Appendix

1. Robustness Check for Model Specifications

The number of deportations ranges from to more than 35,000, with a mean of 126.74. That means that 30 observations are more than 2 standard deviations above the mean and 45 are more than 1 standard deviation above the mean. To reassure readers that the results found in Table's 3 and 4 are not merely a result of a few extreme outliers, I reran the models dropping all observations 1 and 2 standard deviations above the mean. As the Table's A1 and A2 demonstrate, when making this adjustment the coefficients and statistical significance of the main explanatory variables increase suggesting an even stronger fit. While Conservatism still has a null effect on deportations, in Model 3.1 dropping these observations resulted in a positive coefficient for Conservatism with p-values of 0.912 and 0.654 in the 1 and 2 standard deviation models, respectively. On the other hand, in Model 3.2 Conservatism maintains its negative relationship, as shown in Table A2. Despite a somewhat more ambiguous relationship between Conservatism and deportations, both Tables A1 and A2 demonstrate a strong relationship between the resource variables and the outcome and a weak relationship between Conservatism and Deportations.

Table A1: **Dropping All Observations 1 & 2 Standard Deviations Above Mean, Model 3.1**

	Model 3.1: Dropping if >1 SD		Model 3.1 Dropping if > 2 SD	
Independent Variables				
Private Correctional Facility	0.828**	(0.284)	0.806**	(0.282)
IGSA Contract	0.633***	(0.133)	0.643***	(0.128)
Budget per resident	0.082***	(0.019)	0.085***	(0.021)
Conservatism	0.00008	(0.0035)	0.001	(0.004)
Latino Population	0.038***	(0.004)	0.043***	(0.006)
Crime Rate	2.01e-05	(2.55e-05)	2.27e-05	(2.31e-05)
County Population (centered)	0.006***	(0.0006)	0.006***	(0.0005)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	0.131	(0.134)	0.089	(0.136)
GDP Construction	-0.029	(0.083)	-0.045	(0.082)
Unemployment Rate	-0.022	(0.017)	-0.028	(0.018)

287(g) Participant	-0.040 (0.089)	-0.051 (0.090)
Border State	-0.141 (0.141)	-0.163 (0.141)
Dream Act	-0.280** (0.095)	-0.288** (0.095)
Favors SB1070	0.028*** (0.005)	0.027*** (0.005)
State % Unauthorized	0.280*** (0.040)	0.279*** (0.040)
Constant	-1.067** (0.473)	-0.948* (0.473)
Inflated Model		
Private Correctional Facility	-0.558 (1.678)	-0.595 (1.712)
IGSA Contract	-0.392 (0.485)	-0.390 (0.490)
Budget per resident	-0.149* (0.069)	-0.148* (0.070)
Conservatism	0.003 (0.012)	0.004 (0.013)
Latino Population	-0.807*** (0.245)	-0.810*** (0.251)
Crime Rate	-0.0004 (0.0009)	-0.0004 (0.001)
County Population (centered)	-0.144*** (0.025)	-0.146*** (0.025)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	0.327 (0.358)	0.312 (0.360)
GDP Construction	0.370 (0.229)	0.369 (0.231)
Unemployment Rate	0.180*** (0.051)	0.180*** (0.052)
287(g) Participant	-0.519 (0.354)	-0.522 (0.362)
Border State	-0.979 (1.131)	-1.00 (1.154)
Dream Act	0.719 (0.386)	0.717 (0.393)
Favors SB1070	0.022 (0.026)	0.021 (0.027)
State % Unauthorized	-0.330 (0.170)	-0.332 (0.173)
Constant	-14.88*** (3.250)	-15.07*** (3.275)
Observations	2226	2241
AIC	6.749	6.851

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2: **Dropping All Observations 1 & 2 Standard Deviations Above Mean, Model 3.2**

	Model 3.2: Dropping if >1 SD	Model 3.2: Dropping if > 2 SD
Independent Variables		
Private Correctional Facility	0.746** (0.278)	0.725** (0.272)
IGSA Contract	0.777*** (0.139)	0.785*** (0.133)
Budget per resident	0.0735*** (0.016)	0.073*** (0.016)
Conservatism	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
Foreign-born Population	0.133*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.009)
Crime Rate	1.23e-05 (2.34e-05)	1.21e-05 (2.11e-05)
% Change in Latino Population	0.003*** (0.0007)	0.003*** (0.0007)
County Population (centered)	0.004*** (0.0006)	0.004*** (0.0005)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	-0.024 (0.119)	-0.036 (0.118)
GDP Construction	0.107 (0.078)	0.106 (0.078)
Unemployment Rate	0.029 (0.021)	0.027 (0.021)
Median Household Income (centered)	0.001** (0.0004)	0.001** (0.0004)
287(g) Participant	0.014 (0.084)	0.014 (0.084)

	Model 1	Model 2
Border State	0.276 (0.142)	0.288* (0.143)
Dream Act	-0.076 (0.100)	-0.071 (0.100)
Favors SB1070	0.021*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)
State % Unauthorized	0.153*** (0.043)	0.147*** (0.043)
Constant	-1.784*** (0.480)	-1.697*** (0.479)
Inflated Model		
Private Correctional Facility	-0.069 (0.819)	-0.081 (0.823)
IGSA Contract	-0.418 (0.509)	-0.424 (0.509)
Budget per resident	-0.247* (0.108)	-0.249* (0.109)
Conservatism	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)
Foreign-born Population	-0.478*** (0.113)	-0.478*** (0.113)
Crime Rate	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
% Change in Latino Population	-0.001 (0.0007)	-0.001 (0.0006)
County Population (centered)	-0.157*** (0.029)	-0.156*** (0.029)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	0.435 (0.369)	0.433 (0.369)
GDP Construction	0.477 *(0.233)	0.475 (0.232)
Unemployment Rate	0.133* (0.067)	0.131 (0.068)
Median Household Income (centered)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)
287(g) Participant	-0.444 (0.351)	-0.439 (0.349)
Border State	-1.412* (0.617)	-1.419* (0.615)
Dream Act	1.072** (0.384)	1.079** (0.382)
Favors SB1070	-0.040 (0.026)	-0.041 (0.026)
State % Unauthorized	-0.755*** (0.173)	-0.759*** (0.172)
Constant	-11.74** (3.97)	-11.53** (3.956)
Observations	2226	2241
AIC	6.643	6.732

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To further check the robustness of the findings, I log transformed the dependent variable, the number of deportations (replacing log(0) with 0), and then ran an OLS regression model. As Table A3 reveals, the directional relationships between our independent variables and the outcome remain unchanged. Furthermore, none of the key explanatory variables lose significance. Comparing the log-transformed version of Model 3.1 to Model 3.2, we see that once again Model 3.2 is a better fit. Both the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared report that Model 3.2 accounts for approximately 10 percent more of the variance in the dependent variable, indicating that the addition of the change in

Latino population and median household income variables as well as the replacement of the Latino

population variable with the foreign-born population were all constructive modifications.

Table A3: **OLS Models of 3.1 & 3.2 with Logged Deportations as Outcome**

	Model 3.1: Logged Deportations		Model 3.2: Logged Deportations	
Independent Variables				
Private Correctional Facility	0.489**	(0.161)	0.468***	(0.145)
IGSA Contract	0.777***	(0.102)	0.612***	(0.092)
Budget per resident	0.062***	(0.013)	0.035**	(0.011)
Conservatism	-0.018***	(0.002)	-0.014***	(0.002)
Foreign-born Population			0.133***	(0.007)
Latino Population	0.02***	(0.003)		
Crime Rate	0.00004***	(0.000008)	0.00003***	(0.000007)
% Change in Latino Population			0.002***	(0.0002)
County Population (centered)	0.001***	(0.0001)	0.0007***	(0.00009)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	0.104	(0.086)	-0.194**	(0.078)
GDP Construction	-0.394***	(0.058)	-0.154**	(0.053)
Unemployment Rate	-0.076***	(0.012)	0.019	(0.012)
Median Household Income (centered)			0.003***	(0.003)
287(g) Participant	-0.112	(0.080)	0.025	(0.072)
Border State	-0.253	(0.132)	0.177	(0.116)
Dream Act	-0.394***	(0.080)	-0.288***	(0.071)
Favors SB1070	0.034***	(0.004)	0.029***	(0.004)
State % Unauthorized	0.329***	(0.031)	0.173***	(0.029)
Years Activated=3	0.803***	(0.158)	0.632***	(0.142)
Years Activated=4	1.234***	(0.154)	1.086***	(0.138)
Years Activated=5	2.380***	(0.164)	2.087***	(0.148)
Years Activated=6	3.028***	(0.236)	2.709***	(0.211)
Years Activated=7	2.835***	(0.409)	2.534***	(0.368)
Constant	0.616	(0.435)	-0.901**	(0.404)
Observations	2271		2271	
R-Squared	0.5448		0.6336	
Adj. R-Squared	0.5407		0.6300	
AIC	3.461		3.246	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2. Checking the Effects of Potentially Influential Observations

Following Garay et al. (2011) and Xie et al. (2008), I use generalized Cook's distance to explore

the possibility that my results are a product of influential observations. The models in Table A4

use a cutoff of D>4/N= 0.002, which reveals 141 potentially influential observations, while the

models in Table A5 use D>1 as a cutoff, leading to one suspect observation. In neither case do

the directional effects or statistical significance of the main explanatory variables change.

Table A4: **Models without Influential Observations (According to Generalized Cook's Distance)**

	Model 3.1 D>0.002		Model 3.2 D>0.002	
Independent Variables				
Private Correctional Facility	0.372*	(0.147)	0.487*	(0.213)
IGSA Contract	0.456***	(0.0982)	0.529***	(0.106)
Budget per resident	0.0888***	(0.0233)	0.0372	(0.0253)
Conservatism	-0.00746**	(0.00284)	-0.0125***	(0.00330)
Foreign-born Population			0.119***	(0.00844)
Latino Population	0.0382***	(0.00331)		
Crime Rate	0.00004*	(0.00002)	0.00003	(0.00002)
% Change in Latino Population			0.00190**	(0.000598)
County Population (centered)	0.00485***	(0.000423)	0.00334***	(0.000407)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	-0.0738	(0.0928)	-0.204*	(0.0946)
GDP Construction	-0.209***	(0.0571)	0.00599	(0.0682)
Unemployment Rate	-0.0459***	(0.0129)	0.0182	(0.0192)
Median Household Income (centered)			0.00150***	(0.000348)
287(g) Participant	-0.0627	(0.0737)	0.0351	(0.0744)
Border State	0.169	(0.108)	0.537***	(0.112)
Dream Act	-0.493***	(0.0728)	-0.326***	(0.0777)
Favors SB1070	0.0298***	(0.00413)	0.0223***	(0.00462)
State % Unauthorized	0.380***	(0.0304)	0.258***	(0.0352)
Constant	-0.338	(0.371)	-1.089**	(0.419)
Inflated Model				
Private Correctional Facility	-0.552	(1.967)	0.172	(0.760)
IGSA Contract	-0.330	(0.537)	-0.470	(0.501)
Budget per resident	-0.0828	(0.0889)	-0.273*	(0.125)
Conservatism	0.000803	(0.0124)	-0.0139	(0.0122)
Foreign-born Population			-0.478***	(0.111)
Latino Population	-0.904***	(0.253)		
Crime Rate	-0.000202	(0.000454)	-0.000600	(0.00125)
% Change in Latino Population			-0.002	(0.0009)
County Population (centered)	-0.143***	(0.0246)	-0.153***	(0.0292)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	0.343	(0.368)	0.380	(0.379)
GDP Construction	0.246	(0.242)	0.442	(0.234)
Unemployment Rate	0.151**	(0.0493)	0.109	(0.0630)
Median Household Income (centered)			-0.006**	(0.002)
287(g) Participant	-0.583	(0.356)	-0.392	(0.339)

Border State	-0.735 (1.078)	-1.202* (0.562)
Dream Act	0.609 (0.385)	0.953* (0.374)
Favors SB1070	0.0325 (0.0248)	-0.0410 (0.0235)
State % Unauthorized	-0.204 (0.164)	-0.667*** (0.167)
Constant	-14.69*** (3.143)	-10.74** (3.909)
Observations	2130	2130
AIC	6.361	6.291

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: **Models without Influential Observations (According to Generalized Cook's Distance)**

	Model 3.1 D>1	Model 3.2 D>1
Independent Variables		
Private Correctional Facility	0.684** (0.261)	0.664* (0.274)
IGSA Contract	0.628*** (0.119)	0.728*** (0.133)
Budget per resident	0.0835*** (0.0220)	0.0672*** (0.0158)
Conservatism	-0.00518 (0.00435)	-0.0145** (0.00552)
Foreign-born Population		0.163*** (0.0184)
Latino Population	0.0499*** (0.00574)	
Crime Rate	0.00003 (0.00002)	0.000009 (0.00002)
% Change in Latino Population		0.00328*** (0.0008)
County Population (centered)	0.00402*** (0.000553)	0.00243*** (0.0006)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	-0.0127 (0.127)	-0.179 (0.120)
GDP Construction	-0.0149 (0.0824)	0.231** (0.0870)
Unemployment Rate	-0.0439* (0.0183)	0.0296 (0.0229)
Median Household Income (centered)		0.0017** (0.0005)
287(g) Participant	-0.0123 (0.0925)	0.0598 (0.0899)
Border State	-0.145 (0.143)	0.379* (0.154)
Dream Act	-0.283** (0.0947)	-0.0804 (0.101)
Favors SB1070	0.0241*** (0.00585)	0.0154* (0.00615)
State % Unauthorized	0.283*** (0.0407)	0.128** (0.0451)
Constant	-0.453 (0.505)	-1.326* (0.532)
Inflated Model		
Private Correctional Facility	-0.821 (1.784)	-0.145 (0.937)
IGSA Contract	-0.395 (0.503)	-0.466 (0.526)
Budget per resident	-0.148* (0.0697)	-0.262* (0.116)
Conservatism	0.00158 (0.0131)	-0.0146 (0.0134)
Foreign-born Population		-0.480*** (0.116)
Latino Population	-0.839*** (0.252)	
Crime Rate	-0.000494 (0.00128)	-0.00119 (0.00151)
% Change in Latino Population		-0.00129 (0.000725)
County Population (centered)	-0.150*** (0.0265)	-0.160*** (0.0314)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	0.288 (0.372)	0.378 (0.395)

GDP Construction	0.401 (0.239)	0.551[*] (0.247)
Unemployment Rate	0.179[***] (0.0543)	0.134 (0.0729)
Median Household Income (centered)		-0.00645[**] (0.00227)
287(g) Participant	-0.502 (0.382)	-0.408 (0.366)
Border State	-1.106 (1.272)	-1.483[*] (0.675)
Dream Act	0.738 (0.415)	1.156[**] (0.401)
Favors SB1070	0.0169 (0.0294)	-0.0484 (0.0269)
State % Unauthorized	-0.342 (0.181)	-0.814[***] (0.180)
Constant	-15.06[***] (3.469)	-11.41[**] (4.219)
Observations	2270	2270
AIC	7.131	7.022

Robust standard errors in parentheses
$p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

3. Assessing Standard Errors and Model Parameters

Although King and Roberts (2015) have noted that robust standard errors may hide bias, running the models with classical standard errors produces no substantive differences, negligible difference between the errors, and consistent AIC statistics. Furthermore, as others have pointed out (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Cantoni and Ronchetti 2001; Hilbe 2011; Mebane and Sekhon 2004), robust standard errors are an appropriate choice for ZINB models because they are able to overcome inconsistent and high levels of variance resulting from the heteroskedasticity characteristic of ZINB models. Indeed, Mebane and Sekhon (2004) go so far as to say that "nonrobust estimation should be avoided whenever possible" when dealing with overdispersed data (408). Based on the results in Tables A6 and A7 below, the classical standard errors seem to be slightly underestimated when compared to the robust standard errors, inflating the significance of the coefficients and illustrating the preference for a robust estimation method.

Table A6: **Robust vs. Classical Standard Errors for Model 3.1**

	Robust SEs	Classical SEs
Independent Variables		
Private Correctional Facility	0.604[*] (0.274)	0.604[***] (0.160)
IGSA Contract	0.616[***] (0.118)	0.617[***] (0.105)
Budget per resident	0.073[***] (0.018)	0.0728[***] (0.0182)

Conservatism	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.00827[*] (0.00329)
Foreign-born Population		
Latino Population	0.043[***] (0.007)	0.0427[***] (0.00345)
Crime	0.00003(0.00002)	0.0000324[*] (0.0000142)
% Change in Latino Population		
County Population (centered)	0.004[***] (0.0005)	0.00384[***] (0.000262)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	-0.008(0.122)	-0.00848 (0.106)
GDP Construction	0.067 (0.099)	0.0669 (0.0641)
Unemployment Rate	-0.044[*](0.018)	-0.0444[**] (0.0161)
Median Household Income (centered)		
287(g) Participant	0.024 (0.097)	0.0237 (0.0915)
Border State	0.025 (0.189)	0.0246 (0.143)
Dream Act	-0.284[**] (0.095)	-0.284[**] (0.0897)
Favors SB1070	0.017 [*](0.008)	0.0167[**] (0.00513)
State % Unauthorized	0.304[***] (0.044)	0.304[***] (0.0370)
Constant	-0.413 (0.566)	-0.131 (0.456)
Inflated Model		
Private Correctional Facility	-0.954 (1.848)	-0.954 (1.663)
IGSA Contract	-0.389 (0.514)	-0.389 (0.560)
Law Enforcement Budget	-0.149[*] (0.070)	-0.149[*] (0.0747)
Conservatism	0.0004 (0.013)	0.0004 (0.0126)
Foreign-born Population		
Latino Population	-0.880[***] (0.249)	-0.880[***] (0.191)
Crime	-0.0006 (0.001)	-0.000599 (0.00108)
% Change in Latino Population		
County Population (centered)	-0.149[***] (0.027)	-0.150[***] (0.0239)
Fruits & Vegetables GDP	0.312 (0.381)	0.312 (0.352)
Construction GDP	0.435 (0.245)	0.435 (0.244)
Unemployment Rate	0.179[***] (0.056)	0.179[***] (0.0492)
Median Household Income (centered)		
287(g) Participant	-0.491 (0.395)	-0.491 (0.381)
Border State	-1.080 (1.313)	-1.081 (1.173)
Dream Act	0.7524(0.431)	0.755 (0.390)
Percent Favors SB1070	0.011 (0.031)	0.0112 (0.0257)
State Percent Unauthorized	-0.342 (0.186)	-0.342[*] (0.166)
Constant	-14.711[***] (3.630)	-14.71[***] (2.962)
Observations	2271	2271
AIC	7.191	7.191

[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

Table A7: **Robust vs. Classical Standard Errors for Model 3.2**

	Robust SEs	Classical SEs
Independent Variables		
Private Correctional Facility	0.588[*] (0.281)	0.588[***] (0.155)
IGSA Contract	0.712[***] (0.131)	0.712[***] (0.0998)

Budget per resident	0.063*** (0.016)	0.0635*** (0.0136)
Conservatism	-0.014** (0.005)	-0.0142*** (0.00321)
Foreign-born Population	0.160*** (0.017)	0.160*** (0.00923)
Latino Population		
Crime	0.00001 (0.00002)	0.0000132 (0.0000120)
% Change in Latino Population	0.003*** (0.0008)	0.00333*** (0.000540)
County Population (centered)	0.0024*** (0.0006)	0.00241*** (0.000242)
GDP Fruits & Vegetables	-0.179 (0.117)	-0.179 (0.0960)
GDP Construction	0.250** (0.086)	0.250*** (0.0633)
Unemployment Rate	0.018* (0.024)	0.0177 (0.0178)
Median Household Income (centered)	0.001(0.0006)	0.001** (0.0004)
287(g) Participant	0.042 (0.092)	0.0422 (0.0857)
Border State	0.436** (0.162)	0.436** (0.141)
Dream Act	-0.085 (0.099)	-0.0853 (0.0863)
Favors SB1070	0.009(0.007)	0.00958* (0.00485)
State % Unauthorized	0.143** (0.046)	0.143*** (0.0355)
Constant	-0.986* (0.586)	-0.986* (0.458)
Inflated Model		
Private Correctional Facility	-0.168 (0.974)	-0.168 (0.860)
IGSA Contract	-0.462 (0.533)	-0.462 (0.540)
Law Enforcement Budget	-0.261* (0.115)	-0.262* (0.114)
Conservatism	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.0134 (0.0118)
Foreign-born Population	-0.472*** (0.116)	-0.472*** (0.115)
Latino Population		
Crime	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.00132 (0.00129)
% Change in Latino Population	-0.001 (0.0007)	-0.00130 (0.000796)
County Population (centered)	-0.164*** (0.032)	-0.165*** (0.0269)
Fruits & Vegetables GDP	0.365 (0.399)	0.365 (0.352)
Construction GDP	0.564* (0.250)	0.564* (0.236)
Unemployment Rate	0.132 (0.072)	0.132* (0.0622)
Median Household Income (centered)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
287(g) Participant	-0.429 (0.372)	-0.429 (0.359)
Border State	-1.477* (0.674)	-1.477* (0.633)
Dream Act	1.155** (0.409)	1.155** (0.376)
Percent Favors SB1070	-0.053* (0.027)	-0.0531* (0.0226)
State Percent Unauthorized	-0.815*** (0.183)	-0.815*** (0.162)
Constant	-11.624** (4.267)	11.62*** (3.318)
Observations	2271	2271
AIC	7.077	7.077

$^*p < 0.05, ^{**}p < 0.01, ^{***}p < 0.001$

4. Accounting for Possible Problems of Collinearity

The main source of collinearity from the model is from demographic and attitudinal variables related

to immigration. Table A8 shows the most troublesome of these relationships, namely the correlation

between the Latino and foreign-born population variables and the correlation between the percentage

of state residents that are unauthorized and the percentage of voters favoring SB1070. The former

was taken care of by not including the Latino population variable in Model 3.2. Surprisingly, there is

relatively little correlation between Latino population growth and the foreign-born and Latino

population variables. Furthermore, being a 287(g) participant or from a county that votes for the

Republican presidential candidate is not strongly correlated with these variables.

Table A8: **Correlation between Variables Related to Immigration**

	Foreign-Born	Latino	% Change Latino	Unauthorized	Favors SB1070	Border State	287(g)
Foreign-born	1						
Latino	**0.6976**	1					
% Change Latino	-0.0641	-0.1567	1				
Unauthorized	0.4969	**0.5953**	-0.1072	1			
Favors SB1070	-0.332	**-0.5237**	0.1621	**-0.7046**	1		
Border State	0.3707	**0.6142**	-0.1754	**0.6600**	**-0.6385**	1	
287(g)	0.0680	0.0548	0.0797	0.1091	0.1278	-0.0912	1
Conservatism	-0.1915	-0.0607	0.0383	0.0740	0.0457	0.1734	0.0129

To address the potential impact of collinearity on the results, I ran multiple models, excluding

these variables one at a time and in groups. In general, this resulted in certain control variables

gaining or losing statistical significance, but in only one case does the directional effect of a variable

change: the percent favoring SB1070 becomes negative (but statistically insignificant) in model 3.1

when you exclude the unauthorized variable. I am happy to share these results, but did not include

them here, as there is basically no change in the main effects of the models. Overall, the mean VIF is

1.78 for both Model 3.1 and 3.2, indicating that even in the full models collinearily is not inflating

the variance of the coefficients much.

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