## Online Appendix for "The Professionalism Advantage: Attracting, Fostering or Retaining Knowledge?"

Figure 1: Distribution of Professionalism and Cut-offs. Dashed line is the Broockman and Skovron (2018) cut-off. Dotted line is the median.


Table 1: Decomposition Sample Sizes

|  | Low Professionalism <br> Incumbent | Low Professionalism <br> Non-Incumbent | High Professionalism <br> Incumbent | High Professionalism <br> Non-Incumbent | Total |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Note: For Tables 2-6, the asteric in the Difference column denotes statistical significance for a one-tailed test at $p<0.05$. Calculations for this can be found in our replication files.

Table 2: Group Means and Regression Coefficients for Decomposition 1: Broockman and Skovron cut-off and All candidates

| Quantities of Interest | High Professionalism | Low Professionalism | Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Knowledge Gap $\overline{\mathrm{KG}})$ | 19.47 | 20.58 | $-1.11^{*}$ |
| Average Years Served $\overline{\text { Years }})$ |  |  | $(0.60)$ |
| Non-Incumbent Knowledge Gap $(\alpha)$ | 19.71 | 2.96 | $0.74^{*}$ |
|  |  | 20.99 | $-1.28^{*}$ |
| Rate of Learning While in Office $(\beta)$ | -0.07 | -0.14 | $(0.66)$ |
|  |  |  | $(0.07$ |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ${ }^{*} p<0.05$ (one-sided). |  |  |  |

Table 3: Group Means and Regression Coefficients for Decomposition 2: Broockman and Skovron cut-off and Republicans

| Quantities of Interest | High Professionalism | Low Professionalism | Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Knowledge Gap $(\overline{\mathrm{KG}})$ | 23.29 | 25.19 | $-1.90^{*}$ |
| Average Years Served ( $\overline{\text { Years }})$ |  |  | $(1.02)$ |
| Non-Incumbent Knowledge Gap $(\alpha)$ | 2.68 | 3.04 | -0.36 |
|  |  | 25.38 | $(0.58)$ |
| Rate of Learning While in Office $(\beta)$ | 0.08 | -0.06 | $(1.14)$ |
|  |  |  | $(0.14$ |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $* p<0.05$ (one-sided). |  |  |  |

Table 4: Group Means and Regression Coefficients for Decomposition 3: Broockman and Skovron cut-off and Democrats

| Quantities of Interest | High Professionalism | Low Professionalism | Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Knowledge Gap $\overline{\mathrm{KG}})$ | 17.39 | 17.31 | 0.08 |
| Average Years Served ( $\overline{\text { Years }})$ |  |  | $(0.64)$ |
| Non-Incumbent Knowledge Gap $(\alpha)$ | 17.61 | 2.91 | $1.35^{*}$ |
|  |  | 17.89 | $(0.52)$ |
| Rate of Learning While in Office $(\beta)$ | -0.05 | -0.20 | $(0.71)$ |
|  |  |  | $\left(0.15^{*}\right.$ |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ${ }^{*} p<0.05$ (one-sided). |  |  |  |

Table 5: Group Means and Regression Coefficients for Decomposition 4: Median and all candidates

| Quantities of Interest | High Professionalism | Low Professionalism | Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Knowledge Gap ( $\overline{\mathrm{KG}}$ ) | 19.52 | 21.09 | $\begin{gathered} -1.57 * \\ (0.50) \end{gathered}$ |
| Average Years Served (Years) | 3.40 | 2.88 | $\begin{gathered} 0.52 \\ (0.33) \end{gathered}$ |
| Non-Incumbent Knowledge Gap ( $\alpha$ ) | 20.06 | 21.24 | $\begin{gathered} -1.18^{*} \\ (0.55) \end{gathered}$ |
| Rate of Learning While in Office ( $\beta$ ) | -0.16 | -0.05 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.11 \\ & (0.08) \end{aligned}$ |

Table 6: Group Means and Regression Coefficients for Decomposition 5: NCSL and all candidates

| Quantities of Interest | High Professionalism | Low Professionalism | Difference |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Knowledge Gap $\overline{\mathrm{KG}})$ | 19.23 | 21.04 | $-1.81^{*}$ |
| Average Years Served (Years $)$ | 3.72 | 2.40 | $(0.68)$ |
| Non-Incumbent Knowledge Gap $(\alpha)$ | 19.53 | 21.28 | $1.33^{*}$ |
| Rate of Learning While in Office $(\beta)$ | -0.08 | -0.10 | $-1.75^{*}$ |
| Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $* p<0.05$ (one-sided). |  | $(0.75)$ |  |
| N |  | 0.02 |  |

Decompositions 1, 2, 4 and 5 all have a professionalism advantage for the knowledge gap that is statistically significant and in the expected direction (higher professionalism legislatures have more knowledgable members). The professionalism advantage for decomposition 3 is not statistically significant. Decomposition 3 includes just Democratic candidates, which is consistent with the Broockman and Skovron (2018) finding that the knowledge gap is attenuated drastically among Democratic candidates, relative to Republican candidates. Thus, we do not include decomposition 3 in our robustness checks because this specific sample of the data does not exhibit the phenomenon we are studying.

Table 7: Decomposition Results for Decomposition 1: Broockman and Skovron cut-off and All candidates

| Total Professionalism Advantage | $\begin{aligned} & =\mathrm{KG}_{L}-\mathrm{KG}_{H} \\ & =20.58-19.47 \\ & =1.11 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Components of Professionalism Advantage |  |
| Advantage from Attracting Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\alpha_{L}-\alpha_{H}\right) \\ = & (20.99-19.71) \\ = & 1.28^{*} \\ & (0.66) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Fostering Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\beta_{L}-\beta_{H}\right)^{*} \text { Years }_{H} \\ = & (-0.14-(-0.07)) * 3.70 \\ = & -0.26 \\ & (0.26) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Retaining Incumbents | $\begin{aligned} = & \beta_{L} *\left(\text { Years }_{L}-\text { Years }_{H}\right) \\ = & -0.14^{*}(2.96-3.70) \\ = & 0.10 \\ & (0.07) \end{aligned}$ |

Note: $* p<0.05$ (one-sided). Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapping was used to calculate
the standard errors for the Advantage from Fostering Knowledge and Advantage from Retaining Incumbents quantities

Table 8: Decomposition Results for Decomposition 2: Broockman and Skovron cut-off and Republicans

| Total Professionalism Advantage | $\begin{aligned} & =\mathrm{KG}_{L}-\mathrm{KG}_{H} \\ & =25.19-23.29 \\ & =1.90 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Components of Professionalism Advantage |  |
| Advantage from Attracting Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\alpha_{L}-\alpha_{H}\right) \\ = & (25.38-23.08) \\ = & 2.30^{*} \\ & (1.14) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Fostering Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\beta_{L}-\beta_{H}\right)^{*} \text { Years }_{H} \\ = & (-0.06-(0.08)) * 2.68 \\ = & -0.38 \\ & (0.45) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Retaining Incumbents | $\begin{aligned} = & \beta_{L} *\left(\text { Years }_{L}-\text { Years }_{H}\right) \\ = & -0.06 *(3.04-2.68) \\ = & -0.02 \\ & (0.05) \end{aligned}$ |

Note: $* p<0.05$ (one-sided). Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapping was used to calculate the standard errors for the Advantage from Fostering Knowledge and Advantage from Retaining Incumbents quantities

Table 9: Decomposition Results for Decomposition 4: Median and all candidates

| Total Professionalism Advantage | $\begin{aligned} & =\mathrm{KG}_{L}-\mathrm{KG}_{H} \\ & =21.09-19.52 \\ & =1.57 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Components of Professionalism Advantage |  |
| Advantage from Attracting Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\alpha_{L}-\alpha_{H}\right) \\ = & 21.24-20.06 \\ = & 1.18^{*} \\ & (0.55) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Fostering Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\beta_{L}-\beta_{H}\right)^{*} \text { Years }_{H} \\ = & (-0.05-(-0.16)) * 3.40 \\ = & 0.37 \\ & (0.23) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Retaining Incumbents | $\begin{aligned} = & \beta_{L} *\left(\text { Years }_{L}-\text { Years }_{H}\right) \\ = & -0.05 *(2.88-3.40) \\ = & 0.03 \\ & (0.04) \end{aligned}$ |

Note: $* p<0.05$ (one-sided). Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapping was used to calculate the standard errors for the Advantage from Fostering Knowledge and Advantage from Retaining Incumbents quantities.

Table 10: Decomposition Results for Decomposition 5: NCSL and all candidates

| Total Professionalism Advantage | $\begin{aligned} & =\mathrm{KG}_{L}-\mathrm{KG}_{H} \\ & =21.04-19.23 \\ & =1.81 \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| Components of Professionalism Advantage |  |
| Advantage from Attracting Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\alpha_{L}-\alpha_{H}\right) \\ = & (21.28-19.53) \\ = & 1.75^{*} \\ & (0.75) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Fostering Knowledge | $\begin{aligned} = & \left(\beta_{L}-\beta_{H}\right)^{*} \text { Years }_{H} \\ = & (-0.10-(-0.08)) * 3.72 \\ = & -0.07 \\ & (0.36) \end{aligned}$ |
| Advantage from Retaining Incumbents | $\begin{aligned} = & \beta_{L} *\left(\text { Years }_{L}-\text { Years }_{H}\right) \\ = & -0.10 *(2.40-3.72) \\ = & 0.13 \\ & (0.13) \end{aligned}$ |

Note: $* p<0.05$ (one-sided). Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapping was used to calculate
the standard errors for the Advantage from Fostering Knowledge and Advantage from Retaining Incumbents quantities.

Figure 2 shows that in all three decompositions the majority of the professionalism advtange is derived from the ability of a highly-professionalized legislature to attract knowledgable nonincumbent candidates. Per our pre-analysis plan: "If any of the decompositions 1-5 yield results that attraction does not constitute the majority ( $50 \%$ or higher) of the professionalism advantage, then those results will be considered different and we will pursue the specifications listed below." In all four decompositions the majority of the professionalism advantage is derived from the ability of a highly-professionalized legislature to attract knowledgable non-incumbent candidates, so we do not pursue further decomposition specifications.

Figure 2: Percent of Professionalism Advantage Derived from Attracting High-Knowledge Candidates


Table 11: Distribution of members from single-member and multi-member districts

|  | $\mathrm{N}=$ | $\%$ of Total Sample | $\%$ of MMD Sample |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1-seat district | 677 | $84 \%$ | - |
| 2-seat district | 74 | $9 \%$ | $58 \%$ |
| 3-seat district | 34 | $4 \%$ | $27 \%$ |
| 4-seat district | 10 | $1 \%$ | $8 \%$ |
| 5-seat district | 2 | $<1 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| 6-seat district | 1 | $<1 \%$ | $<1 \%$ |
| 7-seat district | 3 | $<1 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| 8-seat district | 2 | $<1 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| 10-seat district | 1 | $<1 \%$ | $<1 \%$ |
| 11-seat district | 1 | $<1 \%$ | $<1 \%$ |

