	-0.020**	-0.011^	0.013^	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Constant	0.041***	0.011*	0.017***	0.013**
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Observations	157	157	163	163
R-squared	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.03
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table C3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions to Women from Men, Mixed Groups, Saturated Model (compare to Table 3)

Majority Rule	0.602**
	(0.274)
Number of Women	0.074
	(0.059)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.205**
	(0.093)
Number of Egalitarians	0.020
	(0.066)
Majority Rule x Number of Egalitarians	-0.041
	(0.087)
Egalitarianism	0.002
	(0.280)
Constant	0.199
	(0.224)
Observations	83
R-squared	0.11
Control for Experimental Location	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

D Liberal Control Models

Table D1: Negative Proportion of Men's and Women's Interruptions Received, Separately by Male and Female Interrupters, Mixed Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 1)

	(1) Women from Men	(2) Women from Women	(3) Men from Men	(4) Men from Women
Majority Rule	0.412*	-0.061	0.077	-0.010
	(0.221)	(0.400)	(0.158)	(0.125)
Number of Women	0.004	-0.072	0.045	-0.027
	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.030)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.172**	-0.007	-0.108	0.053
	(0.079)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.057)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.004***	0.003**	0.002**	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Liberalism	0.022	0.078	-0.247*	-0.110
	(0.160)	(0.200)	(0.141)	(0.145)
Number of Liberals	0.044	-0.000	-0.020	-0.082**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Constant	0.059	0.558**	0.236*	0.266**
	(0.156)	(0.255)	(0.128)	(0.106)
Observations	102	94	107	111
R-squared	0.20	0.09	0.15	0.14
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table D2: Proportion of Turns Receiving Positive and Negative Interruptions, Mixed Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 2)

	Women		Men	
	(1) Positive	(2) Negative	(3) Positive	(4) Negative
Majority Rule	-0.022**	-0.000	0.005	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Number of Women	-0.003	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	0.006^	-0.002	-0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Liberalism	0.003	0.003	0.009	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Number of Liberals	0.002	0.004***	0.001	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	0.028***	0.013**	0.020***	0.017***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	157	157	163	163
R-squared	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.03
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table D3: Elaborated Proportion of Positive Interruptions to Women from Men, Mixed Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 3)

Majority Rule	0.606**
	(0.229)
Number of Women	0.080
	(0.065)
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-0.241***
	(0.079)
Liberalism	0.297^
	(0.196)
Number of Liberals	-0.044
	(0.048)
Constant	0.160
	(0.170)
Observations	83
R-squared	0.13
Control for Experimental Location	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table D4 – Panel A: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Others' Ratings of Speaker's Influence, All Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 4 – Panel A)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Women		**Men**	
	Mixed	**Enclave**	**Mixed**	**Enclave**
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-1.315***	-1.014*	-0.600*	-0.572
	(0.388)	(0.587)	(0.319)	(0.694)
Liberalism	-0.203	0.403	-0.942***	0.240
	(0.586)	(0.676)	(0.355)	(0.767)
Number of Speaking Turns	0.019***	0.014***	0.011***	0.023***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.973***	-0.944***	0.083	-1.710***
	(0.344)	(0.268)	(0.208)	(0.541)
Alpha	0.639	0.558	0.088	0.408
	(0.325)	(0.333)	(0.117)	(0.416)
Observations	128	65	141	59
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients from negative binomial model
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table D4 – Panel B: Effect of Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received on Self-rating of Speaker's Influence, All Groups, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 4 – Panel B)

	Women		**Men**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mixed	Enclave	Mixed	Enclave
Neg / (Neg + Pos)	-0.133**	0.075	-0.036	-0.037
	(0.052)	(0.162)	(0.052)	(0.072)
Liberalism	0.011	0.112	-0.003	-0.101
	(0.053)	(0.167)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Speaking Turns	0.001^	0.002^	0.001^	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.676***	0.462***	0.677***	0.611***
	(0.035)	(0.085)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	128	65	141	59
R-squared	0.07	0.06	0.02	0.29
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table D5: Effect of the Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Positive Interruptions on Women's *Proportion Talk*, Liberalism Controls (compare to Table 5)

			Minority Female (1-2 women)				Majority Female (3-4 women)			
	Women in Enclaves		Majority Rule		Unanimous Rule		Majority Rule		Unanimous Rule	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Majority Rule	Unanimous Rule	From Women	From Men	From Women	From Men	From Women	From Men	From Women	From Men
Prop. w/ Positive	0.899	0.490	-0.737	3.193***	1.288*	-1.074	2.433***	-0.056	0.895*	0.724^
	(0.768)	(0.739)	(0.669)	(0.920)	(0.588)	(1.361)	(0.370)	(0.605)	(0.511)	(0.469)
Liberalism	0.060	0.112	-0.140	-0.098	0.384^	0.182	0.053^	0.060**	-0.099***	-0.11***
	(0.056)	(0.125)	(0.211)	(0.086)	(0.194)	(0.142)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Constant	0.152***	0.149*	0.188**	0.117***	0.022	0.140***	0.123***	0.159***	0.205***	0.207***
	(0.032)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Observations	40	35	14	23	12	22	53	53	59	59
R-squared	0.08	0.04	0.14	0.23	0.56	0.17	0.37	0.05	0.11	0.13
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Dependent variable in all models is *Proportion Talk*. Independent-level analysis. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.20

Table D6: Group-level Effects on Total Number of Interruptions, Mixed-Gender Enclave Groups (compare to Table 6)

	Positive		Negative		Neutral	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	All	Elaborated	All	Elaborated	All	Ela
Mixed-Gender Groups Only						
Majority Rule	3.107	1.703	0.038	-0.651	0.711	0
	(4.423)	(2.442)	(2.466)	(2.021)	(1.309)	(0
Number of Women	2.079**	0.925^	-0.017	-0.348	0.398^	0
	(1.024)	(0.565)	(0.571)	(0.468)	(0.303)	(0
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-1.119	-0.727	0.290	0.365	-0.196	0
	(1.471)	(0.812)	(0.820)	(0.672)	(0.435)	(0
# of Speaking Turns	0.112***	0.053***	0.091***	0.073***	0.032***	0.0
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0
# of Liberals	-0.118	0.328	0.474	0.614	-0.025	0
	(1.368)	(0.755)	(0.763)	(0.625)	(0.405)	(0
Constant	-6.486^	-4.113^	-8.60***	-5.917***	-2.927**	-1
	(4.738)	(2.616)	(2.643)	(2.166)	(1.402)	(0
Observations	94	94	94	94	94	
R-squared	0.58	0.50	0.69	0.68	0.53	
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Mixed-Gender Groups and Enclaves						
Majority Rule	1.640	2.927	2.912	1.412	-0.001	-(
	(6.468)	(4.121)	(4.133)	(3.344)	(1.901)	(1
Number of Women	1.066	0.678	0.239	-0.166	0.600	0.
	(1.627)	(1.036)	(1.040)	(0.841)	(0.478)	(0
Majority Rule x Number of Women	-1.103	-1.710	-1.233	-0.711	-0.307	-(
	(2.360)	(1.503)	(1.508)	(1.220)	(0.694)	(0
# of Speaking Turns	0.085***	0.042***	0.090***	0.072***	0.027***	0.0
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0
# of Liberals	1.246	0.984	0.507	0.634	0.122	0
	(1.420)	(0.904)	(0.907)	(0.734)	(0.417)	(0
Constant	0.001	-1.918	-8.776**	-6.107*	-2.126	-1
	(6.066)	(3.864)	(3.876)	(3.136)	(1.783)	(1
Observations	64	64	64	64	64	
R-squared	0.48	0.37	0.65	0.65	0.51	
Control for Experimental Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	

Note: Group-level analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10, ^ p<0.2

E Research Design

1. Subject Recruitment and Experimental Procedures

Recruitment

We recruited participants, including students and non-students, from the campuses and surrounding communities of a small northeastern university and a large western university. Potential participants were asked to take part in a two-hour experiment investigating "how people make decisions about important issues." Recruitment was conducted through a wide variety of methods including emails to students[1], postcards to purchased random lists of community members, online advertisements, flyers posted both on and off campus, and direct contact to local community groups. Recruits were promised the chance to earn between $10 and $60 depending on their decisions during the experiment. During recruitment, potential participants were told that the project was a study of "how people make decisions about important issues." Each session included five participants, and volunteers were not allowed to take part in the experiment if they knew any other participant prior to participation. In all, 600 people participated in the 120 sessions of the experiment.

Procedures

Gender composition and decision rule were systematically manipulated. There were 12 types of groups (6 gender compositions and 2 decision rules). Gender compositions were randomly assigned to days on the schedule. Participants were then scheduled to the day that worked best for them. This process ensured that participants had a roughly equal probability of being assigned to each group type and that group types did not cluster on particular days of the week. For each session, more than 5 participants were allowed to sign up. These additional participants helped ensure that we could fill the session's assigned gender composition. Participants who showed up at a session but were not needed were paid $10 and allowed to sign up for a subsequent session. No participant was allowed to take part in the experiment more than once. Prior to each session's start the experimenter rolled a die to randomly select the decision rule that would hold for the experiment.

Once the participants arrived they were informed of the risks and benefits of participation and signed a consent form. Then, the experimenter read an introduction outlining the three stages of the experiment: the first stage in which participants learned about the different principles of just income distribution, the second stage in which they deliberated about the theories and voted to adopt the "most just" principle, and the third stage in which they performed an unspecified task to earn money, which would then be redistributed according to the rule adopted by the group.

After the introduction was read, participants moved to computer stations and began the first stage. They began by completing a 35-question introductory questionnaire that measured general attitudes towards redistribution, feelings about group work, risk aversion, prosociality, and more. Participants then read a five-page description of the four distributive principles that could be adopted during the experiment. After reading the descriptions, each participant completed an 11-question quiz about the principles and registered a pre-deliberation preference ordering of the principles. Selections of the materials provided to the participants have been reproduced at the end of this appendix.

[1] At the northeastern university, student emails were those of volunteers for previous experiments in their lab, and later to the entire student body. At the western university, several random samples of the entire student body were obtained and used.

During the second stage of the experiment, the participants read instructions about the deliberation and voting process. Participants were instructed to conduct a "full and open discussion" that considered their role as "establishing rules for a new society which you will be part of." To avoid self-clustering in the deliberative area, participants were seated randomly around the table. The experimenter opened discussion by asking "Would someone like to start by explaining which principle they believe to be most just and why?" Participants deliberated until they agreed first by unanimous vote to end deliberation and then by the assigned decision rule to adopt a particular principle of distribution. Deliberation was required to last for at least five minutes, and all voting occurred by secret ballot.

The average group deliberated for just over 25 minutes (standard deviation = 11). This is the total time spent from the point at which the researcher read the group deliberation instructions to the point at which the participants agreed to stop talking. Participants agreed by unanimous vote to end deliberation. In analyses that use *Proportion Talk* or *Talk Time*, we employ a slightly different version of total talk time, which is the sum of all individual talk times, not counting the researcher instructions or any silences in which no member of the group spoke. For this alternative measure, the mean is just over 19 minutes (standard deviation = 11). Groups at our Western site talked for several minutes longer than groups at the East Coast site. Despite this intercept shift, the relationships we observe between our dependent variables and the experimental conditions are very similar at the two locations.

Groups were allowed four voting rounds to come to a decision. The experimenter remained in the room during the deliberation to manage the recording equipment and answer clarification questions about the distribution principles or other aspects of the process, but did not otherwise moderate the discussion. Once the deliberation was complete, the participants moved back to their computer terminals, preference ranked the principles, and completed a post-deliberation questionnaire that measured their evaluation of the group's most influential member and their satisfaction with both the process of deliberation and the group's final decision. Deliberations were recorded both on individual microphones and a group microphone and video.

In the third stage, subjects were informed that their task would be to correct spelling mistakes in blocks of text. After a practice round, the subjects completed three rounds of the task. The performance in each task round was equated with a yearly salary. The income was then redistributed so that the group's final distribution of income conformed to the principle chosen by the group. At the end of each round, participants were privately told their "annual income" as well as the group's high, low, and average incomes both before and after redistribution. They were also asked to again rank the distributional principles from most to least preferred and indicate how happy they were with the group's decision. Following the final round participants completed a battery of demographic questions and were paid according to their performance, plus a $10 show-up fee which had not been previously disclosed.

Additional Research Elements

As a control, fourteen group sessions were completed in which no deliberation occurred. The group recruitment and scheduling processes were identical. Researchers treated the control condition as another potential decision rule for selection before the start of the experiment. In these cases, all discussion instructions were omitted and participants were informed that a principle of justice would be assigned to them at a certain point in the experiment. All other aspects of the experiment were identical, except for the post-discussion questionnaire, which was omitted. The principle imposed on these groups was a Floor Constraint of $14,500.

The first sixteen groups were considered to be a "pilot study," after which the experimental procedure was evaluated. After this point, several minor adjustments took place in order to

streamline the process. Much of the more technical information about the distributive principles was moved to an appendix in the Participant Handbook, three questions were removed from the Principles Quiz, and several questions were added to the overall questionnaire. A practice task round was also included which allowed participants to become familiar with the task format, but was not formally graded and in no way impacted the final payment. Community recruitment also did not begin until after the pilot study took place.

Finally, in all gender-study groups the race of participants was controlled to isolate the effect of gender. All participants classified themselves as "White/Caucasian" upon volunteering. However, a second pilot study of 20 groups was completed in addition to the 120 already mentioned which systematically manipulated the race or ethnicity of the participants. Gender compositions were held to 2 or 3 females in each group. Due to differing local demographics, at the western university the race/ethnicity pilot study used Hispanic participants, and the northeastern university used black participants. The data from these 20 groups are not included in the current analyses.

2. Recording Configuration and Verbal Behavior Analysis Software

Each group of five deliberators was recorded using a total of 6 microphones and two separate digital video cameras. Five individual Shure low profile headset microphones were worn by the participants. The unidirectional cardioid pattern of these microphones helped eliminate any contamination of each speaker's audio by background noise and other participants' speech. The sixth microphone was an omnidirectional flat tabletop model. The microphones were connected to a MOTU 8PRE 8-channel microphone preamplifier. This preamplifier connected via a Firewire cable to a standard Microsoft Windows lab PC running Adobe Audition multi-track recording software.

A simple Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 application was written (using the 'sendkeys' function) to automate the operation of the Audition software to ensure that recording was started on all channels at the same time, to name the channels according to experimental naming standards to ease data archiving and post-processing, and to copy the final files to a large network server disk drive for storage. The audio files are so large (often over a GB per group) that they would rapidly fill the hard drive of the recording PC.

Once the individual participants' audio channels were recorded, they were processed using a software package written expressly for this project. This software application first performed voice activity detection (VAD) on each channel. Each participant's audio was converted from an audio file (.wav file) to an amplitude data file (.amp) of average speaking amplitudes, by calculating the average amplitude of the speaker's voice during every .25 second interval of the recording. These averaged amplitudes for each speaker were then converted to binary on-off Voice Activity files (.vad). That is, if the amplitude for a .25 second interval for this speaker was greater than a minimum threshold that was manually determined for each speaker, then their speaking status was set to 1 or ON for that interval, otherwise it was set to 0.

This process yielded data files (.vad) for each subject with their speaking turns (utterances) identified. This data was then post-processed to ensure that slight pauses during utterances were bridged if they were less than 1 second in duration (to avoid have long single utterances broken into two shorter utterances). Then to avoid spurious short utterances due to microphone noise, etc., any of these utterances that did not contain at least one .25 second interval of some minimum high amplitude during the utterance were eliminated. For the present experiment, the 'minimum maximum' for an utterance was set to +5 above the specified minimum threshold. Once all individual .vad files were processed, the software integrated them into a single group data file (.grp) for each deliberative group. Verbal behavior statistics were then run on this data,

including such measures as total amount of speaking time for the group, % of time for this speaker, etc.

3. Method & Design

An experiment that revolves around the manipulation of group characteristics poses many interesting challenges for experimenters. In our case, some pertinent questions might be:

- What does it mean for "gender" to be a treatment?
- Is a within- or between-subjects design best?
- Are the assumptions of the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) violated?
- Is assigning gender composition an experimental manipulation, or is this an observational study?

Our general response to these questions is that the design in this study conforms to definitions of "experiment." It uses what Don Green and his colleagues call a "passive" experimental design that randomly assigns individuals to the discussion group based on their demographic, ideological, or other pre-existing characteristics, and observes the outcomes (Farrar et al. 2009, pp. 617-618). While individual gender cannot be manipulated, a group's gender composition can be. Other experiments that manipulate the composition of groups and where the units purposely interact correctly claim to be experimental and note no violations of the Rubin model. These have been published in various top journals including APSR (Druckman 2004; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Luskin et al. 2002; Myers and Bishop 1970).

In what sense is our design experimental? According to Morton and Williams (2010), an experiment occurs "when a researcher intervenes in the data generating process (DGP) by purposely manipulating elements of the DGP", where manipulating means "varies the elements of" (p. 42). We varied the elements of the data generating process – specifically, the gender composition and decision rule for all groups in our sample.

In addition, we use the hallmark of experiments as traditionally conceived: random assignment to a treatment. Gender composition conditions were randomly assigned to each scheduled experimental session. Through this process, each man had an equal probability of assignment to a given condition, and the same is true for each woman. (And of course, each deliberating group has an equal chance of assignment to a rule by rolling dice prior to the start of the experimental session.) Additionally, several assumptions of the Rubin Causal Model and its variants are satisfied in this study where they would not be in observational studies to the same extent or at all: 1) ignorability or independence for Y_i and for X_i (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski and Lupia 2011, pp. 23-24), confirmed by our propensity score analysis on p.14, note 15; 2) individual units do not influence each other across treatments, nor across groups within a treatment, nor do groups influence each other; 3) the exclusion restriction (the assignment works only through the treatment); 4) units cannot choose or decline treatment and thus noncompliance and self-treatment are non-issues. The present study thus is far preferable to an observational study of naturally-occurring gender compositions.

Is interaction among subjects a violation of SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption)? Our particular type of design, namely a passive design, is a special case of the more general treatment-interaction-outcome (T-I-O) design. Morton and Williams (2010) cite several studies with the general T-I-O design without noting any violations of the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) (e.g., pp. 238-40), and implicitly endorse (p. 278) the passive design of Don Green and colleagues (Farrar et al 2009). In fact, many of the experimental game-theory studies proliferating in the field are also a case of the T-I-O design, yet they are not thought to violate the RCM by virtue of the subject interaction component.

How is SUTVA not violated when the units are treating each other? We have several responses. First, SUTVA refers to avoiding treatment spillover effects – for example, when treatment 1 affects units assigned to treatment 2. The fact that units influence the outcome of others within a deliberating group does not create bias in the treatment effect because an individual unit does not affect individuals in other treatment conditions. That is, the interaction among units does not carry the effect of a treatment to units not assigned to the treatment. This means that the interaction among units does not create bias in the treatment effect. Second, relatedly, this interaction among units constitutes a set of mediating variables, not a confounding variable, and poses no bias to the treatment effect. Third, most of our analysis uses the group as the unit of analysis, avoiding the problems of using the individual as the unit and thus avoiding the SUTVA problem. Fourth, when we employ individual-level data, we employ random effects models or regression models with cluster robust standard errors to account for the interdependence of the units (observations) within the deliberating group. Fifth, our treatment is placement in a discussion group assigned to a particular gender composition and to unanimous or majority decision rule. This allows us to make use of the random assignment and control we do have without appearing to claim that what follows after the manipulation is exogenous.

Is individual gender a treatment? Individual gender is (obviously) not manipulated and we do not claim that it is. Our treatment is gender composition. Regarding *individual* gender specifically, we note on p. 16 the potential concern that gender is correlated with other factors that could be doing the actual causal work, and we control on those noted in the literature, namely the value of egalitarianism and preferences over redistribution principles. In addition, since individual gender is exogenous, any attitudinal difference (in preferences, ideologies, values, etc.) that may be associated with it occurs later in the causal chain and would constitute mediating rather than confounding variables. Known works in the field have treated those attitudinal variables as mediators for demographic effects rather than confounds of them (e.g., Gilens 1999). Nevertheless, we do not rely on this assumption about the causal order but rather use the standard method of controls for confounds.

Would a within-subjects design be better than our between-subjects design? Assigning different individuals to different compositions creates some potential difficulties. However, these are the standard difficulties of a between-subjects design. The primary difficulty is that the estimates have high variance. Bias is not a problem, however. We chose to use a between-subjects design rather than a within subjects design because we worried that prior treatment would bias the effect of current treatment, the standard problem of within-subjects designs (Morton and Williams 2010, Chapter 4). For example, experiencing an all- female group before experiencing a predominantly male group may alter the response of a female to the predominantly-male group. Thus we choose the inefficient estimates of between-subjects design to avoid the higher bias that would result from sequential treatments. This is thus not a choice that violates SUTVA.

Is SUTVA violated in some other way? The design might be thought to violate SUTVA in the sense that each group consists of a different set of co-members surrounding the subject and thus units receive different versions of the treatment. For example, when a 4-female group consists of females A, B, C, and D, while another 4-female group consists of females E, F, G and H, the man in these groups gets different versions of the 4-female treatment. A-D differ from E-H in a number of ways that might affect the outcome of interest. However, we do not regard this as a source of bias in the estimate of treatment effects because the variance is uncorrelated with the treatment. Even if this is unpersuasive, the resulting effects are still unbiased, if more narrowly stated. In that case, according to the Rubin Causal Model, our effect would be merely the average of the difference between the observed outcome for each treated unit and what would have been observed for each unit under the alternative treatment. We would not claim that the effect we estimate is the average difference in potential outcomes that would have been observed given all units experiencing treatment vs. all experiencing control.

Though experiments manipulating group-level features present unique challenges, our summary view is that ours is an experimental rather than observational study, and it has strengths comparable to or exceeding those of prominent experimental studies with a similar design.

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F Instructions for Coding Interruptions

1 Introduction

The coding unit for this project is a single possible interruption. Using a computer program, we have identified a list of possible interruptions for every deliberative group that we conducted. Fundamentally, the coders' first task is to determine if each listed 'interruption' is, in fact, an interruption. Then, for instances that the coder believes are valid interruptions, a series of decisions describing the disposition and content of the interruption will be made. The process for determining what is an interruption, and the decisions that follow, are described below in detail.

1.1 Coding Process

To complete this assignment, we will provide the following documents for each deliberative group:

1. An Excel spreadsheet that contains a row for each possible interruption and columns that correspond to the various variables (described in detail below) that you will code. This is where you'll enter your coding judgments.

2. A word-for-word transcript of the group discussion.

3. An MP3 file that contains the full group conversation.

4. 5 separate MP3 files that contain the audio recording for each individual speaker.

Each possible interruption is identified by the time that it occurs during the group discussion. To perform your coding, you should locate the specified time in both the written transcript and the group audio recording. Once you have located the conversational interaction that is identified as a possible interruption, use both the audio and written records at your disposal to determine if an interruption occurred or not and, if there was an interruption, continue by filling in the subsequent variables. If you have difficulty sorting out the conversation from the group audio files, please use the individual audio files to get things right. After coding the first possible interruption, move to the next row and repeat the process for the 2nd possible interruption, and so on.

PLEASE NOTE: For each group, the time that the interruption is listed at in the Excel file should correspond to the time it occurs at in the audio recording but the times may be slightly shifted in the timestamps that the transcripts contain. Be sure that you have matched the speech that you can hear at the specified time with the proper section of text in the transcript.

We suggest that you download and use Audacity in order to listen to the audio files. Using this program, you can load in all 5 individual audio files as individual tracks and then select and play all of them at once or just the 2-3 speakers that are relevant to the exchange you're listening to. The program also allows you to easily jump to certain locations in the recording

and is free. Download at: http://audacity.sourceforge.net/download/

As you listen to the group conversations, it is likely that you will hear what seem to be interruptions that are not listed in the Excel file. It is critical that you code only the possible interruptions listed in the Excel file: the computer has defined a universe of potential interruptions, and that is all that we are assessing. To do this, note the time of the possible interruption as well as the two speakers involved - this information is provided in the Excel file. Then carefully assess the written/audio exchange to make your coding determinations: does speaker Y interrupt speaker X? Etc. We realize that this method may omit some interruptions but, again, it is vital that coders focus only on the possible interruptions listed for them in the Excel files.

A few other notes to keep in mind:

- Some of the transcripts will have [interposing] placed at instances that have been flagged as interruptions, but many will not. The [interposing] annotations are not systematic and were provided by our transcriptionists. They should not be used as a substitute for your coding decisions.

- Laughter itself is not an interruption.

- Often, if you listen to all 5 speakers at once, somebody will make a joke and it seems like everybody laughs at the same time and there are no interruptions, even if the computer flagged one (or more). Listening to these episodes speaker-by-speaker often shows that the laughter is staggered and the first person laughing obscures the interruption(s) that the computer flagged. Be sure to listen to just the speakers flagged by the computer in laughter episodes to ensure that you code the exchange correctly.

- In general, please try to minimize your use of the missing data code.

2 Detailed Variable Information

1.2 Interruption

This variable is a unique number identifying each interruption in every group.

1.3 Interruptee ID (computer coded)

This variable identifies the interruptee (or the 'original speaker') and corresponds with the individual subject ID that the speakers are identified by in the transcripts. It is vital to properly match the IDs from the list of interruptions with the actual group participants to make sure that you are coding the correct exchange.

1.4 Interrupter ID (computer coded)

This variable identifies the interrupter and corresponds with the individual subject ID that the speakers are identified by in the transcripts. It is vital to properly match the IDs from the list of interruptions with the actual group participants to make sure that you are coding the correct exchange.

1.5 Interruption Start Time (computer coded)

This variable is the time in each group when a specific interruption begins. It is generated automatically by the VBA program and is listed in the Excel file to help you locate the part of the conversation that needs to be coded. As mentioned above, the time should correspond precisely with the audio file but may be slightly different from the timestamps in the transcripts.

1.6 Interruption End Time (computer coded)

This variable is the time in each group when a specific interruption ends. It is generated automatically by the VBA program and is listed in the Excel file to help you locate the part of the audio file, but may be slightly different than the timestamps in the transcripts.

1.7 Interruption Duration (computer coded)

This variable is a number generated by the VBA program that roughly corresponds to the length of the interruptive instance that you are assessing. The 'duration' variable isn't particularly accurate - it does not record the length of overlapping speech nor does it record the duration of the interruptive speaking turn.

Rather, the duration time should be used as a 'window': if an interruption of A by B is flagged at 3:23 for a duration of 16 seconds, coders should evaluate 3:23-3:39 to see if anywhere in that window an interruption of A by B occurs.

- If so, then the interruption should be verified and coded
- If more than one such interruption fits the bill in the "window", then the first valid

instance should be the one that is coded; the rest can be ignored (unless they are flagged separate by the computer).

1.8 Interruption Gender (computer coded)

This variable records the gender of the interruptee/interrupter. It should be coded as:

1: If a man interrupts a woman.
2: If a man interrupts a man.
3: If a woman interrupts a woman.
4: If a woman interrupts a man.

1.9 Interruption Verification

The first task of the human coders is determining whether or not the speaking exchange is an interruption. If it is determined to be a valid interruption, then coding continues. If not, it's marked as spurious and coding ceases after this variable. This verification step was conducted separately and before the following coding.

An utterance is an interruption if it is an intelligible word or words. Sounds or unintelligible word(s) are not interruptions. For example, “yeah”, “yep”, “sure”, “okay”, are all words that count; “hmm” or “uhhuh” and other similar interjections are sounds and do not count. Laughter, mic rumbling, buzzes and other sounds that the computer cannot discern from speech should be coded as not an interruption. Furthermore, to be an interruption the utterance must overlap with either the interruptee's speech or come at the end of an incomplete clause (a period could not properly be put at the end of the interrupted utterance).

- If the original speaker has clearly finished speaking before the second speaker begins and there was not an interruption, then it should not be coded as an interruption.

- If it sounds like both speakers started speaking at exactly the same instant (simultaneous speech), then it should not be coded as an interruption.

- They must start talking at exactly the same time to not be coded as an interruption.

- Even if it is hard to decipher crosstalk, it is vitally important that you attempt to verify whether or not the computer has accurately identified an interruption. We have removed the separate crosstalk code, so please make every effort to untangle the conversations.

- There are instances of 'interruptions' that sound less like somebody interrupting/speaking over another person and more like the 2nd speaker agreeing/encouraging the original speaker to continue. These are often referred to as “back-channel communications” (For our purposes, please code these as though they were interruptive. Most likely, they will be positive/negative/neutral without elaboration).

- What if there is an interruption of A by B but the computer flagged an interruption of B by A?

    - If the speakers involved in an interruption flagged by the computer don’t seem to

match, then it should be 'not verified' and coding for that row should cease.

- Examples of clause/overlap requirement:

  - If the interruptee finishes with a complete clause (a period could be proper punctuation) and the interrupter does not speak over him or her (there is no overlap of words), it is not an interruption.
  - If the interruptee finishes with a complete clause (a period could be proper punctuation) and the interrupter does speak over him or her (their words overlap), it is an interruption.
  - If the interruptee does not finish a complete clause (a period would be improper) and the interrupter does or does not speak over him or her (their words may or may not overlap), it is an interruption.

The valid codes for this variable are:

0: No audible words and/or no interruption occurs. This is the general code for 'no interruption' and should be used if there is no audible interjection, only an unintelligible sound can be heard, or - as a last resort - if it is impossible to sort out crosstalk.

1: Interruption occurs.

If words have been spoken but it is impossible to determine what has been said, then the instance should be coded as missing data with a period (.) and the following variables should be left blank. If one of the speakers is actually the moderator, then this should also be coded as missing data (.).

2.9 Disposition of Interruption: Positive, Negative, or Neutral

Disposition consists of a set of dummy variables, coded 0 or 1, that are not mutually exclusive. In other words, all three of the disposition dummies may be coded as present (marked as 1) for a single interruption. That said, at least one of the three categories (positive, negative, or neutral) must be coded as a 1; all three may not be 0 simultaneously. An affirmative mark in the neutral category should be used sparingly, only when an interruption cannot be plausibly construed as positive or negative. When any dummy is coded as 1 (signifying the presence of positive, negative, and/or neutral feedback), then the elaboration dummies must be coded as either 1 (there is elaboration) or 0 (there is no elaboration).

- An elaboration requires, at a minimum, a phrase - a small group of words standing together as a conceptual unit - that is more than simply echoing or repeating what has been said in the interrupted turn. Examples include an idea, consideration, thought, other information that was not in the immediately previous speaking turn. This new information could be making explicit thoughts or concepts that are implicit in the previous statement. Elaborated content is not necessarily an elaboration of the particular disposition; it can be an elaboration of some other thought that is not part of the initial positive or negative reaction.

- If the statement merely offers a general evaluation or agreement/disagreement, then it is not elaboration. A statement is not an elaboration merely because it uses many words;

it could include many phrases of general agreement but it would still be general and thus not elaboration.

- An unelaborated interruption is one that only offers a general statement, opinion or evaluation, and does not include any specific thoughts, considerations, or examples not already uttered by the interruptee. If it is a general statement of opinion, agreement, and/or disagreement, then it is coded as unelaborated.

Note: The coding decisions regarding disposition and elaboration are not made based on the one speaking turn of the interruption as well as a few of the immediately preceding speaking turns. Disposition should be clarified by reviewing the prior few turns, e.g.:

Greg: But they need to live.
Ally: So…
Greg: They need to have…
Andrew: [interposing] just enough to get by.

Andrew is completing Greg's thought, hence Andrew's interruption is positive; Andrew's point that people need just enough to get by is in line with Greg's pre-interruption turn. Reviewing that pre-interruption turn clarifies the agreement. More disposition examples are provided in the following three sections.

2.9.1 Positive (agreement or support)

1. Simple definition:

   a. Expressing solidarity, affection, or support for the speaker or the speech (Leaper and Ayers 2007).

   b. An interruption that completes the prior speaker's thought in the same direction without disagreement or contradiction.
      i. Answering the prior speaker's question does not count as completing the prior speaker's thought per se. See the definition of neutral below.
      ii. Disposition should be determined according to the rules and examples in this document only.

2. Guidelines and examples:

   a. Phrases may begin with: "I know," "I agree," "That's right," or "I think X is a good/tremendous/fantastic/excellent idea" after a prior speaker suggested X (Stromer-Galley 2007). For example:
      i. This would be coded as positive with elaboration.
         0:01:58 CHRIS, C: I actually thought about this a little bit. It should be high enough to support a person, but low enough that it's uncomfortable-
         0:02:09 PAUL, D: [Interposing] Right, so that they don't just sit there.
      ii. This would be coded as positive without elaboration.
         0:02:12 JAN, A: –feel like they have to sit there - -

0:02:12 BARBARA, C: [Interposing] I agree.

iii. This would be coded as positive without elaboration.

0:03:57 JUSTIN, A: So yeah, it's low enough to be uncomfortable but enough where they might want to say maybe I should get a part-time job - -
0:04:05 VINCE, E: Yeah.
0:04:05 JUSTIN, A: –or try to get some other type of social welfare program.

b. Alternatively, an interruption that completes the prior speaker's thought may be coded as positive even if it does not include an encouraging phrase or explicit agreement. For example:

i. Wayne and Jason clearly agree here about redistribution, and this would be coded as positive with elaboration.

0:20:00 WAYNE, B: Well let's take the other opposite though. What if you have a whole bunch of rich people? Who thinks that like Bill Gates who has tons and tons of money and that we should just redistribute some of his wealth because he has way too much?
0:20:11 JASON, A: I kind of do. Like to tell you the truth. I mean - -
0:20:13 WAYNE, B: [interposing] He has more money than anybody.

ii. Again, this is coded as positive with elaboration. Becka extends/completes Aaron's thought - this is clear because Aaron then repeats what Becka said before he stops speaking, but even if he doesn't do so, Becka is providing a logical completion to Aaron's thought.

0:26:09 AARON, C: All those inventors that did hit a lucky break, they still had to - -
0:26:12 BECKA, B: [interposing] Worked hard.
0:26:12 AARON, C: They worked and they failed millions of times.

c. Additionally, there may be an occasional brief interjection like "Okay", "Go ahead", or other similar phrases that are a part of conversational flows and sustain the conversation, but contain no evaluation. These may be coded as positive. Transitional words or phrases, like "yeah" or "alright," are inherently positive and should be coded accordingly - the neutral category is only for utterances that do not have a positive or negative disposition.

d. However, an interruption could begin with an apparent agreement but move quickly to disagreement, by saying something like, "I agree with that, but…" or "That makes sense, though…" or "yeah, but…" Because this has both positive and negative elements, this counts as an agreement and it also counts as a disagreement. The turn should be coded as a "1" on each of those two categories. (See more on negative disposition below.)

2.9.2 Negative (disagreement)

1. Simple definition:

a. Expresses disapproval of speaker or speech, criticism, or some other form of disagreement (Leaper and Ayers 2007), or makes a point that conflicts with an

interruptee's point, or completely ignores the content of the interrupted turn. It is negative if it includes a thought that "makes light of, or minimizes" or completely ignores the prior speech. A negative code does not require a detailed thought; it could just be unelaborated disagreement (e.g., "I don't think so", "No", "But what if").

b. If the interruption clearly fails to address any aspect of the interrupted turn, it is negative. It is negative if it changes the topic without expressing understanding of the previous turn; does not use acknowledgment cues; and does not refer to prior turn in any way, implicit or explicit.

2. Guidelines and examples:

a. A negative interruption may begin the turn with a word or phrase indicating opposition or negation of prior speech: "well", "but", "however", "although", "though", "not", "I sort of disagree", "I'm not sure about that", "I don't know", "That's not right" or other similar interjections. (Adapted from Stromer-Galley 2007). For example:

i. The following interruption is a disagreement without elaboration:

00:19:56 BRENTON, A: Yes. The dollars is going so far down.
00:19:58 ALFREDO, B: [interposing] But the-

That is, starting the turn with "But" and not adding content that clearly agrees with the interruptee counts as negative.

ii. This would be coded as negative with elaboration because the second speaker disagrees with what the first speaker has suggested and offers an alternative perspective.

0:04:21 FRANK, E: Well for the sake of the project, I think, I think they're going to like give us money like not just in our situation, like where we're greedy college students, but like depending on how we-
0:04:33 ROBERT, C: [Interposing] I don't know. I just think they probably thought ahead far enough on this in that if we're all trying to go for the same exact amount of money, split it evenly…

b. Not all speaking turns that begin with "No" or another similar term will be coded as negative. It is possible that expressing disagreement is, in fact, a way of correcting a misconception that there is disagreement. For example, "No, I'm saying that I like your proposal." Watch carefully for double negatives, and be mindful of considering the immediate context of the individual words.

c. Alternatively, a negative interruption could begin with an apparent agreement but move quickly to disagreement, by saying something like, "I agree with that, but" or "That makes sense, though" or "yeah, but" Because this has both positive and negative elements, this counts as an agreement and it also counts as a disagreement. The turn should be coded as a 1 on each of those two categories.

d. If the interruption makes a statement that implicitly or explicitly conflicts with a points made in the interrupted turn it is negative.

e. If it ignores it by addressing a prior speaker (not the interrupted speaker), it is negative – even if the interrupted and the interruptee have just been on the same side of the issue.
Eg:

A: We're not deliberating mercy.
B: It's part of society though.
C: But we're…that's…

Here C is addressing A while interrupting B and in the process C is ignoring B's content. Therefore C's interruption is negative toward B. Here we ignore the fact that C and B have been arguing on the same side of the issue against A. Even though B and C are allies until this point in the discussion, C is ignoring B's content and this makes C a negative interrupter in this particular exchange.

2.9.3 Neutral

1. Definition: An interjection that does not have agreement or disagreement content or a positive/negative tone.

2. Guidelines:

   a. This variable should be coded positively only if there is no plausible way to code it as positive or negative while following the guidelines for those variables. In particular, interruptions that seem neutral in substance may be positive or negative based on the few turns immediately preceding the interrupted turn. Our emphasis is on capturing positive and negative interruptions - it is that distinction that we are primarily interested in. Accordingly, though we recognize that sometimes an interruption is neither, we encourage you to see the neutral category as one to be used sparingly. That said, if the interruption is simply not positive nor negative even implicitly, then it is neutral.

   b. Examples:
      i. When interrupter complies with interruptee's request to provide input, or answers a non-rhetorical question the interruptee posed, this is neutral. We distinguish here between rhetorical questions that express an opinion in the form of a question versus questions that solicit input from the group or a member. Only a non-rhetorical question counts here as neutral. It is neutral even if the content of the interrupting utterance disagrees or agrees with what interruptee said in pre-interrupted turns. However, if the content of the interruption disagrees with some point articulated by interruptee during the interrupted turn then the interruption is not neutral but negative. By the same token, if the interruption agrees with a point articulated during the interrupted turn, then the interruption is not neutral but positive.
      ii. E.g. below, A and B disagreed in the immediately preceding turns but in this exchange A interrupts B while B is soliciting clarification from A, so A is providing input that B solicits; therefore, A's interruption is

neutral.

A: Is it the government's job to force people to be nice to each other?

B: How would, like what do you mean? How would they force…

A: [interposing] I mean, is it the government's job to force all the people that are good at what they do, to give up half their money to make sure the people that don't have money can have some.

iii. The following are rhetorical because it does not invite a reply, so does not count as soliciting input from the group or a member:

A: Is it the government's job to force people to be nice to each other?

A: If you don't even have a college within thousands of miles of your house, how would you ever consider going to college?

iv. The following are non-rhetorical because it directly solicits an opinion or clarification of a statement or asks for concrete information:

A: How would, like what do you mean?

A: Anyways, Tom?

A: what do we think?

A: so what is the vote on?

c. In these examples the speaker is directly and explicitly asking a member of the group to clarify an opinion or statement, or to provide an opinion, or asking non-directly for concrete information or to clarify the group's procedure.

d. You might need to look at the immediately preceding turns to determine if a question is rhetorical. Many neutral interruptions will ask a question (or repeat a phrase) for clarification or explanation of what was just interrupted. Do not count as neutral questions of something said before the interrupted turn, or questions that offer an opinion of their own, or questions that are subtly critical or subtly supportive. Not all questions are neutral; if there is an evaluative element (either positive or negative) in the question, then the direction of the evaluation should be noted and the interruption coded as positive or negative rather than as neutral. Note that an interrupting turn may include more than one type of question. If it includes a rhetorical question and a soliciting question code the turn as neutral for the soliciting question and also code the turn as positive/negative for the rhetorical question.

e. Interruptions too incomplete to convey positive or negative may be neutral. For example, "I would say" does not provide enough content to count as either positive or negative and should be coded as neutral. However, some interruptions are very brief yet clearly negative ("But") or clearly positive ("Yeah").

2.9.4 Complex Examples

Some interruptions will be coded as a yes for more than one of the positive/negative/neutral options. This section provides some examples that would fall into this category.

Examples:

1. Positive and Negative, elaboration for both:

> TODD, A: So, I support the floor constraint even though it's a tax. I guess I'm saying that taxes aren't necessarily bad - -
> KATIE, C: Right, some taxes are necessary to keep us safe, but I don't think we should subsidize people who aren't making any effort on their own.

This interruption would be coded as positive because Katie agrees that some taxation is OK because of safety concerns but disagrees with the premise that a floor constraint (supported by taxes) is a good idea. In both parts, Katie clearly adds new information, making both elaboration codes 1.

2. Positive and Negative, only negative elaboration

> 0:19:59 JULIA, D: So my point is that you should have enough money for food and housing and for education and that to make this - -
> 0:20:04 BRIAN, A: Right, but I'm saying that the right way to achieve this isn't cutting everybody a $20,000 check.

Again, this is coded as both positive and negative because there is a mix of agreement and disagreement. There is no elaboration on the positive side, but there is elaboration on the negative side.

2.10 Sentence Completion: Interrupter & Sentence Completion: Interruptee

These two variables are three categories, 0 for incomplete, 1 for complete, and 9 for unclear if complete or incomplete. Your task is to determine whether each speaker - the interruptee and the interrupter - manages to finish a complete grammatical sentence, meaning their utterance could be appropriately punctuated with a period or a question mark:

- If you were a copy editor and had to decide whether to insert 1) a period or question mark vs. 2) a comma or nothing, and you choose 1) rather than 2), then the sentence is complete.

- Repeating one's own prior words verbatim during a turn does not decide this code for the interruptee or interrupter. Also irrelevant is the overall length of the turn – if the interruptee or interrupter clearly completes his/her sentence, no matter how long or short, the appropriate variable should be coded as a 1.

- If it is not clear - e.g., the sentence trails off and you cannot tell what was actually said – then code as 9. The 9 is to be used sparingly - use it if you cannot tell what is said after 3 attempts to listen. Code the sentence as complete if it shows up as complete in the transcript even if you can't hear the completion.

- If either party clearly fails to complete her/his sentence, then the appropriate code is 0. Do not code the contributions of any third parties. The sentences do not need to be completed during the interruption window - look at the target speaking turns and not the window for sentence completion. However, the conditions for sentence completion differ between the interruptee and the interrupter; details are below.

2.10.1 Sentence Completion Definitions

1. The interruptee has two speaking turns to consider: the turn that is interrupted and the first speaking turn that the interruptee takes following the interruption. If the interruptee finishes the turn that is interrupted with a complete grammatical sentence as defined above, then he or she is coded 1. If the interruptee does not finish the turn that is interrupted with a complete grammatical sentence but his or her next speaking turn completes the cut-off sentence, then SC interruptee is coded 1. A clear instance of this is when the first utterance of the second turn can be joined with the cut-off utterance from the speaker's prior turn to form a complete grammatical sentence. The code is not affected when the second turn repeats any of the cut off utterance; if the second utterance can be joined with the cut off utterance once the repetition is set aside, the code is 1. The code is 1 even if the second turn contains words that do not complete the cut off sentence as long as the cut-off sentence is grammatically complete at some point during the second turn. The code is 1 even if the second turn does not end with a complete grammatical sentence. If the above does not hold then the interruptee SC is coded 0.

2. The interrupter has one speaking turn, the interruption only, to complete his or her last spoken sentence. If the interrupter finishes his or her last sentence by the grammatical criteria of sentence completion explained above, i.e. one can put a period or question mark on it by the rules of grammar, then the code is 1. If the interrupter does not finish his or her last sentence, then the code is 0. This is the correct code, even if the interrupter completed one or more complete sentences previous to the end of his or her speaking turn.

3. Clarifications

   - What if both interrupter and interruptee finish their comments? You can code them both positively.

   - What if both people audibly finish, but one of them clearly speaks more loudly than the other? If the completion is audible to you, then code it as if both parties spoke at an equal volume. Do not attempt to determine who held the group's attention.

   - What if you cannot hear well but the transcript shows a complete sentence? Then code according to the transcript.

   - What if a burst of laughter drowns out everyone and effectively resets the conversation? If this happens, then sentence completion should be coded as missing (.).

2.10.2 Sentence Completion Examples

1. A complete thought is not necessarily a complete grammatical sentence Eg:
   A: A person needs $20,000 to live on?
   B: What state?

"What state" is not grammatically complete and thus does not count as a complete sentence.

2. Another example:

> COURTNEY, D: Yeah. But I mean if you're setting something for the whole - -
> CONRAD, E: [interposing] Yeah.
> COURTNEY, D: - - United States you're going to have to pick something that's going to be higher for-more comfortable for some and less comfortable for others.

This would be coded as 1 for both interrupter and interruptee. The interrupter (Conrad) completes his sentence even though it is only a single-word interjection and Courtney's second utterance grammatically completes her cut-off utterance - the cut off and following utterances can be grammatically joined.

3. Another example:

> JULIA, D: Yeah. And I, I don't think it should be handouts I think ideally it'd be like education, important things that would give the opportunities so that they could make more someday. So instead - -
> BESS, C: [interposing] I agree with that but I - -
> JULIA, D: - - we need a little, but not a lot 'cause education's a lot cheaper than $20,000 a family so but I mean we'll bend but I, I would go 20.

The completion variables would be coded as a 0 for Interrupter but as a 1 for Interruptee. Bess fails to finish her sentence - one cannot put a period or question mark at the end of it by the rules of grammar. Julia's cut off utterance is joined with her second utterance to form a grammatically complete sentence.

4. An example of a complete sentence by interruptee (and incomplete by interrupter) that contains extraneous words before completion:

> A: They need to have
> B: just enough to get by, not to
> A: yeah, they need to have food, shelter

Here A completes her cut off sentence in the second turn despite inserting "yeah" before the completion (and despite repeating part of her cut-off utterance). Setting aside the extraneous words preceding the completion (the "yeah"), and the repetition ("they need to have") the second turn provides the missing part of the cut off sentence. That counts as code 1 for interruptee's SC.

5. An example of an incomplete sentence by interruptee and by interrupter:

> A: They need to have…
> B: just enough to get by, not to
> A: yeah, they need to have…we don't want people to starve.

Here A's second turn is a complete grammatical sentence on its own, but that does not decide the code. A's second turn does not form a complete grammatical sentence when joined with

the cut off utterance even after setting aside extraneous or repeating words. A's cut off utterance is never completed grammatically even when A resumes the floor in the second turn. Although it is tempting to code A's second turn as completing A's cut off utterance, that is because it completes A's thought about what people need. But despite completing A's thought, A's second turn does not complete A's cut off sentence so the code for SC interruptee is 0.

6. Example of incomplete sentence by interruptee:

A: We should vote for option 3.

B: so, yeah

A sentence that starts with "so" implies that a thought is coming but none is provided beyond a too-vague "yeah". However, an utterance consisting only of "yeah" is a complete sentence.

G Examples of Each Type of Interruption

Positive Without elaboration:

> E: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -
> B: [interposing] That's ideal.
> E: - - citizens have a safety net to fall into.

Positive With elaboration:

> A: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -
> B: [interposing] That's great - I really like the idea of setting a floor so that we ensure that nobody falls below a certain income level.

Negative Without elaboration:

> E: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -
> B: [interposing] Well, not necessarily.
> E: - - citizens have a safety net to fall into.

Negative With elaboration:

> E: So, I think the key here is to establish some kind of sharing so that the poor - -
> B: [interposing] Well, not necessarily since it's so hard to set a limit on who is poor.
> E: - - citizens have a safety net to fall into.

Neutral without elaboration

> A: it doesn't really matter if all of us worked as hard as we possibly could it wouldn't change the amount of dollars in the market. And one of us would get zero.
> B: [interposing] I think - -

Neutral with elaboration:

> A: Basically just because I want to get as much money as possible.
> B: [interposing] Do you mean out of this, tonight?

Interruptee and Interrupter Complete:

> A: Yeah. But I mean if you're setting something for the whole - -
> B: [interposing] Yeah.
> A: - - United States you're going to have to pick something that's going to be higher for-

more comfortable for some and less comfortable for others.

Interruptee and Interrupter Incomplete:

A: They need to have - -
B: [interposing] Just enough to get by, not to . . .
A: yeah, they just . . .

Interruptee Complete and Interrupter Incomplete:

A: Yeah. And I, I don't think it should be handouts I think ideally it'd be like education, important things that would give the opportunities so that they could make more someday. So instead - -
B: [interposing] I agree with that but I - -
A: - - we need a little, but not a lot 'cause education's a lot cheaper than $20,000 a family so but I mean we'll bend but I, I would go 20.

Interruptee Incomplete and Interrupter Complete:

A: But I mean you look at the range constraint and it doesn't help the poor person at all. And you just keep that, that-
B: I think these are supposed to be like examples of extremes, like where it could go wrong, where like the floor constraint really does hurt the high person the most.

Complex Examples

Negative Starts with Positive Disposition: Expressing disagreement can be a way of correcting a misconception that there is disagreement. For example, "No, I'm saying that I like your proposal." Or, a speaker posing a sarcastic rhetorical question met with an expected "no" response:
0:25:08 A: Well, I don't think it's going to hurt rich people that much like between 28 and $30,000. Is that really going to make much of a difference?
0:25:14 C: No. No, that probably wouldn't make much of a difference.

Statements with Positive and Negative Dispositions: A statement might include an apparent agreement but move quickly to disagreement, by saying something like: "I agree with that, but. . . ." Because this has both positive and negative elements, this counts as a positive and it also counts as a negative. The turn is coded as a "1" on each of those two categories.

H Participant Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics

Table H1: Demographic Characteristics of Participants

Variable	Question Text or Explanation	Response Options	N	Mean	St. Dev	Range
Age	Age of subjects	--	467	27.63	11.71	18-78
Income	Expected annual family income during year of study participation.	1. Under $25,000 2. $25,000 - $39,000 3. $40,000 - $54,999 4. $55,000 - $69,999 5. $70,000-$84,999 6. $85,000 - $99,999 7. $100,000 - $114,999 8. $115,000-$129,999 9. $130,000-$144,999 10. $145,000-$160,000 11. Over $160,000	466	4.12	3.31	1-11
Education	Highest level of schooling completed.	1. Some high school 2. High school diploma or equivalent 3. Some college 4. Technical or Associates degree 5. Bachelor's degree 6. Graduate degree	466	3.79	1.16	1-6
Female	Self-reported gender	0. Male 1. Female	470	0.49	0.50	0-1
Partisanship	Self-reported party identification: "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be an …"	1. Strong Democrat 2. Weak Democrat 3. Ind. leaning Democrat 4. Independent/Other/DK 5. Ind. Leaning Republican 6. Weak Republican 7. Strong Republican	433	4.39	2.01	1-7
Experimental Location	Site of Experimental Session	0. Western Site (n=230) 1. Eastern Site (n=240)	470	0.51	0.50	0-1

Table H2: Descriptive Statistics (question wordings for egalitarianism follow)

Variable	Explanation	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range
Proportion Talk	Proportion of group talk time for each individual.	--	470	.20	.11	0.01-0.58
Speaking Turns	Subject's number of speaking turns.	--	470	41.2	28.8	1-157
Egalitarianism	9-item index (alpha reliability coefficient=.73) created from questions measuring agreement with statements about egalitarianism (see below).	0 - low egalitarianism 1 - high egalitarianism	470	.51	.18	0-.97
Influence (Own Vote Excluded)	"Who was the most influential member of your group during the group discussion? (Indicate using the letter on the nameplate in front of the group members.)" [A, B, C, D, E]	Number of votes subject received	470	.83	1.13	0-4
# of Individuals with High Levels of Egalitarianism	# of subjects in group scoring above the midpoint of 0.5 on scale of egalitarianism.	--	64 (mixed-gender groups only)	2.68	1.26	0-5
Individual Liberalism	"On most political matters do you consider yourself to be:"	0 - Strongly conservative .25 - Moderately conservative .5 - Neither, middle of the road .75 - Moderately liberal	470	0.47	0.30	0-1

Variable	Explanation	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range
Number of Liberals in Group	# of subjects in group scoring above the midpoint of 0.5 on liberalism.	--	470	1.83	1.56	0-5

Variable	Explanation	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range
Group Positive Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a positive disposition	Group-level Count	94	19.72	17.84	0-96
Group Elaborated Positive Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a positive disposition and were elaborated	Group-level Count	94	8.17	9.02	0-56
Group Negative Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a negative disposition	Group-level Count	94	11.45	11.55	0-48
Group Elaborated Negative Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a negative disposition and were elaborated	Group-level Count	94	8.98	9.42	0-37
Group Neutral Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a neutral disposition	Group-level Count	94	4.48	5.02	0-28
Group Elaborated Neutral Interruptions	Total number of interruptions in the group that had a neutral disposition and were elaborated	Group-level Count	94	2.36	2.96	0-17
Ratio of women to men receiving positive interruptions	The average proportion of positive interruptions received by the women in the group divided by the average for men	Group-level Count	59	1.06	1.14	0-4.65
Positive Interruptions Received	Total number of positive interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level Count	470	3.95	5.03	0-38

Variable	Explanation	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range
Negative Interruptions Received	Total number of negative interruptions received by each participant	Individual-level Count	470	2.29	3.09	0-17
Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received	Proportion of positive and negative interruptions received that were negative	Individual-level Proportion	393	0.34	0.30	0-1
Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received from Women	Proportion of positive and negative interruptions received from women that were negative	Individual-level Proportion	271	0.35	0.33	0-1
Negative Proportion of Interruptions Received from Men	Proportion of positive and negative interruptions received from men that were negative	Individual-level Proportion	268	0.36	0.34	0-1
Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Positive	Proportion of participant's speaking turns that received a positive interruption	Individual-level Proportion	470	0.09	0.09	0-0.67
Proportion of Speaking Turns Receiving Negative	Proportion of participant's speaking turns that received a negative interruption	Individual-level Proportion	470	0.05	0.05	0-0.29
Elaborated Positive	Proportion of positive interruptions received that were elaborated	Individual-level Proportion	363	0.41	0.33	0-1

Variable	Explanation	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range
Interruptions Received						
Elaborated Positive Interruptions Received from Men	Proportion of positive interruptions received from men that were elaborated	Individual-level Proportion	231	0.40	0.36	0-1
Elaborated Positive Interruptions Received from Women	Proportion of positive interruptions received from women that were elaborated	Individual-level Proportion	242	0.40	0.35	0-1
Confidence Index	Index that combines the next six variables into an index of high vs. low confidence	0 - low confidence 1 - high confidence	470	0.50	0.50	0,1
Articulate	Frustrated by inability to express self	0 Strongly Agree .25 Agree .5 Neutral .75 Disagree 1 Strongly Disagree	470	0.68	0.24	0-1
Relative Confidence	Confidence in ability compared to other people	0 Strongly Disagree .25 Disagree .5 Neutral .75 Agree 1 Strongly Agree	470	0.65	0.21	0-1

Variable	Explanation	Scale Coding	N	Mean	St. Dev	Empirical Range
Confidence in New Tasks	Confidence in ability on new tasks	0 Strongly Disagree .25 Disagree .5 Neutral .75 Agree 1 Strongly Agree	470	0.72	0.20	.25-1
Effective participation in groups	Believe that participant effectively participates in groups on political issues	0 Strongly Disagree .25 Disagree .5 Neutral .75 Agree 1 Strongly Agree	470	0.72	0.20	0-1
Confidence in political issues	Participant feels he/she has good understanding of political issues	0 Strongly Disagree .25 Disagree .5 Neutral .75 Agree 1 Strongly Agree	470	0.64	0.24	0-1
Complexity of political issues	Participant feels sometimes political issues are too complex	0 Strongly Agree .25 Agree .5 Neutral .75 Disagree 1 Strongly Disagree	470	0.61	0.25	0-1

I Sample Deliberation Transcript

Line#	Timecode	Quote
1		**[START TAPE GROUP 1]**
2	00:00:04	MODERATOR: Starting at the A position, can you
3		say your letter and your name?
4	00:00:08	SUBJECT A: My letter is A and my name is WOMAN
5		A.
6	00:00:11	SUBJECT B: B, MAN A.
7	00:00:13	SUBJECT C: C, MAN B.
8	00:00:15	SUBJECT D: D, MAN C.
9	00:00:16	SUBJECT E: E, WOMAN B.
10	00:00:18	MODERATOR: Okay great. You're all - - . All
11		right, and during the discussion, we'll have the
12		principles up here. You'll notice that two of
13		the principles need a dollar number attached to
14		them, so to make the voting easier later on,
15		whenever you guys say a dollar number I'm just
16		going to write it up here on the board, so don't
17		mind me while I do that. Does someone want to
18		start off the discussion by saying which
19		principle they prefer?
20	00:00:43	WOMAN A: Sure, I can do that. I think I prefer
21		the, sorry I forgot the name of it, set a floor
22		constraint because it basically ensures that
23		everyone has enough to get by, and but there's
24		still a lot of incentive to work. If you have to

Line#	Timecode	Quote
25		maximize the floor, then you have a lot of people
26		earning underneath the 80% mark, so they wouldn't
27		have as much incentive to work. Basically,
28		they'd get 80% no matter what they do. So with a
29		set a floor constraint, I think they have
30		basically incentive to breakout of the lower
31		thing, but then they also have incentive to work
32		if you're in the higher income bracket.
33	00:01:22	MAN A: I think that if we were going to go for
34		that structure, the maximize the floor would be
35		better. So I think that the high earners in
36		almost every society wildly out-pace the middle
37		earners, so by setting a maximum floor, you get
38		the mass amount of useless income essentially
39		from the high earners distributed essentially,
40		mostly to the low earners and a little bit to the
41		middle earners, which greatly brings up the
42		average quality of life.
43	00:01:54	MAN C: You mentioned the high earners wild—being
44		outliers, wildly outpacing the average, would it
45		be possible to set a floor constraint and a range
46		constraint to prevent that and it would keep the
47		income levels less toward the middle, that the
48		80% would, but yet it would still set that floor

Line#	Timecode	Quote
49		where everyone could get by and prevent the
50		outliers I think, because of the range
51		constraint.
52	00:02:19	MAN A: But doesn't the range constraint
53		initially apply to the bottom rather than the top
54		according to the rules described.
55	00:02:26	MAN C: The range is the difference between the
56		bottom and the top.
57	00:02:28	MAN A: Right, it's the difference between the
58		bottom and the top, but it initially triggers on
59		the bottom.
60	00:02:34	MAN B: Well, from the average though. So the
61		average is going to be the same on everyone, so
62		it starts from the average to the bottom and then
63		the top, so it shouldn't really matter. I would—
64	00:02:47	MAN A: [interposing] No, it says all the incomes
65		that are too low, that is the range between them
66		and the highest income, would receive—as opposed
67		to taxing from the top, it starts working at how
68		much you need to give to the bottom and then
69		chops off with everything.
70	00:03:01	MAN B: Right, depending on the range that we
71		set.
72	00:03:05	MAN C: Can we do a floor constraint and a range

Line#	Timecode	Quote
73		constraint?
74	00:03:08	MAN A: Which order would we want them to be
75		applied?
76	00:03:09	MODERATOR: For the purposes of this experiment,
77		you have to pick just one constraint.
78	00:03:15	WOMAN A: Okay.
79	00:03:16	WOMAN B: I think that by setting a floor
80		constraint, that will—it increases inflation,
81		that kind of thing, so it basically brings
82		everything back down to zero, setting a floor
83		constraint, it's kind of counterproductive.
84	00:03:28	MAN A: Why is that counterproductive?
85	00:03:30	WOMAN B: Well, if you have a floor constraint,
86		then you have a definite amount that everyone
87		will be earning, so then other things can—other
88		you know, expenses can go up based on that and
89		you just end up paying more for other things.
90	00:03:46	MAN A: We can't increase the total expenses in
91		this society. It's a fixed—there's no economy in
92		this society. We're like farmers, we're just
93		obtaining income arbitrarily. There's no trading
94		going on. We're just getting income and taxing.
95		It's not like the income's coming from somewhere,
96		so inflation is not a worry.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
97	00:04:08	MAN C: Especially if the floor constraint was
98		set very low. If the floor constraint was set
99		very high, that would kind of be like maximizing
100		the floor income and that could maintain
101	00:04:17	MAN A: Well, except that it doesn't penalize the
102		high earners as much. Because maximizing the
103		floor, if everyone earns loads right, a floor
104		constraint may be completely ineffective.
105	00:04:30	MAN B: [interposing] it might not even need to be
106		used.
107	00:04:32	MAN A: [continues] So say we set a floor
108		constraint of $30,000 and everyone earns $60,000
109		or above, it's going to be zero taxation.
110	00:04:43	MAN B: That's assuming that we can—is there—I
111		might have missed it, is there a limit to the
112		amount that the group can make? Is there a
113		ceiling as a group?
114	00:04:53	MAN A: I was under the impression that we can—we
115		each perform independently at the task and
116		obtain.
117	00:04:58	MODERATOR: It's not a zero sum tax, so you're
118		earning [crosstalk].
119	00:05:01	MAN A: So if everyone does well
120		MAN B: (interposing) so if everyone does well.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
121		(continues) and the group can earn more total
122		money.
123	00:05:06	MODERATOR: The general across all people who
124		have done this the distribution looks something
125		like the distribution of America, but you five
126		might be very good at the task - - .
127	00:05:27	MAN A: I feel like maximizing the floor means
128		that—I mean, the high earners are always going to
129		have a very good quality of life, if not a
130		quality of life where the additional income isn't
131		helping, like the fifth or sixth helicopter
132		doesn't make that much difference to quality of
133		life. It's diminishing returns, every subsequent
134		million dollars that you spend on stuff doesn't
135		actually make you that much happier, but towards
136		the lower income, the more you make, the more
137		additional you make, the greater material
138		difference it has on your quality of life.
139	00:06:11	WOMAN A: The problem with maximizing the floor
140		though is that everyone—the rich are going to be
141		very close to the average. It's not like it's
142		going to be the difference between eight
143		helicopters and four helicopters. It's going to
144		be the difference between one helicopter and zero

Line#	Timecode	Quote
145		helicopters.
146	00:06:22	MAN C: And as you mentioned earlier, it would
147		reduce productivity amongst the lowest earners
148		because they would all be artificially bumped up
149		to so much closer to the average as opposed to
150		being—if they're closer to the floor it might
151		encourage them to be more productive.
152	00:06:36	MAN A: But, as-- Well first of all, you don't
153		know if you're going to be a lowest earner until
154		you start earning. And secondly, even as a
155		lowest earner, every penny—so say you've got a
156		task that's really difficult for you, but you
157		know that however hard you work, you're
158		increasing the group's average and essentially
159		you're paying out to yourself more than a rich
160		person is paying out to themselves, so you have
161		if anything, a greater incentive. Like every
162		penny that you make is worth more to you. Do you
163		follow? You get a greater fraction of what you
164		make.
165	00:07:12	MAN B: That's true, but—but when the floor is.
166	00:07:14	MAN A: If you're a low income person, you get
167		like maybe 200% of what you make, so you have a
168		much higher—so that extra $10 at the end is worth

Line#	Timecode	Quote
169		that much to you, right?
170	00:07:25	WOMAN A: Yeah, but then problem is with the
171		higher income people, they know that there's
172		going to be a cap basically on whatever they
173		earn. So like there's—
174	00:07:30	MAN A: There isn't a cap. The more they—
175	00:07:32	WOMAN A: But it's going to go down to.
176	00:07:34	MAN B: They're going to be limited by the group.
177	00:07:35	WOMAN A: Very close to the average.
178	00:07:36	MAN A: Not very close to the average.
179	00:07:38	WOMAN A: If it's an 80% thing it's going to be
180		very close to the average. 80% floor.
181	00:07:41	MAN B: I feel like though with the—
182	00:07:42	MAN A: [interposing] No, if it's spiking
183		outliers for the rich, they still make a lot more
184		money.
185	00:07:48	MAN C: You're right, most people would make more
186		under that scenario, but at the cost of being
187		less productive for society.
188	00:07:55	MAN A: I think that the society as a whole would
189		produce more under a maximize the floor because
190		people—first of all, people have less fear.
191	00:08:07	MAN C: And that's a reason to work harder.
192	00:08:08	MAN A: But everyone has a reason to work harder.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
193		The people who make the most have good reason to
194		work harder because they're at the top, they
195		always have good incentive to work. The people
196		at the bottom have incentive to work because
197		they're—essentially the government is matching
198		them $0.20 on the dollar for what they're making.
199		If anything, it creates a greater incentive for
200		the lowest earners and increases the quality of
201		life for the lowest earners, thus increasing the
202		average happiness of the society as well as the
203		average productivity.
204	00:08:55	MAN B: Just to chime in here, I agree a little
205		bit in part with the max floor. I think setting
206		a floor, we're kind of all in agreement, we want
207		to set a floor, we don't want to have no
208		redistribution, just to keep this moving forward.
209		I think that maximizing the floor isn't really
210		going to be to the group's benefit as much as
211		setting the floor. We don't have to set the
212		floor super low, but just in terms of
213		distributing—it's going to be more closer
214		distributed to our actual performance if we set
215		the floor you know kind of in the middle range
216		without really maximizing it and it's not—

Line#	Timecode	Quote
217	00:09:35	MAN A: [interposing] But we don't know what the
218		average income is going to be, so by maximizing
219		the floor you make every dollar earned below the
220		floor as an increased payout, but by setting a
221		floor once you're near the floor there's no point
222		in working. So say you set the floor of $20K, as
223		long as someone is earning $16K, there's no point
224		in working because their productivity is not
225		contributing to their success. In fact, anyone
226		below a fixed floor has no incentive to do
227		anything, whereas a floor that is a fraction of
228		the society success, everyone has an incentive to
229		work. In fact, the bottom have the most
230		incentive to work harder because they get the
231		most benefit from their extra work.
232	00:10:20	WOMAN A: But they're not going to have a huge
233		impact on the society's average if they're at the
234		bottom.
235		MAN B: Right. (continues) It's the rich that are
236		going to have more of an impact. So, their work.
237	00:10:27	MAN A: But they're going to have a strong
238		impact—there are only five of us, it's a small
239		society.
240	00:10:31	WOMAN A: I guess in this society that might be

Line#	Timecode	Quote
241		more applicable, MAN A: (interposing) They have a
242		strong impact. (continues) but in the larger
243		society it would not have as much of an impact.
244		Are we all in agreement that we want either do
245		set a floor or maximize the floor? Is anyone - -
246	00:10:45	MAN A: [interposing] The other thing that I'm
247		really uncomfortable with about setting a floor
248		is we have no idea how much we're going to make.
249	00:10:52	WOMAN A: He did say we have—we do have some
250		idea. He said that it's going to be somewhat
251		representative of the American household.
252	00:10:57	MAN C: Is there a maximum income level? I think
253		your concern that if we set a floor of $20,000
254		and some people are earning $300 billion, then
255		the maximize the floor is good, but if there's a
256		maximum income level of $300,000 and setting a
257		floor of $20,000 or something - -
258	00:11:20	MAN A: [interposing] Yeah, that was the example I
259		was using.
260	00:11:25	MAN C: [continues] - - is different.
261	00:11:28	MAN A: Well but also—
262	00:11:32	MAN C: My question is, is there a maximum?
263		Income level in this scenario.
264	00:11:33	MODERATOR: Is there a maximum.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
265	00:11:34	MAN B: Is there a maximum income level in this
266		scenario?
267	00:11:39	MODERATOR: There is a theory—
268	00:11:40	MAN A: [interposing] Presumably it's a finite
269		performance task?
270	00:11:41	MODERATOR: Yeah, there is in theory, though it
271		has never been reached.
272	00:11:45	MAN A: Can you plausibly perform perfectly at
273		the task?
274	00:11:49	MODERATOR: In theory. No one has ever done it,
275		but there is a theoretical task that's probably
276		the best thing about it though. In real life
277		there's a theory.
278	00:12:04	MAN C: And that's the way you're thinking about
279		it, that there's no maximum. And that's why you
280		want protect most people by setting the maximum-
281		-
282	00:12:11	MAN B: Well, if you are the top earner, the max
283		floor isn't really going to affect you either
284		way. You're still going to—if you're outpacing
285		the group—
286	00:12:19	MAN A: [interposing] So we agree that either
287		floor—so we're happy with a floor scenario, so
288		it's one or three.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
289	00:12:24	WOMAN A: Are we allowed to maximize the floor
290		not at 80% and something like 70% or something
291		like that?
292	00:12:29	MAN A: Yeah, that's a—
293	00:12:30	MODERATOR: [interposing] Unfortunately, no. It
294		has to be—
295	00:12:32	WOMAN A: It has to be 80%.
296	00:12:34	MAN A: So we agree that we want a floor of some
297		kind, whether it's 80% or a fixed number.
298	00:12:41	MAN B: Right.
299	00:12:42	MAN A: Ideally, we would like something that's
300		not 80%, so if we can estimate what 70% is, but I
301		guess that doesn't create the same incentive at
302		the bottom level. So do we agree that the people
303		earning the most probably don't care about the
304		difference between these two systems? They
305		affect them roughly similarly, except that they
306		might make more under maximizing the floor
307		because the low income people are more likely to
308		work more.
309	00:13:06	MAN B: [interposing] Assuming the low income
310		people would step it up-right-respond to it.
311	00:13:09	MAN A: Would respond to it, right, but in our
312		society I think it's clear that the low income

Line#	Timecode	Quote
313		people all know that they have a lot to gain by
314		working.
315	00:13:19	MAN B: Well right, but the other thing is though
316		that we're all starting on equal ground here.
317		There isn't a social structure to this group, so
318		we're not starting like someone with no
319		education, you know.
320	00:13:32	MAN A: Well, that's what I'm saying. Amongst
321		us, the low income person or the low income
322		people will know that they have little incentive
323		to do better under a fixed floor, but a strong
324		incentive to do better under a maximized floor.
325	00:13:52	MAN B: So, it almost sounds like we just need to
326		decide what the floor would be, so it wouldn't be
327		maximizing the floor.
328	00:13:58	MAN A: Well, except that if we set a fixed floor
329		and after the first round of work everyone—so
330		there are three rounds of work right. After the
331		first round of work, everyone knows how much
332		they're making. If you're making 80% of the
333		floor, why bother working, of the fixed floor.
334	00:14:12	WOMAN A: Well, you could make, if you're making
335		80% of the fixed floor, then you're not that far
336		from making the average and going above the

Line#	Timecode	Quote
337		average. So-
338	00:14:20	MAN C: I think the problem with maximizing the
339		floor income is that it creates a huge number of
340		people who don't have to do anything and they'll
341		make 80% of the average income.
342		MAN B: The average might be lower, but they'll
343		still make 80% relatively.
344		MAN C: 80% is still pretty close.
345	00:14:36	MAN A: The more they do, the more 80% of the
346		average is. That's the thing, because the
347		average earning is linked to each individual's
348		earning, whereas a fixed constraint is not linked
349		to the individual.
350	00:14:47	WOMAN A: But then they only get one-fifth—if
351		it's a group of five, they only get one-fifth of
352		what they earn and one-fifth isn't that big of an
353		incentive. At least.
354	00:14:55	MAN A: I'm sorry?
355	00:14:56	WOMAN A: Okay, since there are five of us
356		working, the average would basically be divided
357		by five, so for every basically dollar that they
358		earn they only see one-fifth of it.
359	00:15:08	MAN A: Not if they're below the—if they're
360		earning below 80% of the average, they're earning

Line#	Timecode	Quote
361		significantly more than one-fifth bonus on the
362		dollar. They're making more than $.20 on the
363		dollar in benefit from taxes.
364	00:15:24	WOMAN A: No, because the average would only go
365		up by one-fifth.
366	00:15:29	MAN A: Right, but they get a better payment from
367		it, because of the difference.
368	00:15:36	MAN C: I think maybe we should get the
369		correlation between standard of living and
370		productivity. I don't want to—I wouldn't want to
371		make more people less productive because I think
372		it could lower the standard of living on the
373		society as a whole. Productivity is a good thing
374		and maximizing the floor to where everyone is
375		making 80% of the average, discourages
376		productivity.
377	00:16:01	MAN A: I think it encourages productivity
378		because if you're making less than the floor,
379		which is a function of the group productivity,
380		every bit of extra that your marginal
381		productivity has X reward for you. You're making
382		more than you're working towards right.
383	00:16:26	MAN B: But, and assuming there's no limit in
384		this society to what you can make, the high

Line#	Timecode	Quote
385		earners are still going to make the high amount
386		and you could theoretically just sit back and
387		say, I'm not really going to try at this because
388		the super rich are still going to make the most.
389	00:16:44	MAN A: Do we think that one person is going to
390		have like 80% of the wealth?
391	00:16:51	MAN B: No, but the majority of the wealth could
392		go to one person if it is kind of reflective of—
393	00:16:58	MAN A: [interposing] But we're in competition
394		with each other, so if one person does well,
395		other people don't do badly.
396	00:17:05	MAN B: No.
397	00:17:06	MAN A: It's just a fixed task.
398	00:17:08	MAN B: Right.
399	00:17:08	MAN A: So, the person making the most is still
400		going to be making the most. They're going to
401		have every bit of extra work that they do won't
402		be a huge extra consideration to them, but every
403		piece of extra work that the low earners do will
404		be a huge consideration because I still think
405		that having a floor that's linked to the average,
406		incentivizes those below the floor more than it
407		incentivizes them if you just had a fixed floor.
408	00:17:44	WOMAN A: I don't think it has that much of an

Line#	Timecode	Quote
409		incentive. Basically, say you're well below the
410		80% of the thing, you make an additional $10
411		right, so the average of the group goes up $2 and
412		you're making 80%, so you only get $1.60 more
413		when you actually made $10. So I don't see that
414		as a huge incentive. I don't see increasing the
415		average a huge incentive because it doesn't
416		increase the average that much based on what you
417		do.
418	00:18:08	MAN A: But—
419	00:18:09	MAN C: I think there's less incentive to work
420		harder if you're guaranteed to make 80% of the
421		average.
422	00:18:13	WOMAN A: If you have the possibility of breaking
423		out of the set floor. You have an easier way of
424		breaking out of the floor constraint, then I
425		think you have more of an incentive to work
426		harder.
427	00:18:27	MAN A: But if you break just above a floor
428		constraint, you're not—you're getting taxed on
429		that above income. Whereas the harder you—the
430		average earner goes up—you're unlikely to mess up
431		and make your additional work be less valuable to
432		you, whereas if you're working with an average

Line#	Timecode	Quote
433		that's—sorry-a floor that's tied to the average,
434		if you're a low earner you're almost certainly
435		going to be making 20% at least extra on the
436		dollar, that's a lot of money. Twenty percent on
437		the dollar, if you got a 20% raise at work that's
438		a lot of money. I think that's a really strong
439		incentive to work hard.
440	00:19:23	WOMAN A: If we do set a floor constraint though
441		what does everyone think a fair floor constraint
442		would be based on the—
443	00:19:28	MAN C: It's hard to say without knowing what the
444		maximum income could be, but do you—
445	00:19:33	MAN A: [interposing] I really want to know what
446		the average is.
447	00:19:35	MAN C: Okay.
448		WOMAN A: I mean the average in American society--
449	00:19:37	MAN B: It sounds like the average is going to be
450		whatever we make it.
451	00:19:40	WOMAN A: How much is it in the U.S, $40-50,000?
452	00:19:44	MAN A: I have no idea.
453	00:19:46	MAN B: I think it's lower than that.
454	00:19:48	MAN C: The median is probably around $40,000 I
455		think. The mean is higher.
456	00:19:55	MAN B: Well, if we assume it's $40,000, should

Line#	Timecode	Quote
457		we just I guess get into the discussion
458		hypothetically based off the U.S., just amounts?
459		So, if it was $40,000 and we were to maximize the
460		floor that would put it at—$32.
461	00:20:11	WOMAN A: $32,000.
462	00:20:12	MAN B, C $32,000 would be the minimum right.
463	00:20:15	MAN C: You said 80%, but we were talking about
464		if we wanted to use 60%.
465	00:20:18	MAN B: So maxing the floor would make it
466		$32,000, but if were to set it at 60% that would
467		be $24,000.
468	00:20:34	MAN A: Umm, what about setting a range
469		constraint to zero?
470	00:20:37	MAN C: That's socialism.
471		MAN B: Yeah, no one.
472	00:20:38	WOMAN A: Yeah, no one has no incentive to do
473		anything.
474		MAN C: That's—that'd be—you're going to make the
475		same as everyone and there's no incentive to do
476		anything, except what the government tells you.
477	00:20:48	MAN A: But you're going to make the same as
478		everyone, but however much you work, you make
479		everyone get more money.
480	00:20:57	MAN B: That's assuming that everyone has the

Line#	Timecode	Quote
481		intention to do that, but I don't—
482	00:21:02	MAN A: [interposing] But everyone wants to make
483		as much money as they can.
484	00:21:02	MAN B: Not everyone has the ability to do that.
485	00:21:04	WOMAN A: But your work is five times more
486		meaningless if everyone makes the same money.
487	00:21:11	MAN A: I don't think it's meaningless. You're
488		still making money for yourself.
489		WOMAN A: It means five times less-it means five
490		times less.
491	00:21:17	MAN C: You mentioned that you wanted people to
492		have incentives, if there's not going to be an
493		increase in their income, there's no incentive to
494		work harder or innovate.
495	00:21:29	MAN A: I feel like there's still—
496	00:21:30	MAN C: [interposing] No financial incentive.
497	00:21:31	MAN A: I feel like you're discounting people's
498		ability, especially in a small society to see the
499		outcome of their increased productivity through
500		the taxing.
501	00:21:45	MAN B: But there will always be people with that
502		opinion though. If the three of us in this
503		discussion could bring up that point, then I
504		think that's enough of a representation.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
505	00:21:55	MAN A: Yeah, but you don't have to act like it.
506	00:21:56	MAN B: [interposing] I don't know that I
507		personally would act that way, but there's a
508		chance that that would happen and if only one of
509		us did, that's still 20%.
510	00:22:06	MAN A: But why base the perception on this
511		possible malicious lazy person in your society—
512	00:22:11	MAN B: [interposing] It doesn't even have to be
513		lazy. What if the tasks were assigned, someone
514		just can't wrap their head around it?
515	00:22:17	MAN A: But they're still going to try as hard as
516		they can. They're going to do the best-
517	00:22:19	WOMAN B: Well, even if they try as hard as they
518		can, that doesn't necessarily mean that they're
519		going to be able to earn as much as a person who
520		earns the highest.
521	00:22:27	MAN B: Right.
522	00:22:28	MAN A: And? That's the whole point of the
523		distribution of wealth.
524	00:22:33	WOMAN B: But if we have a range of zero, if you
525		can't make as much as the highest earning person,
526		it doesn't matter because you just take that
527		money away from them and then it gives us all the
528		same amount of money at the end.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
529	00:22:44	MAN A: Why- I don't see how that's problematic.
530		You still have the incentive to work harder
531		because you're contributing to the social good as
532		well as your own good. It's a small social good
533		that you can see the effects of. We're not
534		talking about a society of a couple of million
535		people right. This is like a village or smaller
536		sized society. You can see the benefits of your
537		work if everyone is getting the same amount, if
538		everyone—
539	00:23:14	WOMAN B: Yeah, but we don't know what the task
540		we're doing is right now, so it could be
541		something that you are—one of us is just
542		incapable of doing and so even if you try harder
543		it doesn't necessarily mean that your income is
544		going to go up.
545	00:23:28	MAN A: And why is that a problem? I'm not
546		following you.
547	00:23:31	MAN B: Well, because then the rest of the
548		people—
549	00:23:33	MAN A: [interposing] Are supporting that person.
550		And--
551	00:23:35	MAN B: Right. At what point though within a
552		society do you—how long do you support that

Line#	Timecode	Quote
553		person when they're just a burden? Especially in
554		a small society you have the people that are the
555		burden on society.
556	00:23:49	MAN A: I think we've decided that we're going to
557		support someone anyway. We're definitely going
558		to be using.
559		WOMAN A: To an extent.
560	00:23:53	MAN B: To some extent, but if we're studying the
561		hypothetical numbers, 80% at $40,000 I think is
562		more than enough to sustain or no, 80% of $32,000
563		if $40,000 was the average. Eighty percent of
564		$32,000 is—
565	00:24:15	MAN A: Well, why don't we go 80% at $32,000?
566		Assuming it'll come out to $32,000.
567	00:24:22	MAN C: I thought we were just using $24,000, now
568		you're talking about $25,000, it's not a big
569		difference. But you are talking about setting a
570		floor constraint.
571	00:24:29	MAN A: Well, I'm still gunning for maximize the
572		floor because I still think that creates the
573		greatest incentive at the bottom end to do that
574		extra.
575	00:24:38	MAN C: But you said you would be happy with the
576		80% of $32,000?

Line#	Timecode	Quote
577	00:24:41	MAN A: Well, except that—sorry, 80% of $40,000.
578	00:24:45	MAN B: No, the 80% of $40,000, being $32,000.
579	00:24:47	MAN A: So, because when you have a fixed floor,
580		it's fundamentally different from a fractional
581		floor in that you don't see benefit from your
582		increased work. In fact, if you're below the
583		fixed floor, by working, you're only decreasing
584		the taxation on the rich. If anything, once you
585		work out that you're earning below a fixed floor,
586		you have an incentive to just stop working
587		because then the rich will just pay for you
588		completely.
589	00:25:24	MAN C: That was my argument against maximizing
590		the floor.
591	00:25:26	MAN A: But maximizing the floor, if you stop
592		working, you make less.
593	00:25:33	MAN C: If you stop working, you're guaranteed to
594		make 80% of the average.
595	00:25:36	MAN A: Which is going to be a lot less.
596	00:25:39	MAN C: It would be more than what you would make
597		if you stopped working under setting a floor
598		constraint.
599	00:25:42	MAN A: You definitely have more incentive to
600		work below the floor in a maximized floor than a

Line#	Timecode	Quote
601		fixed floor because when you work more in a
602		maximized floor, you see—there is a difference to
603		your income, but when you work more in a fixed
604		floor, which you are below, you don't see
605		anything.
606	00:26:08	MAN B: I don't think that that's actually-that
607		in every case that's going to hold true.
608	00:26:15	MAN A: No, it's definitely true that if you're
609		below the floor in a fixed floor and you're not
610		going to hit the floor by working more, then the
611		extra work is useless to you. It's only
612		decreasing the taxation on the rich, it's
613		decreasing your gap to the floor, which is just
614		being taxed off the rich.
615	00:26:37	MAN B: That's only going to be-It's not going to
616		work that way with every distribution because the
617		lowest—the lowest floor, depending what percent
618		it is, the lowest actual income, you know, it'll
619		change more depending how low they go. So, if
620		you make two and you've got a set floor that
621		brings you up to 15, versus making two and a set
622		floor that brings you up to like 30.
623	00:27:17	MAN A: There's no incentive for you to do any
624		work whatsoever in either of those cases.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
625	00:27:23	MAN B: Right.
626	00:27:24	MAN A: Whereas if you have a maximized floor,
627		and the maximized floor happens to be about 15
628		when you're making two, you still have the
629		incentive to make the two otherwise—to do the
630		work for the two, otherwise you'll make even
631		less.
632	00:27:37	MAN B: But with a set floor versus a maximized
633		floor, everybody will benefit from everyone
634		making more.
635	00:27:45	MAN A: No, with a set floor, the people at the
636		bottom won't benefit from themselves working
637		more.
638	00:27:50	MAN B: They still will.
639	00:27:51	MAN A: No. At a set floor? No, they won't
640		because they'll definitely make the floor unless
641		the entire society can't support the floor.
642	00:27:57	MAN B: [interposing] They'll definitely make the
643		floor, but that's assuming that the floor is—
644		MAN A: (interposing) Out of reach. (continues)
645		we're not going to lower people. We're not
646		speaking that way are we?
647	00:28:06	MAN A: No.
648	00:28:06	MAN B: Like if someone makes—well, I guess it's

Line#	Timecode	Quote
649		not possible.
650	00:28:08	MAN A: The people who make more than the floor
651		are paying for the people who make less than the
652		floor. Assuming the society can support everyone
653		at least at the floor, everyone below the floor
654		has no reason to continue working.
655	00:28:21	WOMAN B: Well, we do also have a scenario that
656		everyone can make more than the set floor and if
657		everyone is making more than the set floor, then
658		everyone has more incentive to work because that
659		increases their own money.
660	00:28:29	MAN B: Right.
661	00:28:30	MAN A: But if just one person is below a fixed
662		floor, that person has no incentive to work and
663		everyone makes less.
664	00:28:39	MAN C: No one would go bellow a fixed floor.
665	00:28:40	MAN A: What?
666	00:28:40	WOMAN A: But, if that person in subsequent years
667		can make more than a set floor then he does have
668		incentive to work.
669	00:28:44	MAN A: But say they’re making two and the floor
670		is 15, they’re not hitting that floor because
671		that’s not happening. It is the same task in
672		subsequent years?

Line#	Timecode	Quote
673	00:28:58	MODERATOR: I can't—yeah it is the same task.
674	00:29:02	MAN A: The same skill, like if you're good at
675		year one, you'll be good at year two?
676	00:29:04	MODERATOR: Yeah.
677	00:29:08	WOMAN A: I mean I'd probably be in favor of a
678		maximized floor if it was lower than 80%. I just
679		think 80% is too high.
680		MAN C: Me too.
681	00:29:15	MAN B: [interposing] So you're in favor of a
682		floor, that's kind of how I feel. Just looking
683		at this graph and these numbers, even discounting
684		the highest earner, looking at the averages, with
685		this one, the max floor and even over here, with
686		the max floor it puts medium, medium, low and low
687		all at the same level. To that, as a—I'm not
688		assuming that I'm going to be the floor, the
689		lowest or the highest, but if I'm somewhere in
690		the middle, I feel like I'm going to pay for it
691		more by being equal with the people who are doing
692		less quality or not as much work as I am.
693		Whereas with the set floor, it's still going to
694		be relative. You know, they're still—there is
695		some stratus there. You can be a little—
696	00:29:57	MAN A: You care about being better than people

Line#	Timecode	Quote
697		rather than just being able to enjoy a standard
698		of life?
699	00:30:01	MAN B: I care about getting out what I'm putting
700		in.
701	00:30:03	MAN A: (interposing) Ah, see, now that's why we
702		have a difference of opinion. (continues) So I
703		feel like if I'm doing more quality—if I'm going
704		to do better quality work—and you know what, I
705		also feel that, if I'm not doing the better
706		quality that I don't necessarily need to be a
707		drain on someone else who is.
708	00:30:19	MAN A: I feel like everyone deserves a good
709		standard of living.
710	00:30:24	MAN C: That's why we are setting a floor.
711	00:30:25	MAN B: Well, I think the floor should be set at
712		a good standard, I'm just saying that if someone
713		is able to get higher than that standard—you know
714		like-the medium-high in here and here they get
715		penalized.
716	0:30:36	MAN A: If I'm—after the first year realizing
717		that I'm getting this good standard of living,
718		I'm not making anything near the floor is, I have
719		no incentive to keep working. I can just stop
720		working and live on the fruits of the society.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
721		Whereas in a maximized floor I can't.
722	00:30:50	MAN B: Still going to make less.
723	00:30:52	MAN C: You would make more under the maximized
724		floor by doing less work.
725	00:30:55	MAN A: No, I'm making more under the maximized
726		floor, by doing more work.
727	00:30:57	MAN B: You make more relatively, but not more
728		overall since the average is still dependent on
729		what everyone makes.
730	00:30:59	MAN A: In a maximized floor, you definitely make
731		more by doing more work. Because by doing more
732		work the average goes up, so 80% of the average
733		goes up.
734	00:31:06	MAN B: It's same in the set though.
735	00:31:07	MAN A: No. But in a set floor, the floor is
736		set, so if I'm making 10 and I can make 12 by
737		working harder, then there's no reason—
738	00:31:17	MAN B: [interposing] But the floor is not set at
739		10, the floor is set at a percent of the average.
740	00:31:21	MAN A: In a floor? No. The floor is set at a
741		number.
742	00:31:28	MODERATOR: In a set floor, the floor is set at a
743		number.
744	00:31:30	MAN B: Okay.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
745	00:31:31	MAN A: So you get no benefit from extra work in
746		a fixed floor. If you're below the floor, which
747		is fixed, you get no benefit from extra work. In
748		fact, if anything you maximize your utility by
749		doing no work and enjoying your leisure time.
750	00:31:45	MAN C: Even more so under maximizing the floor
751		income.
752	00:31:47	MAN A: No, because under maximizing the floor,
753		whenever you work, you increase the floor, so
754		you're increasing what you're making.
755	00:31:56	MAN C: The higher income people increase the
756		floor
757		MAN A:(interposing) So do the low income.
758		(continues) because the floor is set at 80% of
759		the higher income.
760	00:32:02	MAN A: No it's 80% of the average.
761		MAN B: The average.
762	00:32:05	MAN C: Okay.
763	00:32:07	MAN A: So in a maximized floor, the people at
764		the bottom still contribute to the average. And
765		as someone who's below the floor, I know that
766		every dollar that I earn will be worth more to me
767		because I'm going to raise the average and get a
768		better 80% of the average.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
769	00:32:28	WOMAN A: In a large scale society that wouldn't
770		work because you wouldn't affect the average
771		basically, but in five people that might work
772		maximizing the floor.
773	00:32:35	MAN A: Well, I think it'll work in any small
774		society where you can see the benefits.
775	00:32:39	WOMAN A: In a very small society, like five
776		people.
777	00:32:40	MAN A: Well no, I think like even a small
778		society on the scale of a small village or a
779		small community.
780	00:32:45	MAN C: But we're talking about the whole
781		country. I think when you're talking about the
782		economy of this country in this scenario right?
783	00:32:52	WOMAN A: Are we supposed to decide what we think
784		is best for this society of five or what we think
785		is best for any society?
786	00:32:58	MAN C: The size of this country I think we're
787		talking about.
788		MAN A: So, in an economy--
789	00:32:59	MODERATOR: So when it says in the instructions
790		that you think of yourself as designing a new
791		society that you will be part of, there's no
792		explicit instructions about the scale of the

Line#	Timecode	Quote
793		society, but think about it as designing the
794		roles for a new country.
795	00:33:12	MAN A: And moreover, as the country gets bigger
796		it starts to get more economic complexities and
797		you start competing, you're still getting
798		economic problems. We're setting the rules that
799		start out at the beginning when it's just—we're
800		essentially living off the land here. We're
801		doing—or like mining or whatever. You know,
802		There's a fixed—there's this endless pot of money
803		that you're just going in and picking up and if
804		you're better at the picking up of the money, the
805		more you make. There are no externalities,
806		there's nothing complicated going on.
807	00:33:44	MAN C: One good thing about maximizing the floor
808		income is that it kind of puts a cap on the super
809		rich becoming even super richer, since we're not
810		able to set a range constraint or a maximum, so
811		that's one good thing that it would prevent.
812		We're setting a floor—
813	00:34:03	MAN A: It's more of a creeping effect rather
814		than a like a strong-
815	00:34:06	MAN C: It would enable the outlying super rich
816		to just take over everything.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
817	00:34:11	MAN B: But if we want to do that, then we just
818		set a range constraint.
819	0:34:24	MAN A: So do we want to set a small range
820		constraint or a large range constraint to do
821		that? So what do we think the range is going to
822		be? Should we take one of these examples? Say
823		the range is maybe—
824	00:34:36	WOMAN A: But the problem with the range
825		constraint is that if you're in the highest, you
826		basically don't have as much incentive to work.
827	00:34:43	MAN B: It's the same problem.
828	00:34:44	MAN A: No, you do because at the—the way that
829		the range constraint is calculated is first of
830		all, it looks the highest and it says, okay
831		that's the top. Then it looks at the lowest and
832		it says, is this person outside of the range and
833		if it not, it'll work out where they have to be
834		for the range and then it'll resort everything in
835		order up to the highest. It has a more liberal
836		effect.
837	00:35:06	MAN B: [interposing] Although the problem with
838		the range constraint is going to be if it's too
839		wide of a range, then people on the low end could
840		end up with very, very low. If the top earners

Line#	Timecode	Quote
841		don’t get high enough.
842	00:35:21	WOMAN A: And it doesn’t ensure everyone—yeah, if
843		it’s too big it doesn’t ensure everyone a decent
844		standard of living.
845	00:35:26	MAN B: [interposing] Right, but if we look on
846		page seven, the range constraint example they
847		give us, if it’s $70,000 the bottom earner is
848		still—
849	00:35:33	WOMAN A: Yeah, you’re not going to be able to
850		live on $2,500 and we don’t know enough about
851		this society to do a range constraint. That’s
852		why I’d be either in favor to maximize the floor
853		or set a floor. If we knew more about the
854		society I think we could set a range.
855	00:35:48	MAN A: right--I feel like we should—I mean, just
856		because the—basically because of our ignorance,
857		because we can’t do things that are strongly
858		linked to the society, we can only pull numbers
859		out of my heads, I think the maximize the floor
860		makes more sense, just because it’s strongly
861		linked to the society that actually happens, as
862		opposed to simply like—in any of the ones where
863		we pick numbers, in setting a range constraint or
864		setting a floor constraint, like we could miss.

Line#	Timecode	Quote
865		We could completely miss and get it wrong.
866	00:36:23	MAN C: I forgot your name.
867	00:36:24	WOMAN A: Oh sorry it's WOMAN A.
868	00:36:25	MAN C: WOMAN A and I and maybe I'm trying to
869		remember—
870	00:36:28	MAN B: MAN B.
871	00:36:29	MAN C: MAN B. I think we all kind of agree on
872		the maximize the floor is a good thing, but that
873		the 80% is too high of a number.
874	00:36:36	MAN A: I think the problems with the 80% are
875		less dangerous than the problems with messing up
876		and dis-incentivizing the floor for a fixed
877		constraint.
878	00:36:48	WOMAN A: For this society I might agree with
879		that.
880	00:36:54	MAN B: Yeah, with this smaller group.
881	00:36:57	MAN A: Okay.
882	00:36:58	MAN C: But are we talking about, is this
883		experiment talking about for the small group,
884		we're talking about for a lot of people.
885	00:37:05	MODERATOR: [interposing] It's supposed be - - is
886		designing a new society, but it will affect your
887		- -.
888	00:37:15	MAN A: We're designing a small new society of

Line#	Timecode	Quote
889		farmers. I mean-
890	00:37:22	WOMAN A: Are we basically ready to vote?
891	00:37:24	MAN C: sure.
892	00:37:27	MODERATOR: Okay. The voting process is a little
893		complicated, so I'm going to explain it. First,
894		we have to vote to end discussion. This has to
895		be a unanimous vote. So can everyone should have
896		a pad of paper in front of you. This is by
897		secret ballot, so even if you feel like the group
898		has reached a consensus, please vote secretly.
899		So if you want to end discussion write "yes" on
900		the piece of paper and then fold it in half and
901		pass it over to me. And if you don't want to end
902		discussion, write "no".
903		Okay. You have agreed unanimously to end
904		discussion. So now this is the part where we
905		vote on a principle. So these are the principles
906		that we're voting on. These are the two numbers
907		I heard associated with the floor constraint.
908		The only specific number I heard associated with
909		the range constraint is zero, is that correct?
910		Okay. So—
911	00:38:36	MAN A: So write down the number? Like 1 or 3a.
912	00:38:38	MODERATOR: Yeah, write down the number and if

Line#	Timecode	Quote
913		you want to vote for a floor constraint or a
914		range constraint, please also write down the
915		letter of the floor constraint or range
916		constraint.
917	00:38:50	WOMAN A: This is just a majority? We have to
918		have a majority.
919	00:38:52	MODERATOR: This is by majority. This vote, so
920		three people need to vote for the same principle.
921		Okay, thank you. Okay, we have a majority in
922		favor of principle one, maximize the floor
923		income, so congratulations, you've completed the
924		second part of the task, of the experiment,
925		sorry. So at this point in time, can you move
926		back to the computer that you were seated at
927		before. You'll probably want to bring your - -
928		with you.
929		**[END TAPE 1]**