## A Appendix

## A. 1 Balance

Table A1 reports the proportion of respondents in the specified covariate categories within treatment groups. It suggests that randomization was successful, achieving covariate balance across treatment groups.

Table A1: Balance Table

| Variable Level | Control | Good Governance | Interaction | Responsiveness |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Independent | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.36 |
| Republican | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.24 |
| Democrat | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.37 |
| Other Party | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.03 |
| Not White | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| White | 0.83 | 0.86 | 0.87 | 0.88 |
| No College Degree | 0.66 | 0.69 | 0.64 | 0.70 |
| College Graduate | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.30 |
| Income: <30k | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.26 |
| Income: >70k | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.31 |
| Income: 30k - 70k | 0.40 | 0.38 | 0.45 | 0.43 |
| Age: 18-29 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 |
| Age: 30-49 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.26 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.24 | 0.25 |
| Female | 0.54 | 0.59 | 0.55 | 0.55 |
| Male | 0.46 | 0.41 | 0.45 | 0.45 |
| Unemployed | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.60 | 0.56 |
| Employed | 0.45 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.44 |
| Whitmer Support: Poor | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| Whitmer Support: Excellent | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.26 | 0.31 |
| Whitmer Support: Good | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.22 |
| Whitmer Support: Fair | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.11 |
| Govt. Trust: Almost Never | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.17 |
| Govt. Trust: Always | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 |
| Govt. Trust: Sometimes | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.45 | 0.47 |
| Govt. Trust: Seldom | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.29 |

## A. 2 Initial Support

Table A2 suggests that Republicans and Democrats have more initial support for funding legislatures than Independents. Support for funding legislatures is also correlated with younger citizens (ages 18-29), those who approve of MI governor Whitmer, and those who trust the government.

Table A2: Initial Support for Funding Legislatures

|  | Initial Support |
| :---: | :---: |
| Republican | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.200^{* * *} \\ (0.054) \end{gathered}$ |
| Democrat | $\begin{aligned} & 0.131^{* *} \\ & (0.051) \end{aligned}$ |
| Other Party | $\begin{gathered} 0.039 \\ (0.093) \end{gathered}$ |
| White | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.057) \end{gathered}$ |
| College Degree | $\begin{gathered} 0.050 \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income 70k+ | $\begin{gathered} 0.018 \\ (0.053) \end{gathered}$ |
| Income 30k-70k | $\begin{gathered} -0.086^{*} \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age 30-49 | $\begin{gathered} -0.163^{* * *} \\ (0.059) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age 50-64 | $\begin{gathered} -0.406^{* * *} \\ (0.059) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age 65+ | $\begin{gathered} -0.407^{* * *} \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ |
| Male | $\begin{array}{r} -0.013 \\ (0.039) \end{array}$ |
| Employed | $\begin{aligned} & -0.064 \\ & (0.043) \end{aligned}$ |
| Whitmer Approval (Excellent) | $\begin{gathered} 0.528^{* * *} \\ (0.067) \end{gathered}$ |
| Whitmer Approval (Good) | $\begin{gathered} 0.414^{* * *} \\ (0.064) \end{gathered}$ |
| Whitmer Approval (Fair) | $\begin{gathered} 0.244^{* * *} \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ |
| Always Trust Govt. | $\begin{gathered} 0.620^{* * *} \\ (0.090) \end{gathered}$ |
| Sometimes Trust Govt. | $\begin{gathered} 0.363^{* * *} \\ (0.062) \end{gathered}$ |
| Seldom Trust Govt. | $\begin{gathered} 0.241^{* * *} \\ (0.060) \end{gathered}$ |
| Survey Wave | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 1.734^{* * *} \\ (0.114) \end{gathered}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{N} \\ & \mathrm{D} \end{aligned}$ | 1,768 |
| $\underline{\mathrm{R}^{2}}$ | 0.210 |

## A. 3 Additional Results by Partisanship

Table A3: Average Change in Support (Post-Pre Outcome) by Partisanship

|  | Control | Good Governance | Combination | Responsiveness |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Out-party | -0.02 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.01 |
| In-party | 0.01 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.22 |

Based on Table A3, the good governance and combination treatments increased support similarly for out-party and in-party respondents, while the responsiveness treatment clearly only increased support among in-party respondents. The table also confirms the consistency of responses for the control group across the two versions of the outcome question.

Table A4: Treatment Effects by Partisanship

|  | Good Governance | Combination | Responsiveness |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Out-party | $0.21^{* * *}$ | $0.18^{* * *}$ | 0.02 |
| In-party | 0.13 | $0.17^{* *}$ | $0.23^{* * *}$ |

Next, Table A4 reports treatment effects based on regression coefficients for the main covariateadjusted interactive model. The good governance and combination treatments produced significant effects for out-party individuals ( $\mathrm{p}=0.000$ and $\mathrm{p}=0.003$, respectively), and the combination and responsiveness treatments produced significant effects for in-party individuals ( $\mathrm{p}=0.045$ and $p=0.007$, respectively). Thus, the combination frame was effective in persuading both in- and out-party respondents, while the single good governance frame seems more persuasive for out-party respondents and the single responsiveness frame seems more persuasive for in-party respondents.

## A. 4 Additional Hypothesis Testing

Table A5 presents additional comparisons to evaluate our hypotheses based on comparing the relevant treatment group to only one other distinct group at a time. Results are consistent with Table 2.

Table A5: Expanded Hypothesis Testing Results

| Hypothesis | Treatment Group with $n$ and Average Change in Support |  |  | Comparison Group with $n$ and Average Change in Support |  |  | Difference |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | Expected | Actual | p-Value |
| 1 | Good Governance | $n=507$ | 0.171 |  |  |  | Control | $n=491$ | -0.014 | + | 0.185 | 0.0001 |
| 2a | In-party Responsiveness | $n=169$ | 0.219 | In-party Control | $n=155$ | 0.006 | + | 0.212 | 0.003 |
| 2b | Out-party Responsiveness | $n=335$ | 0.006 | Out-party Control | $n=336$ | -0.024 | - | 0.030 | 0.580 |
| 3a | In-party Combination | $n=170$ | 0.148 | In-party Control | $n=155$ | 0.006 | + | 0.141 | 0.057 |
| 3a | In-party Combination | $n=170$ | 0.148 | In-party Good Governance | $n=164$ | 0.171 | ? | -0.023 | 0.770 |
| 3a | In-party Combination | $n=170$ | 0.148 | In-party Responsiveness | $n=169$ | 0.219 | ? | -0.071 | 0.384 |
| 3b | Out-party Combination | $n=328$ | 0.148 | Out-party Control | $n=336$ | -0.024 | + | 0.172 | 0.002 |
| 3b | Out-party Combination | $n=328$ | 0.148 | Out-party Good Governance | $n=343$ | 0.171 | ? | -0.023 | 0.704 |
| 3b | Out-party Combination | $n=328$ | 0.148 | Out-party Responsiveness | $n=335$ | 0.006 | ? | 0.142 | 0.021 |

## A. 5 Treatment Effects for Alternative Outcome Measures

Table A6 presents regression results for an alternative outcome measure of interest-a binary variable indicating whether a respondent was moved from opposing to supporting increased legislative resources. For the public sample, the good governance and combination treatments increased "movers" by about 10 percentage points, and the responsiveness treatment increased movers by about 6 percentage points, relative to control. There were some movers in the control group (28/491 or about $6 \%$ ) who switched from opponents to supporters when simply asked a second time. For the elite sample, the combination treatment was most effective and produced about 15 percentage points more movers than control. There were no movers in the control group in the elite sample.

Table A6: Regression Output for Moving Opponents to Supporters

|  | Moved from Opposition to Support |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | General Public |  |  |  | Elite Sample |  |  |  |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Good Governance | $\begin{gathered} 0.095^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.091^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.117^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.115^{* * *} \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.082 \\ (0.051) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 \\ (0.053) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.091^{*} \\ & (0.054) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.087 \\ (0.056) \end{gathered}$ |
| Responsiveness | $\begin{gathered} 0.058^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.062^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.051^{* *} \\ & (0.025) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.049^{*} \\ & (0.027) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.059 \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.058 \\ (0.052) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.048 \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.044 \\ (0.057) \end{gathered}$ |
| Combination Treatment | $\begin{gathered} 0.097^{* * *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.103^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.104^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.100^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.150^{* * *} \\ (0.048) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.155^{* * *} \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.188^{* * *} \\ (0.053) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.191^{* * *} \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ |
| In-party |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.043) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.000 \\ (0.094) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.023 \\ & (0.130) \end{aligned}$ |
| Good Governance x In-party |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.070 \\ & (0.044) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.079^{*} \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.091 \\ & (0.154) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.100 \\ & (0.158) \end{aligned}$ |
| Responsiveness x In-party |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.022 \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.063 \\ (0.133) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.067 \\ (0.136) \end{gathered}$ |
| Combination Treatment x In-party |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.018 \\ & (0.044) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.188 \\ & (0.125) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.184 \\ & (0.129) \end{aligned}$ |
| Covariates | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| N | 2,000 | 1,782 | 2,000 | 1,782 | 215 | 212 | 215 | 212 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.017 | 0.033 | 0.020 | 0.037 | 0.045 | 0.070 | 0.072 | 0.090 |

Table A7 presents regression results for another alternative outcome measure of interest-a binary variable indicating whether a respondent supported increased legislative resources when asked the second time. Note that is outcome measure uses only the "post-outcome" in our pre-post design and thus no longer makes use of the additional information that we have on respondents' prior opinions before treatment. For the public sample, the good governance and combination treatments increased support, relative to control, by about 16 and 17 percentage points, respectively. The responsiveness treatment was largely ineffective. The baseline support rate in the control group
was about $32 \%$. For the elite sample, no treatments appear to be effective in increasing support relative to control.

Table A7: Regression Output for Binary Post Support

|  | Post Support (Binary) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | General Public |  |  |  | Elite Sample |  |  |  |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Good Governance | $\begin{gathered} 0.151^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.159^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.171^{* * *} \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.175^{* * *} \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.036 \\ & (0.092) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 0.008 \\ (0.093) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.097) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.041 \\ (0.098) \end{gathered}$ |
| Responsiveness | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.052^{*} \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.028 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.031 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.062 \\ & (0.091) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.056 \\ & (0.091) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.122 \\ & (0.098) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.121 \\ & (0.099) \end{aligned}$ |
| Combination Treatment | $\begin{gathered} 0.132^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.172^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.143^{* * *} \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.185^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.087) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.042 \\ (0.087) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.009 \\ & (0.095) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015 \\ (0.096) \end{gathered}$ |
| In-party |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.154^{* * *} \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.089 \\ (0.059) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.051 \\ & (0.168) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.072 \\ & (0.225) \end{aligned}$ |
| Good Governance x In-party |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.058 \\ & (0.065) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.050 \\ & (0.065) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.477^{*} \\ (0.275) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.391 \\ & (0.274) \end{aligned}$ |
| Responsiveness x In-party |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.039 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.059 \\ (0.065) \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.344 \\ (0.239) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.348 \\ (0.237) \end{gathered}$ |
| Combination Treatment x In-party |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.023 \\ & (0.065) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.038 \\ & (0.065) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.092 \\ (0.225) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.122 \\ (0.223) \end{gathered}$ |
| Covariates | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| N | 2,000 | 1,782 | 2,000 | 1,782 | 215 | 212 | 215 | 212 |
| $\mathrm{R}^{2}$ | 0.020 | 0.165 | 0.046 | 0.168 | 0.004 | 0.068 | 0.045 | 0.102 |

${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<.1 ;{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<.05 ;{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<.01$

## A. 6 Survey Instrument

## Baseline Question

Different states provide their state legislative representatives with differing amounts of resources. Some pay their legislators more than others and some provide more staff than others.

Do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?
[Followed by buffer questions from other research teams participating in the omnibus survey]

## Treatment Conditions

- Control, $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ of respondents: Research shows that state legislators are equipped with differing levels of resources like salary and staff. After a bit of time to think it over, do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?
- Good Governance, $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ of respondents: Research shows that when state legislators have more resources like salary and staff they are better equipped to deal with real problems. For example, states that provide their legislators with more resources had better responses to the opioid crisis and therefore fewer overdose deaths. After a bit of time to think it over, do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?
- Responsiveness, $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ of respondents: Research shows that when state legislators have more resources like salary and staff they are better equipped to give voters the policies they want. For example, among states (like Michigan) where voters elected Republicans to run the legislature, policy is more conservative in states where legislators had more resources. After a bit of time to think it over, do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?


## - Combination Treatments, $25 \%$ of respondents

- Good Governance x Responsiveness, 12.5\% of respondents: Research shows that when state legislators have more resources like salary and staff they are better equipped to deal with real problems. For example, states that provide their legislators with more resources had better responses to the opioid crisis and therefore fewer overdose deaths.

Legislators are also better equipped to give voters the policies they want. For example, among states (like yours) where voters elected Republicans to run the legislature, policy is more conservative where legislators had more resources. After a bit of time to think it over, do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?

- Responsiveness x Good Governance, $\mathbf{1 2 . 5 \%}$ of respondents: Research shows that when state legislators have more resources like salary and staff they are better equipped to give voters the policies they want. For example, among states (like yours) where voters elected Republicans to run the legislature, policy is more conservative where legislators had more resources. Legislators are also better equipped to deal with real problems. For example, states that provide their legislators with more resources had better responses to the opioid crisis and therefore fewer overdose deaths. After a bit of time to think it over, do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?


## Outcome Questions

For the baseline question, respondents were asked, "Do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?" And after the treatment prompts, respondents were asked, "After a bit of time to think it over, do you support providing your state legislators with more resources like salary and staff?" Both questions used a 4-point bipolar Likert scale: Strongly oppose, Somewhat oppose, Somewhat support, Strongly support.

