

Appendices

In addition to providing summary statistics for all variables utilized in the primary models (see Appendix A), the below tables feature results from a series of supplementary models that validate the findings presented in the main text. I begin by fitting complementary log-log (cloglog) models to the event history data. As Allison (2014) points out, cloglog regression is the discrete-time equivalent of the Cox proportional hazards model, and while political scientists generally prefer logistic regression for discrete-time EHA, the asymmetric link function of cloglog regression has made it popular in other fields for the analysis of events with a low probability of occurrence (Kitali et al. 2017; Mills 2011)—a category that includes SDR adoptions. As Appendix B indicates, the cloglog results are nearly identical to the standard logit results, even though it is common for these models to produce conflicting results when the number of events is small (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

The results in Appendices C through E were generated using standard logistic regression after manipulating the main model specifications. Most notably, three of the models utilize naïve specifications that include only the predictors of primary interest and controls for time, which may have the effect of reducing the bias of the estimates by increasing the number of events per variable (Vittinghoff and McCulloch 2007). Additional models replace the original, disaggregated partisan variables with indicators representing unified Democratic (Republican) government and the switch to unified Democratic government.

Other modifications included dropping the South dummy and adding variables that tap the influences of intrastate mobility and ideological diffusion. Since movers should be more likely to take advantage of SDR, I anticipate that intrastate mobility—much like interstate migration—will be positively related to adoption. American Community Survey estimates of the

percentage of states' residents to have moved to a new county within the same state over the past year, which are available for 2005 onward, make it possible to gauge cross-state and over-time variation on this metric. Ideological diffusion refers to the tendency of policies to spread to ideologically similar, rather than geographically proximate, states (Mallinson 2021). Given that support for convenience voting reforms has become a tenet of American liberalism (Alvarez et al. 2011), it is possible that this mechanism helps explain the proliferation of SDR. To that end, I construct a variable, modeled after the one utilized by Mallinson (2021), that uses Berry et al.'s (1998) citizen ideology scores to measure the ideological distance between a given state and the states to have previously adopted SDR. Due to the way this variable is calculated, values are recorded as missing for 1973, before which any state had adopted SDR. The formula, which weights the state(s) to have most recently adopted the policy more heavily, is as follows:

$$\text{Ideological distance} = |\text{Ideology of potential adopter} - [(\text{Mean ideology of most recent adopters} + \text{Mean ideology of remaining older adopters})/2]|$$

Overall, regardless of the specification used, the logit estimates presented here for the focal independent variables do not meaningfully differ from those that appear in the main text and are thereby a testament to their robustness.

The remaining tables (Appendices F and G) contain event history results from two sets of models predicting legislative adoptions of OVR and AVR, respectively, thus offering insight into whether the study's core findings are exclusive to SDR. Ideally, I would have used the full slate of control variables, but issues with model convergence forced me to use more limited specifications. It likely would have been problematic to model AVR adoptions with so many predictors anyway, given both the small number of legislative adopters (11) during the period under study and limited sample size of 209 state-years (Vittinghoff and McCulloch 2007).

The results fail to provide any evidence that the adoption pattern of OVR—a policy that has attracted widespread bipartisan support (Hicks, McKee, and Smith 2016a)—has been consistent with the strategic partisan framework discussed in the main text. In fact, none of the 27 states to have legislatively adopted OVR between 2002 and 2019 did so in the first year of a Democratic legislature, preventing me from including the Democratic legislature switch variable in the models. Relatedly, Republicans have not been more likely to resist OVR in states with larger Black and Latino populations. The adoption pattern of AVR, by contrast, more closely resembles that of SDR. I expected this to be the case considering that AVR and SDR induce similarly dramatic reductions in voting costs. Immediately after the switch to a Democratic governor, states have an elevated chance of enacting AVR. The complete Democratic takeover of government has the same effect. Further, Republican control interacts with racial and ethnic demographics to significantly influence the probability of adoption, and these coefficients’ signs usually align with expectations. Importantly, AVR is a new reform, having first been adopted in 2015; as more states adopt it, these results may well change, so they should be interpreted with caution.

Appendix A. Summary Statistics.

	<i>M</i> / <i>%</i> yes	<i>SD</i>	Min.	Max.
SDR adoption	1.15	—	—	—
Switch to Democratic legislature	2.72	—	—	—
Democratic legislature	49.40	—	—	—
Republican legislature	31.59	—	—	—
Switch to Democratic governor	4.49	—	—	—
Democratic governor	51.75	—	—	—
Republican governor	47.47	—	—	—
Latino population size*	0.00	9.37	-7.24	41.62
Black population size*	0.00	9.65	-10.92	26.67
Public liberalism _{<i>t</i>-1}	48.26	15.96	5.86	95.97
Initiative	41.83	—	—	—
Term limits	16.40	—	—	—

Adopting neighbors _{t-1}	0.59	0.88	0	4
Professionalism (Dim. 1)	0.04	1.54	-1.88	8.58
Professionalism (Dim. 2)	0.04	0.74	-3.27	3.17
South	26.4	—	—	—
Percent born out of state	39.95	13.70	18.40	78.70
GSP per capita	1.58	1.03	0.29	7.42
NVRA	4.54	—	—	—
Existing statewide registration requirement	97.02			
Year	21.55	13.28	0	46

Note: *Represents grand-mean centered values

Appendix B. Complementary Log-Log Regression Models of Same-Day Registration Adoption, 1973-2019.

	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switch to Democratic legislature	1.35** (0.53)	1.89*** (0.51)	2.38*** (0.62)
Democratic legislature	1.35* (0.72)	—	—
Switch to Democratic governor	0.78 (0.70)	0.83 (0.68)	0.67 (0.89)
Democratic governor	2.38*** (0.87)	—	—
Republican legislature	—	-0.32 (0.68)	-37.94** (16.73)
Republican governor	—	-2.44*** (0.86)	-1.63* (0.85)
Black population size	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.07)
Latino population size	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Republican legislature X Black population size	—	—	-3.95** (1.65)
Republican legislature X Latino population size	—	—	0.44* (0.23)
Republican governor X Black population size	—	—	0.06 (0.07)
Republican governor X Latino population size	—	—	-0.20*** (0.07)
GSP per capita	-1.04** (0.44)	-1.07** (0.42)	-1.07*** (0.41)
Percent born out of state	0.04	0.03	0.04

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Existing statewide registration requirement	-3.03**	-2.60**	-3.29**
	(1.19)	(1.07)	(1.40)
Public liberalism _{t-1}	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Initiative	-0.28	-0.38	-1.52
	(0.94)	(0.89)	(1.28)
Professionalism (Dim. 1)	0.04	-0.03	0.05
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Professionalism (Dim 2)	0.25	0.25	0.45
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Adopting neighbors _{t-1}	0.12	0.17	0.08
	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.32)
South	-0.42	-0.37	-0.11
	(1.55)	(1.62)	(1.66)
Term limits	0.35	0.52	1.63**
	(0.73)	(0.79)	(0.69)
NVRA	4.27***	4.16***	4.10***
	(1.09)	(1.07)	(0.97)
Year	-0.17**	-0.17**	-0.21***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Year ²	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.33***	-2.84**	-2.33*
	(1.56)	(1.35)	(1.20)
AIC	194.29	199.91	183.28
BIC	305.44	311.06	316.66

Notes: N = 1,915. The dependent variable denotes the legislative adoption of same-day registration. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Two-tailed tests.

Appendix C. Alternative specifications of Model 1.

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Switch to unified Democratic government	—	1.39***	—	—	—
	—	(0.52)	—	—	—
Unified Democratic government	—	2.05***	—	—	—
	—	(0.68)	—	—	—
Switch to Democratic legislature	1.86***	—	1.38**	1.82**	1.37**

	(0.60)	—	(0.61)	(0.87)	(0.58)
Democratic legislature	0.86	—	1.78**	2.32**	1.37*
	(0.53)	—	(0.70)	(1.17)	(0.74)
Switch to Democratic governor	0.86	—	0.94	0.56	0.85
	(0.68)	—	(0.75)	(1.01)	(0.74)
Democratic governor	1.94***	—	2.44**	3.33**	2.37***
	(0.72)	—	(1.07)	(1.50)	(0.90)
Black population size	-0.12**	-0.09	-0.10	-0.05	-0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Latino population size	-0.00	-0.02	-0.04	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GSP per capita	—	-1.13**	-1.08**	-0.38*	-1.04**
	—	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.21)	(0.48)
Percent born out of state	—	0.04	0.06*	0.01	0.04
	—	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Existing statewide registration requirement	—	-2.58**	-3.70**	—	-3.06**
	—	(1.26)	(1.59)	—	(1.35)
Public liberalism _{t-1}	—	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01
	—	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Initiative	—	-0.53	-0.72	-0.46	-0.28
	—	(0.95)	(1.16)	(1.48)	(1.00)
Professionalism (Dim. 1)	—	0.10	0.08	-0.12	0.05
	—	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.16)
Professionalism (Dim 2)	—	0.21	0.32	0.55	0.25
	—	(0.36)	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.37)
Adopting neighbors	—	0.16	0.17	0.34	0.15
	—	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.36)
South	—	-0.64	-0.66	-0.51	—
	—	(1.49)	(1.50)	(1.99)	—
Term limits	—	0.29	0.36	0.46	0.36
	—	(0.83)	(0.88)	(1.51)	(0.79)
NVRA	—	4.45***	4.59***	—	4.42***
	—	(1.10)	(1.21)	—	(1.09)
Ideological distance	—	—	0.01	—	—
	—	—	(0.03)	—	—
Intrastate mobility	—	—	—	0.07	—
	—	—	—	(0.34)	—
Year	-0.12*	-0.18**	-0.13	0.14	-0.17**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)

Year ²	0.00***	0.01***	0.00***	—	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	—	(0.00)
Constant	-7.30***	-4.06***	-5.69**	-12.38**	-5.57***
	(1.01)	(1.42)	(2.69)	(5.94)	(1.72)
N	1,915	1,915	1,866	525	1,915
AIC	197.12	197.94	182.90	118.46	194.47
BIC	247.13	297.97	299.06	195.20	300.06

Notes: The models are logistic regressions where the dependent variable denotes the legislative adoption of same-day registration. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Two-tailed tests.

Appendix D. Alternative Specifications of Model 2.

	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Switch to unified Democratic government	—	2.36***	—	—	—
	—	(0.50)	—	—	—
Unified Republican government	—	-1.69*	—	—	—
	—	(0.96)	—	—	—
Switch to Democratic legislature	2.19***	—	1.87***	2.47***	1.92***
	(0.59)	—	(0.62)	(0.80)	(0.56)
Republican legislature	-0.25	—	-0.71	-1.67*	-0.29
	(0.56)	—	(0.71)	(0.94)	(0.70)
Republican governor	-1.97***	—	-2.43**	-3.55**	-2.41***
	(0.74)	—	(1.00)	(1.75)	(0.89)
Switch to Democratic governor	0.93	—	0.99	0.57	0.89
	(0.68)	—	(0.72)	(0.94)	(0.71)
Black population size	-0.12**	-0.09	-0.08	-0.05	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Latino population size	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GSP per capita	—	-0.99**	-1.02**	-0.34*	-1.06**
	—	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.20)	(0.45)
Percent born out of state	—	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.03
	—	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Existing statewide registration requirement	—	-2.25**	-3.15**	—	-2.56**
	—	(1.14)	(1.29)	—	(1.17)
Public liberalism _{<i>t</i>-1}	—	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.01
	—	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Initiative	—	-0.56	-0.73	-0.49	-0.35

	—	(0.87)	(1.06)	(1.62)	(0.94)
Professionalism (Dim. 1)	—	0.04	0.00	-0.19	-0.02
	—	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Professionalism (Dim 2)	—	0.18	0.33	0.62	0.26
	—	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.35)
Adopting neighbors _{t-1}	—	0.11	0.23	0.27	0.19
	—	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.30)
South	—	-0.45	-0.66	-0.16	—
	—	(1.65)	(1.58)	(2.00)	—
Term limits	—	0.35	0.59	0.91	0.51
	—	(0.85)	(0.88)	(1.59)	(0.83)
NVRA	—	4.12***	4.27***	—	4.28***
	—	(1.04)	(1.06)	—	(1.07)
Ideological distance	—	—	0.02	—	—
	—	—	(0.03)	—	—
Intrastate mobility	—	—	—	-0.07	—
	—	—	—	(0.29)	—
Year	-0.12*	-0.19***	-0.13*	0.14	-0.17**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Year ²	0.00***	0.01***	0.00***	—	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	—	(0.00)
Constant	-4.80***	-3.14**	-2.93	-7.94*	-3.10**
	(0.82)	(1.33)	(2.26)	(4.76)	(1.44)
N	1,915	1,915	1,866	525	1,915
AIC	200.91	203.05	189.94	122.15	200.07
BIC	250.93	303.09	306.10	198.89	305.66

Notes: The models are logistic regressions where the dependent variable denotes the legislative adoption of same-day registration. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Two-tailed tests.

Appendix E. Alternative Specifications of Model 3.

	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Switch to unified Democratic government	—	2.36***	—	—
	—	(0.52)	—	—
Unified Republican Government	—	-27.28***	—	—
	—	(6.90)	—	—
Switch to Democratic legislature	2.48***	—	2.38***	2.39***
	(0.69)	—	(0.83)	(0.69)
Republican legislature	-23.46***	—	-46.37**	-39.62**

	(8.20)	—	(19.03)	(17.35)
Switch to Democratic governor	1.06	—	0.96	0.81
	(0.78)	—	(0.96)	(0.90)
Republican governor	-1.75**	—	-1.62**	-1.70**
	(0.73)	—	(0.82)	(0.84)
Black population size	-0.08	-0.09	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Latino population size	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Unified Republican government X Black population size	—	-2.73***	—	—
	—	(0.69)	—	—
Unified Republican government X Latino population size	—	0.25**	—	—
	—	(0.12)	—	—
Republican legislature X Black population size	-2.48***	—	-4.76**	-4.12**
	(0.79)	—	(1.91)	(1.71)
Republican legislature X Latino population size	0.26*	—	0.55**	0.46*
	(0.14)	—	(0.24)	(0.24)
Republican governor X Black population size	0.04	—	0.06	0.06
	(0.07)	—	(0.07)	(0.07)
Republican governor X Latino population size	-0.19**	—	-0.24***	-0.21***
	(0.09)	—	(0.07)	(0.07)
GSP per capita	—	-0.95**	-1.09**	-1.12**
	—	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.46)
Percent born out of state	—	0.04	0.08***	0.04
	—	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Existing statewide registration requirement	—	-2.75**	-4.79***	-3.38**
	—	(1.20)	(1.56)	(1.57)
Public liberalism _{t-1}	—	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01
	—	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Initiative	—	-0.79	-2.36*	-1.48
	—	(0.85)	(1.33)	(1.29)
Professionalism (Dim. 1)	—	0.07	0.10	0.05
	—	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.17)
Professionalism (Dim 2)	—	0.12	0.52	0.46
	—	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.36)

Adopting neighbors _{t-1}	—	0.01	0.18	0.09
	—	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.33)
South	—	-0.32	-0.48	—
	—	(1.64)	(1.85)	—
Term limits	—	0.74	1.96**	1.62**
	—	(0.80)	(0.82)	(0.72)
NVRA	—	4.20***	4.32***	4.36***
	—	(1.02)	(1.12)	(1.12)
Ideological distance	—	—	0.01	—
	—	—	(0.03)	—
Year	-0.13*	-0.21***	-0.19**	-0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Year ²	0.00***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.24***	-2.79**	-1.80	-2.36*
	(0.90)	(1.21)	(1.77)	(1.27)
N	1,915	1,915	1,866	1,915
AIC	189.79	199.78	173.33	183.70
BIC	262.04	310.93	311.62	311.53

Notes: The models are logistic regressions where the dependent variable denotes the legislative adoption of same-day registration. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. The model with intrastate mobility would not converge, so those results do not appear in this table. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Two-tailed tests.

Appendix F. Event History Models of Online Voter Registration Adoption, 2002-2019.

	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Switch to unified Democratic government	—	—	-0.92	0.04
	—	—	(1.06)	(1.01)
Unified Democratic government	—	—	1.34***	—
	—	—	(0.41)	—
Unified Republican government	—	—	—	0.09
	—	—	—	(0.44)
Democratic legislature	0.71	—	—	—
	(0.45)	—	—	—
Republican legislature	—	-0.50	—	—
	—	(0.46)	—	—
Switch to Democratic governor	-0.27	-0.32	—	—
	(1.08)	(0.95)	—	—
Democratic governor	0.08	—	—	—
	(0.41)	—	—	—

Republican governor	—	-0.01	—	—
	—	(0.43)	—	—
Black population size	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Latino population size	0.02	0.06*	0.03*	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republican unified government X Black population size	—	—	—	-0.01
	—	—	—	(0.04)
Republican unified government X Latino population size	—	—	—	-0.05
	—	—	—	(0.03)
Republican legislature X Black population size	—	-0.00	—	—
	—	(0.04)	—	—
Republican legislature X Latino population size	—	-0.02	—	—
	—	(0.03)	—	—
Republican governor X Black population size	—	0.04	—	—
	—	(0.06)	—	—
Republican governor X Latino population size	—	-0.04	—	—
	—	(0.04)	—	—
Year	0.66*	0.70*	0.64	0.65*
	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.36)
Year ²	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-7.01***	-6.69***	-7.01***	-6.55***
	(2.03)	(1.99)	(2.03)	(1.74)
AIC	211.07	217.28	203.87	213.57
BIC	246.66	270.66	235.01	253.61

Notes: N = 632. The models are logistic regressions where the dependent variable denotes the legislative adoption of online voter registration. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. The Democratic legislature switch variable perfectly predicts the failure to adopt OVR, so it could not be included in any of the model specifications. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Two-tailed tests.

Appendix G. Event History Models of Automatic Voter Registration Adoption, 2015-2019.

	(25)	(26)	(27)
Switch to unified Democratic government	—	—	3.34**
	—	—	(1.43)
Unified Democratic government	—	—	2.57***
	—	—	(0.80)

Switch to Democratic legislature	-0.01 (1.03)	1.05 (1.34)	— —
Democratic legislature	4.20*** (1.41)	— —	— —
Republican legislature	— —	-34.15*** (5.02)	— —
Switch to Democratic governor	3.08*** (1.05)	12.63*** (1.66)	— —
Democratic governor	0.82 (0.83)	— —	— —
Republican governor	— —	1.02 (1.13)	— —
Black population size	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.28* (0.15)	-0.04 (0.06)
Latino population size	-0.01 (0.04)	0.12 (0.09)	0.02 (0.03)
Republican legislature X Black population size	— —	-0.17*** (0.06)	— —
Republican legislature X Latino population size	— —	-4.05*** (0.64)	— —
Republican governor X Black population size	— —	0.36** (0.15)	— —
Republican governor X Latino population size	— —	-0.15* (0.09)	— —
Year	1.19 (0.91)	1.43 (1.04)	1.28 (0.78)
Year ²	-0.29 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.24)	-0.37* (0.19)
Constant	-6.68*** (1.42)	-4.67*** (1.19)	-4.47*** (0.75)
AIC	68.32	65.93	74.01
BIC	98.44	109.44	97.44

Notes: N = 210. The models are logistic regressions where the dependent variable denotes the legislative adoption of automatic voter registration. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. The unified Republican government variable perfectly predicts the failure to adopt AVR, so it could not be included in any of the model specifications. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Two-tailed tests.