

Table A1: The Effect of State Fiscal Shocks on Income Inequality (90/10 Ratio)

|                                      | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                      | b/se                | b/se                | b/se                | b/se                |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-1</sub>      | 0.359***<br>(0.028) | 0.367***<br>(0.028) | 0.358***<br>(0.028) | 0.363***<br>(0.028) |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-2</sub>      | 0.085***<br>(0.027) | 0.082***<br>(0.028) | 0.083***<br>(0.027) | 0.081***<br>(0.028) |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t</sub>   | -0.001<br>(0.028)   |                     | 0.004<br>(0.029)    |                     |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t-1</sub> | 0.107***<br>(0.025) |                     | 0.117***<br>(0.025) |                     |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t</sub>           |                     | -0.002<br>(0.010)   | -0.006<br>(0.010)   |                     |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t-1</sub>         |                     | -0.005<br>(0.010)   | -0.017*<br>(0.010)  |                     |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t</sub>   |                     |                     |                     | 0.013<br>(0.014)    |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t-1</sub> |                     |                     |                     | 0.045***<br>(0.014) |
| Δ % Econ. Health Index               | 0.015<br>(0.009)    | 0.017*<br>(0.009)   | 0.014<br>(0.010)    | 0.016*<br>(0.009)   |
| Government Liberalism <sub>t</sub>   | -0.001<br>(0.001)   | -0.001<br>(0.001)   | -0.001<br>(0.001)   | -0.000<br>(0.001)   |
| Δ % Union                            | -0.016<br>(0.021)   | -0.021<br>(0.021)   | -0.018<br>(0.021)   | -0.022<br>(0.021)   |
| Federal Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>  | 0.004<br>(0.002)    | 0.005**<br>(0.002)  | 0.004<br>(0.002)    | 0.005**<br>(0.002)  |
| Δ Age 60+ Change                     | 0.053**<br>(0.025)  | 0.053**<br>(0.025)  | 0.052**<br>(0.025)  | 0.052**<br>(0.025)  |
| Δ % Non-White                        | 0.126**<br>(0.055)  | 0.135**<br>(0.055)  | 0.128**<br>(0.055)  | 0.135**<br>(0.055)  |
| Time Trend                           | 0.035***<br>(0.003) | 0.036***<br>(0.003) | 0.034***<br>(0.003) | 0.034***<br>(0.003) |
| Constant                             | 3.736***<br>(0.232) | 3.706***<br>(0.234) | 3.755***<br>(0.232) | 3.742***<br>(0.233) |
| N                                    | 1250                | 1250                | 1250                | 1250                |
| R <sup>2</sup>                       | 0.374               | 0.364               | 0.375               | 0.369               |

\* p&lt;0.10, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \*\*\* p&lt;0.01

Note: Estimates are from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models with state fixed effects. All variables were examined to determine levels of integration using Fisher augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests (specifically designed for TSCS data). A first difference (Δ) version of the variable is used when tests indicated that it is a non-stationary series. In all cases when non-stationarity was detected, the first difference version of the series was determined to be stationary.

Table A2: The Effect of State Fiscal Shocks on Income Inequality (80/20 Ratio), Shocks Limited to Periods of Negative State Economic Growth

|                                      | (1)                  | (2)                 |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
|                                      | b/se                 | b/se                |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-1</sub>      | 0.344***<br>(0.028)  | 0.345***<br>(0.028) |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-2</sub>      | 0.097***<br>(0.028)  | 0.095***<br>(0.028) |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t</sub>   | 0.050**<br>(0.021)   |                     |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t-1</sub> | 0.022<br>(0.018)     |                     |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t</sub>           | -0.009<br>(0.008)    |                     |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t-1</sub>         | -0.027***<br>(0.008) |                     |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t</sub>   |                      | 0.022*<br>(0.012)   |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t-1</sub> |                      | 0.036***<br>(0.012) |
| Δ % Econ. Health Index               | 0.018***<br>(0.005)  | 0.013***<br>(0.004) |
| Government Liberalism <sub>t</sub>   | -0.000<br>(0.001)    | -0.000<br>(0.001)   |
| Δ Age 60+ Change                     | 0.039***<br>(0.012)  | 0.039***<br>(0.012) |
| Δ % Non-White                        | 0.057**<br>(0.026)   | 0.056**<br>(0.026)  |
| Δ % Union                            | -0.014<br>(0.010)    | -0.012<br>(0.010)   |
| Federal Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>  | 0.002<br>(0.001)     | 0.001<br>(0.001)    |
| Time Trend                           | 0.022***<br>(0.002)  | 0.022***<br>(0.002) |
| Constant                             | 2.377***<br>(0.143)  | 2.402***<br>(0.142) |
| N                                    | 1250                 | 1250                |
| R <sup>2</sup>                       | 0.465                | 0.464               |

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: Estimates are from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models with state fixed effects. All variables were examined to determine levels of integration using Fisher augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests (specifically designed for TSCS data). A first difference (Δ) version of the variable is used when tests indicated that it is a non-stationary series. In all cases when non-stationarity was detected, the first difference version of the series was determined to be stationary.

Table A3: Estimated Long-Run Effects of State Fiscal Policy Shocks on Income Inequality (80/20 Ratio)

| Variable              | All periods<br>Long-run effect / [90% c.i.] | Only periods of negative growth<br>Long-run effect / [90% c.i.] |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Negative Budget Shock | 0.070<br>[0.020, 0.120]                     | 0.128<br>[0.046, 0.211]   |
| Revenue Shock         | -0.013<br>[-0.033, 0.007]                   | -0.064<br>[-0.100, -0.028]                                      |
| Negative Fiscal Shock | 0.034<br>[0.005, 0.062]                     | 0.103<br>[0.053, 0.153]   |

Note: Estimated long-run effects for all periods (column 1) are based on results in Table 1. Long-run effects for periods of negative economic growth (column 2) are calculated from the results found in Table A2.

Table A4: The Effect of State Revenue Shocks on Income Inequality by Revenue Source

|   | 80/20 ratio |         | Bot. 20% share |         | Top 20% share |         |
|---|-------------|---------|----------------|---------|---------------|---------|
|   | b           | se      | b              | se      | b             | se      |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-1</sub>         | 0.350***    | (0.028) |                |         |               |         |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-2</sub>         | 0.095***    | (0.028) |                |         |               |         |
| Bottom 20% Inc. Share <sub>t-1</sub>    |             |         | 0.431***       | (0.025) |               |         |
| Top 20% Inc. Share <sub>t-1</sub>       |             |         |                |         | 0.395***      | (0.026) |
| Personal Inc. Tax Change <sub>t</sub>   | -0.001      | (0.002) | 0.006**        | (0.002) | -0.050***     | (0.013) |
| Personal Inc. Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub> | -0.006**    | (0.002) | 0.000          | (0.002) | -0.012        | (0.013) |
| Corp. Inc. Tax Change <sub>t</sub>      | -0.000      | (0.002) | -0.001         | (0.002) | 0.001         | (0.009) |
| Corp. Inc. Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub>    | -0.001      | (0.002) | -0.001         | (0.002) | -0.007        | (0.009) |
| Sales Tax Change <sub>t</sub>           | 0.004       | (0.004) | -0.002         | (0.004) | -0.017        | (0.020) |
| Sales Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub>         | 0.001       | (0.004) | -0.003         | (0.004) | -0.019        | (0.020) |
| Tobacco Tax Change <sub>t</sub>         | -0.000      | (0.000) | 0.000          | (0.000) | -0.000        | (0.002) |
| Tobacco Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub>       | 0.000       | (0.000) | 0.001**        | (0.000) | -0.001        | (0.002) |
| Fuel Tax Change <sub>t</sub>            | 0.001       | (0.002) | -0.001         | (0.002) | 0.017         | (0.011) |
| Fuel Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub>          | 0.001       | (0.002) | 0.000          | (0.002) | -0.009        | (0.011) |
| Alcohol Tax Change <sub>t</sub>         | -0.001      | (0.001) | 0.001          | (0.001) | 0.000         | (0.005) |
| Alcohol Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub>       | -0.001      | (0.001) | -0.000         | (0.001) | -0.002        | (0.005) |
| Δ % Econ. Health Index                  | 0.013***    | (0.004) | 0.002          | (0.005) | 0.038         | (0.024) |
| Government Liberalism <sub>t</sub>      | -0.000      | (0.001) | -0.000         | (0.001) | -0.004        | (0.003) |
| Δ % Union                               | -0.012      | (0.010) | 0.018*         | (0.011) | -0.132**      | (0.057) |
| Federal Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>     | 0.002       | (0.001) | -0.000         | (0.001) | -0.003        | (0.006) |
| Δ Age 60+ Change                        | 0.038***    | (0.012) | 0.014          | (0.013) | -0.116*       | (0.068) |
| Δ % Non-White                           | 0.056**     | (0.026) | 0.075***       | (0.028) | -0.063        | (0.150) |
| Time Trend                              | 0.022***    | (0.002) | -0.014***      | (0.002) | 0.040***      | (0.008) |
| Constant                                | 2.367***    | (0.144) | 2.535***       | (0.122) | 27.150***     | (1.194) |
| N                                       | 1250        |         | 1300           |         | 1300          |         |
| R <sup>2</sup>                          | 0.464       |         | 0.320          |         | 0.243         |         |

\* p&lt;0.10, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \*\*\* p&lt;0.01

Note: Estimates are from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models with state fixed effects. All variables were examined to determine levels of integration using Fisher augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests (specifically designed for TSCS data). A first difference ( $\Delta$ ) version of the variable is used when tests indicated that it is a non-stationary series. In all cases when non-stationarity was detected, the first difference version of the series was determined to be stationary.

Table A5: The Effect of State Budget Shocks on Income Inequality (2010-2012 only)

|                       | 80/20 ratio<br>b/se | Bot. 20% share<br>b/se | Top 20% share<br>b/se |
|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| K12 Cut               | -0.097<br>(0.156)   | 0.047<br>(0.128)       | 0.028<br>(0.551)      |
| Higher Edu. Cut       | 1.467***<br>(0.556) | -0.761*<br>(0.455)     | 1.414<br>(1.962)      |
| Public Assist. Cuts   | 3.016***<br>(0.945) | -1.609**<br>(0.774)    | 5.435<br>(3.336)      |
| Medicaid Cuts         | -0.293<br>(0.326)   | -0.121<br>(0.267)      | -1.186<br>(1.152)     |
| Corrections Cuts      | -1.200<br>(1.098)   | 1.553*<br>(0.900)      | -4.850<br>(3.878)     |
| Transportation Cuts   | 0.186<br>(0.696)    | 0.029<br>(0.570)       | 2.849<br>(2.459)      |
| Econ. Health Index    | -0.026**<br>(0.010) | 0.009<br>(0.008)       | -0.052<br>(0.036)     |
| Government Liberalism | 0.006***<br>(0.002) | -0.004**<br>(0.002)    | 0.019***<br>(0.007)   |
| % Union               | -0.013<br>(0.012)   | -0.004<br>(0.010)      | -0.016<br>(0.044)     |
| % Federal Revenue     | 0.035***<br>(0.010) | -0.031***<br>(0.008)   | 0.016<br>(0.034)      |
| % Age 60+             | 0.000***<br>(0.000) | -0.000***<br>(0.000)   | 0.000***<br>(0.000)   |
| % Non-White           | 0.014***<br>(0.004) | -0.016***<br>(0.003)   | 0.036**<br>(0.015)    |
| Year 2010 (ref.)      |                     |                        |                       |
| Year 2011             | 0.372***<br>(0.130) | -0.186*<br>(0.106)     | 1.106**<br>(0.458)    |
| Year 2012             | 0.570***<br>(0.150) | -0.301**<br>(0.123)    | 1.573***<br>(0.530)   |
| Constant              | 5.570***<br>(1.182) | 4.873***<br>(0.968)    | 47.519***<br>(4.172)  |
| N                     | 150                 | 150                    | 150                   |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | 0.477               | 0.420                  | 0.279                 |

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: Estimates are from OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses.

Table A6: The Effect of State Revenue Shocks on Income Inequality by Progressive and Regressive Revenue Source

|                                       | 80/20 ratio<br>b/se | Bot. 20% share<br>b/se | Top 20% share<br>b/se |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-1</sub>       | 0.352***<br>(0.028) |                        |                       |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-2</sub>       | 0.096***<br>(0.028) |                        |                       |
| Bottom 20% Inc. Share <sub>t-1</sub>  |                     | 0.435***<br>(0.025)    |                       |
| Top 20% Inc. Share <sub>t-1</sub>     |                     |                        | 0.355***<br>(0.029)   |
| Top 20% Inc. Share <sub>t-2</sub>     |                     |                        | 0.072**<br>(0.029)    |
| Progressive Tax Change <sub>t</sub>   | 0.002<br>(0.003)    | 0.010***<br>(0.003)    | -0.075***<br>(0.019)  |
| Progressive Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub> | -0.008**<br>(0.003) | 0.003<br>(0.003)       | -0.038**<br>(0.018)   |
| Regressive Tax Change <sub>t</sub>    | 0.005<br>(0.003)    | -0.004<br>(0.004)      | 0.023<br>(0.020)      |
| Regressive Tax Change <sub>t-1</sub>  | 0.005<br>(0.003)    | -0.001<br>(0.004)      | -0.013<br>(0.019)     |
| Δ % Econ. Health Index                | 0.014***<br>(0.004) | 0.003<br>(0.005)       | 0.041*<br>(0.024)     |
| Government Liberalism <sub>t</sub>    | -0.000<br>(0.001)   | -0.001<br>(0.001)      | -0.003<br>(0.003)     |
| Δ % Union                             | -0.012<br>(0.010)   | 0.019*<br>(0.011)      | -0.151**<br>(0.058)   |
| Federal Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>   | 0.002<br>(0.001)    | -0.000<br>(0.001)      | -0.003<br>(0.007)     |
| Δ Age 60+ Change                      | 0.039***<br>(0.012) | 0.015<br>(0.013)       | -0.122*<br>(0.069)    |
| Δ % Non-White                         | 0.057**<br>(0.026)  | 0.079***<br>(0.028)    | -0.072<br>(0.150)     |
| Time Trend                            | 0.022***<br>(0.002) | -0.013***<br>(0.002)   | 0.032***<br>(0.009)   |
| Constant                              | 2.344***<br>(0.142) | 2.520***<br>(0.121)    | 25.774***<br>(1.439)  |
| N                                     | 1250                | 1300                   | 1250                  |
| R <sup>2</sup>                        | 0.463               | 0.318                  | 0.231                 |

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: Estimates are from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models with state fixed effects. All variables were examined to determine levels of integration using Fisher augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests (specifically designed for TSCS data). A first difference (Δ) version of the variable is used when tests indicated that it is a non-stationary series. In all cases when non-stationarity was detected, the first difference version of the series was determined to be stationary.

Table A7: The Effect of State Fiscal Shocks on Income Inequality (80/20 Ratio), Including Total Per Capita Spending and Revenue Measures

|                                      | (1)      |         | (2)      |         |
|--------------------------------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
|                                      | b        | se      | b        | se      |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-1</sub>      | 0.345*** | (0.028) | 0.346*** | (0.028) |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-2</sub>      | 0.100*** | (0.028) | 0.099*** | (0.028) |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t</sub>   | 0.004    | (0.014) |          |         |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t-1</sub> | 0.024*   | (0.013) |          |         |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t</sub>           | 0.000    | (0.005) |          |         |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t-1</sub>         | -0.008*  | (0.005) |          |         |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t</sub>   |          |         | 0.002    | (0.007) |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t-1</sub> |          |         | 0.015**  | (0.007) |
| Δ % Econ. Health Index               | 0.014*** | (0.005) | 0.013*** | (0.005) |
| Government Liberalism <sub>t</sub>   | 0.000    | (0.001) | 0.000    | (0.001) |
| Δ % Union                            | -0.012   | (0.010) | -0.012   | (0.010) |
| Federal Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>  | 0.002    | (0.001) | 0.002    | (0.001) |
| Δ Age 60+ Change                     | 0.039*** | (0.012) | 0.039*** | (0.012) |
| Δ % Non-White                        | 0.051*   | (0.026) | 0.052**  | (0.026) |
| Total Spending Change <sub>t</sub>   | -0.002   | (0.002) | -0.002   | (0.002) |
| Total Spending Change <sub>t-1</sub> | -0.002   | (0.002) | -0.001   | (0.002) |
| Total Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>    | -0.001   | (0.002) | -0.001   | (0.002) |
| Total Revenue Change <sub>t-1</sub>  | -0.004** | (0.002) | -0.004** | (0.002) |
| Time Trend                           | 0.021*** | (0.002) | 0.021*** | (0.002) |
| Constant                             | 2.378*** | (0.143) | 2.385*** | (0.142) |
| N                                    | 1250     |         | 1250     |         |
| R <sup>2</sup>                       | 0.465    |         | 0.465    |         |

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: Estimates are from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models with state fixed effects. All variables were examined to determine levels of integration using Fisher augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests (specifically designed for TSCS data). A first difference (Δ) version of the variable is used when tests indicated that it is a non-stationary series. In all cases when non-stationarity was detected, the first difference version of the series was determined to be stationary.

Table A8: The Effect of State Fiscal Shocks on Income Inequality (80/20 Ratio), Including Government Party Control Measure

|                                      | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                                      | b/se                | b/se                | b/se                | b/se                |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-1</sub>      | 0.349***<br>(0.028) | 0.350***<br>(0.028) | 0.346***<br>(0.028) | 0.347***<br>(0.028) |
| Inequality Ratio <sub>t-2</sub>      | 0.101***<br>(0.028) | 0.099***<br>(0.028) | 0.099***<br>(0.028) | 0.097***<br>(0.028) |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t</sub>   | 0.009<br>(0.014)    |                     | 0.007<br>(0.014)    |                     |
| Negative Budget Shock <sub>t-1</sub> | 0.030**<br>(0.012)  |                     | 0.030**<br>(0.012)  |                     |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t</sub>           | 0.000<br>(0.005)    |                     | -0.000<br>(0.005)   |                     |
| Revenue Shock <sub>t-1</sub>         | -0.009*<br>(0.005)  |                     | -0.009*<br>(0.005)  |                     |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t</sub>   |                     | 0.003<br>(0.007)    |                     | 0.003<br>(0.007)    |
| Negative Fiscal Shock <sub>t-1</sub> |                     | 0.017**<br>(0.007)  |                     | 0.017**<br>(0.007)  |
| Δ % Econ. Health Index               | 0.015***<br>(0.005) | 0.014***<br>(0.004) | 0.014***<br>(0.005) | 0.013***<br>(0.004) |
| Government Liberalism <sub>t</sub>   |                     |                     | -0.003**<br>(0.001) | -0.003**<br>(0.001) |
| Gov. Party Control <sub>t</sub>      | 0.006<br>(0.007)    | 0.008<br>(0.007)    | 0.032**<br>(0.014)  | 0.034**<br>(0.014)  |
| Δ % Union                            | -0.012<br>(0.010)   | -0.012<br>(0.010)   | -0.012<br>(0.010)   | -0.012<br>(0.010)   |
| Federal Revenue Change <sub>t</sub>  | 0.001<br>(0.001)    | 0.001<br>(0.001)    | 0.001<br>(0.001)    | 0.001<br>(0.001)    |
| Δ Age 60+ Change                     | 0.038***<br>(0.012) | 0.038***<br>(0.012) | 0.038***<br>(0.012) | 0.038***<br>(0.012) |
| Δ % Non-White                        | 0.053**<br>(0.026)  | 0.055**<br>(0.026)  | 0.055**<br>(0.026)  | 0.057**<br>(0.026)  |
| Time Trend                           | 0.022***<br>(0.002) | 0.022***<br>(0.002) | 0.022***<br>(0.002) | 0.022***<br>(0.002) |
| Constant                             | 2.332***<br>(0.137) | 2.345***<br>(0.136) | 2.486***<br>(0.155) | 2.503***<br>(0.154) |
| N                                    | 1250                | 1250                | 1250                | 1250                |
| R <sup>2</sup>                       | 0.463               | 0.462               | 0.465               | 0.464               |

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: Estimates are from autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models with state fixed effects. All variables were examined to determine levels of integration using Fisher augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests (specifically designed for TSCS data). A first difference (Δ) version of the variable is used when tests indicated that it is a non-stationary series. In all cases when non-stationarity was detected, the first difference version of the series was determined to be stationary.



Table A9: Overview of Pew Surveys Used in Great Recession Analysis

| Survey                          | Collection dates     | Sample                    | N     |
|---------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| February 2011 Political Survey  | February 2-7, 2011   | Nationally representative | 1,385 |
| January 2012 Political Survey   | January 11-16, 2012  | Nationally representative | 1,502 |
| September 2013 Political Survey | September 4-8, 2013  | Nationally representative | 1,506 |
| February 2015 Political Survey  | February 18-22, 2015 | Nationally representative | 1,504 |

Table A10: Descriptive Statistics for Pew Survey Variables

|                              | Mean   | Std. Dev. | Min.  | Max.   |
|------------------------------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|
| Financial Situation          | 1.96   | 0.84      | 1.00  | 3.00   |
| Income                       | 5.04   | 2.39      | 1.00  | 9.00   |
| Education                    | 4.81   | 1.80      | 1.00  | 8.00   |
| Party ID                     | 2.11   | 0.86      | 1.00  | 3.00   |
| Age                          | 51.59  | 18.06     | 18.00 | 97.00  |
| Female                       | 0.51   | 0.50      | 0.00  | 1.00   |
| White, Non-Hisp.             | 0.73   | 0.45      | 0.00  | 1.00   |
| Negative Budget Shock        | 1.00   | 0.72      | 0.00  | 3.10   |
| Revenue Shock                | 0.81   | 1.18      | -2.00 | 4.48   |
| Negative Fiscal Shock        | 0.53   | 0.87      | -3.05 | 2.77   |
| Recession Econ. Health Index | 96.50  | 3.47      | 85.94 | 104.48 |
| Econ. Health in Survey Year  | 106.62 | 8.52      | 85.05 | 131.97 |